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Queen's Gambit Accepted

by

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Introduction

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4



By capturing the c4 pawn, Black concedes ground in the centre, and after restoring material equality White gains a certain advantage in space. Is it worth affording him this superiority?

The present book is an attempt to answer this question.

Mention of the Queen's Gambit Accepted, including traps where Black tries to hold on to the gambit pawn, is made in the first works on reformed chess – the Göttingen Manuscript (late 15th century) and that of Damiano (1512), as well as later books by Lopez (1561) and Salvio (1604).

The second edition of Stamma's book (1745) indicates the possibility after 3 e3 of the counter 3...e5, which was to occur nearly 100 years later (with the continuation $4 \pm xc4$ exd4 5 exd4 1266) in games from the La Bourdonnais-McDonnell matches. Later, in order to prevent ...e7-e5, White began playing 3 ± 13 and only then e2-e3,

and Black would employ the other counter ...c7-c5. This gave rise to $3 \bigcirc f3$ $\bigcirc f6 4 e3 c5 5 @xc4 e6$, which became the Classical Variation.

In his World Championship Match with Zukertort (1886) Steinitz demonstrated a plan of action against the isolated d4 pawn. In this match positions from the Queen's Gambit Accepted were reached by transposition. For example, the 9th game went 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 20c3 20f6 4 20f3 dxc4 5 e3 c5 6 2xc4. Here and in other similar positions Steinitz would exchange 6...cxd4 7 exd4, opening the diagonal for the enemy bishop, but isolating the central pawn, which he would then put under siege.

Steinitz's plan was not taken up by his contemporaries, and the popularity of the Queen's Gambit Accepted, in comparison with other branches, remained insignificant. Normally White would gain the advantage.

By exchanging his d-pawn for the cpawn, Black voluntarily concedes his opponent superiority in the centre. Siegbert Tarrasch, the author of one of the first monographs on the Queen's Gambit, wrote: '...the Queen's Gambit Accepted is a strategic mistake. Without a fight Black concedes the attacking centre, instead of somehow defending it; as a result White gains absolute domination. Meanwhile the entire opening struggle should be concentrated on control of the centre. Whoever has a solid central pawn is the more strongly placed'. And later: '...by accepting the gambit, Black gives his opponent a tempo, allowing the

development of the king's bishop. The acceptance of the gambit could be justified only if Black were able to hold the gambit pawn by ...b7-b5. But, as is known, this is not in fact the case...'

A crisis in the classical variations of the Queen's Gambit Declined forced players to think about improving the accepted gambit, in the development of which several stages can be traced.

In the early 1930s, along with improvements to Black's play in the Classical Variation (3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 c5 5 2c4 e6 6 0-0 a6 followed by ...b7-b5 and ... \$b7), new ideas were put forward. Black's main concern is the development of his queen's bishop, an important diagonal of which is blocked bye7-e6. In his match with Bogoljubow (1934), instead of the traditional 3... Df6 Alekhine replied 3...a6, and after 4 e3 developed his bishop at g4. This gave rise to a variation that was later modernised: 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 \$g4 5 \$xc4 e6.

In the same match after $3 \bigcirc 13 \bigcirc 16$ Bogoljubow regained the pawn by 4 $\bigotimes 44$ and 5 $\bigotimes xc4$, which initiated a new branch of the accepted gambit.

The evaluation of the Steinitz Variation 3 \bigcirc 13 \bigcirc 16 4 e3 e6 5 \pounds xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4 remained debatable, until in the 1930s Botvinnik demonstrated a clear plan for using the semiopen e-file and the e5 outpost. As a result many positions with an isolated central pawn began to be evaluated in favour of White.

Of the original ideas we should mention Smyslov's plan introduced in the 1950s of 3 신경 신6 4 e3 g6, which resembles the Grünfeld Defence.

The Classical Variation was modernised in various ways; in particular, attempts were made to carry out the strategically important move e3-e4 by forcible means, sacrificing if necessary (6 0–0 c6 7 e4), and the plan of 6 2 e2 followed by dxc5 and e3-e4 was also suggested.

The modern interpretation of the opening involves an early e2-e4 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4; 3 273 a6 4 e4; 3 273 273 276 472 373 276 472 375 276 472 375

Those who accept the gambit have also not been idle. In chess, as in warfare, an improvement in means of attack leads to an improvement in defensive measures. The development of an opening is a constant battle of ideas – a search for the new in practical play and in research.

The Queen's Gambit Accepted is employed in the most important events. The names of players who have enriched its theory will be found in the games and analyses.

The layout of this book is somewhat untraditional. The Classical Variation is regarded as the basic, and then deviations from it are examined – first by Black, and then by White. Material up to the end of 1996 has been included.

Classical Variation 7 ≝e2 b5

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	ହା	

White develops his king's knight and at the same time prevents 3...e5, which can follow after 3 e3, 3 e4 or 3 2c3. Until recently it was thought that the counter 3...e5 enabled Black to equalise without difficulty, but this opinion has now been shaken.

3 ... 句f6

Black, in turn, takes measures against e2-e4.

e3 e6

4

Black prepares to develop his king's bishop and to attack the centre (4 ... c5). 4...c5 and then 5...e6 also occurs.

5 \$xc4 c5

We also give a few old games that are still of practical interest.

5...&e7 (Black does not hurry to attack the centre, but first completes his kingside development) 6 0–0 (6 2c3should also be considered, and if 6...0–0 7 e4!) 6...0–0 7 2c3:

(a) 7...b6 8 營e2 金b7 9 e4 c5 (the evaluation of this line was not changed by the modern game Dimitrijevic-S.Nikolic, Kragujevac 1974: 9... ②bd7 10 트d1 c5 11 dxc5 金xc5 12 金g5) 10 트d1 cxd4 11 公xd4 營c8 12 e5 with advantage to White (Lasker-Teichmann, Hastings 1895);

(b) 7... ②bd7 8 b3 (as in the main lines of the Classical Variation, 8 ₩e2 is also good) 8...b6 9 \$b2 \$b7 10 @e2 @e4 11 @g3, and White's position is preferable (Teichmann-Blackburne, Hastings 1895). 5...2b4+6 ($2c_3$ 0-0 7 0-0 b6 8 ($2c_5$ (the standard plan of 8 ($2c_2$ 2b7 9 ($2d_1$) should also be considered) 8...2b7 9 ($2b_3$ $2xc_3$ (9... $2d_6$ is preferable) 10 bxc3 with some advantage to White (Steinitz-Gunsberg, New York 1890/1).

5...a6 (Black delays ...c7-c5, but with the idea of driving back the bishop from c4 and of developing his queenside) 6 2c3 b5:



(a) 7 &e2 (this was played a few times by Capablanca) 7...&b7 8 0–0 \textcircled bd7 9 b3 &d6 10 &b2 0–0 11 \blacksquare c1 c5 (in Andersson-Belyavsky, Reykjavik 1988, 11... \textcircled e7 allowed White to gain the better chances by 12 a4! b4 13 \textcircled b1 c5 14 \textcircled bd2 cxd4 15 \textcircled xd4 \oiint c5 16 \oiint c4 &c7 17 f4 \blacksquare ac8 18 &f3 \oiint fe4 19 \textcircled c2) 11...c5 12 dxc5 \oiint xc5 13 b4 \oiint cc4 14 \oiint xe4 \oiint xe4 15 a3 with an equal position;

(b) 7 \$\Delta b3 \$\Delta b7\$ and 7 \$\Delta d3 \$\Delta b7\$ followed by ...c7-c5 usually transpose into lines examined below. However, it should be emphasised that delaying ...c7-c5 for a long time can cost Black dearly: 7 & d3 & b7 8 0 0 bd7 9 e4 b4 10 e5! bxc3 11 ext6 gxt6? (11...2xt6 is the lesser evil, although even then after 12 bxc3 White has the advantage) 12 bxc3 c5 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ e2 cxd4 14 cxd4 & d6 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ b1!, and in Kampenus-Klavins (Riga 1963) Black came under a very strong attack.



The basic position of the Classical Variation.

6 0-0

This is the main line. White can also begin play in the centre before castling, by playing 6 **We2**, then dxc5 and e3-e4 (the Furman Variation) -- see Chapter 6.

We should also mention $6 \bigtriangleup c3$ a6:

(a) 7 a4 or 7 0–0 usually leads to lines given below, although after 7 0-0 b5 8 \$\Delta d3 \$\Delta bd7\$ a transposition into the Meran Defence is possible;

(b) 7 2b3 (this gives the play an original direction) 7...b5 8 a4 b4 (8...c4 9 2c2 b4 leads to a clear advantage for White after 10 2e4 2b7 11 2xf6+ 2xf6 12 2e2 b3 13 2b1 2b4+ 14 2d2 2xf3 15 2f3 2exf3 16 gxf3, in view of the weakness of the faradvanced pawns) 9 2e2 2b7 10 2f42bd7 11 2g5! 2d5 (not 11...2d6? 12 2xf7! 2xf7 13 2xe6, but 11...2e7?? and 11.... $\forall a5$ need testing) 12 \bigcirc gxe6 fxe6 13 \bigcirc xe6 $\forall c8$ 14 \bigcirc xd5 \bigcirc xd5 15 $\forall b5+ \bigcirc c7$ 16 $\forall xd5 \bigcirc f6$ 17 $\forall xc5+ \bigcirc$ xe6 18 $\forall e5+ \bigcirc f7$ 19 $\bigcirc cd2 \forall d7$ 20 $\forall a5$, and with three pawns for the piece plus an active position, White has the better chances (Makarychev-Mitenkov, Russian Ch. 1995 - analysis by Makarychev).

Another possible plan is the simplifying dxc5 (either immediately, or after the preparatory a2-a3).



Black has two main plans:

I. Preparing to develop his queenside by ...a7-a6, retaining the tension in the centre or exchanging at a convenient moment on d4 (Chapters 1-4).

II. The immediate exchange on d4, in order after exd4 to besiege the isolated pawn. This, the Steinitz Variation, is covered in Chapter 5.

White intends to exploit his central superiority by preparing e3-e4 and bringing his queen's bishop into play. Black, in turn, has to decide how to develop his queen's bishop. The usual way is bya7-a6,b7-b5 and ... \pounds b7. If White does not want to allow ...b7-b5, he plays a2-a4, but in so doing the b4 square is weakened.

6

Preparing for the development of the queenside.

If $6... \pounds e7$ White continues 7 $rak{W}e2$, and answers the routine 7...0-0 with 8 dxc5! \pounds xc5 9 e4 and then e4-e5.

6...②c6 7 賀e2 a6 or 7...cxd4 is examined under a different move order (6...a6 7 賀e2 公c6) and in the Steinitz Variation.



7 ₩e2

Apart from this move, which is the subject of Chapters 1 and 2, White also has:

7 a4 (Chapter 3);

Other 7th moves (Chapter 4).

After defending his d-pawn with his rook, White plans e3-e4.

.. b5

Black's other options of developing his queen's knight at c6 or d7 are considered in Chapter 2.

For lines with the exchange in the centre -7...cxd4 8 exd4 2e7 followed by 9 2c3 or 9 Ed1 - cf. the Steinitz Variation (Chapter 5), and for 9 a4 - cf. Chapter 3.

Now White has: 8 \$\Delta b3 (1.1) 8 \$\Delta d3 (1.2) - p.43 1.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 句f3 句f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 幽e2 b5)

8 单b3

At b3 the bishop does not block the d-file and, more important, 'looks' at d5 and e6, forcing Black to reckon with d4-d5 and possible sacrifices at e6 and f7.

8 ... **≙b7** For 8... **⊘c6** see the variation 7 ₩e2 **⊘c6 8 ¤**d1 (8 **⊘**c3) 8...b5 9 **≜**b3 (p.49).

White can prepare e3-e4 by playing 9 IIdI or else continue his development with 9 2c3 (1.11).

The alternative is to try and exploit the drawback to $\dots b7-b5$ by the undermining 9 a4 (1.12) - p.36.

1.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ④f3 ④f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 賀c2 b5 8 皇b3 皇b7)

9 🖾d1



This move and $9 \bigtriangleup c3$ are sometimes made in reverse order, although lines of independent significance are possible:

(a) 9... 2 e7 10 dxc5. White tries to exploit the time spent by Black on the

'two-stage' development of his bishop. Since $10... \pounds xc5$? allows $11 \pounds xb5$, before regaining his pawn Black has to play $10... \pounds bd7$ (or $10... \pounds c7$ $11 \pounds c2$ $\pounds xc5$ 12 e4 with the initiative for White) $11 c6 \pounds xc6$ $12 \pounds d4 \pounds b7$. White's position is preferable, but it should be mentioned that the direct sacrifice on e6 is not dangerous: after $13 \pounds xe6$?! fxe6 $14 \pounds xe6 \clubsuit b6$ 15 $\oiint xg7+ \pounds f7$ White has three pawns for a bishop, and the opponent's king is unable to castle, but there is no way of attacking it, all Black's pieces are in play, and he has the better chances;

(b) 9...cxd4 10 exd4 \$\overline{2}e7 11 \$\overline{2}g5 0-0 leads to a position from the Steinitz Variation.

9 ... ②bd7 9...cxd4 10 ②xd4 徵b6 11 a4 bxa4 12 ②xa4- ②bd7 is weaker:

(a) 13 e4, and Black is in difficulties:

(a1) 13... xe4 14 2c3 and then g5 with a strong attack;

(b) 13 兔d2 兔e7 (13...豐xb2? 14 ④b3! 鬯e5 15 兔c3 鬯g5 16 f4 or 15... 鬯e4 16 f3 and wins) 14 兔a5 鬯a7 15 ②c3, and Black cannot complete his mobilisation without losing material – 15...0-0 is met by 16 ②xe6.

Now let us see how events develop if Black, without determining the position of his queen's knight, completes his kingside development with 9...\$e7:

(a) 10 (2) c3 0-0 11 e4, and now:

(a1) 11...b4 12 d5 (an interesting sacrifice suggested by Suetin; if 12 e5 12... bxc3 13 exf6 &xf6 14 bxc3 cxd4 15 cxd4 &d5 16 &f4 with roughly equal chances, Pachman-Wade, Bucharest 1954) 12...bxc3 (after 12...exd5 13 \bigotimes xd5 \bigotimes xd5 14 &xd5 White stands better) 13 dxe6. Where should Black move his queen?

(a11) 13... 13... 15... 16 14..5 15... 15... 16 15... 15... 16 15...

(a12) 13...留c7 14 exf7+ 當h8 15 e5 ②g4 (15...②fd7 16 e6, or 15...④e4 16 e6! 氢f6 17 氢d5 ②d2 18 氢xb7 寶xb7 19 氢xd2 cxd2 20 鼍xd2 ②c6 21 饗e4 and 簋e1, Vaiser-Donchev, Vrnjacka Banja 1984, both favour White):



16 bxc3 c4 17 \pounds xc4 \pounds xf3 18 gxf3 (18 \clubsuit xf3 \clubsuit xc4 19 \clubsuit xa8 fails to 19... \pounds c6) 18... \pounds xe5 19 \pounds d5 \pounds bc6 20 \pounds f4 \pounds d6 (forced) 21 \pounds xc6 \clubsuit xc6 22 \pounds xe5 \pounds xe5 23 \clubsuit xe5 \clubsuit xf3 (23... \pounds xf7 is preferable) 24 \clubsuit d5! \clubsuit xc3 25 \pounds ac1, and Black had to seek a way of saving the heavy-piece ending (Toshkov-E.Adamski, Warsaw 1985);

 16 e5 2h7 17 2xe7 3xe7 3xe7 18 4d6leaves White with the better chances) 15 2xe6! fxe6 16 2xe7 4xf2 17 3xe4!3xe7 18 2xe4 (Ftacnik-Zaltsman, New York 1987);

(b) 10 a4:



10... 2bd7 11 dxc5 (after 11 axb5 axb5 12 萬xa8 對xa8 the chances are roughly equal) 11... 全xc5 12 色e5 b4 (Lukov-Dlugy, Palma de Mallorca 1989; 12... 對b6 is also good), and now 13 包xd7 包xd7 14 包d2 leads to a position with equal chances;

After 9...@c7 10 2c3 (10 a4! – Gligoric, e.g. 10...c4 11 2c2 2e7 12 axb5 axb5 13 axa8 axa8 14 e4) 10... b4 (10...2e7 11 e4 cxd4 12 2xd4 leads to a position examined later) 11 2b12bd7 12 2bd2 2e7 13 2c4 0–0 14 2d2 a5 chances are roughly equal (Rabar-Lesnik, Yugoslavia 1948).

9...c4 10 호c2 Ôc6 11 Ôc3 친b4 12 호b1 is considered on p.53).

And now:

10 Dc3 (1.111)

10 e4 (1.112) - p.33

1.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7 ₩e2
b5 8 \$b3 \$b7 9 \$d1 \$bd7)

10 Dc3



In this position Black has tried: 10... \pounds d6 (1.1111) 10... \Downarrow b8 (1.1112) - p.18 10... \pounds c7 (1.1113) - p.24 10... \And c7 (1.1114) - p.25 10... \oiint b6 (1.1115) - p.28 10...b4 (1.1116) - p.31 10... \And a5 (1.1117) - p.33

1.1111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 &xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 響e2 b5 8 &b3 &b7 9 ¤d1 ②bd7 10 ②c3)

10 ... 2d6 An invention of Smyslov, introduced in a game with Petrosian in the 1959 Candidates Tournament, after which the variation with the development of the bishop at d6 (later after the preparatory 10... 208) for some time became a topical problem.

Since White is intending to advance his e-pawn to e4 (and if Black should allow it, to e5), 10...2d6 covers the e5 square and also establishes control of the h2-b8 diagonal.

11 e4 Other possibilities: 11 d5 exd5:



(a) $12 \mod xd5 \ c4 \ 13 \mod xf6 + \oiint xf6 \ 14 \ 2c2 \ 2c5 \ 15 \ 14 \ 0 - 0 \ 16 \ b3 \ (16 \ 2d2 \ 2c5 \ with the better prospects for Black,$ Meduna-Nogueiras, Cienfuegos 1984) $<math>16...c3 \ 17 \ 2c5 \ 2c5 \ 18 \ e4 \ g6 \ 19 \ 2e3 \ 2xe3 \ 20 \ 2xe3 \ 2ad8 \ 21 \ b4 \ with chances for both sides (Gufeld);$

(b) 12 e4 leads to great complications:

(b1) 12...d4 13 e5 $\pounds xf3$ 14 gxf3 $\pounds xe5$ 15 f4 0-0 16 fxe5 $\Xi e8$ 17 f4 dxc3 18 bxc3 c4 19 $\pounds c2$ $\oiint b6+ 20$ $\pounds e3$ $\oiint e6$ (Liberzon-Klavins, USSR Team Ch. 1961), and Black retains his pawn, since 21 exf6 is met by 21... $\pounds xf6$ 22 $\Xi e1$ $\oiint g4$, regaining the piece. However, White is not obliged to take the knight, and his two bishops and strong central pawns more than compensate for the material deficit (Boleslavsky);

(b2) 12...0-0 (Black returns the pawn, but completes his development) 13 2xd5 (or 13 e5 Ξ e8 14 2f4 c4) 13...c4 14 2c2 (or 14 2xf6+ $\Im xf6$ 15 2c2 2e5) 14...2xd5 15 exd5 Ξ e8, in all cases with a sound position;

(b3) 12...c4 is an interesting variation with a temporary piece sacrifice: 13 exd5+ (after 13 e5?! \bigtriangleup xe5 14 \boxdot xe5 0-0! Black gains the advantage) 13... We7 14 Wxe7+ \diamondsuit xe7 (14... \bigstar xe7 15 d6) 15 \backsim d4 with double-edged play (Nogueiras). 11 dxc5 &xc5 12 \bigcirc e5 Bc7 13 \bigcirc xd7 \bigcirc xd7 \bigcirc xd7 14 e4 (most of Black's pieces are on the queenside, and White tries to launch an offensive) 14...0-0 15 &g5:



(a) 15... 全d6 16 萬ac1 ④c5 17 衡h5 對b8 (17... ④xb3 18 ④d5!) 18 鱼c2 b4 19 皇f6!, and Black came under a strong attack (Zavernaev-Radevich, Arkhangelsk 1964);

(c) 15...豐e5 can be recommended, and if 16 置xd7 全c6, attacking White's rook and bishop and restoring material equality, or 16 全h4 公f6 17 全g3 豐g5.

11 ⓓe5 ₩c7 12 ⓓxd7 ᡚxd7 13 h3:



(a) 13...0.0 14 d5 e5 15 24 f5 16 2g5 \mathbf{I} f6 17 e4 with advantage to White (Ilivitsky-Tarasov, Russian Team Ch. 1960), but Black can consider 14... c4 15 2c2 (15 dxe6 can be met by 15... fxe6 or 15...cxb3 – Ravinsky) 15... b4 16 dxe6 2f6 with the initiative for the sacrificed pawn;

(b) 13...cxd4 14 exd4 0-0 15 d5 exd5 16 2xd5 2xd5 17 2xd5 Zae8, and White's advantage is merely symbolic.

The prophylactic 11 h3 is not very promising: 11...0-0 12 全之 智行 13 e4 cxd4 14 ①xd4 邕ac8 15 a3 邕fd8 with equal chances (Partos-Radulescu, Romania 1962).

11 ... cxd4 And now: 12 ②xd4 (1.1111) 12 Ixd4 (1.11112) - p.16

1.11111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 오xc4 c5 6 0--0 a6 7 響e2 b5 8 오b3 오b7 9 罵d1 ②bd7 10 ②c3 오d6 11 e4 cxd4)

12 ②xd4 ₩b8



With gain of tempo the queen leaves the d-file, which had become dangerous. Note that this same position can arise via a different move order in the variation 10...費b8 11 e4 cxd4 12 分xd4 全d6.

13 g3

Other continuations:

13 h3. Can Black take the pawn?

(a) 13...b4 14 $\textcircledaa4$ $\pounds xe4$ (14... $\textcircledaa4$ $\pounds xe4$ is dangerous in view of 15 $\textcircledaa4$ g at 15 $\textcircledaa4$ $\textcircledaa4$ $\textcircledaa5$ (to 15 f 3 Black has the good reply 15...e5! 16 fxe4 exd4 17 $\charaa5$ xd4 $\pounds e5$) 15...0-0 16 $\charaa6$ at 2h2+ 17 $\textcircledaa5$ xd4 $\pounds e5$) 15...0-0 16 $\charaa6$ xd4 $\aa6$ xd4 $\aa6$

(b) with 13...0-0 14 a3 **Z**d8 Black declines the sacrifice:

(b1) 15 &g5 h6? (the threat of 16 $\textcircledaxe6$ would have been most simply parried by 15...&f4 although 15...&e5 was also possible) 16 $\textcircledaxe6$ fxe6 (it was better not to take the knight, although after 16... \blacksquare e8 17 &xf6 $\textcircledaxf6$ 18 $\textcircledad4$ $\textcircledaxe4$ 19 $\textcircledaxe4$ &xe4 20 $\textcircledaxf6$ 18 $\textcircledad4$ $\textcircledaxe4$ 19 $\textcircledaxe4$ &xe4 20 $\textcircledaxf6$ 18 $\textcircledad4$ $\textcircledaxe4$ 19 $\textcircledaxe4$ &xe4 20 $\textcircledaxf6$ 18 $\textcircledad4$ 18 &xf6 $\textcircledaxf6$ 19 e5, and White regained his piece, remaining a pawn up (Bannik-Suetin, Minsk 1962);

(b2) 15 호c2 호h2+ 16 空h1 호f4 17 分b3 호xc1 18 트axc1 纪e5 19 纪a5 豐c7 20 纪xb7 豐xb7 21 트xd8+ 트xd8 22 트d1 豐c7 23 호b3 h6 with a satisfactory position for Black (Reshevsky-Portisch, Amsterdam 1964).

13 公f3 b4 has proved unsuccessful for White:

(a) 14 2d5 exd5 15 e5 2xe5 16 2xe5 0-0!, and White has no compensation for the sacrificed pawn (Petrosian-Smyslov, Zurich Candidates 1959);

(b) in Mileika-Klovans (Riga 1961) White sacrificed the exchange by 14 置xd6 豐xd6 15 e5, but after 15...①xe5 16 ①xe5 bxc3 17 皇a4+ 学f8 Black should be able to parry the attack.

13 **2xe6** fxe6 14 2xe6 is an interesting sacrifice:



(a) $14... \oplus f7$ 15 Og5+ Og8 16 a4 h6 17 Of3 b4 18 Od5 Oxd5 19 exd5 We8? 20 We6+ and White won (Beni-Fichtl, Berlin 1962), but with 19... Of8!Black could have parried the threats and retained a material advantage;

(b) $14... \hat{Q}xh^{2+} 15 \hat{G}h^{1} \hat{W}e5 16$ $2xg^{7+} \hat{G}f^{7} 17 f4 \hat{Q}xf4 18 \hat{Q}xf4 \hat{W}xf4 19 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7} 20 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7} 22 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7} 22 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7} 22 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7+} 21 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7+} 2xd^{7+} 21 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7+} 2xd^{7+} 2xd^{7+} 21 \\ 3xd^{7+} 2xd^{7+} 2xd^{7$

13 f4?! $\hat{\Omega}x$ f4 14 $\hat{\Omega}x$ f4 |||x|f4 15 $\hat{\Omega}x$ e6?! leads to quite fantastic complications, but after 15...fxe6 16 $\hat{\Omega}x$ e6 $|||eads 17 \hat{\Omega}x$ g7+ $\hat{\Omega}f8$ 18 |||x|d7 $\hat{\Omega}x$ d7 19 $|||f1+|||eads 19...\hat{\Phi}x$ g7 20 ||||g4+) 20 ||||g4|h5 21 |||||g6| ||||after gamma gamm

It remains to consider one further sacrifice. Exploiting the remoteness of the enemy queen, with 13 e5 White opens the central file, an idea that proved justified in Kakageldiev-Reiman (USSR Team Ch. 1969): 13...\$xe5 (13...\$xe5 is strongly met by 14 f4 20c4 15 a4) 14 2xe6 fxe6 15 f4 0 0! (after 15...2xc3 16 $2xe6 \cdot 2d8$ 17 2e3 White threatens 18 2b6 - and then 2ac1 with a strong attack) 16 fxe5 2xe5 17 2d4 2c6 (defending against 18 2f4, but 17...2g6 came into consideration, not allowing the enemy rook across to the kingside) 18 2h4 2e5 19 2xe6 + 2h8 20 2xe5 2xe5 21 2g5. Material equality has been restored, and White has the more pleasant position.

13...0-0 14 f3 (Savon-Kots, 29th USSR Ch, Baku 1961) and now 14... Id8 can be recommended to those who prefer quiet play.

14 Da4



To take or not to take?..

14 ... **£**xe4

14... \bigcirc xe4 is very dangerous. White drives back the knight with 15 f3, and then breaks up the enemy king's defences:

(b) 15... 包ec5 16 皇xe6 fxe6 (16... 0-0 17 皇xd7 ②xd7 18 ②f5!) 17 ②xc5 ②xc5 (White also develops a decisive attack after 17... 全xc5 18 谢xe6+ 舍d8 19 全g5+) 18 公xe6 会f7 19 公g5+ 会f6 20 谢c4 with irresistible threats.

With 14...0-0 15 & c2 Black can decline the sacrifice:

(a) 15...a5 16 b3 包c5 17 e5 皇a6 18 對了 皇b7 19 對e2 皇a6 with a draw by repetition (Prieditis-Circenis, corr. 1963);

(b) 15... Ξ c8 16 &g5 a5 17 &d3 &e5 18 \bigtriangleup f3 &c6 19 \boxtimes xe5 &xa4 (instead of this forcing variation, the simple 19... \textcircled xe5 20 &xf6 gxf6 or 20 &f4 \oiint h5 should be considered) 20 \bigotimes xd7 &xd1 21 \bigotimes xf6+ gxf6 (Gik-Schulte, Moscow 1962) 22 \textcircled d2 fxg5 (22... \oiint e5 fails to 23 &f4 and 24 Ξ xd1) 23 \oiint xg5+ \oiint f8 24 Ξ xd1 with a pawn for the exchange and attacking chances.

15 f3

15 &g5 can be met by 15...0-0, and if 16 $\textcircled{2}xe6 \blacksquare e8!$

e5

15 ... 16 De6

If 16 fxe4 exd4 17 簋xd4 0-0, when V.Sokolov-Janosevic (Yugoslavia 1962) continued 18 全e3 全e5 19 簋d3 斷b5 20 簋ad1 全b8! 21 斷c2 全a7 22 全xa7 簋xa7 23 歐g2 斷b5 24 h3 ④e5, and Black took the initiative.

17...公c5 18 豐c4 公xb3 19 豐xe6+ 全e7 20 豐xb3 公g4 21 單f1 favours White (Safin-Nenashev, Tashkent 1989).

18 Dxc5

If 18 &e3 Wb5! (the simplest; with 18...&xe3+ 19 \oiint xe3 Qg4 20 \oiint f3 \oiint a7+ Black wins the exchange, but after 21 Cg2 Qe3+ 22 \oiint sh3 Qxd1 23 \blacksquare xd1 he has to withstand an attack) 19 \oiint d3 \oiint xd3 20 \blacksquare xd3 &xe3+ 21 \blacksquare xe3 \oiint e7 22 \blacksquare c1 \blacksquare ac8 and Black is a pawn up, although it is devalued, and White retains drawing chances (Michaljcisin-Ugrinovic, Yugoslavia 1962).

18		Dxc5
19	₩c4	₩b5

Black has parried the attack, and he is a pawn up, although it is too early to draw the line. This line, relating to the late fifties and early sixties, was tested in Maichrak-Fichtl (Czechoslovakia 1972). With **20 \&e3** White sacrificed a second pawn - 20... &xc4 21 &xc4 20fxe4 22 &f1, and thanks to his two bishops gained enough compensation.



12 Xxd4

This move was suggested in 1961 by Bondarevsky and Spassky.



12 ... 全c5 Forced, since 12...對8 or 12...對c7 is met by 13 罩xd6 and 14 e5.

13 Id3!

White intends to cramp the opponent by e4-e5, or to play &g5 and $\blacksquaread1$ with pressure on the d-file.

13 ... ₩c7

13...②g4 14 皇g5! 對b6 (14...皇xf2+ 15 會f1 對b6 16 h3 ②ge5 can be met by 17 罩xd7!; Ribli suggests 16...④de5) 15 ②d5!:



(a) 15...exd5 (this allows White a very strong attack) 16 exd5+ & 17 d6 & xd6 (if 17...Ee8 18 & e7+ & g8 19 & e6!!) 18 E ad1 Ee8 (after 18...& xf2+ 19 & xf2 & xf2 20 E xd6 & xd1 21 E xd7 White has a won position) 19 & e3 & 2xe3 20 fxe3;

(b) 15... axd5 16 exd5, and now:

(b1) 16...e5 17 2h4 0-0 18 2g5 (18 h3 e4!) 18...2gf6 19 2e6 fxe6 20 dxe6 29h8 21 exd7 2d4! 22 2h3 with a highly promising position (Veresov-Suetin, USSR Ch ½-Final 1961);

(b2) 16... \bigcirc xf2 17 dxe6! \oslash xd3+ 18 \$\phi f1 fxe6 (if 18...0-0 19 Wxd3 \bigcirc f6 20 \$\overline{2}xf6 gxf6 21 \bigcirc c2) 19 Wxd3 \bigcirc e7 (Koblenz-Klovans, Riga 1962) and now White could have continued the offensive with 20 \bigcirc xe7 \diamondsuit xe7 21 \blacksquare e1;

(b3) 16... \hat{Q} xf2+ (an interesting innovation in this thoroughly studied variation) 17 \hat{G} f1 (17 \hat{G} h1 \hat{Q} c5 18 h3 h6 or 18... \hat{Q} xd3 19 dxe6 fxe6 20 hxg4 h5!) 17... \hat{Q} c5 (not 17... \hat{Q} de5 18 h3 \hat{Q} xf3 19 gxf3), when in Levitt-Sadler (London 1988) White should have played 18 h3, and if 18... \hat{Q} xd3 19 hxg4 \hat{Q} g3 20 \hat{Q} e3! \hat{Q} c5 21 \hat{Z} c1 \hat{Q} d6 22 \hat{W} c2! (Sadler).

(c) 15...響a5 16 罩f1:



16... Ξ c8 (16...0–0 fails to 17 \bigcirc e7- \pounds xe7 18 \pounds xe7 \bigcirc ge5 19 \bigcirc xe5 \bigcirc xe5 20 \pounds xf8 \bigcirc xd3 21 \pounds xg7, while if 16... \bigcirc de5 17 \bigcirc xe5 \bigcirc xe5 18 \pounds f4!, and 18... \bigcirc xd3 is not possible due to the loss of the queen after 19 \pounds c7!) 17 \bigcirc f4! (preventing castling and threatening 18 \bigcirc xe6) 17... \bigcirc ge5 18 \bigcirc xe5 \bigcirc xe5 19 \blacksquare h3 \bigcirc c4 20 \blacksquare d1 \blacksquare b6 21 \bigcirc h5! \blacksquare g8 (21...0–0 22 \bigcirc f6+! gxf6 23 \pounds xf6 \pounds xf2+ 24 \oiint h1, or 21... \pounds f8 22 \blacksquare hd3) 22 \blacksquare hd3, and White has an overwhelming advantage (Petrosian-Bertok, Stockholm 1962).

Other alternatives:

13...,對6 14 h3 (having taken measures against ...,②g4, White plans e4-e5) 14...h6 15 e5 ②g8 16 堂e3 盒xe3 17 盖xe3. Black is behind in development (Rudenko-Schulte, Minsk 1962).

13...0-0 14 \triangleq f4 b4 15 \bigcirc a4 wa5 16 \bigcirc d2 wb5 17 \bigcirc xc5 \bigcirc xc5 18 \pounds c4 wa519 \blacksquare d4, and the exchanging operation 19...e5 20 \pounds xe5 \bigcirc cxe4 21 \pounds xf6 \bigcirc xf6 22 we7 \pounds c6 23 \pounds f1 merely highlighted Black's pawn weaknesses (Tal-Georgadze, Georgian Ch. 1970).

13...b4 is unjustified in view of 14 e5! 신g4 (14...bxc3 15 exf6) 15 효a4 효c8 16 원e4.

14 **≟**g5 0—0



Klüger-Colz (Sofia 1962) continued 15 a3 ②g4 16 罩ad1 鱼e7 17 鱼c2 ②c5 18 罩xd8+ 罩xd8 19 罩xd8+ 罾xd8 20 b4 ②cd7 21 e5 ③d5, and after further exchanges Black maintained the balance.

Serious consideration should be given to 15 \blacksquare ad1, suggested more than 30 years ago by Ravinsky, and if 15... b4 16 \bigcirc a4 \triangle xe4 17 \blacksquare xd7 \triangle xf3 18 \blacksquare xc7 \triangle xe2 19 \blacksquare d2, when both bishops are attacked, or 15 \blacksquare c1, and if 15... \blacksquare b6 16 \blacksquare cd1.

1.1112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 響e2 b5 8 皇b3 皇b7 9 單d1 公bd7 10 公c3

10

... ₩b8

Now after 11 e4 cxd4 the capture with the rook is no longer so favourable for White. The bishop goes to c5 immediately, not in two moves (...\$d6c5), and compared with the variation 10...\$d6 11 e4 cxd4 12 \$\overline{xd5}\$ \$\overline{c5}\$ 12 \$\overline{xd4}\$ black has made the useful move ...\$\overline{b8}\$ 'for free'. These considerations were confirmed by Kaunas-Pohla (Daugavpils 1979): 12 \$\overline{xd4}\$ \$\overline{c5}\$ 13 \$\overline{ad3}\$ \$\overline{c3}\$ e14 \$\overline{c3}\$ c1 (it will be recalled) that in the 10... \pounds d6 variation the black queen was still at d8, and White had good attacking chances, but here it is Black who launches an offensive) 14... \pounds df6 15 h3 h5 16 \pounds g5 \pounds xe4.

If after 10... 168 11 e4 cxd4 White prefers 12 2 xd4, then 12... d6 leads to a favourable position for Black from variation 1.11111 (p.14).

Therefore after 10... \$68 White usually employs some other plan.



11 d5

The queen has moved away to b8, and White hurries to exploit this by opening the centre.

The quiet 11 h3 单d6 (11...单e7 is also played) 12 e4 cxd4 13 罩xd4 (13 ②xd4 leads to a position from 1.11111) gives Black time to prepare for defence:

(a) 13... ②e5 (Titenko-Doroshkevich, USSR 1962). Now 14 兔g5 is met by 14... ②xf3+ 15 徵xf3 兔e5, while if 15 gxf3 兔c5, and the attacked rook cannot move in view of 16... 徵g3+;

(b) after the standard 13...堂c5 14 Id1 b4 Black wins a pawn, but 15 包a4 ②xe4 16 ②xc5 ②dxc5 17 堂c2 0-0 18 ②g5 ③xg5 19 堂xg5 gives White compensation - two active bishops plus better development, with the enemy queen awkwardly placed (Torbergsson-Drozd, Bucharest 1962).

The slow 11 &c2 allows Black to complete his development unhindered: 11...&c7 12 b3 0–0 13 &b2 \blacksquare d8 14 \blacksquare ac1 cxd4 15 Oxd4 Wa7 16 e4 Of8 17 Of3 Og6, with perhaps somewhat the more active position (Polugayevsky-Volovich, Yalta 1962).

A complicated situation arises after $11 \otimes e5$.



(a) 11... (2) xe5 12 dxe5, and now:

(a1) 12... $\forall xe5$ 13 $\bigcirc xb5$ c4 (as suggested by Simagin, Black tries to win a piece; after 13... &e7 14 $\oslash a3$ the knight comfortably establishes itself at c4) 14 &xc4 axb5 15 &xb5+, and White develops a very strong attack (Boban-Savic, Yugoslavia 1981);

(a2) 12...2d7 13 f4 2c6 (a development of the author's analysis dating back to 1964, which considered 13...c4 14 2c2 2c5 15 b4! cxb3 16 axb3, when 16...b4 fails to 17 2b5!) 14 a4 c4 15 2c2 2b7 16 axb5 axb5 17 2xa8+ 2xa8 18 2dc5 19 f5 exf5 20 2d5 (Barczay-Brilla-Banfalvi, corr. 1980/2). Even so, after 20...2xd5 21 2xd5 2z 2xd5 2e7 23 2xf5 0-0 Black maintains the balance;

(b) 11....皇d6 (Black continues his development) 12 ②xd7 ②xd7 13 d5

exd5 (13...2xh2+14 $rac{1}{2}h1$ is dangerous, while after 13...e5 14 a4 White's position is the more promising). This move looks risky, but if 14 $rac{1}{2}g4$ (after 14 2xd5 0–0, or 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 $rac{1}{2}xd5$ 2f6, or 15 2xd5 0–0 the game is equal) Black can try 14...2xh2+15 $rac{1}{2}h1$ 2e5 (analysis).

11 ... Dxd5 11...exd5 is more restrained:



(a) 12 e4, and now:

(a1) 12...d4 (this leads to an extremely sharp situation) 13 e5 (13 2d5!?, with the threat of 14 2f4) 13... 2xf3 14 3xf3 2xe5 15 3e2 2d6 16 f4 0-0 17 fxe5 2xe5 18 2d5 2e8 19 2xf6+ 2xf6 20 3e4 c4 21 2f1 2e5 22 2d1 2xh2+, and the four compact pawns are more than sufficient compensation for the bishop (Cvetkovic-Georgadze, Sukhumi 1966);

(a2) 12...dxe4, when:

(a21) 13 \bigcirc 5 c4 14 \bigcirc cxe4 is parried by 14... \bigcirc xe4 15 \bigcirc xe4 W e5! 16 \pounds c2 0.0 0! (Ustinov-Tukmakov, Moscow 1972). After 17 a4 Black's king may seem to be in danger, but he is a pawn up with good development. The position remains quite sharp, but White has insufficient compensation:

(a22) 13 皇c2 皇e7 14 ⊙xe4 ⊙xe4 15 皇xe4 ⊙f6 16 皇f4! 竇c8 17 皇xb7 ₩xb7 18 \$\Deltade \$\Deltaft\$ 19 a4, and White has compensation for the pawn (Ribli-Marjanovic, Reggio Emilia 1985/6);

(b) 12 2xd5, after which Black is not obliged to make further exchanges: 12...b4 13 2xb7 (the piece sacrifice 13 "C4 is incorrect, Gerusel-Zinn, Halle 1967) 13... ₩xb7, when his position is somewhat preferable;

(c) 12 2xd5, and now:



(c1) 12... 2xd5 13 2xd5 2xd5 14 2xd5, transposing into the main line;

(c2) 12... 2d6 13 智d3 全c7 14 智f5 c4 15 公xc7+ 智xc7 16 全c2 and White's position is preferable (Rossiter-Sadler, Crewe 1993);

(c3) 12...c4 13 e4! (suggested by Taimanov; after 13 公xf6+ 公xf6 14 全c2 全c5 chances are roughly equal):



13...\$d6 (after 13...cxb3? 14 \$\Delta f4 \$\$"a7 15 Dc7+\$Dd8 16 Dg5 there is noway of defending f7, Lerh-Koronowski, $corr. 1985) 14 $\Delta c2 0-0 15 $\Delta xf6+$$ $<math>$$Dxf6 16 $\Delta g5$ with advantage to White$ (Mirkovic).

11...c4 12 dxe6 fxe6 13 &c2 &d6 14 e4 0–0 15 h3 &f4 (15...h6 would have prevented the next move; 15...&c5 16 \blacksquare xd6 leads to unclear complications) 16 &g5! &c5 17 &e3 &xe3 18 \blacksquare xe3 with advantage to White (Gerusel-Todorcevic, Monte Carlo 1968).

If Black prevents the opening of the centre by 11...e5, White gains the better chances by 12 e4 \pounds d6 13 \Diamond h4! (even more promising than 13 a4 b4 14 \Diamond b1 followed by \Diamond bd2-c4 – Ribli) 13...0–0 14 \Diamond f5 g6 15 \Diamond h6+ \pounds g7 16 Wf3 c4 17 \pounds c2 \pounds c8 18 \Diamond e2 b4 19 \Diamond g3 (Gil-Sadler, Benidorm 1991).

12 2xd5 2xd5

If 12...exd5 White has the usual aggressive move in this type of position, 13 e4:



(a) 13...dxe4 14 2xf7+ (after 14 2g5 c4 15 2xf7 cxb3 16 2xh8 2f6the position is unclear) 14...2xf7 15 2xd7+2g8 (15...2e8 16 2f4 2xf4 17 2xb7 favours White) 16 2g5 2c6 (17 2h5 was threatened) 17 2f4! If now 17...2e5?! 18 2f4 2e8 (18...2xd7 19

對xd7) 19 單c7 with a strong attacking position, but of course, Black should not waste a tempo, and after the immediate 17...費e8 White still has to demonstrate the correctness of his attack;

(b) 13...d4 14 e5 &xf3 (14...Ob6? 15 &f4! c4, and in K.Grigorian-Tukmakov, 40th USSR Ch, Baku 1972, White could have gained a decisive advantage by 16 Oxd4!, and if 16...cxb3 17 e6!) 15 Wxf3 c4 16 $\ddddot{X}xd4$ (16 &f4 Wc8) 16...Oxe5 (16...cxb3? loses to 17 $\ddddot{X}d7$) 17 We4 cxb3 18 &f4 f6 19 &xe5 fxe5 20 Wc6+ Cf7 21 Wd5+ Cf6 22 $\ddddot{E}e1$, and Black has no defence against the threats of 23 $\ddddot{f}f4+$ and 23 f4.

13 \$\overline{13} xd5 exd5 14 \$\overline{14}\$ to \$\$ xd5

In Geller-Korchnoi (Curacao Candidates 1962), the source game of this variation, before capturing on d5 White weakened the enemy queenside: 14 a4 bxa4 15 Xxd5 2e7 16 e4. Despite the apparent danger, Black found a sound defensive resource: 16... Wb5! 17 Wd1 2f6 (17...2b6 came into consideration. e.g. 18 Zd3 0-0 19 \$25 Zfd8! 20 Ixd8+ Ixd8 21 ₩c2 \$xg5 22 @xg5 Wd3, with advantage to Black in the endgame) 18 Id2 (Dxe4 19 Ie2 f5 20 $2g_5$ (here 20 $\&g_5$ should probably have been played, when 20...Zd8! 21 Wel Zd7 leads to an equal heavy piece ending) and after 20... 2xg5 21 2xg5 0-0 the initiative passed to Black.

The gambit 14 e4 is parried by 14...d4, and if 15 e5 366.

14 ... ⊈e7

Black must complete his development as quickly as possible. 14...O fo is weaker in view of 15 \blacksquare e5+ O e7 16 e4 followed by O g5 or O e3.

If 14... b 6 White has the promising 15 $\blacksquare h5! - cf$. the commentary to Black's next move.

15 b3 is also played: 15... 2b6 16 2h5! 0-0 17 2b2 2d8 18 2g5 h6 19 2e4 36c8 20 36f3 2d5 21 36g3 and White created decisive threats (Mitskevich-Filippov, corr. 1984).

15 ... ₩b7

15...Db6 16 Eh5! is promising for White, whose plan includes advancing the e-pawn in combination with an attack on the rook's file after Black castles. This old recommendation justifies itself after 16...O (or 16...Wd6 17 Qg5, and if 17...Wg6 18 Oh4 We6 19 Of5) 17 e5:

(a) 17...置e8?, and in A.Geller-Hermlin (corr. 1972) Black was quickly crushed: 18 e6! f6 19 ②h4! 對d6 20 ②f5 對c7 21 算xh7! Black resigns;

(b) 17...₩b7 (a final evaluation of this line will probably be given by a practical testing of Korchnoi's recommendation of 17...₩c8 18 ₩e4 g6, but not 18...h6? 19 \$\overline\$ xh6! gxh6 20 \$\overline\$ xh6 f5 21 exf6 \$\overline\$ xf6 22 \$\overline\$ xf6 23 \$\overline\$ g6+) 18 e6!, and now:



(b1) 18...g6 19 exf7+ $\exists x f7$ 20 $\exists e5$ 2c4 21 $\exists e6 \& f6$ 22 $\& h6! \exists e7$ 23 $\exists e1$. White has a menacing position, and after 23... $\exists ae8$ he sacrificed his queen --24 $\exists x f6! \exists x e2$ 25 $\exists x e2 \exists d8$ 26 h3, and

after including his knight in the attack he created decisive threats (Andersson-Cifuentes, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984);

(b2) 18...f6 19 分h4 貫ad8 20 鱼h6!! (20 罩xh7 allows the defence 20... 賀d5!), and according to analysis by Nunn, White's threats are irresistible;

If 15... \bigcirc 16 (attacking the rook from the other side) 16 \equiv g5! 0–0 17 e5 \bigcirc d5 18 We4! \equiv d8 (F.Olafsson-Balcerowski, Varna Olympiad 1962), and now 19 e6! would have given White a decisive advantage.

After 15...豐c7 16 b3 0-0 17 全b2 當fe8 18 邕c1 邕ad8 19 ②d4 White stands better (Timman-Van der Wiel, Holland 1980).



As with 15... 徵c7, Black defends his knight, preparing castling. At the same time the queen 'aims' at e4.

16 **2g5 ⊘b6** First of all, why does not Black play 16...**2xg5**, exchanging bishops?



(a) 17 2xg5, and now:

(a1) 17...0-0 18 罩ad1, and by tactical means Black maintains the balance: 18...公f6! 19 罩xc5 h6 20 e5 響e7! 21 酇c2 罩ad8 (Zilber-Klavins (Riga 1963); (a2) 17...h6 18 罩ad1 (after 18 公f3 0·0 19 罩ad1 Black solves his problems by 19...公f6 20 罩xc5 公xe4 21 罩e5 罩fe8, with equality) 18...hxg5 (18...分f6 19 罩e5+, Ojanen-F.Olafsson, Varna Olympiad 1962) 19 罩xd7 竇xd7 20 罩xd7 혛xd7, and after a number of adventures Doroshkevich-Ostrovsky (Russian Ch. 1963) ended in a draw;

(b) 17 Zad1! This strong intermezzo was discovered by Vul:



(b1) 17...罩d8 18 公xg5 (threatening 19 彎h5 g6 20 彎f3 0 -0 21 彎h3) 18...h6 (if 18...0-0 19 彎d2 winning the knight)

19 ②xf7! 當xf7 20 寶f3+ 當e7 (20...當e8

21 徵g4) 21 徵g3 and wins (1.Zaitsev);

(b2) 17... 2b6 18 **E**xg5, and two black pawns are attacked;

(b3) 17... \triangle f6, and White gains an advantage by preventing the opponent from castling – 18 Ξ e5+ \Leftrightarrow f8 19 Ξ xg5;

(b4) 17... 全f6 18 罩xd7 響xd7 19 Ixd7 \$\phixd7 20 e5 \$\overline\$e7 21 e6+ fxe6 22 \$\overline\$e5+ with a winning attack;

(b5) 17...2e7 (relatively best) 18 ad7 = 2d7 = 2d

Thus 16... £xg5 leads to a difficult position for Black.

16...f6 can be answered not only by 17 \pounds f4 0 0 18 \triangle h4, but also by 17 \exists ad1 \triangle b6, since it is unfavourable to take the bishop: 17...fxg5 18 \exists xd7 \blacksquare xd7 19 \exists xd7 \pounds xd7 20 \blacksquare d2+ and \triangle xg5. After 17... \triangle b6 a position from the main line is reached.



17 Zad1!

By sacrificing the exchange. White gains a strong passed pawn on the d-file.

The quiet $17 \text{ \Xi}d2 \ 0-0 \ 18 \text{ \Xi}ad1$ retains for White a slight initiative. His control of the d-file should not be underestimated, but with careful defence Black can avoid the worst:

(a) 18... \$xg5 19 €xg5 ₩e7! (Black should not concede the file), and now:

(al) 20 f4 h6 21 公f3 置ad8 22 b3 置xd2;

(a2) 20 谢h5 h6 21 创行 置ad8, and Black equalises;

(a3) 20 賀g4 h6 (not 20...署ad8 in view of 21 罩xd8 罩xd8 22 罩xd8 - 賀xd8 23 賀h5 h6 24 賀xt7+ 容h8 25 寶xg7 -. 26 ④e6+ and 27 孙xd8) 21 罩d6 (21 ④f3 罩ad8) 21...hxg5 22 罩xb6 寶e5, and Black holds on (analysis);

(b) 18...置fe8 (this is also acceptable) 19 호xe7 豐xe7 20 e5 黨a7 21 b3 黨d7 22 黨xd7 ②xd7 23 豐e4 h6 (Solmundsson-Garces, Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964).

17 ... f6

The immediate acceptance of the sacrifice $-17...\odot x d5$ 18 exd5 f6 (18... $rac{1}{2}$ kg5 19 d6 $rac{1}{2}$ xg5 20 $rac{1}{2}$ xg5) allows White to build up a crushing attack by 19 d6! fxg5 20 $rac{1}{2}$ e1 (Neronsky-Zhuk, corr. 1966).

Interposing 17...h6 also does not help. After 18 &xe7 &xd5 19 &xc5!&e7 (19...&f4 20 @e3 &e6 21 &d6 is positionally hopeless) 20 &e5! the deadly invasion of the rook at d7 is threatened:

(b) the more tenacious 20...₩c7 is strongly met by 21 2 d7! (21 2 d6 ₩b7), defending both minor pieces and also preventing castling.

18 🚊 f4



18... 2xd5 19 exd5 0-0 20 d6 \$\u00e9d8 21 d7 \$\u00e9c7 22 \$\u00effe6+ \$\u00edf7, and now:

(a) 23 全e3 23... 對b6 24 對e4 (24 對d5 looks stronger, but Black holds on with 24... 直d8 25 全xc5 單dxd7 26 對xf7+ 罩xf7 27 全xb6 全xb6 28 單d6 틸b7 with an equal ending) 24... 亘d8, and White probably has sufficient compensation for the sacrificed exchange (Danner-Szimczak, Prievidsa 1980);

In Vrjola-Agzamov (Sochi 1984) Black preferred the quiet 18...0-0, and after 19 Ξ 5d2 Ξ ad8 (19... Ξ fe8 is worth testing, to answer 20 e5 with 20...c4 and ...全b4) 20 e5 (20 h4 基xd2 21 基xd2 基e8 or 21...留c6 22 h5 基e8 23 ②h4 全f8) 20...基xd2 21 基xd2 ②c4 a draw was agreed.



10 ... Âe7

11 e4

By threatening to advance one of his central pawns, White forces the opponent to fix the position in the centre.

With 11 d5 his achievements are modest. After 11...exd5 12 \pounds xd5 \pounds xd5 13 \pounds xd5 \pounds xd5 14 \ddagger xd5 Bc7 (14... Bc8 can also be tried, with the idea after ... \pounds 16 of playing the queen to e6 Anand) compared with the 10... Bb8 variation Black is more soundly prepared for defence (Gligoric-Wade, Bognor Regis 1957). 11 ... cxd4

Events take on a forcing aspect after 11...b4 12 e5 bxc3 13 exf6:

(a) 13...gxf6 is strongly met by 14 d5;

(b) 13...9xf6 14 aa4+, and Black must give up the right to castle, since 14.... 15 dxc5 is bad; after 14... \$18 15 dxc5 響c7 (Szabo-Stoltz, Stockholm 1952) 16 b4! 包g4 17 h3 皇xf3 18 幽xf3 ₩h2+ 19 \$f1 Black loses material;

(c) 13... xf6 14 d5!, and now:

(c1) 14...cxb2 15 @xb2 (after 15 dxe6 bxa1=9)! Black parries the attack) 15 @xb2, when Zilber-Roisman (Riga 1961) continued 15... xb2 (15...e5 is better) 16 dxe6! \$xf3 17 exd7+ Black resigns, since 17... 李f8 18 響xf3 皇f6 19

(c2) 14...e5. Black avoids the immediate danger by closing the central files. Even so, after 15 bxc3 0-0 16 2d2! followed by 2c4 White gains the advantage (Smyslov-Keres, Zurich Candidates 1953).

11...c4 12 皇c2 鬯c7 13 皇g5 皇b4 14 a3 \$a5 15 \$d2 cannot be recommended for Black. To prevent e4-e5 and with an inferior position. Lutikov-Tarasov (RSFSR Ch. 1956) went 15... Id8? 16 e5 皇xc3 17 bxc3 包d5 18 包g5 and White gained a strong attack.

のxd4 12

12 Exd4 2c5 leads to a position from the 10... d6 variation.

> 12 . . .

₩c7

12.... Wb8 is possible. The bishop sacrifice 13 2xe6 fxe6 14 Dxe6 is unclear: 14... 響e5 15 包xg7+ 會f7 16 包f5 置hd8 17 f4 翼c5+ 18 盒e3 襌c4 (Nikolac-Schulz, West Germany 1984/5).

13 £g5

Or 13 a3 0-0 14 \$2,5, and now:

(a) 14... 2c5 15 Zac1 h6 16 \$h4 (Reshevsky-Najdorf, match, New York 1952), and now 16... Ifd8 was correct, when White still stands slightly better;

(b) 14...里ad8 15 里ac1 皇c5 16 乞f3 Ic8 17 皇a2 習b8 18 皇b1 Ifd8 with roughly equal chances (Aleksandrov-Shulskis, Minsk 1993).

In the event of the bishop sacrifice 13 \$xe6 fxe6 14 Dxe6, apart from 14.... We5 (given in the variation 12... **Wb8**) Black can offer the exchange of queens with 14... Wc4, but after 15 ₩xc4 bxc4 16 Dc7+ and 17 Dxa8 the chances are probably with White.

13 ... b4

13... Dc5 is strongly met by 14 Zac1, and if 14...0-0 15 e5, 14...②xb3 15 Dexb5, or 14...b4 15 \$xf6 gxf6 16 ②a4 0-0 17 皇xe6 and wins (Panno-Keller, Moscow Olympiad 1956).

Smyslov-Keres (Budapest Candidates 1950), now continued 14 2a4 We5 15 皇xf6 ①xf6 16 ①b6 墨d8 17 皇a4+ \$\$18, when Black was unable to castle, but his position was not easy to break up. After 18 皇c6 響c7 19 皇xb7 鬻xb7 he gradually equalised.

1.1114 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2)3 2 f6 4 e3 e6 5 xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 ₩e2 b5 8 \$b3 \$b7 9 \$d1 \$bd7 10 DC3



25

11 e4 11 d5 is the main alternative:

(a1) 16 賀c2 筥fd8 17 오d2 ②f6 with an equal game (Najdorf-R.Byrne, New York 1951);

(a3) 16 兔g5, when compared with the 10...對b8 variation Black has already castled (cf. Timman-Van der Wiel, p.22). Ilivitsky-Boleslavsky (Moscow 1964) continued 16... 金双5 17 置xg5 單fe8 18 響e3 單c6 19 單e1 h6 20 單h5 罩ac8 and ended in a draw;

(a4) 16 b3 公f6 17 直d1 單fd8 18 愈b2 Ixd1+ 19 IIxd1 IId8 with an equal game (Robatsch-Lehmann, Palma de Mallorca 1966);

(b) 11...c4 is also acceptable:



12 dxe6 fxe6 13 2c2 2d6, and now: (b1) 14 h3 0-0 15 e4 **Zae8** (if 15...2c5 Black has to reckon with 16

鼍xd6) 16 雲h1 호f4 17 호xf4 戦xf4 18 戦d2 戦xd2 19 ⊙xd2 ⊙e5 20 f3 ⊙h5 with counterplay;

If 11 a3 the simplest is 11... d6 (Furman-Uusi, USSR Ch. ¹/₂-Final, 1954).

11 ... cxd4

11...b4 is weak:

(a) 12 e5! bxc3 13 exf6, and if 13... (2) xf6 (or 13...gxf6) 14 d5!;

(b) 12 2d5 is a piece sacrifice similar to that in Geller-Fuderer (cf. note to the next move), but in a more favourable situation. The dangers awaiting Black are illustrated by Adison-Berliner (USA 1962): 12...exd5 13 exd5+ 2e7 14 dxc5 2dxd5 15 2xd5 2xd5 16 2dxd5 16 2dxd5 17 2e3 2d7 18 2g5 f6 19 2e1 2d6 20 2f4 Wb7 21 2c5 2c8 22 2d6 2xc5 23 Wxe7+ Black resigns.

12 🖾xd4

12 Od5?! leads to interesting complications. In Geller-Fuderer (Gothenburg 1955) the acceptance of the sacrifice led to a win for White: 12...exd5 13 exd5+ Qe7 14 Qg5 (if 14 \blacksquare xd4 with the threat of 15 d6, then 14...Qf8, e.g. 15 Qf4 Qd6 16 \blacksquare c1 Wb8 and Black parries the attack) 14...Qc5? 15 d6! Wxd6 16 Qxd4 Qce4 17 Qe6!, but had Black played 14...Qf8! it is doubtful whether White would have won.

12 e5?! is another aggressive move. Spassky-Suetin (USSR Spartakiad 1963) continued 12...dxc3 (also 12... 2g4?) 13 exf6 2xf6 14 2e5 2c5 15 2f4 2b6 (15... 0-0 was the simplest, since if the knight moves Black has 16...2c6, threatening mate) 16 2xf7?! (at first sight the sacrifice seems justified, since if 16... &xf7 17 $\Xid6!$) 16...0-0! (a clever defence) 17 2g5 (17 2d6 probably offered better practical chances, when Black had the reply 17...2d5) 17...cxb2 18 $\Xiab1$ $\Xiae8$ 19 2xb2 2c6, and Black was a pawn up.



12 ... Dc5

12... \$e7 transposes into the 10... \$e7 variation.

12... 2 d6 13 g3 (the obvious sacrifice 13 2 dxb5 axb5 14 2xb5 does not work in view of 14... 2xh2+ 15 2h1 2b8 16 f4 2xf4 17 2xf4 2xf4 2xf4 18 2d6+ 2e7 19 2xb7 2xc4) 13... 2e5 leads to a position typical of the 10... 2d6 variation, with the difference that the black queen is at c7 rather than b8:

(a) 14 f3 0–0 15 \pounds e3 \pounds c5 16 \pounds c2 If d8 17 Id2 with the better position for White (Reshevsky-Najdorf, match, New York 1952);

(b) 14 兔g5 h6 15 兔e3, when in Gilman-Romanov (corr. 1966) Black was tempted by the win of a pawn: 15...b4 16 ②a4 兔xe4 17 單ac1 螢b7 18 ②c5 ②xc5 19 罩xc5 兔xd4 20 兔a4+!, which led to a clear advantage for White.

12.... c5, and now:

(a) 13 a3 0-0 14 \$\overline\$e3 \overline\$ad8 (the pawn cannot be taken on account of

(b) 13 &g5 0–0 14 \equiv ac1 is more energetic, but note that the attempt to gain an immediate advantage with 14 &xf6 &xf6 15 e5 &d7 16 &xe6 is refuted by 16...fxe6 17 &xe6- \Leftrightarrow h8 18 \equiv xd7 \equiv xf2! 19 \equiv xc7 \equiv xg2+ (analysis).

12...b4 allows White excellent attacking chances. Bolbochan-Naidorf (match, Buenos Aires 1952) continued 13 2d5! (compared with the Geller-Fuderer game on p.26, here the sacrifice is much stronger, since White's other knight is at d4, and in a number of lines he can advantageously play (2)(5) 13...exd5 14 exd5+ 徵e5 (Black returns) the piece and exchanges queens, but due to his queenside pawn weaknesses he stands worse: if 14... e7 15 2f5. or 14... 當d8 15 皇g5 and then, according to circumstances, Zacl or De6-) 15 ₩xe5+ 2xe5 16 Zel 0-0-0 17 Zxe5 乞xd5 18 皇d2 乞c7 19 皇e3 f6 20 〓a5 皇d6 21 置c1 當b8 22 纪c6+ with a clear advantage to White.

13 **L**g5

13 e5 ②fd7 (if 13...②xb3 14 exf6, and 14...②xa1 fails to 15 ③xe6 fxe6 16 資xe6+ 鱼e7 17 fxg7; 13...②fe4 14 ④xe4 ④xe4 15 f3! also favours White) 14 鱼f4, and now:

(a) 14... 公xb3 15 axb3 全e7 16 蓋ac1 對b6 17 全e3 對a5 18 f4, and White gained a powerful position (Farago-Dobosz, Lodz 1980);

(b) 14...b4! (Chernin), and after this simple reply Black has nothing to fear.

13 全3 全7 14 里ac1 0-0 15 f3 (15 全c2!? and then a2-a3) 15....里ac8 16 全c2 單fd8 17 a3 戰b8 18 全b3 全xb3 19 全xb3 全d6 20 g3 全e7 with roughly equal chances (Salov-Chernin, Wijk aan Zee 1991).

13 \$d6 . . . 13.... Is very dangerous in view of 14 Dxe4 @xe4 (if 14...Dxe4? 15 Ixa4 18 Wxc6+!, winning) 15 f3!, and if 15... Dxb3 16 Wxe4 (Christiansen). 14 Hac1 ≜xh2+

15 ∲h1 Âe5



In Christiansen-Anand (Las Palmas 1993) a sharp tactical battle developed: 16 \$xf6 gxf6 (if 16...\$xf6? 17 Dcxb5! axb5 18 2xb5 19 2d6+ \$e7 20 Wh5 g6 21 Wxc5 and wins) 17 @cxb5! (if 17 Wh5 0-0-0) 17... We7 18 Exc5! (18 2c3 f5 favours Black) 18 ... Wxc5 19 @xe6! fxe6 (if 19... Wxb5 20 Wh5 雲e7 21 ②c7 響xb3 22 axb3 皇xc7 23 ₩c5+ and wins) 20 ₩h5+ \$e7 21 \$xe6! \$xe6 22 ₩g4+ \$f7 23 Id7+ ₩e7 24 ₩h5+ \$f8 25 ₩h6+ \$f7 26 " xe7+ \$xe7 27 ₩g7+ \$e6 28 ₩g4+, with a draw by perpetual check (analysis by Anand).

1.1115 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Df3 響e2 b5 8 拿b3 拿b7 9 罩d1 分bd7 10 Dc3

> 10 ₩b6 . . .

5

Black takes measures against e3-e4 (by putting pressure on d4), but compared with the 10... #c7 variation, the position of the queen at b6 has its drawbacks.

11 a4

If 11 e4 cxd4 12 2xd4 \(c5 (after) 12... Dc5 13 2c2 Id8 14 2e3 White's position is preferable) 13 2e3 De5 (13...0-0 is the simplest) 14 a4 (14 f3 is better) 14... Deg4 15 e5 (after 15 axb5 ₩c7 16 g3 ᡚxe3 17 fxe3 axb5 18 Wxb5+ De7 Black has sufficient compensation for the pawn, Burmakin-Varga, Balatonbereny 1992) 15...@xe3 (15... 2xe5 is also worth trying) 16 fxe3 ④d7 17 ₩g4 h5 18 ₩xg7 0-0-0 19 Wxf7 Lng8 with an extremely sharp position, where Black has attacking for the sacrificed pawns chances (Korchnoi-Pr.Nikolic, Reykjavik 1988).

Other continuations:

11 h3 Id8 12 e4 cxd4 13 2d5?! exd5 14 exd5+ 2e7 15 2xd4. This sacrifice occurs frequently in similar positions, but here in Artsukevich-Klovans (Riga 1964) the cool 15... 當f8 16 公f5 金c5 17 鱼f4 Ie8 18 ₩f3 De5 19 ₩g3 ④h5 20 響g5 響g6 21 里ac1 句f3+ 22 gxf3 ②xf4 23 ₩xg6 hxg6 24 Xxc5

gxf5 enabled Black to parry the threats and realise his material advantage.

11 d5:



(a) 11... ①xd5 12 ②xd5 ①xd5 13 ②xd5 exd5 14 罩xd5 ④e7 (a position typical of many variations; here the queen is not defending the knight at d7) 15 e4 罩d8 (also possible is 15... 對b7, transposing into the 10... 對b8 variation, or 15... 對c6), and now:

(a1) 16 \$\overline\$g5 \$\overline\$xg5 17 \$\overline\$xg5 h6 18 \$\overline\$f3 0--0, and Black solved his opening problems (Ree-Portisch, Wijk aan Zee 1985);

(a2) 16 全e3 對b7! 17 罩ad1 0-0 18 對d2 對a8! 19 對c2 公f6 20 罩xd8 罩xd8, and here a draw was agreed in Salov-Ivanchuk (Linares 1990);

(a4) 16 e5 is weak in view of 16... 響e6, e.g. 17 單d1 0-0 18 全f4 全b6 with a good position (Ubilava-Yakovich, 54th USSR Ch., Kuybyshev 1986);

(b) 11...exd5 used to be considered dangerous in view of 12 e4:

(b1) in Ryzhkov-Tarasov (USSR 1972) Black declined the sacrifice with 12...0--0-0, but after 13 2xd5 2xd5 14 \$xd5 f6 15 \$f4 White gained the advantage;

(b2) but is the attack after 12...dxe4 13 2g5 really so dangerous? Arencibia-Valdes (Havana 1986) and analysis by the Cuban master Andres have not confirmed its correctness: 13...c4 14 \u00e9c2 (if 14 ②cxe4 ②xe4 15 ③xe4 ₩e6! 16 $\pounds c2 \ 0 c5$ with advantage to Black) 14...\$b4 (14...\$e7!?) 15 Dcxe4 0-0 16 a3 皇c5 17 邕xd7?! (the attempt to regain the pawn by exploiting the 'overloading' of the knight at f6 17 ②xh7 ②xh7 18 冪xd7 – ends in failure after 18...Zae8!). Now, instead of 17... ①xd7? 18 ②xc5 〓ae8 19 拿xh7+ 當h8 20 皇e4!, after which White won. Black had the opportunity for a countersacrifice: 17... @xe4! 18 @xe4 \area ae8 19 Id1 2xe4 20 2xe4 ¥c6, regaining the piece and remaining a pawn up with the better position;

(c) 11...c4 12 dxe6, and now:

(c1) 12...fxe6 13 & c2, when at b6 the queen is less well placed than at c7:

(c11) 13...@e7 14 e4 @c5 15 @g5, and Black had to return his queen with 15...@c7 (if 15...0-0 16 e5) 16 e5 @d517 @e4 @xe4 18 @xe4 @c5 19 @d4@f7 20 @g4 @xd4 21 $\blacksquarexd4$ 0-0 22 \blacksquare f1 with advantage to White (Porreca-Lokvenc, Helsinki Olympiad 1952);

(c12) 13....≝d8 14 2g5 and in Nickoloff-Hamilton (Canada 1984) Black launched a dashing counterattack: 14... 2c5!? 15 2xh7 \$e7!? 16 2c2 ≣h5 17 e4 Idh8 18 h3 2e5 with a sharp and unclear situation;

(c2) 30 years ago I suggested 12... 響xe6, and if 13 皇c2 皇c5 or 13 句d4 響b6;

(d) 11...e5 leads to a closed position in the centre:

(d1) 12 a4 c4 (12...b4 13 a5) 13 âc2 **≅**c8 (after 13...âd6 White stands better, but Black retains defensive resources) 14 axb5 axb5 15 \triangle xb5! \forall xb5 16 \triangle a4 \forall c5 17 \triangle xe5 \forall c7 18 \triangle xd7 \triangle xd7 19 \forall g4 h5 20 \forall h3 \triangle d6 21 \triangle d2, and White developed a very strong attack (Najdorf-Reshevsky, match, New York 1952);

(d2) 12 2g5 \$\overline{2}6\$ 13 \$\overline{2}c2\$ 0--0 14 \$\overline{9}f3\$ \$\overline{2}6\$ 15 \$\overline{6}6\$ 16 \$\overline{2}ge4\$ \$\overline{3}f8\$ 17 b3 \$\overline{2}f3\$ 18 \$\overline{2}6\$ 19 \$\overline{2}xd7\$ \$\overline{2}xd7

(d3) 12 e4 c4 13 &c2 &c5 14 &g5 0-0 with a perfectly satisfactory position for Black;

(d4) 12 &c2 c4 13 &f5!? (in the previous line White includes the exchange of his passive bishop) 13... &d6 14 &xd7+ Oxd7 15 e4 &c5 16 \blacksquare b1 0–0 17 b4 &d4 (17...cxb3 18 $\blacksquarexb3$ with the idea of Oa4) 18 Wd2 (18 &c3) with the better position for White (Lobron-Pr.Nikolic, Novi Sad Olympiad 1990).

11 \bigcirc e5 \blacksquare d8 12 f4 \pounds e7 (the attempt to regain the pawn by 12...cxd4 13 exd4 \bigcirc xe5 14 fxe5 \blacksquare xd4? loses material after 15 \pounds e3 \blacksquare xd1+ 16 \bigcirc xd1) 13 a4 b4 14 a5, and now:

(a) 14..., wc7 15 a4 wxa5 (after 15...0-0 16 ad2 and ac1 White's position is preferable) 16 axc5 wa1 17 axb7 ab8 18 wc2 with the threat of ad2, or 17...ac8 18 ad3 with the same threat;

(b) 14...@a7 15 $\textcircleda4$ 0–0 (here too it is not good to win the d4 pawn: 15... cxd4 16 exd4 $\textcircledaxe5$ 17 fxe5 \blacksquare xd4? 18 $\textcircledas2!$ \blacksquare e4 19 $\textcircledaxa7!$ \blacksquare xe2 20 exf6 \blacksquare xg2+ 21 $\textcircledasf1$ gxf6 22 $\textcircledasf2$ c5 with advantage to White, Ribli) 16 $\textcircledasc4$ cxd4 17 exd4 ②d5 18 单e3 ②7f6 with equal chances (Salov-Ribli, Barcelona 1989).

h4 11 The recent game Høi-Sadler (Yerevan Olympiad 1996) took an interesting course: 11...c4 12 Qc2 b4 13 a5 Wc7 14 2a4 罩c8 (14...豐xa5 15 皇d2) 15 e4 (if 15 2b6, then 15...b3 16 2xd7 bxc2 17 ②xf6 · gxf6 18 響xc2 f5! 19 響a4+ \$c6 20 ₩xc4 \$\sumsymbol{Z}g8 gives Black an attacking position for the sacrificed pawns) 15...b3 16 2b1 Waa5 17 e5 ②d5 (17... 皇xf3 18 ¥xf3 幻d5 merits attention) 18 2g5 2b4 (18...2e7 is possible) 19 響f3 置f8 20 響h5 當d8!? (an original idea; after 20...c3 21 皇xh7) c2 22 If1 the play favours White).



21 $\triangle xf7+$ (after the complicated 21 $\triangle c5 \forall xa1 22 & \triangle cxe6+$ fxe6 23 $\triangle xe6+$ the position is still unclear) 21...cc7 22 $\triangle d6 (22 & \triangle g5 \blacksquare fe8 23 \forall f7 & b8 is also$ $unclear) 22...<math>\pounds xd6 23 exd6+ & b8 24$ $\triangle c5 \forall xa1 25 & \triangle xd7+ & a7 26 & \triangle xf8$ $\blacksquare xf8 (26...\forall xb1 27 & \triangle xe6 favours$ White) 27 $\pounds e4 c3! 28 bxc3$ (to the more tenacious 28 $\pounds xd5$ Black coolly replies 28...exd5!, Speelman, and after 29 $\forall e2$ he wins by 29... $\blacksquare e8! 30 \forall xe8$ $cxb2 31 \forall e1 b1=\forall 32 d7 b2! 33 d8=\forall bxc1=\forall) 28...b2 29 & d2 g6 30 & e2$ $\triangle f4 31 \forall e1$ (if 31 $\pounds xf4 & \pounds xe4$) $31...\forall xd1 32 \forall xd1 & \pounds xe4 33 & \pounds xf4$ Ixf4 34 d7 If8 White resigns, as 35 d5 would be met by the simple 35...e5 (analysis by Sadler).

12 🕗bl

l recommended this move more than 30 years ago. The knight changes route, heading for c4 via d2.

12 a5 幽c7 13 句a4 is sharper:



(a) 13...₩xa5, and now:

(a1) 14 호d2 鬯c7 15 邕ac1 with pressure on the queenside for the sacrificed pawn;

(b) 13...cxd4 14 exd4 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ d5 15 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ b6 (15 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ xd5 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ xd5 16 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ d2 is possible) 15... $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ xb6 16 axb6 $\hat{\mathbf{W}}$ xb6 17 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ a4+ $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ c6 18 d5?! (18 $\hat{\mathbf{W}}$ c2!?) 18... $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ xa4 19 \mathbf{Z} xa4 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ xd5 (Radchenko-Antoshin, RSFSR Ch. $\frac{1}{2}$ -Final 1959), and it transpired that 20 \mathbf{Z} xd5 fails to 20... \mathbf{W} c6! After 20 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ g5 Black still had to defend, but in the end his material advantage told: 20... \mathbf{W} b7 21 \mathbf{Z} a5 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ e7 22 \mathbf{W} e4 \mathbf{Z} b8 23 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ xe7 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ xe7 24 \mathbf{W} g4 0–0 25 \mathbf{Z} h5 \mathbf{Z} fd8 26 \mathbf{Z} e1 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ f5 27 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ g5 h6 28 $\hat{\mathbf{Q}}$ e4 $\hat{\mathbf{W}}$ f8 29 \mathbf{Z} xf5 exf5 30 \mathbf{W} xf5 $\hat{\mathbf{C}}$ g8 White resigns.

12		cxd4
13	exd4	£d5
14	②bd2	皇 e7
15	Âxd5	⊙xd5

In isolated d-pawn positions White usually aims for an attack on the kingside, and Black, after blockading the dpawn or in some other way preventing its advance, tries to simplify. But in this case the weakening by Black of the c4 square suggests to White a plan of action of the queenside.

Suetin-Yakovich (Leipzig 1986) continued 16 \bigcirc c4 Ba7 (Suetin recommends 16...Bc7) 17 Ag5 0 0 (if 17... Axg5 18 \bigcirc xg5 0–0 19 Cd6 with the threat of 20 \bigcirc gxf7 and 21 Bxe6, Suetin) 18 Axe7 \bigcirc xe7 19 Eac1 Cb6 20 a5 Cbd5 21 Bc2 with a slight advantage to White.

1.1116 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 e6 5 2xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7 竇e2 b5 8 皇b3 皇b7 9 〓d1 ④bd7 10 නිc3



Disregarding the weakening of his queenside, Black drives the knight away from c3 and thereby hinders e3-e4.

11 Da4

11 2b1 2e7 12 2bd2 0-0 is quieter:

(a) 13 2c4 2c7 14 2d2 a5! 15 2ce5 (after 15 2ac1 the pin 15...2a6 is unpleasant, e.g. 16 2e1 a4! 17 2xa4 2xc4 18 2xd7 2xa2 19 2b5 2b3, winning the exchange) 15...2xe5 16 2xe5 2d6! 17 f4 a4 18 2c4 2fd8 with an excellent game for Black (Filip-Keres, Curacao Candidates 1962). Without the undermining of the opponent's queenside by a2-a4, White's control of c4 does not set Black any serious problems;

(b) 13 e4 cxd4 14 e5, recommended by Tolush, comes into consideration. If, for example, 14...d3 15 敏太3 ②g4, then 16 오c2! (as later transpires, it is important for White to force ...g7-g6) 16...g6 17 ②c4 오xf3 18 敏太f3 ②gxe5 19 ②xe5 ②xe5 20 敏b7 오d6 21 오h6 置e8 22 오a4 置e7 23 敏e4. White's positional advantage provides more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

The alternative is Shamkovich's recommendation of 11... &e7, and if 12 dxc5 $\forall a5$ 'with roughly equal chances'. Thirty years ago I pointed out that after 12 2 xc5 2 xc5 13 dxc5 $\forall c7$ (13... $\forall a5$ 14 &d2 &xc5 15 a3) 14 &d2 White has some advantage. This variation will be required by us for later evaluations.

₩a5

12 **2**d2

11

Recommended by Mikenas. White wants to exploit the drawbacks to the queen's position at a5.

Keres-Spassky (Amsterdam Candidates 1956) went 12 e4 3556 (it is dangerous to take the pawn: 12...2566 (it is dangerous to take the pawn: 12...2566 (it is dangerous to take the pawn: 12...2566 (it is dands, or 12...2566 (it is dangerous to take the pawn: 12.. parried by 14...c4!) 14...c4! 15 ②xc4, and now Black should have played 15...全d5, and if 16 ②e5 皇e7, when White's advantage is minimal.

White does not gain anything by 12 dxc5 2xc5 13 2xc5 2xc5 14 2d2 0-0 (14...3b5 15 3xb5+ axb5 16 3ac12e4 17 2e1 0-0 18 2d4 favours White, Liberzon-Nurmamedov, Moscow 1967) 15 a3 3b6.

12 ... 单e7



Many modern authors focus on this move.

As in the line given in the note to the previous move, 12...,

If $12... \pounds c6$ 13 xc5 \pounds xc5 14 dxc5 2xc5 15 dd4!, again with advantage to White.

If 12...cxd4 13 2xd4 e5 (after 13... 2e7 14 a3 Black is forced to part with a pawn), and now

(a) 14 ②c2 호c6 15 響c4 호xa4 16 響xf7+ 當d8 17 e4, and Black comes under an attack;

(b) 14 a3 (an original idea introduced in Christiansen-Korchnoi, Antwerp

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1993) 14...exd4 15 exd4+ 含d8 16 公c5 愈xc5 (but not 16...豐c7 17 愈xb4 a5 18 愈xf7) 17 dxc5 罩e8 18 變d3 變b5, and now 19 變g3! would have placed Black in a difficult situation;

(b3) 14 首ac1! (as shown by Christiansen, this version of the knight sacrifice is even more effective) 14...exd4 15 exd4+ 當d8 16 盒f4!, e.g. 16...宣c8 17 宣xc8+ 盒xc8 18 賞e1 盒b7 19 盒xf7 with irresistible threats.

After $12... \pounds e7$ Black intends to castle and activate his rooks. What should White play?

The attempt to exploit the queen's position at a5 by 13 a3 (the idea of Mikenas's recommendation) in this case adds strength to the manoeuvre 13.... 對b5! After 14 響xb5 axb5 15 ④xc5 ④xc5 16 dxc5 bxa3 the game is equal.

However, let us play 13 dxc5 2xc5 14 $\Re xc5$ & xc5 15 a3, when we reach a position that the reader has twice encountered. The first time was in the note to Black's 11th move (the line 11... e7 12 dxc5 etc.), and the second time was in the note to White's 12th move (the line 12 dxc5 (1)xc5 etc.). What is the difference? In the second case Black has already castled, whereas in the first his king is still at e8, since he has lost a tempo on ... e7 and ... xc5. In the second line (with castling) Black's position is satisfactory, whereas in the first, due to the potential threat of 2a4 the position favours White. And it is this first position that we have now reached.

1.1117 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 實e2 b5 8 皇b3 皇b7 9 簋d1 公bd7 10 公c3

10 ... ₩a5



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compared with 10...b4 and 11...#a5 allows White to begin play in the centre) 12 e5 bxc3 13 exf6 \bigtriangleup xf6 (or 13...cxb2 14 \pounds xb2 \boxdot xf6 15 d5) 14 d5 c2 (to divert one of the attacking pieces) 15 #xc2 \boxdot xd5 16 \pounds a4+. The black king is forced to remain in the centre (Fridstein-Mikenas, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1958).

1.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 纪f3 纪f6
4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0 0 a6 7 竇e2
b5 8

10 e4!?



10 ... cxd4

First let us analyse the acceptance of the sacrifice: 10...\$xe4 (10...\$xe4 is strongly met by 11 d5!, e.g. 11...\$xd5 12 \$xd5 exd5 13 \$\overline{2}c3\$), and now:

(a) 11 2g5, with these possibilities:

(a1) 11...皇xb1 12 ④xf7 豐e7 13 ①xh8, when:

(a11) 13...全f5 14 dxc5 公xc5 15 全3 公xb3 16 axb3 (threatening 17 智xb5+ as well as 17 罩xa6 and 智xb5+) 16...智b7 17 罩ac1 - the white pieces occupy threatening positions, and Black has no time to go after the knight at h8;

(a2) 11...\$f5 12 d5, and:

(a22) 12...e5 (a more recent attempt to rehabilitate the variation made in Lazarev-Yakovich, Saratov 1984) 13 a4 c4 14 @c2 @xc2 15 @xc2 h6?!, when White gained a clear positional advantage by 16 @c6! @c8 17 axb5 @b6 18 @xf8. Black should seriously consider 15...@d6, avoiding the weakening of g6 and continuing his mobilisation;

(a3) 11...2g6 is another attempt, recommended by Gorelov: 12 d5 e5 13 20e6 (13 d6 20e6) 13...20e6 14 2xf820e7 xf8. At the cost of the right to castle, Black has held the gambit pawn, and both sides have chances;

(b) 11 d5 e5:

(b1) 12 d6 c4 13 2xe5 2xe5 14 2xc3 (Kazanov-Korsunsky, USSR 1984). After 14...2xd6 15 2xe4 2xe4 16 燮xe4 0-0 (16...cxb3 17 基xd6) 17 盒c2 g6 18 a4 White has the initiative for the pawn;

(b2) 12 ②bd2 皇xf3 13 ②xf3 皇d6 14 ②g5 豐e7 (if 14...0-0 15 ②e6!) 15 a4 c4 16 皇c2 0-0 17 皇e3 ②c5 with chances for both sides (Yurtaev-Korsunsky, Leningrad 1989).

Two more restrained replies to 10 e4: 10... \forall b6 11 d5 e5 12 2c2 2d6 13 b3 0-0 14 2b2. White has the better prospects.

11 e5

After 11 $\bigcirc xd4$ Wb8 12 $\bigcirc c3$ a position from the 10...Wb8 variation is reached, and if 11...Wb6 12 $\bigcirc c3$ a position from the 10...Wb6 variation (12 $\bigcirc c3$ can be met by 12...cc5 13 f3 0–0).

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Black has also tried 11... \bigcirc e4 (11... \bigcirc g4 requires testing in practice) 12 ac2 d3 13 axd3 ac5 14 ac2 ac7(14...ac7 comes into consideration, and if 15 ac3 b4) 15 ac3 b4 16 ac4! ac7(16...axe5 17 axe5 $\ddddot{axe5}$ is met by the spectacular 18 axc5!! $\ddddot{axc5}$ 19 aa4+ ac6 20 ac3, in both cases

11 ... 创d5

winning) 17 纪d6+ 皇xd6 18 罩xd6 (18 exd6 also looks guite good) 18...0-0 19 皇f4 邕fc8 20 皇g3 ④f8 21 邕d4! ④cd7 22 2d3 a5 (Magerramov-Chekhov, USSR Cup 1982). Now with 23 Ie1. intending h2-h4 and Ig4 (or 23 h4 immediately) White could have developed his kingside initiative (Chekhov).

11....\$xf3 12 gxf3 2h5 13 f4 (13 Zxd4 is premature: 13... 2c5 14 Zd1 Wh4) leads to great complications:

(a) 13...g6 14 **X**xd4 (if 14 f5 Black has the good reply 14... 2g7) 14... 2b6 (compared with the note to White's 13th move, here 14... 2c5 15 Id1 Wh4 is strongly met by 16 \frac{16}{13} and (act)c3-e4) 15 Id1 Id8 16 2c3 全e7? (White's next could have been prevented by 16...(2)g7!) 17 f5 (opening the diagonal for the bishop at c1) 17...0 0 (17...exf5? 18 2d5!) 18 皇e3 皇c5 19 罩d6 with an obvious advantage to White (Timman-Seirawan, Indonesia 1983);

(b) 13...)4 14 邕xd4 皇c5, and now:

(b1) 15 Xxd7 (exploiting the diverting of the opponent's pieces to the kingside) 15... \$xd7 16 習f3 罩ac8 (16... **L**hc8 is interesting, preventing the bishop sacrifice at e6, when White can continue the offensive by 17 2c3 f5 18 exf6 Dxf6 19 f5! with an extremely sharp, unclear position) 17 2c3 f5 (defending against the threat of De4, but allowing the following combination, which, however, is not dangerous) 18 ≜xe6+ \$xe6 19 \$d5+ \$e7 20 \$b7+. Black has a draw, but if he wants more, he can try escaping with his king to the queenside, as in Salov-Kupreichik (54th Minsk 1987). which USSR Ch., nevertheless ended in a draw;

(b2) 15 $\exists e4 \ \ \Omega g3$ (apart from this problematic piece sacrifice, 15... 2b6 intending ... Dc5 also requires testing) 16 hxg3 竇xg3+ 17 會f1 竇h3+ 18 會e1 谢h1+ 19 當d2 皇xf2 intending …②c5 (Salov).

¤xd4 **≜c**5 12

Other continuations:

12... 皇e7 13 ②bd2 (the immediate switching of the rook to the kingside by 13 Eg4 is also possible: 13... Wc7 14 \$d2 g6 15 @c3 @xc3 16 \$xc3 ≌c8 17 Ze1 with the better chances for White. Condie-Botterill, Brighton 1984) 13... Wc7 14 乞f1 0-0 15 邕g4 邕fc8 16 皇h6 g6 17 h4, and in this sharp position White's chances are somewhat better (Vaiser-Damljanovic, Vrnjacka Banja 1984).

12.... @c7 13 @d2. and now:

(a) 13... ②5b6 14 ②c3 皇c5 15 邕g4 皇xf3 16 鬯xf3 ①xe5 17 竇g3 盒d6 18 De4 Dec4 19 Dxd6+ 窗xd6 20 窗xd6 ②xd6 21 Ixg7 ②f5 22 Ig4, and the two bishops promise some advantage (Mikhalchishin-Balashov, Minsk 1986);

(b) 13...De7 14 Dc3 Dc6 (14... ②g6!?) 15 If4 ②dxe5 16 ②xe5 豐xe5 (16... 2 xe5 17 Ec1) 17 Ee4 with highly unclear play.

12... Ic8 13 2d2 2c5 14 Ig4 g6 15 2c3 h5 16 Ig3 2e7 17 De4 with the initiative for White (Timman-Garcia Martinez, Reggio Emilia 1984/5).

13 **Z**g4

₩c7


This indirect defence of the g7 pawn (14 $\exists xg7$? &f8, simultaneously attacking the rook and the bishop at c1) is stronger than 13...g6 14 &h6! &f8 15 &xf8 &xf8 16 Obd2 Wc7 17 h4, when White gained the advantage in Gorelov-Baryshev (USSR 1984).

After 13... Wc7 White has two plans.

The second is to force matters by 14 &xd5 &xd5 &xd5 15 &c3 &xf3 16 @xf3 ac8, when the exchange of the g7 and e5 pawns leads to an extremely unclear situation (Perez-Valdes, Cuba 1987).

1.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 2 f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 ¥e2 b5 8 2b3 2b7

9 a4



Before advancing in the centre, White provokes a weakening of the opponent's queenside.

9 ... ⊘bd7 Other continuations: 9...b4, and now:

(a) 10 ②bd2 cxd4 11 exd4 ④c6 12 오c4 오c7 (it is dangerous to accept the pawn sacrifice in view of 12...2xd4 13 2xd4 wxd4 14 2e3) 13 $\Xi d1$ 0–0 with roughly equal chances;

(b) 10 Idl 2bd7 11 2bd2 (also worth trying is 11 2e5 VC7 12 2xd72xd7 13 d5 exd5 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 Ixd5, Beikert-Kallai, France 1993, 15... 76 16 Idl c4) 11...VC7 (with Black's queen's knight at d7 rather than c6, less favourable is 11...cxd4 12 exd4 2e7 13 2c4 0–0 14 2fe5 2d5 15 a5 with the initiative for White, Bogoljubow-Rubinstein, Kissingen 1928; Black would have done better to play ...a6-a5 himself, and White to play a4-a5 earlier) 12 2c4 2e7 13 2fe5 0–0, when:

(b1) 14 2d2 IIac8 15 IIac1 IIfd8. White has the more pleasant position (Keres-Reshevsky, Semmering 1937);

(b2) 14 e4!? was played in the modern game Khalifman-Sadler (Hastings 1995/6):



14...cxd4! (taking on e4 loses the exchange after 15 2xd7) 15 2f4 25 16 2ac1 2a7 17 2a5. Black's position appears perilous, but he held on to the sacrificed pawn: 17...2c5 18 2xb7 2xb7 19 2d3 2fc8 20 2c4 2b6 21 e5 2d5 22 2f 3 a5 23 2dc1 2xc4 24 2xc4 2c8.

9...c4 10 \$c2 \$\overline{2}c6 (after 10...\$\overline{2}bd7 11 e4 \$e7 12 \$g5 0-0 13 e5 \$\overline{2}d5 14 We4 g6 15 Wh4 or 13 ②bd2 ⊑e8 14 Efd1 White stands better, Averbakh-Aronin, 19th USSR Ch., Moscow 1951), and now:

(a) 11 Dc3, when Black has:

(a1) 11...b4 12 ②e4 變d5 13 ②fd2 Ic8 14 ②xf6- gxf6 15 盒e4! 變d7 16 ③xc4 ③xd4 17 exd4 盒xe4 18 變xe4 Ixc4 19 變a8- with advantage to White (Shishkin-Cherepkov, Leningrad 1960);

(a2) 11... \forall b6 12 &d2 \blacksquare c8 13 axb5 axb5 14 e4 \bigtriangleup b4 (14... \boxdot xd4 15 \boxdot xd4 \textcircled xd4 is bad in view of 16 \boxdot xb5, after which 16... \textcircled xb2 fails to 17 &c3 \oiint xb5 18 &a4) 15 &b1 &e7 16 \blacksquare e1 h6 17 d5! with some advantage to White (Pilnik-Stoltz, Belgrade 1952);

(b) 11 axb5 axb5 12 異xa8 署xa8 13 ②c3 署a5 (13... 堂a6 14 e4 ②b4 15 堂b1 堂e7 16 堂g5, threatening d4-d5) 14 e4 ③d7 15 d5! ④d8 16 ③d4! b4 17 ②cb5 with a difficult position for Black (Fine-H.Steiner, Hollywood 1945).

Now White has: 10 axb5 (1.121) 10 c4 (1.122) - p.41 10 Id1 (1.123) - p.42

1.121 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 幻f3 幻f6
4 e3 e6 5 全xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 e2
b5 8 皇b3 皇b7 9 a4 ②bd7

10	axb5	axb5
11	Zxa8	₩xa8
12	Dc3	

12 ₩xb5 is not good on account of 12... \$\overline{x}xf3\$, while 12 \$\overline{x}bd2\$ does not cause Black any difficulties: 12...c4 13 \$\overline{x}c2\$ \$\overline{x}e4\$ (Bondarevsky-Alatortsev, 18th USSR Ch., Moscow 1950).

12 ... b4

If first $12... \pounds x f3$ 13 gxf3 and now 13...b4, then 14 42b5 32b8 15 e4 with the threat of e4-e5.

13 🖾b5



Black's main continuations are: 13... #a5 (1.1211)

13...₩b8 (1.1212) – p.39

13... 2xf3!? also comes seriously into consideration. Yusupov-Anand (Las Palmas 1993) continued 14 gxf3 Wb8 15 Idl (15 f4!? ge7 16 e4 Db6 17 d5, the latest try, was dangerous for Black in Djurhuus-Degerman. Reykiavik 1995) 15... e7 16 e4 cxd4 17 2xd4 **2**d6 18 e5 (18 h3 0−0 19 **¥**b5 may give White a minimal advantage -Anand) 18... \$xe5 19 \$xe6 fxe6 20 f4 \$e7 (after 20...\$xf4 21 \$xe6+ \$d8 22 2a4 White has a winning attack, but Anand's suggestion of 20...\$f7 is worth trying) 21 ₩c4 2d5! 22 fxe5 and Black maintained the balance.

1.1211 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 分行 分f6 4 e3 e6 5 象xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 響e2 b5 8 象b3 象b7 9 a4 分bd7 10 axb5 axb5 11 異xa8 響xa8 12 乞c3 b4 13 分b5)

13 ... ₩a5 14 e4

14 2e5 is interesting. Obukhov-Ibragimov (Novorossisk 1989) continued 14... \bigcirc xe5 (14... \bigcirc a6 15 \bigcirc c7+) 15 dxe5 \bigcirc d7 16 \blacksquare d1 \bigcirc c6 (16... \bigcirc xe5? 17 \blacksquare d2!) 17 \bigcirc d6+ \bigcirc xd6 18 \blacksquare xd6 \bigcirc b5 19 \bigcirc c4 \bigcirc xc4 20 \blacksquare xc4 \bigcirc b6 (20... \bigcirc xe5 21 \blacksquare e4), and now 21 \blacksquare d3! 0-0 22 \blacksquare d8 g6 23 e4 would have set Black problems in view of the weakness of the dark squares (Obukhov).

14 ... ≗e7

14... \bigcirc xe4 15 \bigcirc g5, and after 15... \bigcirc xg5 16 \bigcirc xg5 White threatens 17 \bigcirc xe6.

14... & c6 15 & c4 \triangle xe4 is unsatisfactory: 16 \triangle g5 (or 16 &f4) 16... \triangle df6 17 \triangle xe4 \triangle xe4 18 f3 \triangle d6 19 \triangle xd6+ &xd6. As 20 &xe6 can be met by 20... 0-0, it used to be thought that Black's position was quite sound, but 20 d5! gives White the advantage (analysis).

15 d5

After 15 e5 Black has two replies:



(a) 15... De4, and now:

(a1) 16 &c2 &c6 17 &xe4 Шxb5 18 Шc2 c4 19 &g5 (the pawn sacrifice 19 d5 &xd5 20 &xd5 exd5 21 \bigcirc d4 comes into consideration) 19...&xe4 20 Шxe4 &xg5 21 \bigcirc xg5 h6 22 Шa8+ \bigcirc b8 23 \bigcirc f3 0-0 24 \blacksquare c1 \bigcirc c6 and Black achieved a good position (Uhlmann-Benko, Buenos Aires 1960); (a2) 16 莒d1 cxd4 17 ②fxd4 0-0 (17...②ec5) 18 ③xe6 fxe6 19 莒xd7 (interesting is 19 ①xe6+ 哈格 20 莒xd7 莒xf2 21 莒xe7 戰d8, Meister-V.Ivanov, USSR 1991, after which 22 戰xf2 ②xf2 23 莒d7 should be tried – Ivanov) 19... 獸a1 20 ①xe6+ 哈格 21 莒xe7 獸xc1+ 22 獸f1 獸xf1+ 23 歐xf1 ②a6 24 ②d7, and the position remains sharp (Hübner-Waitzkin, San Francisco 1995);

(b) 15...2d5 16 &g5 &a6 17 &xd5 &xb5 18 &c4 &xc4 19 Шxc4 \bigtriangleup b6 20 Шc1. In Maderna-Stahlberg (Mar del Plata 1947) Black's pawn sacrifice 20... h6 21 &xe7 &xe7 justified itself after 22 Шxc5+? Шxc5 23 dxc5 \bigotimes a4!, but 22 dxc5 would have given White the advantage.

15 ... exd5 Not 15...e5 16 d6. 16 ≜xd5

16 exd5 does not prevent Black from castling: 16...0–0 (17 $rarget{} xe7$ $rarget{} xb5$). Ruzele-Howell (Gelsenkirchen 1995) went 17 $rarget{} d1$ 2a6 18 2c4 2b6 19 d6 2d8 20 b3 2xc4 21 bxc4 $rarget{} ae8$ 22 2c3 (22 $rarget{} d3$!?) 22...2e4 23 $rarget{} d3$ 2xb5 24 cxb5 $rarget{} ae6$, and here 25 2d2 would have retained the initiative (Ruzele).



16 ... ∅xd5

16... $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ xd5 17 exd5 0.0 is weaker in view of 18 d6 $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ d8 19 $\underline{\mathbf{w}}$ c4 with advantage to White (Gligoric).

17 exd5 0-0 18 燮xe7 燮xb5 19 星d1

Now after 19... ①f6 20 兔e3 c4 21 d6 兔c6 22 響e5 響a4 23 響d4 ④d7 24 罩c1 兔b5 25 ④e5 ④xe5 26 響xe5 罩e8 27 寶d4 h6 28 h4 a draw was agreed in Florian-Pilnik (Helsinki Olympiad 1952).

Serious consideration should be given to Ravinsky's suggestion of 19... #a4! If the rook moves on the d-file (the d5 pawn has to be defended), there follows 20...c4, while if 20 #e2 #b3. In this variation Black's position is more promising than in the Florian-Pilnik game.

1.1212 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 ③xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 響e2 b5 8 鱼b3 鱼b7 9 a4 ④bd7 10 axb5 axb5 11 簋xa8 竇xa8 12 ②c3 b4 13 ③b5)

13 ... ₩b8



14 e4 cxd4 If 14...②xe4, as in the 13...₩a5 variation White attacks with 15 ②g5

2c6 (suggested by Obukhov; if 15... 20df6 16 2a4 2c6 17 d5, or 15...<math>2xg5 16 2xg5 with two threats -17 2xe6and 17 d5) 16 d5 (this leads to an extremely complicated tactical situation; if 16 2xe4 2xb5 17 2c4 2b7 with a good position for Black) 16...2xb5 17 2xe4 2f6. This line was tested in Yusupov-J.Polgar (Moscow Olympiad 1994): 18 2xf1 19 2xf7 2xh2+ 20 2xh2 2g4+ 21 2g1 2xe3 22 2xh8 2xd5 23 2a4+ 2e7 24 2g5+ 2f6 25 2xf1, with advantage to White, since Black cannot regain the piece (25...g6 26 2e3 2d7 27 2f7).

14... 全xe4 is also answered by 15 2g5 全f5 (if 15... 全d5 White develops a strong attack by 16 全xd5 纪xd5 17 纪xe6 fxe6 18 豐xe6-), and in Osnos-Spassky (USSR Ch. ½-Final 1959) 16 d5! would have given a winning position.

Other replies:

14.... ⊈e7 15 d5! and now:

(a) 15...0-0 16 dxe6 全c6 17 全bd4 cxd4 18 exd7 全xe4 19 全xd4 置d8 20 全c2 置xd7 21 全xe4 置xd4 22 全xh7+ 含xh7 23 徵xe7 and after the complications White remains a pawn up (Uhlmann-Stahlberg, Wageningen 1957);

(b) 15...e5 (blocking the centre) 16 \pounds g5 0–0 17 Ξ al with the better chances for White (Gligoric);

(c) 15...exd5 16 exd5. This line illustrates well the difference between 13....¥a5 and 13...¥b8. With the queen at a5 Black could now castle (17 ¥xe7 ¥xb5), whereas here the knight is not attacked, and castling is impossible.

14...2c6 is unsatisfactory in view of 15 2a4! 2xe4 (or 15...2b6 16 2e5!2xa4 17 2xc6 2b6 18 d5 with advantage to White) 16 2e5! 2xe5 17 dxe5 2b6 18 2d1 (threatening 19 2xe42xe4 20 2c7+ 2e7 21 2d7 mate) 18...2e7 19 2c7- 2f8 20 2xc6 2xc6 21 2b5. Black has a difficult position: his knight at e4 is in danger, and his rook is shut out of play (Suetin-Alatortsev, 19th USSR Ch., Moscow 1951).

Now White has a choice of good moves:

15 ②fxd4 (1.12121)

15 Dbxd4 (1.12122) (p.41)

If he delays capturing on d4, after 15 Id1 d3 16 Wxd3 &xe4 17 We2 &xf3 18 gxf3 \$e7 the chances are equal (Najdorf-Reshevsky, match, 1953).

1.12121 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乞行]
Df6 4 e3 e6 5 £xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7
響e2 b5 8 皇b3 皇b7 9 a4 ②bd7 10
axb5 axb5 11 🖾xa8 🖤xa8 12 🕰c3
b4 13

15 例fxd4 De5

Black has to defend his e6 - after 15... e7 he comes under an attack by 16 皇xe6 fxe6 17 ②xe6, with the threats of 18 2bc7+, 18 2xg7+ and 18 Wc4.

15.... 15.... 15 xe4 is also unsatisfactory in view of 16 f3 Dec5 17 & xe6.

> e5 16

Black faced a new test in this already difficult variation in I.Sokolov-De la Villa Garcia (Lyon 1995): 16 @c4 @e7 (after 16 ... 2 xe4 17 f3 2d5 18 2 xd5 2xd5 19 Ed1 White has a dangerous initiative for the sacrificed pawn) 17 e5 ④fd7 18 萬e1 0-0 19 皇f4 ④b6 20 ④d6 - White stands better.

> 例fd7 16 . . .

Or 16... Dxb3 17 exf6 (stronger than 17 2xb3 2d7 18 2a5, which is also good) 17... ①xd4 18 ②xd4 单d5 (19 ₩b5+ was threatened) 19 ₩a6 gxf6 20 ₩a4+ \$\cong d8 21 \$\overline{2}\$ d1! (threatening 22) €c6+) and if 21... 2d6 22 £f4! (analysis). ∲e7

17 **£**f4

After 17... 2xb3 18 2xb3 e7 19 Id1 皇a6 (not 19...皇d5 20 Ixd5! exd5 21 23d4 with a dangerous attack) 20 Dc7+ ₩xc7 21 ₩xa6 0-0 22 Dd4 Dc5 23 Wc4 Black succeeds in completing his development, but White's position remains preferable (Kopylov-Flohr, 19th USSR Ch., Moscow 1951).



In Darga-Clarke (Luzern 1963) came the unexpected sacrifice 18 2f5?! ②xb3 (after 18...exf5 19 皇xf7+ 當f8 20 響h5 皇e4 21 ②d4 皇f6 it would appear that Black can parry the threats) 19 ②bd6+ \$xd6 20 ②xd6+ \$e7 21 ¥h5. when 21... If 8? allowed White to conclude his attack successfully: 22 ₩g5+ f6 23 ₩xg7+ \$d8 24 exf6, but after 21... 2d5! 22 Wxf7+ &d8 23 Id1 Ξf8 24 ₩xg7 ⊑xf4 25 ₩g5+ Ξf6 Black could have defended, e.g. 26 包f7+ 當e7 27 exf6+ ②xf6 28 ②h6 豐f8 29 豐f4 ₩d8 30 ₩xb4+ ₩d6 (Darga).

Ravinsky's recommendation of 18 2d6+ 2xd6 19 exd6 should be consid-with a very strong attack) 20 \$c2 with advantage to White.

Later in Uhlmann-Gheorghiu (Hastings 1965/6) White adopted the positional plan 18 2c2. After 18...0-0 19 ②c6 響e8 21 ③xh7+ ⑤xh7 22 響h5+
 ⑤g8 23 ③c7) 20 竇g4 ④f8 21 h4! he gained the advantage.

1.12122 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 e6 5 全xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 智e2 b5 8 全b3 全b7 9 a4 公bd7 10 axb5 axb5 11 基xa8 燮xa8 12 公c3 b4 13 公b5 燮b8 14 e4 cxd4)



15 ... ②c5

If 15... 2e7 the bishop sacrifice 16 2xe6 fxe6 17 2xe6 is promising.

After 15...&d6 (Ühlmann-Balcerowski, Bad Liebenstein 1963) there again followed 16 &xe6 fxe6 17 \textcircled xe6 \textcircled e5 (after 17...g6 the position remains unclear), when Black came under a strong attack: 18 \textcircled xe5 &xe5 19 f4 \textcircled a7+ 20 &e3 &a6 21 \blacksquare a1 &xe2 22 \blacksquare xa7 &xb2 23 \oiint xg7+.

After 15... 2c5 Black again has to reckon with 16 2xe6 fxe6 17 2xe6Ud6 18 2xg7. 2f8 19 Ud1, and White has three pawns for the piece with a continuing attack (Kuzminykh).

Thus the sacrifice at e6 is constantly in the air, and in the main line Black radically prevents it. 16 皇c4 If 16 燮b5+ ②fd7. 16 ... 皇e7

Capturing the central pawn gives White an overwhelming advantage: 16... 2 xe4 17 2 b5+ 2 fd7 18 2 xd7+ 2 xd7 19 Ed1, or 16... 2 fxe4 17 2 b5+ 2 d7 18 2 xd7+ 2 xd7 19 2 5+.

17 皇b5+ 幻fd7

18 🛣d1

White stands better (analysis).

This evaluation was tested in Hübner-Kir.Georgiev (Moscow Olympiad 1994): 18...0-0 19 全xd7 公xd7 20 公xe6 fxe6 21 罩xd7 徵c8 22 罩xe7 螢xc1+23 豐el 蠻xe1+24 公xe1 全xe4 25 罩xe6, with an extra pawn in a complicated ending.

1.122 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0−0 a6 7 ¥e2
b5 8 皇b3 皇b7 9 a4 ④bd7)

10 e4

A gambit variation, which is not dangerous for Black, if he declines the sacrifice.

10 ... cxd4 If 10... \pounds xe4 there follows 11 0g5 \pounds f5 (11... \pounds xb1 is refuted by 12 0xf7; if 11... \pounds d5 12 \pounds xd5 0xd5 13 \varXi e1. with the threat of 14 0xf7) 12 d5 c4 13 dxe6 \pounds xe6 14 0xe6 fxe6 15 Wxe6with a strong attack.

And if 10...2xe4? 11 d5! $\pounds xd5$ (Black loses after 11...exd5 12 $\pounds xd5$ $\pounds xd5$ 13 $\pounds c3$ $\pounds df6$ 14 $\Xi d1$!) 12 $\pounds xd5$ exd5 13 $\pounds c3$ $\pounds df6$ 14 $\Xi d1$ with a clear advantage to White.

11 e5

To 11 axb5 Black should reply 11... Coc5! (11...) b6 is also possible, Sanguinetti-Pilnik, Buenos Aires 1944) 12 Ac4 d3 13 We3 a5 with a good position, but not 13... Axe4? 14 bxa6 2d6 15 b4, when White gained the advantage in Kotov-Flohr (Budapest Candidates 1950).

The quiet 11 (2)xd4 can lead to great complications:

(a) 11... ①c5 12 單d1 (12 全e3 e5) 12... 徵xd4! 13 罩xd4 ②xb3. How should White give up rook for knight? If 14 全e3 ②xa1, or 14 營d1 ③xd4!, and 15 螢xd4 loses to 15... 罩d8!;

(b) 11...全c5 12 蒕d1 對b6 13 全e3 0-0 gives Black a sound position (Stahlberg-Najdorf, Buenos Aires 1941).



Petrosian-Smyslov (18th USSR Ch., Moscow 1950) now continued 11.... ②g4 12 axb5, when 12... ②c5 13 全c4 d3 would have been advisable (Petrosian).

11... \bigcirc d5 is the soundest move, and if 12 axb5 d3! 13 \textcircled xd3 \bigcirc c5 14 \textcircled c4 \bigcirc b6 15 \textcircled c2 axb5, or 14... \bigcirc xb3 15 \textcircled xb3 \textcircled b6 with roughly equal chances.

1.123 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 2 f6
4 e3 e6 5
b5 8 皇b3 皇b7 9 a4 ②bd7)

10 **Z**d1

This allows Black to complete his development successfully.

10 ... Âe7

10....\b6 is also satisfactory:

(a) 11 e4 cxd4! 12 e5 2d5 13 axb5 c5 14 c4 0-0 15 bxa6 2b4 16 c4d3! 17 cxd3 2xd3 18 wxd3 cxf2+ 19 b1 2c5 20 w22 zxa6 21 zxa6 2xa622 zd6 wb4!, with slightly the more active position for Black (Wexler-Fuchs, Leipzig Olympiad 1960);

(b) 11 axb5 axb5 12 萬xa8+ 金xa8 13 全c3 b4 14 dxc5 金xc5 15 全a4 戦b8 16 紀xc5 公xc5 with an equal position (Dokhoian-Balashov, Irkutsk 1986).

10....♥b8 is a modern idea, to answer 11 axb5 axb5 12 \\\#xx8 with 12...\\@xx8, defending the b-pawn with the queen.

After 10...c4 11 &c2 \boxplus c8 12 axb5 axb5 13 b3 cxb3 14 &xb3 &d6 15 Da3! White has the initiative (Vaganian-Mukhin, USSR 1969).

11 Dbd2

If White first exchanges on b5 and a8 - 11 axb5 axb5 12 \blacksquare xa8 \blacksquare xa8, and then plays 13 bbd2, after 13...c4 14 bc2 ce4 this leads to a position from Bondarevsky-Alatortsev (p.37).

Other continuations:

11 公a3 0-0 12 单d2 (not 12 axb5 axb5 13 敏xb5? in view of 13...全a6 14 敏c6 鱼c2 15 트e1 트c8 16 敏b7 트b8) 12...cxd4 13 exd4 bxa4 14 鱼xa4 公b6 15 鱼a5 敏d6 with a perfectly satisfactory position for Black (Novotelnov-Flohr, 19th USSR Ch., Moscow 1951).

11 dxc5 0-0 12 \pounds c2 (in Guimard-Bazan, Buenos Aires 1960, after 12 \bigcirc e5 Wc7 the incorrect 13 c6 \bigcirc xe5 14 cxb7 \bigcirc eg4 15 f4 \oiint xb7 led to an advantage for Black) 12...b4 (or 12... \pounds xc5 13 \bigcirc e5 b4 14 \bigcirc xd7 \bigcirc xd7 15 \bigcirc d2 f5 16 \bigcirc b3 \pounds d5 with an equal game, Euwe-Alekhine, match, Holland 1937) 13 c6 \pounds xc6 14 \bigcirc e5 \oiint c7 15 \bigcirc xc6 \oiint xc6. Black has harmoniously developed his forces (Ilivitsky-Petrosian, 22nd USSR Ch., Moscow 1955). Olafsson-Keres (Zurich Candidates 1959) now continued 11...對b6 12 公f1 0-0 13 公g3 單fd8 with chances for both sides.

1.2 (1	d4 d5 1	2 c4 dx	c4 3 4	Df3 4	<u>)</u> f6 4
e3 e6	5 🗟 x c	4 c5 6	00	a6 7	₩e2
b5)					

8 🟦 d3

The bishop moves off the a2-g8 diagonal, and e6 and f7 do not now come under attack. White's plans involve attacking the b5 pawn, which will give him strong points on the queenside, and also the advance e3-e4.



We consider: 8...cxd4 (1.21 8...ŵb7 (1.22) -- p.45 8...ŵc6 (1.23) -- p.46 After 8...ŵbd7 9 a4 c4 10 ŵc2 ŵb7 11 e4 ŵe7 12 ŵg5 White has a dominating position in the centre (Lilienthal-Landau, Amsterdam 1934).

1.21	(1	d4	d5	2	c4	dx	c4	3	Ð	fЗ	Ðf	6
4 e3	e6	5	Ŷx	c4	c5	6	0-	0	a6	7	₩e.	2
03 8	34.(13)										

8 ... cxd4

Probably best.

9 exd4

Or 9 ②xd4 皇b7 10 置d1 ②bd7 (10...) 変で7 11 a4 b4 is dubious: 12 初d2 ②c6 13 ③xc6 賀xc6 14 f3 皇c5 15 忍c4 0-0 16 當h1 窗c7 17 e4 – White stands better, Gheorghiu-Wittmann, Vienna 1986) 11 a4 bxa4 with an equal game.

9... ⊈e7

What difference does it make whether Black first plays 9... \$b7 and then ... \$e7, or vice versa? But after 9... \$b7 10 a4 there is a difference:

(a) 10...bxa4 11 2c2! (11 2xa4transposes into the main line), and while the opponent is completing his kingside development, White seizes the initiative: 11...2e7 12 2xa4+2bd7(12...2c6 13 2xc6+2xc6 14 2xa62xd4 15 2xd4 2xa6 16 2xa6 2xd417 2e3 – Black cannot take the b2 pawn and, with his passed pawn, White has the better chances; to avoid weakening the c6 square, Black can play 12...2d77, but even then after 13 2c3White stands better) 13 2e5 2c8(13...0-0 14 2c6!) 14 d5!:



By this sacrifice White opens the dfile, tying down the opponent's pieces: (a1) 14... 全xd5 15 纪c3! 0-0 (no better is 15... 全b7 16 置d1 置c7 17 纪xd7 纪xd7 18 单f4 and wins, Ahues) 16 Dxd5 exd5 17 Dc6, and Black is obliged to part with the exchange;

(a2) 14...exd5 15 2xd7 2xd7 16 $\forall g4! g6$ 17 $\Xi e1 h5$ (this weakens g6, but 17...2c6 is unpleasantly met by 18 2h6, and if 18...2f6 19 $\forall d4$) 18 $\forall h3$ 2c6 19 2g5 f6 Endzelins-Szily (corr. 1959) and now 20 $\forall e6!$ (Ahues) would have given White the advantage;

(b) 10...b4:



11 ②bd2 ②c6 (after 11... 全c7 12 ②c4 a5 13 单f4 0--0 14 單fd1 White has a promising position, Landau-Reshevsky, Kemeri 1937), and now:

(b1) 12 ②c4, sacrificing the central pawn – 12...②xd4?! 13 ③xd4 螢xd4 14 全3 螢d5 15 f3, when it is difficult for Black to complete his development;

(b2) 12 ②e4 is also strong, as in Böhm-Seirawan (Holland 1983): 12... 全c7 (the acceptance of the sacrifice 12...①xd4 13 ②xd4 鬱xd4 14 全c3 避e5 15 f4 gives White a strong position), and now 13 全c3! followed by 置fc1 would have given White the better chances (Seirawan).

9....2c6 10 a4 bxa4 11 IIxa4 2b4 has also been played many times:

(a) 12 免b5+ 免d7 13 免xd7+ 變xd7 14 公c3 免e7 15 免g5 0-0 (Black should have played 15..., 變b7!) 16 免xf6 gxf6 17 異a5! 会h8 (17...f5 18 d5!) 18 異h5 Ig8 19 I II: Ig7 20 d5 (xd5 21)(xd5 exd5 22 g3! (22) (xe7?)) g4!),and Black found himself in a critical position (Kozul-Psakhis, Zagreb 1993);

(b) $12 \ @c4 \ @e7 \ 13 \ @g5 \ a5 \ 14 \ @b5+$ $\ @d7 \ 15 \ @c5 \ (instead \ 15 \ @c3 \ was$ $good) \ 15...0-0 \ (parrying the threat of$ $capturing on f6 and d7) \ 16 \ \mathbf{Ixb4} \ (16$ $<math>\ @xf6 \ @xb5) \ 16...axb4 \ 17 \ @xd7 \ @xd7 \ @xd7 \ 18 \ @c6 \ @xg5 \ (there is nothing else) \ 19 \ @xd8 \ \mathbf{Ifxd8}. \ White has queen for rook$ and bishop, but the poor position of hisknight at b1 would appear to give Blacksufficient counter-chances (Portisch-Seirawan, Dubai Olympiad 1986).

10 a4

10 公c3 오b7 11 오g5 transposes into a position from the Steinitz Variation.

10 &g5 &b7 11 a4 bxa4 12 \equiv xa4 (Szabo-Portisch, Kecskemet 1962) 12...&c6 13 \equiv a1 0–0 leads to a position from the main line (cf. the note to Black's 12th move). We should like to mention the idea of 12 &c3 (intending &xa4-c5).

> 10 ... bxa4 11 **X**xa4

Here 11 $2c^2$ does not promise White anything, since Black immediately evacuates his king -11...0-0.

But 11 2 c3 0-0 12 2 xa4 2 c6 13 Edl comes into consideration, as in Lputian-Meister (58th USSR Championship, Moscow 1991).

... ⊈b7

11... \pounds d7 12 Ξ a1 0–0 13 Cc3 a5 14 \pounds g5 Cc6 15 Ξ ad1 Cb4 16 \pounds b1 can also be considered. After 16...a4 17 d5 exd5 18 \pounds xf6 \pounds xf6 19 Cxd5 Cxd5 20 Ξ xd5 Ξ a7 21 We3 Ξ c7 22 Ξ fd1 g6 23 Wd2 Wa8 Black maintained the balance in Grechkin-Borisenko (corr. 1961/2).

12 Dc3

11

White achieves nothing by **12 ②bd2** 0-0 13 **②**b3 (13 **②**c4 **③**c6) 13.... **③**c6 14



12 ... 0-0



13 皇g5 皇c6 14 置aa1 a5 15 置fd1 ②bd7 with equal chances (Reshevsky-Portisch, Santa Monica 1966).

13 **Zd1** a5, and now:

(a) 14 \$\overline\$ g5 (or in reverse order - 13 \$\overline\$ g5 a5 14 \$\overline\$ d1), when Black has:

(a1) 14...②bd7. Compared with the previous variation Black has left the rook at a4 in peace, and this allows White to open the fourth rank for the rook, at the same time vacating d4 for his knight: 15 d5!? exd5 16 篇h4 置e8 17 ②d4 g6 18 ②b5 ②h5 (18...②e4 is refuted by 19 鼍xe4! dxe4 20 ②e6!, Rashkovsky-Meszaros, Hungary 1989) 19 ③xe7 鼍xe7 20 闡g4 ②e5 21 闡g5. For the pawn White has a strong position (Kjellander-Endzelins, corr. 1959);

(a2) 14...2c6 15 2xf6 2xf6 16 d5 exd5 17 2xd5 g6 18 If4 2g7 19 2c4, when White is more active, but Black's position is quite defensible (Donner-Van den Berg, Beverwijk 1966);

(b) 14 2 5 2 c6 15 2 g5 2 b4 16 2xf6 2xf6 17 2 e4 2xe4 (17.... 2 b8!?) 18 2 xe4 2 e7 (Nogueiras-Ehlvest, Zagreb 1987), and now White should have considered switching his rook to the kingside by 19 **Za**3, with somewhat the better chances.

1.22 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 e6 5
b5 8 单d3)

8 ... ♠b7 Black's desire to fianchetto his bishop is understandable, otherwise the advanced position of his pawns may tell unfavourably. But here he has to reckon with tactical nuances.

9 dxc5

The alternative is 9 a4, forcing one of the pawns to advance: 9...b4 (conceding the centre by 9...c4 10 &c2 &bd7 11 e4 &e7 12 &g5 favours White, Lilienthal-Landau, Amsterdam 1934) 10 &bd2, and now:

(a) 10...cxd4 11 exd4 2c6 12 2c4 or 12 2c4, leading to a position analysed on p.44;

9 ... 2c6 After 9...2xc5 10 2xb5+ 2bd7 11 2d3 2xf3 12 gxf3 (12 ₩xf3? 2e5) 12...0-0 13 2c3 Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient (G.Borisenko-Gurgenidze, USSR 1967).

10 b4

This leads to complications. A good positional continuation is 10 **Zd1 W**c7 11 a4 b4 (11...bxa4 is preferable, although even then White stands better) 12 2bd2 2xc5 13 2b3 2c7 14 e4 2d7 15 2c3 0-0 16 **Z**ac1 with advantage to White (Taimanov-Rubinetti, Mallorca 1967).

10 ... 🖾 xb4

10..., 它7 comes into consideration. If 11 a3, then 11...公g4 12 g3 (...公ce5 was threatened) 12...h5 followed by queenside castling (B.Borisenko-Ranniku, USSR 1967).

11 兔xb5+ axb5 After 11.... ④d7 12 兔a4 兔c6 (12... 兔xc5? 13 ④e5) 13 兔xc6 ④xc6 14 ④d4 罩c8 15 兔a3 兔xc5 White gains a material advantage by 16 ④xe6! fxe6 17 兔xc5 ④xc5 18 斷h5+.



12 . . .

②d7!

Weaker is 12...@d7 13 @xb4, when the attempt to create threats on the kingside with 13...@a4 14 @b3 @g4 is easily parried: 15 h3 @g6 16 @bd2@xc5 17 @b1. White's king is protected, and he has an extra passed pawn on the a-file (Neikirch, Tsvetkov).

12.... 全 c6 13 對xb4 全 xf3 14 gxf3 對d5 15 e4 對h5 16 置d1 全 xc5 17 對b5+ 会f8 18 對c6 簋e8 19 對xc5+ 對xc5 20 全a3 also favours White (V.Zagorovsky-Perlov, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1956).

13 Wxb4

After 13 燮xb7 ②c2 14 〓d1 〓b8 (14... 燮c8 15 〓xd7 燮xb7 16 〓xb7 ②xa1 requires testing) 15 燮e4 ②xa1 16 ②e5 (if 16 c6 ②c5 17 〓xd8+ 〓xd8 18 b4 ac2, and it is Black who wins!) 16...axe5 17 axd8+ axd8 18 ba4+ ad7 19 ac3 axc5 20 ab2. White will pick up the knight, while Black completes his development, when he will have two rooks for queen and pawn. Both sides have chances (analysis).

≜xf3

13 ... 14 gxf3



We are following Gusev-Vasilchuk (Moscow 1963). After 14...豐g5+ 15 豐g4 豐f6 16 豐d4 豐xf3 17 包d2 豐c6 18 豐e4 豐xe4 19 包xe4 包xc5 20 包xc5 兔xc5 the ending should be drawn.



... Dc6 a4

Other continuations:

8

Q

9 dxc5 & xc5, and now:

(a) 10 a3, when Black has:

(a) 10...0-0 11 b4 全e7 12 全b2 全b7 13 営d1 徵b6 14 ②bd2 骂fd8 15 ②b3 (Henley-Radulov, Indonesia 1982) and White has good prospects;

(a4) 10... 2d6 11 d1 2b7 12 b4 32b2 2b5 14 2xe5 (interesting complications result from 14 2xe5 2xe5 15 2xb5+ 2e7 16 2a4 2xh2+17 2h1 2e5 18 d1 3xc1+ 19 2xc1 2xa1 - both sides have chances) 14... 2xe5 15 2xe5 3xe5 3xe5 16 2d2 0-0 17 2b3 2d5 18 2c5 with a slight initiative for White (Malanyuk-E.Vladimirov, Tashkent 1987);

(b) 10 單d1 豐c7 11 a4 bxa4 12 ②c3 ②b4 13 兔c4 兔b7 14 ③xa4 兔e7 15 b3 0-0 16 兔b2 with some initiative for White (Polugayevsky-Toprover, USSR 1959):

(c) $10 \sqrt{2}c_3 \sqrt{2}b_7 11 \sqrt{2}c_4 \sqrt{2}c_7 12 \sqrt{2}d_2 0-0 13 \frac{\pi}{3}ac_1 \frac{16}{9}d_5?!$ (better 13... wb6, although even in this case White's position is preferable) $14 \sqrt{2}x_16 + \sqrt{2}x_16$ $15 \ c_4 \frac{16}{9}x_{a2}?$ (he should have played 15...wd7, after which $16 \sqrt{2}c_3$ gives White a definite positional advantage) $16 \ c_5 \ c_2c_7 17 \ c_2c_4 \frac{\pi}{3}ac_8 18 \frac{16}{9}c_3!$ (threatening to win the queen) $18...\sqrt{2}d_8$ $19 \frac{\pi}{3}x_c_8 \sqrt{2}x_c_8 20 \frac{16}{9}a_7 \frac{\pi}{3}e_8 21 \frac{\pi}{3}c_1$ $\frac{16}{9}a_4 22 \frac{\pi}{3}x_c_8 \frac{\pi}{3}x_c_4 23 \frac{\pi}{3}x_c_7 \frac{\pi}{9}b_1 + 24 \frac{1}{2}c_1$ Black resigns (Ruban-Rublevsky, Russian Ch. 1995).

9 2c3, and now:

(a) 9...cxd4 10 exd4 ②b4 (10... ②xd4? 11 ②xd4 徵xd4 12 對f3 favours White) 11 ②b1 ②e7, or

(b) $9... \pounds b7$ 10 dxc5 \pounds xc5 11 e4 2d4 12 2xd4 \pounds xd4, in each case with chances for both sides;

(c) 9... \forall c7 10 dxc5 \pm xc5 11 \bigcirc e4 \bigcirc xe4 (better 11... \oplus e7) 12 \pm xe4 \pm b7 13 \pm d2 with the initiative for White (Yusupov-Hübner, Barcelona 1989).

For 9 \mathbf{I} d1 c4 10 $\mathbf{2}$ c2 $\mathbf{2}$ b4 see section 2.111 (p.49).

9 ... bxa4

Kerus-Smyslov (Budapest Candidates 1950) went 9...b4 10 dxc5 (White can also consider the familiar pawn sacrifice 10 2bd2, and if 10...cxd4 11 exd4 2xd4 12 2xd4 2xd4 2xd4 13 2c4with the initiative) 10...2xc5 11 e4 e5 12 2e3! 2xe3 (if 12...2d4 13 2xd42xd4 14 2d2 2xb2 15 2ab1 2c3 16 2c4; however, it is not essential to sacrifice a pawn, and 14 2d1 is also quite good) 13 2xe3 0-0 14 2bd2 with the better chances for White.

9...c4 10 兔c2 요b7 11 axb5 axb5 12 耳xa8 響xa8 13 ②c3 transposes into the 7...b5 8 兔b3 兔b7 9 a4 c4 variation.

10 **£**c2!

As in the 7...b5 8 \pm d3 cxd4 9 exd4 \pm b7 variation, when Black delays the development of his king's bishop this move is very desirable.

10 \bigcirc c3 b5 11 \blacksquare d1 bc7 12 \oiint xa4 is also possible. In Hertneck-Klundt (Kecskemet 1989) White gained the advantage after 12...bb4 13 bb1 ae7 14 e4 cxd4 15 cxd4 0-0 16 e5 cd7 17 bf4 \blacksquare fd8 18 ce4.



Now after 10...2b4 11 2xa4+ 2d712 2c3 2e7 (or 12...cxd4 13 2xd42e7 14 Ed1 2xa4 15 2xa4 2e7 16 e40-0 17 2g5) 13 Ed1 2e7 14 2xd72xd7 15 d5 White has the advantage.

Classical Variation 7 ≝e2 ②c6 (7... ②bd7)

d51 d42 c4 dxc4 3 ∕⊙f3 ۵f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 ₩e2

Here we consider: 7...2c6 (2.1) 7...2bd7 (2.2) - p.60

2.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4
e3 e6 5





Black wants to exchange the enemy bishop by ...b7-b5, ...c5-c4 and ...2b4. White has the following continuations:

8 Zd1 (2.11)

8 2c3 (2.12) - p.52

8 dxc5 (2.13) - p.58

8 a3 (2.14) - p.59

The position reached after 8 a4 is analysed in Chapter 3 (p.61).

8 \triangle b3 is considered under the move order 7 \triangle b3 \triangle c6 8 $\$ e2 (p.86).

2.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≗xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 ¥e2 ②c6)

8 Id1

White agrees to the exchange of his bishop.

8 ... b5 After 8... \forall c7 9 \triangle c3 (if White wants to prevent ...b7-b5 'for ever', he can choose 9 a4) Black has:

(a) 9...b5 10 **2**b3, leading to positions from section 2.121 (p.53);

(b) 9... e7 and now:



(b1) 10 a3 b5 11 &a2 b4 12 $\bigtriangledowna4$ cxd4 13 exd4 &d7 14 axb4 $\textcircledaxb4$ 15 $\textcircledaxb5!$ 16 $\textcircledaxb5$ (if 16 $\textcircledaxb5$ axb5 17 $\textcircledaxb5+ \textcircledaxb7$, and there is no way of defending the bishop at a2) 16... $\textcircledaxb7$ with roughly equal chances (Flohr-Capablanca (Semmering-Baden 1937);

(b2) 10 dxc5 \$xc5 11 h3 deserves consideration, taking play along the

lines of the Furman Variation (Chapter 6, p.114);

(b3) 10 d5 is another way of fighting for the initiative, e.g. 10...exd5 11 \bigotimes xd5 \bigotimes xd5 12 \bigotimes xd5 0-0 13 h3 (13 e4 \bigotimes g4), when White's position is preferable;

(b4) 10 2b3 is another possibility, to answer 10...b5 with 11 a4;

(c) 9...b5 10 2d3 2b7 11 2d2 (unblocking the c-file, in order to exploit the position of the queen at c7) 11... cxd4 12 exd4 2d6?! (after 12...2e7 13 2ac1 0-0 14 2e4 White stands better, but 12...2b4 comes into consideration) 13 2ac1 2e7 (13...0-0 14 2e4 2xe415 2exe4 g6 16 2exe4 favours White) 14 2e4 and White has the better position (Taimanov-Rashkovsky (Minsk 1976).

We now consider:

9 £b3 (2.111)

9 dxc5 (2.112) - p.51

2.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 賀e2 公c6 8 邕d1 b5)

9 单 b3 c4

Black exchanges the opponent's active bishop, but in so doing he removes the pressure on the d4 pawn and allows White freedom of action in the centre.

Other replies:

9...cxd4 10 2xd4 (10 exd4 is also good), and now:

(a) 10...2xd4 11 exd4, when Black has to reckon with the threat of d4-d5, e.g. 11...2b7 12 2g5 2e7 13 2xf62xf6 14 d5 with advantage to White;

(b) 10...暫c7 11 a4 b4 (if 11...bxa4 12 公xc6) 12 公xc6 暫xc6 13 a5 皇d7 (13...暫b7 is unsatisfactory in view of 14 e4!) 14 ②d2 오e7 15 ②c4, and White has an undisputed advantage.

9....2b7 10 dxc5 \forall c7 11 e4?! \leq xc5, when the routine 12 \leq C3? is met by 12... \leq g4 13 \exists f1 \leq d4!, while if first 12 h3, then 12...h5 is interesting.

9...,≝c7 10 ②c3 or 9...,≝b6 10 ②c3 – cf. variation 2.12 (p.52).

0	≗c2	Db4
1	Dc3	

White wastes a tempo with 11 a3 2xc2 12 2xc2 2b7 13 2c3 2d5 (preventing e3-e4 and 2g5) 14 e4 2xc3 15 bxc3 2c7. Both sides have chances.

11 e4 \bigcirc xc2 12 xc2 \pounds b7 13 d5! is promising for White.

11		②xc2
12	₩xc2	≗b 7

Other replies:

12...2d5 13 e4 (13 b3? cxb3 14 \Im xb3 \pounds b7 15 \bigcirc e5 \bigcirc xc3 16 \oiint xc3 \blacksquare c8 17 \clubsuit e1 \pounds d6 18 \bigcirc d3 \clubsuit h4 gave Black the advantage in Euwe-Keres, Holland 1939) 13... \bigcirc b4 (13... \bigcirc xc3 is weaker in view of 14 \oiint xc3! \pounds b7 15 d5 exd5 16 exd5 with a dangerous initiative for White, Gligoric-Medan, Belgrade 1941) 14 \clubsuit e2 \bigcirc d3 15 a3! White prevents ... \pounds b4 (the routine 15 \pounds e3 \pounds b4 gives Black an equal game) and intends \pounds e3 and b2-b3. After 15... \bigcirc xc1 16 \blacksquare axc1 he has a lead in development.

12... 2e7 13 e4! (13 d5 $rac{1}{2}c7$ 14 e4 e5 15 h3 leads to an equal game) 13... 2b714 a3 with somewhat the better prospects for White.

12....\convertextcolor 13 e4 (here 13 d5 is not good: 13...b4!) 13...\convertextcolor 14 a3. White's chances are somewhat preferable.

13 d5

13 e4 used to be considered unsatisfactory on the basis of Szabo-Euwe (Groningen 1946): 13...b4 14 e5 (14 d5 bxc3 15 dxe6 \forall a5 favours Black) 14... bxc3 15 exf6 gxf6 16 \forall a4+ \forall d7 17 響xc4 罩c8 18 響e2 罩g8, when Black seized the initiative. But instead of 17 " wxc4 White can exchange queens, and a move earlier 16 Wxc3 is possible, and if 16... Wd5 17 \$ f4. We must also mention Mikh Tseitlin's modern idea of 16 d5. and if 16... \$xd5 17 bxc3.



. . . The idea of this move, employed by Flohr against Reshevsky (Nottingham 1936) is to block the centre after e3-e4 withe6-e5

₩c7!

13

If 13... Who there can follow 14 e4 \$c5 15 \$g5 0−0 16 a4 with advantage to White (Vidmar-Grünfeld, Warsaw Olympiad 1935).

Now let us see what happens if Black accepts the challenge: 13...exd5 14 e4 <u>\$e7 (14...</u>\$c5 15 \$g5) 15 e5 كَd7 16 Dxd5 0-0

We are following Euwe-Grünfeld (Zandvoort 1936), where after 17 Wf5 Black gave up his queen for rook and knight: 17... Dc5 18 Df6+ (not 18 @xe7+ ₩xe7 19 @g5 g6 20 ₩h3 h5) 18...\$xf6 19 Ixd8 \$xd8 20 \$25 \$xg5 21 \$xg5 #fe8 (Black cannot drive away the bishop and occupy the d-file) 22 He1 He6 23 He3 Hae8 24 h4 h6 25 \$f6! White soon won, but 23... Ig6 would have been more tenacious (Euwe).

However, several moves earlier White could have prepared his offensive with 17 2e3 (Kmoch).

14 04

White gains no advantage by 14 dxe6 fxe6 15 2d4 (if 15 e4 b4!) 15...當f7, or 15 2g5 賞c6 16 f3 皇e7.

14	e5
15 ≗ g5	
lf 15 ⊈e3 🖓g4.	
15	②d7



Black has nothing to complain of. In the event of passive play by his opponent he can try to exploit his queenside pawn majority.

In Reshevsky-Flohr (Nottingham 1936) after 16 2e3 2c5 17 2xc5 $\frac{1}{2}$ xc5 18 b3 0-0 19 bxc4 $\frac{1}{2}$ xc4 20 $\frac{1}{2}$ d2 當
c7 21 對b2 當fc8 22 當ac1 ④c5 23 Db3 the players agreed a draw, although Black's position is preferable (23...④xb3 followed by ..., ∰d6). As shown by Alekhine, 16... d6 would have been more accurate, when White's demonstration on the kingside does not achieve its aim: 17 h4 g6 18 h6 f6.

A roughly equal game results from 16 Lacl 2d6 17 De2 (intending to

manoeuvre the knight to g3 and f5; White will attack the opponent's pawn chain with b2-b3) 17...0-0 18 2g3 Eac8 (not 18...f6 19 2e3 g6 20 h4 Eac8 21 h5 with an attack, Stahlberg-Alexander, London 1951), and if 19 2f5 \blacksquare fe8 with a defensible position.

9 dxc5

White's plan is to attack the opponent's queenside, therefore his bishop will then retreat to d3.

If immediately $9 \pm d3 \mod 4! (9...c4)$ leads to the main line) $10 \oplus d4 \oplus d4$ $11 \mod 4 \oplus b7$ or $10 \mod 4 \oplus b4$, exchanging the important bishop.

₩c7

Retreating the bishop to b3 is not in the spirit of the variation.

10 ... · ④b4!



This last move is an old recommendation by Leonhardt. Black intends to exchange the dangerous bishop.

Subsequent games showed that Black should not hurry with the capture of the

c5 pawn, since after 10... $\pounds xc5$ 11 a4 his queenside comes under pressure:

(a) 11...bxa4 (employed in Pirc-Flohr, Sliac 1932; later Flohr also played this in his match with Botvinnik in 1933) 12 萬xa4 ④b4 13 鱼b5+ 鱼d7 14 鱼xd7+ ④xd7 15 鱼d2 a5 (15...費b7 is bad in view of 16 鱼c3 0-0 17 鱼xb4 鱼xb4 18 萬xd7 響xd7 19 萬xb4) 16 暠c1 (but not 16 鱼xb4 鱼xb4 17 費b5 簋b8 18 鼍xd7? 竇xd7 19 歐xb8- 每e7!, and Black wins) 16...費b7. This occurred in the Botvinnik-Flohr match; by continuing now 17 ④a3! White would have obtained the better game.

(b) after 11...b4 12 2bd2 Flohr suffered in two earlier games:

(b1) 12...0-0 13 2b3 (or 13 b3 2e514 2e4 2xd3 15 2xf6+ gxf6 16 2xd3with advantage to White, Flohr-Horowitz, USSR-USA 1945) 13...2e7 14 e4 2d7 15 2e3 2de5 16 2xe5 2xe5 17 2ac1 2b8 18 2c5 and White gained a lead in development (Alekhine-Flohr, Bled 1931);

(b2) 12...2a5 13 b3 2d5 14 2b2, and again Black failed to equalise (Euwe-Flohr, match, 1932).

11 a4

After 11 a3 Black quickly equalised in Goglidze-Lasker (Moscow 1935): 11... ᡚxd3 12 ₩xd3 요xc5 13 b4 요e7 14 요b2 요b7.

The sacrifice of a piece for three pawns 11 2xb5+axb5 12 2xb5+2c613 2c5 is unfavourable, although it demands accurate play of Black: 13... 2b7 14 b4 2c7 15 2c3 0–0 16 2xc62xc6 17 2c4 2fd8 18 2b2 2f8 19 2xd8 2xd8 20 2d1 2xd1+21 2xd12d5 and Black should win (Alatortsev-I.Rabinovich, Moscow 1935).

In Pachman's opinion, 11 Dc3 comes into consideration, and if 11...Dxd3 12 ∰xd3 ≙xc5 13 e4. 11 ... bxa4 Not 11... 公xd3 12 對xd3 b4 13 c6!, when after 13... 全e7 14 全d2 0-0 15 當c1 e5 16 e4 White has the advantage (Malich-Andric, Belgrade 1952).

12 Ixa4 Ib8

12... $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ xc5 can be met by 13 $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ b5+ $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ d7 14 $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ xd7+, transposing into a favourable position for White from the Botvinnik-Flohr game (cf. the note to Black's 10th move).

13 Dc3 \$xc5

The chances are roughly equal.

2.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 幻f3 幻f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 竇e2 幻c6)

8 Dc3



As we saw in the preceding variation, by exchanging the c4 bishop Black obtains a satisfactory position. With 8 2c3 White prevents this, since now the bishop has a shelter at b1.

... b5

It is dangerous to accept the pawn sacrifice: 8...cxd4 9 exd4 ②xd4 10 ②xd4 劉xd4 11 單d1 - cf. the Steinitz Variation (p.108).

Other possibilities:

8

8....₩c7, and now:



(b) 9 旦d1 b5 10 全b3 b4 (10...全b7 11 d5!) 11 d5 bxc3 12 dxc6 全d6?! (12...全e7 13 e4 對xc6 14 全e5 對b5 15 對c2 0-0 16 全a4 對b6 17 全c6 對c7 comes into consideration, with a defensible position) 13 對d3 (13 e4 全g4 and ...全e5) 13...全e7 14 對xc3 0-0 15 全a4 全d5 16 對e5 全d6 17 對h5 with advantage to White (Eslon-Garcia Pardon, Spain 1979);

(c) 9 \$d3 \$d6 (or 9...\$e7), and now:

(c1) 10 2d2 0-0 11 dxc5 2xc5 12 Iac1 Id8 13 2e4 2e7 14 2d4 2d7. White's advantage is insignificant (Donner-Radulov, Wijk aan Zee 1974);

(c2) 10 dxc5 &xc5 11 \bigtriangleup e4 &e7 12 b3 \bigotimes xe4 13 &xe4 &d7 (or 13...&f6 14 &b2) 14 &b2 and White has the better prospects (Timman-Miles, Tilburg 1986).

9 **≜b3** Here Black has tried: 9...**\$**b7 (2.121) 9...**\$**e7 (2.122) - p.56 9...b4 (2.123) - p.57 He also has two other possibilities:

9...c4. The plan where Black gives up the battle for the centre is acceptable only when he is able to exchange his knight for the opponent's light-square bishop, i.e. in the variation 8 $\exists d1 \ b5 \ 9$ $b3 \ c4$ and 10... b4. But here the bishop can hide at b1: $10 \ c2 \ b4 \ 11$ b1, and after $11... bd5 \ 12 \ c4 \ c3 \ c3$ 13 bxc3 White has the better prospects.

9...cxd4 10 Ξ d1 (or immediately 10 exd4, since it is unfavourable for Black to accept the pawn sacrifice – cf. Bolbochan-Evans, p.109):



(a) $10... \& e^7$ 11 exd4 (11 2xd42xd4 12 Exd4 @b6 does not promise White any advantage) 11... 2a5 12 & c2& b7 13 2e5 0-0 14 & g5 with the better chances for White

(b) 10... 2015 11 exd4 ②b4. This attempt to prevent d4-d5 encountered a vigorous rejoinder in Spassky-Avtonomov (Leningrad 1950): 12 d5! ②bxd5 13 皇g5 with a clear advantage;

(c) 10...d3 11 萬xd3 螢c7 12 e4 臺e7 13 ②d5! 螢b7 (not 13...exd5 14 exd5 0-0 15 萬c3) 14 ②xe7 ②xe7 (if 14... 螢xe7 15 兔g5!) 15 e5 ②e4 (15...④fd5 16 ②g5!) 16 兔c2 ②c5 17 萬d6 ②f5 (17...0-0? 18 兔xh7+) 18 兔e3! and White gained a significant advantage (Ubilava-Dokhoian, Sevastopol 1986). 2.121 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乞f3 乞f6 4 c3 c6 5 호xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 賀e2 乞c6 8 乞c3 b5 9 호b3)

> 9... ⊈b7 10 ≝d1



10 dxc5 \$xc5 11 e4 comes into consideration:

(a) 11...0-0 12 e5 纪d7 13 单f4 纪e7 14 ②e4 with advantage to White (Suetin-Alekseev, Minsk 1959);

(b) 11... 创d4 is given as best in some opening guides, which continue 12 公太4 覺太d4 13 全e3 覺e5 14 f4 覺c7, but instead of 13 全e3 White has the energetic 13 公太b5!

10 ... ₩c7

After 10... 2e7 White has a choice between two plans:

(a) 11 dxc5 (compared with the exchange on c5 on move 10, White has the extra tempo Id1) 11.... ¥c7 12 e4 \$\overline\$xc5 13 h3 (13 \$\overline\$3 \$\overline\$xc8 xe3 14 \$\verline\$xc8 0-0 15 Idac1 is also good, with a lead in development) 13...0-0 14 e5 \$\overline\$2d7 15 \$\overline\$f4 followed by Idac1, \$\overline\$e4 and \$\overline\$c2 (the order depending on the opponent's actions) with good attacking chances;

(b) 11 d5 (the other plan is the typical breakthrough in the centre) 11... exd5 12 2xd5 (or 12 e4 d4 13 e5, and if 13...2g8 14 e6 c4) 12...2xd5 13 2xd5 3c7 14 e4, which leads to a position examined later.

After 10....\begin{aligned} b6 11 d5 exd5 White has:



(a) $12 \ 2xd5 \ b4 \ 13 \ 2xf7+ \ 9xf7 \ 14$ $\ 2xd7+ \ 9xf7 \ 16 \ 9xd5 \ 17 \ 9xf7 \ 17$ $\ 2xd5+ \ 9xf7 \ 16 \ 9xd5 \ 16 \ 9xd5 \ 17 \ 9xf4+$ $\ 9xf6 \ 18 \ 9xf4+$. White has a draw by perpetual check, but he can hardly count on anything more;

(b) 12 e4!, and White launches an attack:

(b1) 12...d4 13 e5 0–0–0 14 exf6 dxc3 15 &f4 (in the main line this move is not possible, since the black queen is at c7) 15...c4 16 &c2 g6 17 bxc3 with a clear advantage to White (Furman-Byvshev, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1952);

(b2) 12...dxe4 13 2xe4 2xe4 14 2xe4 + 2e7 15 2d5 2d8 16 2g5 2xd517 2xd5 0-0 18 2d7! 2d8 (Reshevsky-Vidmar, Nottingham 1936), and now, as shown by Alekhine, 19 b4! cxb4 20 2e3 would soon have forced Black's capitulation;

(b3) 12...0-0-0 13 ②xd5 ②xd5 14

2xd5. The f7 pawn is attacked, and compared with the main line, in which his queen is at c7, Black's position is more dangerous.

10....b4 is unfavourable:



Since the preceding variations are unfavourable for Black, it is worth trying 10... \bigcirc a5 11 \bigcirc c2 Wb6 12 e4 (the critical move) 12...cxd4 13 \bigcirc xd4 \bigcirc c5 14 \bigcirc e3 0–0 (not 14... \bigcirc c4? 15 \bigcirc a4!) 15 e5 \bigcirc d7 16 \bigcirc e4 when, apart from the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice by 16... \bigcirc xe5 17 \bigcirc xc5 Wxc5 18 \blacksquare ac1, after which White evidently has sufficient compensation, also possible is 16... \bigcirc c4 17 \bigcirc xc5 Wxc5.

11 d5!

The most energetic. By opening the centre, White creates dangerous threats.

11 ... exd5

11... ①a5 12 dxe6 ②xb3 13 exf7+ (13 axb3 is also good) 13...豐xf7 14 axb3 螢xb3 15 e4 favours White.

12 e4!

Signalling the start of a typical attack.

12 象xd5? fails to 12...b4, and if 13 约g5 0-0-0 (not 13...bxc3? 14 象xf7+ 會e7 15 暫c4 20d8 16 bxc3 暫c6 17 e4 暫b5 18 e5 with a very strong attack for White) 14 20xf7 囂xd5 15 20xd5 暫xf7 with advantage to Black.

With the quiet 12 2 xd5 White can hardly count on an advantage: 12... 2 xd5 13 2 xd5 2 e7 14 b3 0-0 15 2 b2, and now:

(a) $15... \blacksquare fd8$ 16 e4 Ob4 17 Qxb7 Wxb7 18 Qc3 Oc6 (if 18...a5 19 a4) 19 $\blacksquare d5$ b4 20 Qb2 $\blacksquare xd5$ 21 exd5, and after the retreat of the knight to the back rank (20... Oa7 does not come into consideration) the black rook is shut out of play and White has the advantage (Euwe-Kramer, New York 1948/9);

(b) 15...트ad8 was therefore recommended by Euwe, when the same variation 16 e4 分b4 17 全xb7 實xb7 18 全c3 纪c6 19 單d5 b4 20 全b2 罩xd5 21 exd5 纪b8 22 單e1 全d8 and ...纪d7 leaves White with only a slight initiative;

(c) 15...②b4 16 오e5 (16 오xb7 響xb7 leads to an equal game) 16...響b6 17 오xb7 響xb7 18 響b2 f6 with equal chances.



12 ... d4 After 12...dxe4? 13 ②xe4 ③xe4 14 ₩xe4+ the black king is unable to find a secure shelter: 14...2e7 (or 14...)15 Bf4 Od8 16 Ee1 Oe6 17 Bg4 c4 18 2g5! with a very strong attack, Kotov-O'Kelly, Groningen 1946) 15 2f4 Bc8 16 2d5 Od8 17 2d6 Bd7 18 2xc5 Eb8 19 2xf7+ Oxf7 20 \fbox{E} xd7, and Black soon had to capitulate (Najdorf-Christoffel, Groningen 1946).

In view of the final evaluation of the variation, perhaps Black should decide on 12...0-0-0. After 13 2xd5 (for 13 e5 d4 cf. the notes to the next move) 13...2xd5 14 2xd5 White can count on an attack after undermining the opponent's pawn chain. The question is, are his chances better here than in the main line?

13 2d5!

After 13 e5 it used to be thought that 13...0-0-0 14 exf6 dxc3 15 axd8+ axd8 16 bxc3 gxf6 was a good reply:

(a) 17 오c2 오d6 (or 17...) (c6, then ... ④e6 and ... 오d6) 18 오e4 ④c6 19 a4 bxa4 20 罩xa4 罩e8 21 오f5+ 空d8 22 오e3 ④e5 23 ④e1 徵c6 24 罩h4 锁b5 with advantage to Black (Fuderer-Andric, Yugoslavia 1951);

(b) but 17 a4 is an improvement: 17...c4 18 2c2 2be6 19 axb5 axb5 20 2be4 with the initiative for White (Kir.Georgiev, Donchev).

. . .

13

₩d8

White gains a powerful attack after 13...2xd5 14 exd5+ 2e7 (if 14...4e715 4e7 (if 14...4e715 4e715 4e7 (if 14...4e715 4e715 4e7 (if 14...4e715 4e715 4e715 4e715 4e716 4e717 4e717 4e718 4e718 4e718 4e719 4e719 4e719 4e719 4e710 4e710 4e710 4e711 4e712 4e713 4e714 4e715 4e714 4e715 4e716 4e717 4e718 4e719 4e719 4e719 4e719 4e710 4e7



14 \$14 Ic8 15 a4!



By breaking up Black's pawn chain, White gains the advantage:

15...c4 16 axb5 d3 (if 16...axb5 17 公xd4 cxb3 18 對xb5 對d7 19 公xf6+ gxf6 20 公f5 and White wins) 17 bxc6! dxe2 18 cxb7 exd1=對+ 19 罩xd1 cxb3 (or 19...全c5 20 全a4+ 会f8 21 公xf6 gxf6 22 罩xd8+ 罩xd8 23 b8=對 罩xb8 24 皇xb8 with a won ending) 20 ④c7+ 會e7 21 皇d6+ 豐xd6 22 bxc8=④+! 會d7 23 ④xd6 皇xd6 24 e5 會xc7 25 〓xd6.

15...bxa4 16 ¤xa4 오e7 17 ②g5 0-0 18 ③xf6+ 오xf6 19 ③xh7, and now:

(a) 19...g6 20 $\triangle xf8$ $\forall xf8$ 21 $\forall g4$ and White must win (Sherwin-Kramer, New York 1954);

(c) 19... 溫e8 20 衡h5, when 20... 衡e7fails to $21 \text{ $\underline{\diamond}$}d6!$, so Black is obliged to sacrifice the exchange.

15...d3 16 算xd3 c4 17 算dd1 cxb3 18 axb5 axb5 19 徵xb5 with a decisive attack.

15...b4 16 ②g5, and f7 cannot be defended.

2.122 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 e6 5
තිc6 8 තිc3 b5 9 L b3)

9



10 dxc5

Compared with the variation 9... 2b7 10 dxc5 2xc5 White has gained a tempo, which secures him the initiative. He has also played 10 $\blacksquare d1 \ 0-0 \ 11$ dxc5 $\blacksquare c7 \ 12 \ e4 \ 2xc5 \ 13 \ h3 \ 2d7 \ 14$ $2e3 \ 2xe3 \ 15 \ \blacksquare xe3 \ 2b7 \ 16 \ \blacksquare ac1$ $\blacksquare ac8 \ 17 \ a4 \ b4 \ 18 \ 2b5 \ (to \ 18 \ 2d5$ Black replies $18...\ \blacksquare d8$, and after the knight moves $-19...\ \blacksquare e7$ $18...axb5 \ 19$ axb5 $2de5 \ 20 \ 2d4 \ \blacksquare e7 \ 21 \ bxc6 \ 2xc6$ with roughly equal chances (Spassky-Kots, 30th USSR Ch., Yerevan 1962).

The fact that f2 was insufficiently defended (the result of 10 \cong d1) allowed Black to equalise. After 10 dxc5! White does not have to waste time on h2-h3.

... Âxc5

If Black defers the capture on c5 by playing 10...公d7, then 11 公d4 is good, and after 11...豐c7 12 變g4 全f6 13 公e4 White has a clear advantage (Sajtar-Podgorny, Prague 1947).

> 11 e4 12 e5

10

White also has a good game after the quiet $12 \bigtriangleup a4 \pounds c7 13 \pounds c3$ (Botvinnik).

h4

•	12	• • •	bxc3		<i>.</i>
	13	exf6	gxf6		
After	13.	₩xf6	14 ¥c4	cxb2	15
₩xc5 🕯	∠d7	16 🖭	b2 ₩xb2	17 I	ad l
White ha	as th	e advan	itage (Botv	innik)	

14 ₩c4! ₩b6 15 \$a4!



This move would seem to be even stronger than 15 $\forall xc3$, which occurred in the Euwe-Alekhine match (Holland 1937), where after 15...20d4 16 2xd42xd4 17 2a4+2c7 18 2c3 White gained the better chances. In Botvinnik's opinion, Black should not have lost if he had replied 18...2d8, although it would appear that even in this case he faces certain difficulties.

Now after both 15....全d7 16 bxc3 with the idea of 斷h4, and 15....全b7 16 bxc3 置g8 17 全f4 White has the advantage, while 15...cxb2 16 全xb2 is completely bad for Black.

2.123 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 句行 句f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 竇e2 ②c6 8 ②c3 b5 9 皇b3)

9 ... b4

An attempt to forestall White's actions in the centre. However, as Alekhine remarked, 'the bishop at b3 becomes too strong'.



10 d5

This committing advance was patented by Alekhine. 10 2a4 is a quiet continuation.

10 ... 纪a5

White answers 10...bxc3 with the vigorous 11 2a4! Wxd5 12 c4 (Alekhine).

10...exd5 11 오xd5 오xd5 12 프d1 followed by e3-e4 favours White.

11 2a4+ 2d7

12 dxe6 fxe6

13 Id1

After 13 2xd7+ 3xd7+ 3xd

Shamkovich has drawn attention to 13 265 bxc3 14 2xd7 2xd7 3xd7 15 Wh5+ 2c7 (15...g6 16 We5) 16 e4, with a dangerous attack.

13		bxc3
14	∐xd7	②xd7
15	De5	∐a7



16 bxc3

This was played in the famous game Alekhine-Böök (Margate 1938), with which this variation originated.

16 e4! was later suggested by Suetin. After 16...cxb2 17 皇xb2 or 16...費f6 17 ②xd7 亘xd7 18 徵xa6 White retains dangerous threats.

16 ... \$\$\phienterrow\$e7? Böök suggested 16...\$\$b8 17 \$\Delta xd7 (or 17 \$\$\phienterrow\$h5+ g6 18 \$\Delta xg6 hxg6 19 \$\$\phienterrow\$xh8 \$\$\phienterrow\$f7) 17...\$\$xd7 18 \$\$\phienterrow\$xa6 \$\$\pmiederrow\$d6\$}\$ with the threat of 19... 徵d1-, when Black parries the attack. But things are not so simple: White can continue his offensive with 18 鱼a3, e.g. 18... 鱼d6 19 單d1 當e7 20 鱼xd7 當xd7 21 鱼xc5 (Shamkovich).

The Alekhine-Böök game concluded 17 e4 (with the threat of 18 \triangle xd7 and 19 \triangle g5+) 17... \triangle f6 18 \triangle g5 Bc7 19 \triangle f4 (instead of this Brinckmann suggested 19 Bh5! with the idea after 19... Bxe5 of giving mate by 20 \oiint e8+ \diamondsuit d6 21 \oiint b8+ \nexists c7 22 \nexists d1+ \triangle d5 23 \oiint d8+ and 24 \oiint xd7; 19...g6 20 \triangle xg6+ hxg6 21 \oiint xh8 is hopeless for Black) 19... \oiint b6 (19... \oiint b7, attacking the e4 pawn, suggests itself, when Alekhine had in mind a spectacular finish: 20 \oiint e3 \oiint d8 21 \oiint d3+ \diamondsuit c8 22 \blacksquare b1 \oiint xe4 23 \triangle f7!!, threatening mate) 20 \blacksquare d1 g6 21 \triangle g5, and the attack quickly reached its goal.



8 dxc5

This exchange is usually linked with the fianchetto of the queen's bishop after a2-a3 and b2-b4. Of course, it is more advantageous to continue dxc5 when Black has already played ...&e7, in order to gain a tempo, but if he delays developing his king's bishop, White has to content himself with the 'minimum program'.

White's other plan is to seize space by advancing his e-pawn.

9 e4 is considered under the move order 6 $\forall e2$ a6 7 dxc5 \pounds xc5 8 0-0 \bigcirc c6 9 e4 (the Furman Variation) p.116.

9 ... 0-0



A simple plan, and probably the strongest. However, 9...b5 has occurred more frequently:

(a) 10 2d3, and now:

(a1) 10...0-0 11 b4 &e7 12 &b2&b7 13 $\blacksquared1$ &b6 14 Obd2 $\blacksquarefd8$ 15 Ob3 Od7 (15...a5 is weak in view of 16 bxa5 Oxa5 17 &d4 &c7 18 $\blacksquaredc1$ with advantage to White) 16 $\blacksquareac1$ $\blacksquareac8$ 17 &b1 with excellent prospects for White (Henley-Radulov, Indonesia 1982);

(a2) 10... \forall c7!?, with the idea of not losing control over e5, e.g. 11 b4 2d6 12 2b2 2g4;

(b) 10 \$a2 \$b7 11 b4:



11...皇b6 12 皇b2 0-0 13 罩d1 響e7 14 它bd2 罩fd8 15 罩ac1 罩d7 16 皇b1

ad8 17 2b3 (Pirc-Spielmann, Maribor 1934), and Black somehow imperceptibly found himself in difficulties. With ...b7-b5 he allowed the enemy knight to manoeuvre via d2 and b3 to c5. If the black knight had been developed not at c6, but at d7, this manoeuvre would not have been so strong.

Now 10 b4 \$\overline{2}d6! (setting up a barrier on the a1-h8 diagonal) 11 \$\overline{2}b2 e5 12 e4 (...e5-e4 was threatened) 12...\$\overline{2}g4 gives roughly equal chances.

2.14 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3	②f6
4 e3 e6 5 🗟 xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7	₩e2
තිc6)	

8 a3

In this variation too White's plan is dxc5, b2-b4 and &b2. If Black plays 8...b5 and ...&b7, this transposes into variation 2.3, in which the knight at c6 is not well placed (it blocks the bishop and also does not control the c5 square).

8 ... 🗘 e7

This allows White to transpose into variation 2.3, with an extra tempo.

9	dxc5	≜xc5
10	b4	âd6
11	≜b2	



Stahlberg-Skalicka (Podebrady 1936) continued 11...0-0 12 互d1 響c7 13 公c3 b6 14 簋ac1 皇b7 15 皇d3 幽e7 16 纪e4, and White obtained an active position.

Despite the lost tempo, it is more sensible for Black to employ the plan indicated in the previous variation. namely 11....e5 and g4 (or ... We7).

	2.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 e3 e6 5	3 ④f3 ④f6 4 a6 7 ₩e2)
--	---------------------------------------	--------------------------

7 のbd7



Now 8 Idl b5 9 单b3 单b7 10 ④c3 (or in reverse order, 8 公c3 b5 9 单b3 ♠b7 10 ⊒d1) leads to a position that we have already examined in detail. Here we will dwell on continuations that are of independent significance.

8 e4

8 a4 is another good continuation, leading to a position typical of the Rubinstein-Botvinnik Variation (6 0-0 a6 7 a4 2c6 8 We2), with the important difference that Black's queen's knight is not at c6 (which enables him to control the b4 square that has been weakened by a2-a4), but at d7:



(a) 8...cxd4 9 exd4 6b6 10 2b3\$e7 11 9c3 0−0 12 Id1 9bd5 13 9e5 皇d7 14 皇g5 皇c6 15 罩d3, and White obtains a strong attacking position (Furman-Keres, 22nd USSR Ch. Moscow 1955);

(b) 8...b6 9 邕d1 幽c7 10 e4 皇b7 11 ②c3 cxd4 12 ③xd4 with the better chances for White (Kan-Goglidze, Leningrad 1936).

8		b5
9	٤b3	≜ b7
	41-	6-11 10

If 9...cxd4 there follows 10 e5.

10 e5 ②d5 11

De3 c4

Recommended by Nikitin. The game Taimanov-Nikitin (Yalta 1962) went 11.... 🖾 xc3 12 bxc3 cxd4 13 cxd4 单 e7. and the pawn sacrifice 14 d5 exd5 (if 14... \$xd5 15 \$xd5 exd5 16 e6) 15 ②d4 0-0 16 ≜b2 enabled White to take the initiative. 12

€c2 **≙e**7 White's initiative on the kingside (2f3-d2-e4) is rather more significant than Black's queenside activity (... 2)d7b6 and in some cases ... b5-b4).

3 Classical Variation 7 a4

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	ଏମ୍ ସ	۵f6
4	e3	e6
5	≜xc4	c5
6	0-0	a6
7	a4	

This continuation was a favourite of Rubinstein. White prevents the extended fianchetto (...b7-b5), but weakens the b4 square. In some cases his queen's rook can come into play via a3.

Black's main alternatives are:

7...cxd4 (3.2) - p.82

The development of the knight at d7 used to be considered unjustified, since White has weakened the b4 square, and the knight is 'supposed' to be at c6. But in the following games after 7... **C**7 8 **E**2 Dbd7 Black managed to equalise:

(a) 9 ②c3 单d6 10 單d1 (or 10 单d2 0-0 11 單ac1 b6 12 h3 单b7, Balashov-Efimov, Lenk 1991) 10...0-0 11 h3 b6 12 b3 单b7 13 单b2 cxd4 14 exd4 单b4 (Plinas-de la Villa, Mallorca 1992), in both cases with a perfectly good game;

(b) 9 e4 cxd4 10 e5 2d5 11 2xd5exd5 12 2g5 3dc4 13 3d1 2dc52xd4 2de6 15 2d3 2xd4 16 2xd42d5 17 2d3 (17 2d3)?) 17...2d33d1 3dc5 20 3dc4 20 3d1 3dc4 22 3dc5 20 3dc4 20 3d1 3dc4 22 3dc4 22 3dc2 3dc43d2 2dc2 3dc4 3d

3.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ₺f3 ₺f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4)

7 ... ⊘c6 Now White has: 8 ₩e2 (3.11) 8 ⁄\c3 (3.12) - p.80

3.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Df3 Df6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 Dc6)

8 ₩e2



Black has two plans available:

(a) exchange on d4 and play against the isolated pawn, or

(b) maintain the tension in the centre while continuing his development.

We therefore consider:

8...cxd4 (3.111) 8...≗e7 (3.112) – p.70

8...₩c7 (3.113) – p.76

3.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2/f3 2/f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 2/c6 8 ₩e2)

8 ... cxd4 This move occurred three times in the Botvinnik-Petrosian World Championship Match (Moscow 1963).

9 Idl &e7

Black can avoid the positions with an isolated d-pawn, typical of this variation, by playing 9...d3, after which the pawn structure is symmetric, but White has a lead in development:



(a) 10 \pounds xd3 Wc7 11 \pounds c3 \pounds e7 12 h3 (if 12 e4 \pounds)g4, but 12 b3 0–0 13 \pounds b2 \blacksquare d8 14 \blacksquare ac1 promises White a slight advantage, Rivas Pastor-Smyslov, Hastings 1981/2) 12...0–0 13 e4 \pounds d7 14 \pounds e3 \pounds b4 15 \pounds c4. White stands better, and after 15... \pounds c2?! 16 Wxc2 \oiint xc4 17 \blacksquare ac1 he gained a substantial lead in development (M.Zagorovsky-Romanov, corr. 1966);

(b) 10 **□**xd3 **⋓**c7, and now:

(b1) 11 e4 ②g4 (11... ②b4 should be considered, and if 12 置c3 響a5) 12 h3 ②ge5 13 ②xe5 ②xe5 14 盒f4 盒d6 (14....響xc4 15 盒xe5 favours White) 15 置xd6 響xc4 (15...響xd6 16 鬱h5) 16 鬱d2 ②c6 17 e5 0-0 18 ②c3 with pressure;

(b2) 11 2 c3 2 d6 12 e4 2 g4 13 h3 2 ge5 14 2 xe5 2 xe5 15 2 b5+! \$\$e7 16 Id 1 with advantage to White (Vaiser-Reiman, USSR 1974).

10 exd4

(a) 10...暫c7 11 2xc6 bxc6 (if 11...暫xc6 12 皇b5! axb5 13 axb5) 12 e4 e5 13 \triangle g5 0--0 14 \triangle d2 a5 15 Eacl with a good position for White (Simic-Abramovic, Belgrade 1977);

(b) 10... 2xd4 11 exd4 0-0 12 公3 響d6 13 皇g5 公d5 14 皇xe7 公xe7 15 d5 exd5 16 公xd5 公xd5 17 皇xd5 and a draw was agreed in Pr.Nikolic-Ljubojevic (Belgrade 1987).

10 ... 0-0

Or 10... 2d5 11 신c3 신cb4 12 신c5 0-0 13 신c4 (other possibilities are examined on p.66), and now:



(a) 13... ②b6 14 單a3!, and in order to defend against the kingside attack, Black has to weaken his e6 pawn: 14... f6 15 a5! ②xc4 (15...fxe5 16 axb6 favours White) 16 ③xc4 ④d5, when:

(a1) 17 萬b3 黉c7 18 ②c3 호d7 19 ②xd5 exd5 20 ②b6 萬ae8 21 ③xd5 (if 21 對h5 호e6 22 ④xd5 獸c6 23 ④xe7+ 萬xe7, and the opposite-colour bishops enable Black to defend successfully) 21...호d6! with good drawing chances Geller-Korchnoi (Moscow 1964);

(a2) 17 \blacksquare g3 is a much more promising plan, suggested by Boleslavsky: 17... \blacksquare f7 (there is nothing better; 17... \blacksquare c7 is met by 18 \pounds h6 \blacksquare f7 19 \blacksquare c1, while if 17... \pounds d7 one of the white knights penetrates to d6) 18 \varTheta c5 \pounds xc5 (18...e5 is strongly met by 19 \boxdot a4) 19 dxc5 \blacksquare c7 (20 \boxdot b6 was threatened) 20 ②d6 里e7 21 b4! ②xb4 22 皇h6! g6 23 h4 響xc5 24 ②e4 with a won position;

(c) 13...b6 14 Ξ a3 (this sets Black more problems than 14 a5 b5 15 \pounds b3 \pounds b7 16 \pounds d2 Ξ c8 17 Ξ ac1 \triangle c6, Flear-Kupreichik, Hastings 1984/5) 14...f6 15 \triangle f3 \pounds d7 16 Ξ a1 \pounds e8 17 \pounds d2 \pounds f7 with a sound position for Black (Troisvan der Sterren, Eerbeck 1978).

After 10....2b4 11 2c5 0-0 White can try to mount an attack by 12 III 2fd5 13 Wh5 (if 13 III) Black defends by 13...2g5 14 Wh5 h6 15 III 2fd5 13 Wh5 (if 13 III) Black defends by 13...2g5 14 Wh5 h6 15 III 3fd5 17 III Black does not want to go in for a risky variation with an extra piece but an exposed king - 13...f6 14 IIII) the start Wah7+ 2f7 16 2h6 (Haba-Pekarek, Czechoslovakia 1988), he should choose 13...2f6 followed by 14 We2 2fd5 or 14 Wh3 2bd5 (Haba).

Now White has a choice:

11 单g5 (3.1111)

11 2c3 (3.1112) - p.64

3.1111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3
9)f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7
a4 ②c6 8 谢e2 cxd4 9 邕d1 皇e7 10
exd4 0-0)

11 **L**g5

The point of giving priority to the development of the bishop is that for the moment White leaves the third rank free for the possible switching of his queen's rook to the kingside.

11 ... Dd5

After 11... 2b4 12 2e5 b6 13 **Z**a3 White has fair attacking chances.

The immediate 11...b6 is strongly met by 12 \$\overline{x}\$xf6 \$\overline{x}\$xf6 13 d5!, when

12 2xe7 Dexe7

13 ②e5

After 13 2c3 Black should play 13...\2015 xc3 14 bxc3 b6. The immediate 13...b6 is weaker in view of 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 2c5, when after 15...2cb7 16 2a3 White has a strong attacking position, and if 16...f6 17 2c6! (Novotelnov-Blekhtsin, Leningrad 1966).

13 ... b6

The 2nd game of the Botvinnik-Petrosian match (1963) went 13...2d714 2d2 (White leaves the third rank free for the thematic rook manoeuvre) 14...2c6 15 2d4 2f4 (otherwise the white knight reaches c5) 16 32x4417 3xe4 2f45 18 2a3! 2c8 19 2h3. White's position is the more promising.



14 Dd2

This is more accurate than 14 a5, as in Petrosian-Kotov (Moscow 1972), when 14... \diamond b7 15 axb6 \forall xb6 16 \bigcirc c3 (16 \bigcirc d7 does not work in view of 16... \forall c6, since White cannot take the rook on account of 17... \bigcirc c3!) 16... \bigcirc xc3 17 bxc3 \bigcirc g6 18 \diamond d3 \bigcirc xe5 19 \forall xe5 \blacksquare fd8 led to an equal position. By playing 14 0d2, White plans 0e4, and after weakening the c5 square -0c5. His chances are better.

3.1112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 e6 5 盒xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 公c6 8 對e2 cxd4 9 單d1 盒e7 10 exd4 0-0)

11 公c3 Black's main options are: 11...公b4 (3.11121) 11...公d5 (3.11122) - p.67 To 11... \$ d7 White can reply 12 \$ f4 (also 12 d5!?), and if 12...公b4 13 \$ e5.

3.11121 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 公c6 8 賀e2 cxd4 9 單d1 皇e7 10 exd4 0-0 11 公c3)

> 11 ... 12 De5

12 \$\,\$g5 is also played (as similar setups, 12 \$\,\$e3 too is possible):

Ø)h4



(a) 12... 幻fd5, and now:

(a1) 13 $\&xe7 \ 2xe7 14 \ We4$ (or 14 $\&e5 \ d7$) 14... $2ed5 15 \ 2e5 b6$ and in this still unclear position a draw was agreed in Tal-Hübner (Skelleftea 1989);

(a2) 13 ᡚxd5 ᡚxd5 14 \$xe7 ᡚxe7 15 ₩e4 ᡚd5 (Black takes measures against 2d3) 16 2c5 2f6 17 @f4. Here in Reshevsky-Petrosian (Siegen Olympiad 1970) a draw by repetition was agreed: 17...2d5 18 @e4 2f6 19 @f4. White could have played on with 19 @f3, retaining a slight initiative;

(b) 12... 2d7, and now:

(b1) 13 d5 exd5 (if 13... 2) fxd5 14 xe7 ᡚxe7 15 ᡚe5 ᡚbd5 16 ᡚxd5 exd5 17 皇xd5 公xd5 18 邕xd5, and 18... g4 does not save Black in view of 19 🖞 وَطْعَانَ) 14 @xd5 @bxd5 (if 14... @fxd5 15 皇xe7 ①xe7 16 ②e5, and White regains his piece, obtaining a positional advantage) 15 2xd5 2xd5 16 2xd5 (but now after 16 皇xe7 ①xe7 17 ②e5 and if 18 Xxd7 We8!) 16... 2xg5 17 ₩d2 hxg5 19 Xxd7 ₩f6 By giving up a pawn, Black gains counterplay, and in game 10 of the Botvinnik-Petrosian match he managed to draw the heavypiece ending;

(b2) 13 De5, and now:



(b21) 13...②fd5 14 호xd5 公xd5 15 公xd5 exd5 (15...호xg5? 16 ②b6!) 16 ②xd7 單e8 17 호xe7, and Black faces a dismal choice: 17...罝xe7 18 ②e5 f6 19 f4, or 17...豐xd7 18 囯e1 單ac8 19 豐e3! 冝c7 20 罩ac1! (Vaganian-Inkiov, Buenos Aires Olympiad 1978);



13 包e5 包xc3 14 bxc3, and now:

(c1) 14...2d5 15 2xe7, when 15... 2xe7 is bad in view of 16 2d3 2d5 17 2c2 and the switching of the rook at d1 to the kingside, while after 15...3xe716 3xe7 White retains the initiative;

(c2) 14... \bigcirc d7 15 \oslash xd7 \diamondsuit xd7 (15... \blacksquare xd7 is a tougher defence, although even then White has the better chances after 16 \diamondsuit xe7 \blacksquare xe7 17 d5) 16 d5 \diamondsuit xg5 17 dxe6 fxe6 18 \blacksquare xd7 \blacksquare f6 19 \blacksquare xb7 \blacksquare xc3 20 \blacksquare f1 with a clear advantage to White (Keres-Saidy, Tallinn 1971);

(d) 12...h6 13 \triangle h4 \blacksquare a7 (in order to defend e7 with the rook) 14 \bigtriangleup e5 b6, and now:

Korchnoi, Yugoslavia v. USSR 1965);

(d2) the weakness at c6 could have been exposed by 15 $2a^2$, when after 15... $2b^7$ 16 $2x^6$ gxf6 17 $2x^4$ $2x^4$ 18 $2g^4$ White has the advantage.

12 ... 🖄 fd5 Other continuations:

12...b6, with these possibilities:

(a) 13 對行 公fd5 (13... 2bd5? 14 公c6; 13... 萬a7 14 d5! exd5 15 公xd5 公fxd5 16 오xd5 公xd5 17 公c6 對c7 18 對xd5 요b7 19 公xe7+ 對xe7 20 對d6! with advantage to White), and now:

(a1) 14 Wg3 Sch8 15 Wh3 We8 16 Le2, and White has slightly the better prospects;

(a2) 14 2xd5 exd5 15 2b3 2e6 16 2d2 f6 17 2g4 with some initiative (Pinter-Korchnoi, Beer-Sheva 1988);

(b) 13 $2e4 \pm b7$ 14 $2xf6+ \pm xf6$ 15 Ea3 Ec8 16 Eh3 Ec7 17 b3 b5 18 axb5 axb5 19 Wh5 (19 $\pm xb5$ Wd5) 19... $\pm e4$ 20 $\pm xb5 \pm 2d5$?! (20... $\pm a2$!? - Bischoff) 21 $\pm c4$ with advantage to White (Bischoff-Hort, Dortmund 1985);

(c) 13 置a3, a typical manoeuvre in such positions, should also be mentioned, as well as the paradoxical 13 g4 金b7 (13...h6 14 h4 ②h7 15 d5!) 14 g5 ②fd5 15 ②e4 ②c6, which leads to double-edged play.

12.... d7, and now:

(a) 13 g5 - cf. the notes to White's 12th move;

(b) after the forcing 13 d5 2fxd5 14 2xd5 exd5 15 2xd5 2xd5 16 2xd5Black has the tactical rejoinder 16... 2g4! 17 2c4 2xd5 18 2xd5 2ad8 19 2b3 2d1+ 20 2xd1 2xd1 21 2g5with an equal ending (Van Scheltinga-Clarke, Wijk aan Zee 1970);

(c) 13 24 2c6 14 2xc6 bxc6 15 a5! with the better chances thanks to the fixing of the weakness at a6 (Gligoric-Miagmarsuren, Sousse 1967). 12... Dbd5 (this abandons control of d3, allowing the rook at d1 to join the attack) 13 Id3, and now:



(a) 13... 2d7 14 耳g3 空h8 15 耳h3 with the better position for White (Benko-Filip, Wijk aan Zee 1970);

(b) 13... 2b4 14 置g3, and if 14.... 對xd4 15 象h6 全e8 16 置d1 對c5 17 空d7 象xd7 18 置xd7 with the threats of 19 置xb7 and 19 空e4. White has the advantage;

(c) 13...\2xc3 14 bxc3 \2d5 15 \Bar{2}h3 with attacking chances (Quinteros-Silva, Fortaleza 1970);

(d) 13... **E**e8 14 **E**g3 **&**d7 15 **&**h6 g6 16 h4 again with attacking chances, Marin-Ghitescu, Romania 1987.



This position has already been examined on p.62 under the move order 10...2d5 11 2c3 2cb4 12 2c5 0–0 in Geller-Korchnoi (1964), which initiated the development of this variation. Geller continued 13 2ce4. Here we will consider White's other possibilities.

13 We4

13 **≜d2** – cf. the variation 11... 2d5 12 **≜**d2 2cb4 (p.68).

13 2d3, exchanging the knight at b4, is an interesting plan. After 13...2f6 14 2xb4 2xb4 15 2f4 White's position is preferable (Schweber-Hase, Buenos Aires 1983).

13 營f3 needs testing. Kiselev-Kozlov (Frunze 1988) went 13...萬a7 14 全b3 b6 15 公xd5 exd5 16 全d2 with the more promising position for White.

The aggressive 13 $\forall g4$ comes into consideration: 13...\$ h8 (after 13...b6 14 &h6 & f6 15 @e4 & h8 16 & g5! & xg517 @xg5 @a7 18 @a3 h6 19 @h3 White $has the advantage – Kouatly) 14 <math>\forall f3$ &g8 15 a5 with the initiative for White (Kouatly-Marjanovic, Marseille 1986).

ДЬ8

13 ... Other possibilities:

13...b6, and now:

(a) 14 2c6 2xc6 15 2xd5 is an interesting tactical possibility:

(a1) 15.... 金b7 16 ②xe7+ 響xe7 17 d5 exd5 (17... ②a5? 18 金d3 g6 19 金h6!, and the threat of 20 斷d4 forced Black to part with the exchange, Jamroz-Mikenas, Lublin 1972) 18 金xd5 蠻xe4 19 鱼xe4 and White stands better;

(a2) 15...置a7 is stronger, and in Zs. Polgar-Magem Badals (Pamplona 1991/2) it led to a completely equal position after 16 公xe7+ 公xe7 17 全g5 營付7 18 全xe7 螢xe7 19 d5 exd5 20 全xd5;

(b) 14 ②xd5 exd5 15 變f3 (White plays positionally) 15...金e6 16 金b3 單c8 17 全d2 f6, with a position from Pinter-Korchnoi (p.65), where it was reached via a different move order. In Rashkovsky-Kupreichik (Minsk 1985) White preferred to exchange the strong enemy knight by 18 2d3, which gave him the better position.

13....Ea7, and now:

(a) 14 全b3 ②f6 15 營h4 b6 16 饗g3, when Black has:

(a1) 16...&b7 17 &h6 $\textcircledarroweb8$ 18 Eacl $\textcircledarrowh8$ 19 d5! exd5 (19...gxh6 is bad in view of 20 dxe6 and 21 $\textcircledarrowx67+$; if 19... $\textcircledarrowx65$ 20 $\textcircledarrowx65$ 20 $\textcircledarrowx67+$; if 19... $\textcircledarrowx65$ 20 $\textcircledarrowx65$ 20 $\textcircledarrowx67+$; if 19... $\textcircledarrowx65$ 20 $\textcircledarrowx65$ 20 $\textcircledarrowx67+$; if 19... $\textcircledarrowx67+$; if 19... arrowx67+; if 19...

(a2) 16...堂h8 (a prophylactic move, after which White sacrifices a pawn for an attack) 17 d5 exd5 18 堂e3 (18 公xd5? 公fxd5 19 오xd5 公xd5 20 公c6 fails to 20...公c3!) 18...罝b7 (in the Petrosian-Spassky game Black did not have this important defensive move) 19 国d2 堂e6 20 罝ad1 斷c8 with chances for both sides (Butkus-Pohla, corr. 1984);

(b) $14 \text{ Wgd} \text{ \congh8 15 Wh3 b6 (not 15...} \\ \text{$\&g5 16 \&xg5 Wxg5 17 \&xd5 <math>\text{$@xxd5 18} \\ \text{$@xd5 exd5 19 $@xf7+ and wins) 16} \\ \text{$@e4 We8 (intending ...f7-f6 and ...Wg6) 17 $\&e2! $\vec{mathbb{Z}c7}$ (relatively best) \\ 18 $@g5 \&xg5 19 \&xg5 and White's position is preferable (Adorjan, Vegh). \\ \end{array}$

13... 2f6 has proved quite good, e.g. 14 2d2 (14 262 b6 15 24 2e7 leads to a position examined earlier) 14... b6 15 2e2 2a7 16 2a3 2c7 17 2h3 g6 18 2b3 2g7 19 2c3 2xc3 20 bxc3 2d521 c4 2f6 22 2f4 2h5 with chances for both sides (Tibensky-Sadler, Capelle la Grande 1991).

14 单 b3 b6

Now after 15 2xd5 exd5 16 2f32 e6 17 2 d2 f6 18 2 d3 the only difference compared with the game Rashkovsky-Kupreichik (cf. the note to Black's 13th move) is the position of the queen's rook. White stands better (Gofstein-Panchenko, Aktyubinsk 1985).

3.11122 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 纪行3 纪f6 4 e3 e6 5 오xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 纪c6 8 谢e2 cxd4 9 트d1 오e7 10 exd4 0-0 11 纪c3)

11 ... Dd5



In this variation Black securely blockades the d4 pawn, but the absence of the knight from f6 weakens somewhat his kingside defences.

12 🗘 d3

Other continuations:

12 We4 \bigcirc f6 (12... \bigcirc cb4 13 \bigcirc e5 leads to a position from variation 3.11121) 13 Wh4 \bigcirc d5. Black offers to repeat moves, but after 14 Wg4 \bigcirc f6 15 Wg3 \bigcirc h5 16 Wh3 \bigcirc f6 (16...g6 is also possible) 17 \bigcirc g5 \bigcirc b4 18 Wg3 Ee8 19 \bigcirc e5 \bigcirc fd5 20 \bigcirc h6 \bigcirc f8 21 Eac1 b6 22 Dxd5 exd5 23 2b3 White has an active position (Polugayevsky-Hort, Manila 1976).

12 h3 ④cb4 13 ④e5 호d7 14 호b3 호e8 15 彎f3 篇c8 16 호d2 ④xc3 17 bxc3 ④c6 18 호f4 호d6 19 彎g3 and White stands better (Vyzhmanavin-Ehlvest, Tilburg 1992).

12 253 $\Xie8$ (12...2cb4 13 2e52d7 14 Ug4 2f6 15 Ug3 2c6 16 2c62e8 17 2xc6 bxc6 18 2e4 with the more promising position for White, Magerramov-Ibragimov, 58th USSR Ch. 1991) 13 2e5 2xc3 14 bxc3 2xe515 dxe5 Uc7 16 $\Xid3$ 2d7 17 $\Xih3$ g6 18 2c6 $\Xied8$ 19 Ue3 (with the threat of 2g7!) 19...Uc5 20 Uf4 2c6 21 $\Xie1$ (21 2g7 g5!) 21...b5 (Naumkin-Sadler, Ostende 1992) 22 2g5, and in this double-edged position White retains attacking chances.

12 \$e3 \$\Debta b4 13 \$\Debta b5 \$\Debta d7 14 \$\Debta b3 \$\Debta c6\$, with chances for both sides (Ftacnik-Pr.Nikolic, Novi Sad 1984).

12 全d2 ②cb4 13 置ac1 全d7 14 ②e5 全c6 with an acceptable position for Black.

12 h4, and now:

(a) 12... ②xc3 13 bxc3 兔xh4 14 d5! exd5 15 兔xd5 營e7 (15... 彎f6? 16 兔a3 骂d8 17 兔xc6 and wins) 16 徵c4, with the threats of 17 螢xh4 and 17 兔a3;

(b) 12...2cb4 13 h5 h6 14 2e5 b6 15 $\frac{1}{9}$ g4 2f6 16 $\frac{1}{9}$ f3 2fd5 17 2xd5 exd5. Here in Kuzmin-Suetin (USSR 1970) White sacrificed a piece: 18 2c6 2xc6 19 2xd5 2g4 20 $\frac{1}{9}$ xg4 $\frac{1}{9}$ xd5 21 2xh6 g6, which led to an unclear, double-edged position.

12 ②e5 ②xc3 13 bxc3 ②xe5 14 寶xe5 (or 14 dxe5 豐c7) 14... 盒d6 (Larsen-Spassky, Leiden 1970) 15 豐e2 with equal chances.

12 ... ∅cb4 13 \$£b1 Or 13 2e4 2f6, and now:



(a) 14 皇f4 ②bd5 15 ②xd5 exd5 16 皇d3 皇g4 17 單dc1 單e8 18 皇c7 變d7 19 變e3 (Karpov-Hübner, Oslo 1984). After 19...皇xf3 (otherwise 20 ②e5) 20 變xf3 White's position is preferable;

(b) 14 包e5 包xe4 15 響xe4 包d5 16 響f3! 包xc3 (16...金f6 17 包e4) 17 bxc3 with some initiative for White (Hjartarson-Marjanovic, Belgrade 1987).

13 ... Df6

In this way Black prevents the queen manoeuvre that is possible after $13... \hat{2} d7$:

(a) 14 營e4! g6 (if 14...公f6 White of course does not reply 15 變xb7? 盒c6, but 15 變h4 followed by 盒g5 – Black is obliged to weaken his king's position in an inferior situation) 15 ④e5 (15 盒h6 簋e8 16 ④e5 盒c6 17 變g4 also comes into consideration, when Black should probably play 17...f5, De Boer-Hartman, Copenhagen 1984) 15...盒f6 16 變f3 盒g7 17 變g3 盒e8 (better 17... 盒c6) 18 h4, and in game 16 of the Botvinnik-Petrosian match Black had to withstand a strong attack;

(b) 14 20e5 is also played: 14... 2c6, and now:

(b1) 15 寶g4 ②f6 (15...g6 is bad on account of 16 皇xg6 fxg6 17 ②xg6 hxg6 18 鬱xg6+ 雲h8 19 簋a3!) 16 鬱h3 g6 17 &g5 (17 a5!?) 17... Ξ c8 (as Suetin showed, 17...a5! would have given Black equal chances) 18 a5 \bigtriangleup h5 19 &h6 Ξ e8 20 \bigotimes xc6 bxc6 21 \bigotimes f3 with advantage to White (Gligoric-Suetin, Yugoslavia v. USSR, Rijeka 1963);

(b2) 15 Za3:



15...①f6 16 兔g5 g6 (the exchange on f6 followed by 兔xh7+ was threatened) 17 兔h6! (stronger than 17 a5 置c8!, which in Gligoric-Ivkov, Pula 1971, and Gligoric-Portisch, Novi Sad 1976, gave Black counterplay) 17...置e8 18 置e1. Black has to reckon with the sacrifice on f7. After 18.... 食f8 19 兔g5 White has the initiative (Suetin).

13...b6:



(a) 14 豐e4 g6 15 皇h6 里e8 16 豐e5 (after 16 ②e5 皇b7 17 豐f3 f5 18 豐g3

金h4 19 衡h3 簋c8 chances are equal, Pr.Nikolic-Petrosian, Vrsac 1981) 16... 全f8 17 全xf8 簋xf8 18 신e4 신c6 19 寶3 신ce7 20 신d6, and a draw was agreed (Petrosian-Portisch, Rio de Janeiro 1979);

(b) 14 a5 (with the idea of weakening the c5 square; we should also mention the plan of 14 \bigcirc e5 \bigcirc b7 15 \bigcirc e4 \blacksquare c8 16 \textcircled h5) 14...bxa5 (if 14... \bigcirc d7 15 \bigcirc e5 bxa5 16 \blacksquare a3!, with the threat of 17 \bigcirc xd5 and 18 \bigcirc xh7+; after 16...f5 17 \bigcirc xd5 \bigcirc xd5 18 \bigcirc xd7 \textcircled xd7 19 \blacksquare xa5 White has the advantage in the centre, Gligoric-Portisch, Pula 1971) 15 \bigcirc e5 (15 \textcircled e4!?) 15... \bigcirc b7 (not 15... \bigcirc d7 16 \blacksquare a3! with the threat of 17 \bigcirc xd5 \bigcirc xd5 18 \bigcirc xh7+ etc.), and now:



(b1) 16 20e4 2008 17 2003 55! 18 2005 2xc5 19 dxc5 2xc5 20 203 2007. A similar position (with the difference that Black did not take on a5, but played ...b6-b5) has already been examined in Gligoric-Portisch. Here too it is very doubtful whether White's initiative compensates for the pawns he has given up (Browne-Portisch, Lone Pine 1978);

(b2) 16 \triangle c4 \blacksquare c8 17 \triangle xa5 \triangle a8 18 \triangle e4 is a quieter alternative, when Black, in turn, has the possibility of a problematic exchange sacrifice: 18... \blacksquare xc1?! 19 \blacksquare xc1 f5 20 \triangle g3 \triangle f4 21

營c4 盒d6 22 f3 營g5 (Arlandi-N.Nikolic, Oakham 1986).

13...,營c7 is a weak move: 14 ②e5, and the pawn sacrifice cannot be accepted in view of 14...③xc3 15 bxc3 營xc3 16 邕a3 營c7 17 盒xh7+ winning.



14 **L**g5

Or 14 2e5 2d7 15 2e4 2c6 16 2xf6+ 2xf6 17 $\Xi a3$ g6 (the standard sacrifice on h7 was threatened) 18 2h6 $\Xi e8$ 19 $\Xi g3$ 2d5 20 $\Xi h5$ 2e7. Here in Spassky-Pachman (Manila 1976) some curious tactics removed most of the men from the board: 21 2g5!? gxh5 22 2xf6+ 2g6 23 2xd8 $\Xi exd8$ 24 2xc6bxc6 25 2e4 $\Xi ab8 - draw agreed.$

14 ... h6

We are following Gligoric-Korchnoi (Belgrade 1965) where after 15 全h4 全d7 16 全xf6 全xf6 17 暫e4 White won a pawn: 17...g6 18 暫xb7 莒b8 19 暫e4 全c6 20 暫e2 全xf3 21 獸xf3 全xd4 22 暫f4 e5 23 獸xh6 斷f6 24 斷d2, but Black gained definite compensation.

3.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≙xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7 a4 ②c6 8 ₩e2)

5, der not to free the bishop at c1. In his book of selected games (1951), Botvinnik expressed the opinion that

Botvinnik expressed the opinion that 8...\$e7 was more promising than the exchange on d4. 'After 9 dxc5', he wrote, 'Black is ready to reply 9...\$e4.' However, in the 1963 World Championship Match, Petrosian as Black did not follow this recommendation...

Black avoids the exchange on d4 and

the isolation of the central pawn, in or-

We consider: 9 dxc5 (3.1121) 9 Id1 (3.1122) - p.73

3.1121 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2)f	3
2 f6 4 e3 e6 5 2xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6	7
a4 ②c6 8 幽e2 鱼e7)	

9 dxc5 \pounds xc5 This was played by Petrosian. After 9...264 White has:

(a) 10 \blacksquare d1 (played by Petrosian, this time with the white pieces, against Portisch, Zagreb 1965) 10... \blacksquare c7 11 b3 \boxdot xc5 12 \pounds b2 0–0 13 \oiint bd2 \pounds d7 14 e4 (instead White should consider playing his knight from d2 via f1 to g3, and in some cases to h5) 14... \blacksquare fd8 15 \blacksquare e3 \pounds e8 16 \pounds e2 a5 17 \oiint d4 \oiint b4 18 \blacksquare ac1 b6 with a roughly equal position;

(b) 10 包d4! is a more effective reply: 10...包xc5 (or 10...包xd4 11 exd4 響xd4 12 單d1) 11 包xc6 bxc6 12 包c3 and White has the advantage.

9...Wc7 has also been played: 10 e4 Qg4 11 Qe3 (11...Qd4 was threatened) 11...Qxe3 12 Wxe3 Wa5 13 \fbox{L} c1 Wxc5; (13...Qxc5 was essential) 14 Wxc5 Qxc5 15 Qxa6 Qxf2+ 16 Cxf2 \fbox{L} xa6 17 b4! with advantage to White (Donner-Szabo, Havana 1965).

10 e4

An idea of Furman. White wants to play e4-e5, which will allow him to use

8 ... Âe7

the e4 square for switching his pieces to the kingside.

10 ... ②g4 10...e5 fails to 11 오xf7+ 當xf7 12 營c4+.

If 10....\cong c7 11 e5, then:

(a) 11...2d7 (this is unsatisfactory) 12 &f4 b6 13 @bd2 &b7 14 $\blacksquareac1$ $\verb"b8"$ 15 $\blacksquarefd1$ @d4 16 @xd4 &xd4 17 @e4 &xe4 18 @xe4 with an overwhelming advantage for White (Donner-Kinnmark, Halle 1963). After 18...&xe5 19 $\blacksquarexd7$ &xf4 20 $\blacksquarexf7!$ &xh2+ (the capture of either rook leads to mate) 21 @f1 @c8 22 $\blacksquaree1$ &e5 23 &xe6 @xe624 $\blacksquaref5$ 0-0-0 25 $\existsxe5$ @d6 26 @a8-@b8 27 $\blacksquarec1+$ Black resigned;

(b) 11.... 12 \$ f4 f6, and now:

(b1) 13 2xe6 leads to an interesting variation in the 'romantic' spirit: 13... 2xe6 14 exf6 @xf4 15 @xe6+ 2f8 16 @d7 gxf6 17 @xb7 2d4 18 @xa8+2g7 19 @b7+ 2h6 20 2bd2 2e2+ 212h1 2xf2 (threatening 22...@xh2+ 232xh2 2g3 mate) 22 2e4 Ee8 23 Exf2@xh2+ 24 2xh2 2xf2+ 25 2xf22g3+ with a draw! (analysis);

(b2) 13 2 c3, or more accurately 13 2 bd2, and White gives up a pawn for a marked lead in development.



Now after 11 e5 it seems that Black can play $11... \textcircled{0}{2}d4$, and after 12 0xd4 0xd4 pick up the e5 pawn.

11 e5

Nevertheless! This move occurred in the 8th game of the Botvinnik-Petrosian match. In the earlier 6th game Botvinnik played 11 2f4, after which Petrosian managed to equalise: 11... Wf6 12 皇g3 ②ge5 13 ②xe5 ③xe5 14 ②d2 0-0 15 Had1 b6 16 Wh5 Dxc4 17 ②xc4 a5 18 ②e5 ¥e7 19 里d2 (it transpires that the knight at e5 is not so solidly placed; if 19 \$f4 f6 20 Dd3 e5 21 ②xc5 ¥xc5 22 \$e3 ¥b4 with a good position for Black) 19...f6 20 纪d3 e5 21 ᡚxc5 ₩xc5, and it was White who had to strive for the draw.

A few remarks:

(a) instead of 14 幻d2 (if 14 衢h5 Black has the strong reply 14... 2d4) White does better to preserve the bishop from exchange by 14 2a2, answering 14...0-0 with 15 公c3 followed by 容h1 and f2-f4 (Tal);

(b) instead of 16...②xc4, stronger is 16... ④d4!, obtaining a perfectly satisfactory position, e.g. 17 b3 单b7 18 容h1 響g6;

(c) instead of 18 2e5, correct is 18 2e5. After 18...₩g6 19 ₩xg6 hxg6 20 2d6 2xd6 21 ¤xd6 2a6 22 2xb6 2xf1 23 2xa8 2xg2 24 2xg2 ¤xa8 White retains a minimal advantage.

11 ... Dd4

12 🖾 xd4

Not **12 We4?** on account of 12... 公xf3+13 gxf3 公xf2.

12 ... ₩xd4

13 Da3!

White is threatening 14 Oc2. Black is obliged to take the e5 pawn, but first he must exchange his important bishop.

But what if he plays 13... 2xe5 immediately, and answers 14 Zd1 with
14... $box{w}$ g4? This variation is indeed acceptable for Black, but the whole point is that White has a much stronger move – 14 \pounds e3!, and only after 14... $box{w}$ d6 – 15 \exists fd1. If now 15...bere7 16 \pounds xc5 berxc5 17 \exists ac1 \pounds xc4 18 \pounds xc4 0–0 19 a5, or 15...berc7 16 \pounds f4 f6 17 \exists ac1, in both cases with a great lead in development.



White has more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn. His main trump is his dark-square bishop, which only needs to reach the a3-f8 diagonal, and Black will have to reckon with dangerous threats. However, to find the strongest continuation is far from simple.

15 b3

This was played by Botvinnik in the afore-mentioned game with Petrosian.

Other ways of continuing the attack: 15 Id1, and now:

(a) 15...豐xc4 16 變xe5, and Black experiences difficulties, e.g. 16...0-0 17 買g3 f6 18 變d6 e5 19 盒h6 盒g4 20 h3, or 16...f6 17 變h5+g6 18 變h6;

(b) 15...豐g4 (recommended by Aronin) 16 斷d2 (the best reply; 16 f3 斷f5 deprives White's queen's rook of the third rank) 16...0-0 17 2e2 2f5. White has the initiative, but it is not clear if it compensates for the pawn.

15 2a2 (recommended by Keres). Here too White has the initiative: after 15...2g6 16 2e3 (aiming for c5) 16... 166 (16...162 (aiming for c5) 16... 17 2c5 (16.1) 17 2c5 (16.1)

15 Ic3 (recommended by Matanovic). Black should probably reply 15...0-0, and if 16 Id1 Wg4.

15 ... $\forall c5$ 15...2 x c4 16 bxc4 allows White's queen's rook to take part in the attack. The following spectacular variation by Bronstein demonstrates just how dangerous Black's position is: 16... 0–0 17 $\Xi g3$ f6 18 $h6 \Xi f7$ 19 $\Xi d1 \ b6 20$ $\psi b2! \ c7 21 \ \Xi x g7 + \Xi x g7 22 \ x f6.$

In reply to 15...公g6 Smyslov suggests a pretty variation: 16 金b2 徵d6 17 貫d1 徵c5 18 金xg7! 徵xa3 19 金b5+ 當e7 (if 19...axb5 20 徵xb5+ 當e7 21 徵g5+, mating) 20 徵f3! f5 21 徵c3, and Black cannot avoid mate.

15...f6 is also not good in view of 16 金b2 響g4 17 f3 響h5 18 g4 豐g6 19 金xe5 fxe5 20 響xe5 0-0 21 簋a2!

16 **Z**a2

The rook vacates a3 for the bishop.

If the bishop is immediately included in the attack by 16 2b2, Black should play 16...2xc4 (on 16...f6 White attacks with 17 265 + 263 +

After 16 b4 (suggested by the Dutch player Wolthuis) Black defends by 16... 劉xc4 17 劉xc5 0-0:

(a) 18 萬g3 f6! 19 徵d6 徵c6 (20 兔h6 當f7 21 徵d8+ was threatened) 20 變e7 當f7 21 徵d8+ 萬f8 22 變e7 with a draw; (b) 18 萬d1 f6 19 萬c3 fxe5 (although it looks dangerous, 19...徵xb4 20 變c7 e5 21 萬g3 兔g4 is also possible) 20 富xc4 b5 21 萬c7 bxa4 22 兔b2 萬b8 23 兔xe5 萬b7 24 萬c1 萬xc7 25 萬xc7 萬d8 26 萬xg7+ �af8. After White parries the mate threat, Black can offer an ending with opposite-colour bishops by 27...萬d7.

16		②xc4
17	bxc4	≗ d7
18	≗a3	₩f5



It is well known that with oppositecolour bishops an attack gains in strength. White must aim to coordinate his queen with his bishop, and with this aim 19 \forall b2 and 19 \forall d2 should be studied.

Botvinnik continued 19 **Ľd2**. After 19...全c6 (Black has no time to take the a4 pawn) 20 **Ľ**el h5! 21 **變**e3 (White was threatening both 22 **變**b6 and 23 **變**c7, as well as 22 **Ľ**d5 全xd5 23 **變**c5) 21...f6! (now the sacrifice on d5 does not work, since the black king can go to g6) Petrosian, by giving up his e6 pawn, obtained slightly the better ending (the a4 and c4 pawns are weak). 3.1122 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乞f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 盒xc4 c5 6 0 0 a6 7 a4 ②c6 8 斷e2 盒e7)

9 🖺 🛙 🖾

White continues his development. inviting the opponent to exchange on d4, or else he himself will take on c5 later.

9 ... ₩c7

9...cxd4 leads to variations examined earlier.

9...0-0 is also played, leading after 10 \triangle c3 to the main variation. The continuation 10 dxc5 \textcircled c7 11 b3 is of independent significance. Exploiting White's delay in developing his queen's knight, Black can try to seize space on the kingside with 11...e5! Pr.Nikolic-Seirawan (Skelleftea 1989) went 12 \triangle c3 e4 13 \triangle d2 \triangle g4 14 f3 exf3 15 gxf3 \triangle h5 16 \triangle b2 \blacksquare ad8 17 \triangle ce4 \triangle e5 18 \blacksquare f1 \triangle xe4 19 \triangle xe4 \triangle g6 20 \blacksquare ac1 \triangle xc4 21 \blacksquare xc4 f5 22 \triangle f2 \triangle f7 23 \blacksquare cc1 \blacksquare f8 24 \triangle d3 \triangle xb3 when Black regained his pawn, and both sides had chances.

10 Dc3 0-0

11 b3

After 11 h3 Black has three replies:



(a) 11...**I**d8, and now:

(a1) 12 b3 盒d7 13 盒b2 盒e8 (13... cxd4 14 exd4 ②b4 is bad in view of 15 d5! exd5 16 豐xe7 ②c6 17 ③xd5 ③xd5 18 窗g5) 14 d5 exd5 15 호xd5 ②d4! 16 ②xd4 ③xd5 17 ④f5 ③xc3 18 호xc3 f6 19 窗g4 호g6 with equal chances (Botvinnik-Keres, Moscow/Leningrad 1941);

(a3) 12 d5 exd5 13 ≜xd5 ②b4 14 e4 ②fxd5, and now:

(a31) 15 exd5 \triangle f5 16 \triangle f4 $extit{Wxf4}$ 17 $extit{Wxe7}$ (Reshevsky-Fine, Semmering-Baden 1937), when Black could have gained a satisfactory position by 17... $extit{Lxh3}$, e.g. 18 $extit{De2}$ (18 $extit{De1}$ $extit{Ee8}$ 19 $extit{Wxc5}$? $extit{Exe1}$ + 20 $extit{Exe1}$ $extit{Wg4}$ and mates, or 18 $extit{Wxc5}$ $extit{Wg4}$ 19 $extit{De1}$ $extit{De2}$ (18 $extit{Le8}$ 19 $extit{Wg4}$ 19 $extit{Dg3}$ $extit{Dxd5}$ 20 $extit{Wxb7}$ $extit{Wc8}$ 21 $extit{Wxc8}$ $extit{Lxc8}$ 22 $extit{De4}$ 4 (Fine);

(a32) 15 2xd5 2xd5 16 exd5 4f517 a5 2d6 18 2e3 2e8 19 2d2 2d720 2c4 2b5 21 2c2 2xc4 22 2cc4with somewhat the better prospects for White (Langeweg-Filip, Beverwijk 1966);

(b) 11...b6 12 d5 exd5 13 호xd5 호b7 14 e4 里ad8 15 호e3 (Eliskases-Reshevsky, Semmering-Baden 1937), and now 15...纪b4 would have given Black roughly equal chances;

(c) 11...2d7 12 d5 exd5 13 2xd5 ad8 14 e4 2b4 15 2c4 2c6 16 axd8 axd8 (16...2xd8 was essential) 17 2g5 2e8 18 e5 2fd5 (18...2d7 19 2xf7!) 19 e6 White gained the advantage (Pr.Nikolic-Skembris, Kavalla 1985).

11 âd2:



(a) 11... 全d7 12 罩ac1 對b6 13 dxc5 全xc5 14 ②g5 罩ad8 15 ③cc4 ④xe4 16 ③xe4 全b4 17 對b5 全c8 (NovoteInov-Kholmov, Moscow 1947) with equal chances;

(b) 11...**E**d8 12 **@**e1!, and now:

(b1) 12...cxd4 13 exd4 $\triangle d7$ (13... $\triangle b4$ 14 \blacksquare ac1 and then $\triangle e5$ is promising for White) 14 \blacksquare ac1 $\triangle e8$ 15 d5 exd5 16 $\triangle xd5 \ \triangle xd5 17 \ \triangle xd5 \ \triangle f6$ 18 b4 with the initiative (Vyzhmanavin-Chekhov (USSR 1986);

(b2) 12....2d7 13 d5 exd5 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 2xd5 2g4 (15....2b4 is poor in view of 16 2xb4 and 17 2ac1; after 15...2f6 16 2c4 2e8 17 2xc5 2xb218 2ab1 2c5 (16) 2c4 2e8 17 2c5 2xb218 2ab1 2c5 (16) 2c5 2c5 2c517 2c3 again with the initiative for White (Foisor-Anand, Moscow 1987).

11 d5 exd5, and now:

(a) 12 $\triangle xd5$ $\triangle xd5$ 13 $\triangle xd5$. This seemingly unpretentious exchange is not in fact so harmless. White's plan is e3-e4, $\triangle e3$, $\Xi dc1$ and a4-a5 with pressure on c5:



(a1) 13...@f6 (13...@b4 14 @c4) 14 h3 (if 14 e4 @g4; weak is 14 @d2? @b4 15 @b3 @f5 16 @f3 @g6 when the advantage is with Black, Plachetka-Mikhalchishin, Trnava 1988) 14... @b4(14...@e8!?) 15 e4 @xd5 16 exd5 @f5 17 免e3 墨ac8 18 a5 墨fe8 19 d6 with advantage to White (Doroshkevich-Rashkovsky, Tbilisi 1974);

(a2) 13... 兔g4 14 h3 兔h5 15 b3 兔f6 16 兔b2 兔xb2 17 對xb2 心b4 18 兔c4 單ad8 19 兔e2 b6 with an equal position (Petrosian-Tal, Yerevan 1982);

(b) 12 호xd5 호g4 (12... 2b4 also comes into consideration – Zilberman) 13 h3 单h5 14 호xc6 對xc6 15 e4 單ad8 16 单f4 單fe8 and White achieves little (Zilberman-Chekhov, USSR 1984).

11 e4:



(a) 11...cxd4 12 2xd4 2xd4 13 12xd4 e5 14 12 2xd4 2xd4 13 12xd4 e5 14 14 2g4 15 f3 12ac8 16 2d5 2xd5 17 2xd5 2e6 18 2xe6fxe6 with somewhat the better chances for White (Huzman, Weinerman);

(b) $11... \textcircled{2}g4 12 e5 (12 d5 loses to 12... \textcircled{2}d4!) 12... cxd4 13 \textcircled{2}xd4 \textcircled{2}gxe5 (13... \textcircled{2}cxe5 is weak on account of 14 \textcircled{2}b3 \Huge{2}f6 15 \textcircled{4}f4) 14 \textcircled{2}f4 \textcircled{2}a5 15 \Huge{2}xc6 \Huge{2}xc6 16 \blacksquareac1. White has compensation for the pawn in the form of his superior development (Serebryanik-Weinerman, USSR 1989).$

The exchange on c5 is not dangerous for Black: 11 dxc5 \pounds xc5 12 h3 (12 e4 \oiint g4!) 12...e5 (or 12... \oiint e5 – Botvinnik) 13 e4 \oiint d4 14 \oiint xd4 exd4 15 \oiint d5 \oiint xd5 16 \pounds xd5 \pounds e6 with an equal position (Kmoch-Euwe, Delft 1940).
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拿d7 11 . . . 11...b6 comes into consideration. The modern game Pinter-Ehlvest (Zagreb 1987) continued 12 皇b2 皇b7 13 Hacl (after 13 d5 exd5 14 2xd5 ②xd5 15 皇xd5 〓ad8 16 豐c4 ②a5 17 ₩g4 g6 18 £e5 £d6 19 £f6 £e7 the position is equal; 16 e4 needs testing -Yusupov) 13...Efd8 14 h3 2a5 15 2e5 ②c6 16 ①b1 ②xe5 17 dxe5 剿c6 18 f3 ②d5 19 ②d2 皇g5 20 ②f1 皇h4, with a complicated and double-edged position. Other continuations:

Other continuations:

11...cxd4 12 exd4, and now:

(a) 12... 2b4 13 金b2 金d7? (13...b6 and ... 金b7 was necessary) 14 d5! exd5 15 豐xe7 公c6 16 公xd5 公xd5 17 豐g5! Black resigns (Gligoric-Miagmasuren, Havana Olympiad 1966);

(b) 12...2a5 13 2b2 (13 2g5? 2xb3) 13...2d7 14 2e5 (after 14 d5 2xc4 15 bxc4 $\blacksquare fe8$ Black maintains the balance) 14...2xc4 15 bxc4 $\blacksquare fe8$ 16 2a3 (or 16 $\blacksquare d3$ followed by f2-f4, $\blacksquare f1$ and $\blacksquare g3$) 16...2c6 17 h3 (17 f3 is also good) 17... $\blacksquare a5$ 18 $2xe7 \blacksquare xe7$ 19 $\blacksquare d2$ $\blacksquare ee8$ 20 c5! $\blacksquare ad8$ (Pinter-Anand, Barcelona 1993). Here 21 2c4! and if 21... $\blacksquare c7$ 22 $2d6 \blacksquare e7$ 23 $\blacksquare e3$ would have led to an advantage for White. 11... Da5 12 d5 exd5 13 Dxd5 Dxd5 14 \$\overline{2}xd5 \$\overline{2}yd2\$ (or 15 \$\overline{2}d2\$) with some initiative for White.

11....**Ed8** comes into consideration.

12 单b2

Botvinnik-Euwe (Groningen 1946) now continued 12....Iac8 (in Botvinnik's opinion, 12...Ifd8 was preferable) 13 d5! exd5 14 2xd5 2xd5 3xd52g4 (not 15...2b4? 16 2e5) 16 2c4(16 h3 2b5 17 g4 2g6 18 h4 came into consideration) 16...2b5 17 2xc6 (now 17 g4 2g6 18 h4 would have given Black counterplay after 18...h5) 17... 2xc6 18 2e5 2e8 19 Id5. As shown by Botvinnik, by continuing 19...b5 Black could have driven the queen from its active position and counted on a successful defence.

After 12...cxd4 13 exd4 2a5 14 2e5 2xc4 15 bxc4 2d6 16 2d3 White has prospects of an attack on the kingside (Jimenez-Pena, Equador 1969).

If 12... Had8, then:

(a) 13 \exists ac1 Bb8 14 h3 cxd4 15 exd4 Bf4 (15...Ob4 was preferable) 16 d5 exd5 17 Oxd5 Oxd5 18 Oxd5 Of6 (18...Efe8 was better) 19 \blacksquare c4 Bh6 20 Oa3 \blacksquare fe8 21 \blacksquare e4 \blacksquare xe4 22 Oxe4, and Black ended up in a difficult position (Minev-Pantaleev, Bulgaria 1967);

(b) 13 d5 exd5 14 2xd5 2xd5 2xd5 2g4 16 36d 2xd5 2xd5 2xf3 17 2xf3 2d6 18 36d 4de 2d5 2g6 20 36d 20 36d 18 36d 4de22 f4 2d6 23 36d 18 36d 18 36dadvantage, Uhlmann-Hennings, East Germany 1968) 17 36d, with the better position for White.

3.113 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7 a4 ⊙c6 8 ₩e2)

8 ... ₩c7

The prelude to a harmonious scheme of development: $... \pounds d6$, ... 0-0 and ... e6-e5, or ... b7-b6 and $... \pounds b7$.



9 Dc3

9

âd6

9...\$e7 10 Idl (the position after 10 dxc5 \$xc5 is analysed in the notes to Black's next move) 10...0-0 is also played:

(a) 11 b3 b6 12 \pounds b2 \pounds b7 13 \blacksquare ac1 \blacksquare fd8 14 h3 Oa5 15 Oe5 Oc6 with a good game for Black (a position from Pinter-Ehlvest, mentioned on p.75, has been reached by a slight transposition);

(b) 11 h3 置d8 12 dxc5 置xd1+ 13 對xd1 皇xc5 14 c4 皇d7 15 皇g5 置e8 16 對c2 @d4 17 @xd4 皇xd4 18 皇d2 置d8 19 皇e1 ②h5! with the initiative (Fahnenschmidt-Ribli, Germany 1991).

10 **H**d1

Other possibilities:

10 d5 exd5 11 @xd5 0-0 12 h3 @d7 13 e4 ②d4 14 響d3 ②xf3+ 15 響xf3 Lab8 16 a5 Lfe8 with a satisfactory position for Black (Vistaneckis-Novopashin, USSR Ch. 1/2-Final 1960).

10 Ad2 0–0 11 d5, and now:

(a) 11...exd5 12 $\Im xd5$ $\Im xd5$ 13 2xd5 2g4 (after 13...De5 14 Dxe5 \$xe5 15 f4! \$xb2 16 Hab1 White has good compensation for the pawn, Miles-Ye Rongguang, Beijing 1991; if 16... £ f6 17 a5, then Wc4, Zb6 and e3e4-e5) 14 h3 \$h5 15 \$c3, and White's position is preferable;

(b) 11...De5 12 Dxe5 2xe5 13 f4 \$xc3 14 \$xc3 @xd5 15 \$e5 with compensation for the pawn (Miles).

10 b3 0-0 11 **2** b2 cxd4 12 exd4:



(a) 12...e5 13 De4 (13 dxe5 Dxe5 leads to equality; if 13 d5 2d4) 13 ... ②xe4 14 ₩xe4 exd4 (14... ②xd4? is a blunder, since after 15 2xd4 exd4 16 ₩xd4 Black has no way of defending g7). In Gligoric-Radulov (Ljubljana/ Portoroz 1973) White gained an active position, but he was unable to increase the pressure: 15 Had1 (Gligoric suggests 15 Efel) 15.... #e7! (16 Exd4 was threatened) 16 Wxe7 2xe7 17 Dxd4 2d7, and Black equalised;

(b) 12....2a5 13 (the only way for White to avoid the exchange of his bishop is by the risky pawn sacrifice 13 호d3 2xb3 14 프ad1 호d7 15 De4) 13... Dxc4 14 bxc4 2d7 15 De4 Dxe4 16 slightly better (Van der Sterren-Hübner, Wijk aan Zee 1988). If 17 Efe1 f6, planninga6-a5 andb7-b6 (Hübner). 10 dxc5 @xc5



(a) 11 e4 2g4! 12 g3 (12... 2d4 was threatened) 12...0–0 13 \pounds f4 e5, and now:

(a1) 14 2d5 ¥d6 15 皇d2 纪f6 16 b4 2)d4 (Sahovic-Adamski, Vrnjacka Banja 1985, and Dizdar-Pr.Nikolic, Sarajevo 1987, went 16... 2xb4 17 \$xb4 \$xb4 18 ᡚxb4 ∰xb4 19 ᡚxe5, and now Black should have played 19... We7 followed by ... 2e6) 17 Wd3 2xf3+ 18 ₩xf3 \$d4 19 2xf6+ ₩xf6 20 ₩xf6 gxf6 with an equal game (Dizdar);

(a2) 14 2g5 h6 15 2d5 Wd6 16 盒d2 ④f6 17 b4 盒d4 18 置ab1 盒g4 19 ₩d3 Ifd8 (stronger than 19... 2xd5?! 20 皇xd5 置fd8 21 b5 ④e7 22 皇b4, when White has the initiative, Pr. Nikolic-Hübner, Wijk aan Zee 1988) 20 b5 axb5 21 axb5 2e7 22 2b4 2c5 23 \$xc5 ₩xc5 24 @xe5 @fxd5 25 exd5 2e6, and Black restored material equality (Sarno-Lin Ta, Novi Sad Olympiad 1990);

(b) 11 b3 0-0 12 全b2 b6 13 ②g5 金b7 14 ②ce4 ③xe4 15 ③xe4 ④e5 16 ③xc5 豐xc5 17 置ac1 ③xc4 18 置xc4 彎e7 and Black equalises (Planinc-Radulov, Amsterdam 1973);

(c) 11 호d3 e5 (Black can avoid this and continue his development - cf. the variation 10 호d3) 12 纪e4 호e7 13 호d2 0--0 14 篇ac1 對b8 15 簋fd1 with the initiative for White (Garcia Martinez-Barczay, Havana 1960).

10 &d3 0–0 (Lin Ta suggests 10... &d7 immediately) 11 dxc5 &xc5 12 \bigcirc e4 (12 e4 \bigcirc d7) 12...&e7 (or 12... \bigcirc xe4 13 &xe4 \bigcirc e5 14 &d2 with a good game for White) 13 b3 \bigcirc d5 14 &b2 &d7 15 \blacksquare fc1 \blacksquare b6 16 \bigcirc d4 \bigcirc e5 (better 16... \blacksquare ac8) 17 a5 \blacksquare a7 (17... \blacksquare d8? 18 \bigcirc xe6) 18 &c2 \bigcirc g6 19 \blacksquare b5! with attacking chances (Lin Weiguo-Lin Ta, China 1989).

10 ... 0–0 If Black is aiming for the set-up with ...e6-e5, it is advisable to castle first. On the immediate 10...e5 White continues 11 2d5! 2xd5 12 2xd5 0–0 (12...2g4is weak in view of 13 dxc5 2xc5 14 2d5! 2xd5 14 2c5 2xc5 14 2dc4!) 13 dxe5 (White can also consider 13 dxc5 2xc5 14 2c4!, and if 14...2a515 2dc4! 13...2xe5 14 2c5 2c5 15f4 2c6 16 2a3! with the better prospects (Gheorghiu-Radulov, Forssa-Helsinki 1972).

11 h3 e5 Other continuations: 11...b6, when White has:

(a) 12 d5, and now:

(a1) 12...2a5 13 dxe6 2xe6 (13... 2xc4 is totally unsatisfactory in view of 14 exf7+ 3xf7 15 2g5) 14 2xe6fxe6 15 2g5 with the better game;

(a2) 12...exd5 13 \$xd5 (leads to interesting events; after 13 \$2xd5 \$2xd5 14 \$xd5 \$b7 the game is level, Holm-Radulov, Hamburg 1974) 13...\$b7 (after 13...②xd5 14 ②xd5 and 15 ②xb6 Black loses a pawn) 14 e4 **Zae8**, when:

(a21) 15 &e3 &f4 16 a5 (first 16 \blacksquare ac1 should be considered, covering c2 and putting pressure on the c5 pawn, Janjgava-Sadler, Yerevan Olympiad 1996) 16...&xe3 (16...&xa5 17 &xf4 \blacksquare xf4 18 &xb7 \bigotimes xb7 19 \blacksquare xa6 favours White) 17 axb6 \blacksquare xb6 (if 17...&xf2-18 \blacksquare xf2 \blacksquare xb6 19 \bigotimes a4 White's position is preferable) 18 \blacksquare xe3 \bigotimes d4 19 \bigotimes xd4 (19 &xb7 \bigotimes c2) 19... \bigotimes xd5 20 \bigotimes xd5 &xd5 21 \bigotimes f5 &xe4! 22 \bigotimes d6 \blacksquare e6 23 \bigotimes xe4 f5 with a roughly equal heavy piece ending (Sadler);

(a22) 15 皇g5 公d4!? (this move, employed several times by Radulov, is a bold prelude to wild complications; 15... 皇e7 16 e5 皇d8 is too passive) 16 公xd4 公xd5 17 公xd5 皇xd5 18 公f5 黑xe4 19 斷h5, when Black has:

(a21) 19...g6 20 \$ f6!! and wins;

(a22) 19... Ξ fe8 20 Θ xg7 Ξ 8e5 (20... \Rightarrow xg7 loses to 21 Ψ h6+ \Rightarrow g8 22 \triangle f6) 21 f4 (note, however, the suggestion by Lautier given below) 21... Ξ xf4 22 Θ e8 Ψ c6 23 Θ xd6.



This line, where everything hangs by a thread, used to be considered favourable for White on the basis of Portisch-Radulov (Nice Olympiad 1974), where after 23...f6 (23... \underline{W} xd6 24 \underline{a} xf4) White won by 24 Eel! (24...Ixg5 25 Ee8+ \$27 26 Ee7+ \$68 27 Ef7+; 24...Id4 25 Exe5 fxe5 26 \$26\$;

Many years later, in Jacobi-Radulov (Hamburg 1984) to the surprise of his opponent Black repeated these moves, only in the diagram position he played 23...h6! This prepared move changed the picture in an instant, and after 24 Wah6 (now White does not have 24 Eel - Black plays 24...Exg5 and after 25 Ee8+ moves his king to g7) 24... Ee2! the Bulgarian GM's counterattack proved victorious;

(a23) 19...f6 (explaining why he rejected the seemingly favourable 19 ... Ife8, Lautier gives the stunning 20 Dxg7 I8e5 21 Wh6! 皇f8 22 皇f6 Wc6 23 \[d3 \] e1+ 24 \[ch2! \] xg2 25 \[g3. when Black must resign) 20 单h6 置fe8 21 皇xg7? (correct is 21 ②xg7 皇h2+ 22 ghl 邕8e5 23 幻f5 寶d7 24 寶f3 ₩xf5 25 ₩xf5 ॾxf5 26 \$xh2 ≣e2 27 \$e3, when White has slightly the worse position with good drawing chances), and now instead of 21... 全f7? (Morovic Fernandez-Lautier, Las Palmas 1994), Lautier gives 21 ... 2h2+! 22 2h1 2f7 23 Dh6+ \$xg7 24 \$xf7+ \$xf7 25 $\Theta x f7$ $\Leftrightarrow x f7$ 26 $\Leftrightarrow x h2$ $\Xi e2$ with advantage to Black;

(a3) 12... \Re e5 13 \Re xe5 \pounds xe5 14 dxe6 \pounds xe6 15 \pounds xe6 fxe6 16 $\ensuremath{\mbox{wc6}}$ 15 \pounds xe6 fxe6 16 $\ensuremath{\mbox{wc6}}$ 13 dxe6 \pounds xe6 14 \pounds xe6 fxe6 15 $\ensuremath{\mbox{wc6}}$ 13 dxe6 \pounds xe6 14 \pounds xe6 fxe6 15 $\ensuremath{\mbox{wc6}}$ the knight at 13 has been exchanged, which is important for Black) 16... $\ensuremath{\mbox{wc6}}$ (16... $\ensuremath{\mbox{wf7!}}$?) 17 \pounds d2 $\ensuremath{\mbox{dd}}$ 18 $\ensuremath{\mbox{el}}$ Efd8 19 $\ensuremath{\mbox{abl}}$ 17 $\ensuremath{\mbox{dd}}$ 20 $\ensuremath{\mbox{cd}}$ 21 $\ensuremath{\mbox{whch}}$ with the more promising position (Karpov-Timman, Linares 1989);

(b) 12 dxc5 \triangleq xc5 13 e4 comes seriously into consideration:

(b1) 13...De5 (if 13...\$b7 14 e5) 14 \$f4 @xf3+ 15 \vert xf3 \$xf2+ 16 \vert xf2 ₩xc4 17 2d6 Ze8 18 e5 with a strong position for White;

(b2) 13... Ω d7 14 e5!? Ω dxe5 (or 14... Ω cxe5 15 Ω f4 Ω xf3+ 16 $\forall x$ f3 Ω xf2+ 17 $\otimes x$ f2 $\forall x$ c4 18 Ω d6) 15 Ω f4 Ω xf3+ (15...f6 16 $\exists ac1 \forall e7$ 17 Ω e4) 16 $\forall x$ f3 (Raetsky-Golikov, Kecskemet 1991), and for the sacrificed pawn White has a substantial lead in development (Raetsky, Vasilchenko);

11....**Ie8** 12 dxc5 **x**c5 13 e4:



(a) $13...\bigcirc e5$ 14 $\bigcirc f4!$ (a pawn sacrifice for a lead in development) $14...\oslash xf3+15$ $\oiint xf3$ $\oslash xf2+16$ $\oiint xf2$ $\oiint xc4$ 17 $\blacksquare d4$ $\oiint c6$ (or 17... $\oiint c5$ 18 $\diamondsuit d6$ followed by e4-e5) 18 e5 $\boxdot d5$ 19 $\blacksquare f1$ with dangerous threats (Vyzhmanavin-Kupreichik, Pinsk 1986);

(b) 13...2d7 14 2a2 b6 15 e5! 2dxe5 (after 15...2b7 16 2f4 2b4 17 2b1 Had8 18 h4 followed by h4-h5 White has attacking chances without any loss of material), and now:

(b1) 16 \$\overline\$14 f6 17 \$\overline\$1ac1 with the initiative for the sacrificed pawn (Lputian-Hübner, Rotterdam 1988); (b2) 16 ②xe5 徵xe5 17 徵f3 鱼b7 18 鱼f4 徵f5 19 鱼b1 ②d4 20 徵g3 徵h5 21 鱼e5! 螢xd1+ 22 歐h2!! with advantage to White (Lputian).

11... \$ d7 12 dxc5 \$ xc5 13 e4, and:

(a) 13... 2e5 is strongly met by 14 $\pounds f4 @xf3+(14... \pounds d6$ is bad in view of 15 @xf3 @xc4 16 @d4 @xf4 17 e5) 15 $@xf3 @xf2+ 16 @xf2 @xc4 17 \pounds e5!$ (Lukacs-Adamski, Naleczow 1985), after which 17... @xe4? fails to 18 @xe4 @xe4 19 @g3 f6 20 @xd7;

(b) 13... 2d6 14 2g5 2e5 15 Ixd6!2xc4 (if 15... Wxd6 there can follow 16 Id1 2xf3+ 17 Wxf3 Wc7 18 2xf6gxf6 19 Wxf6 Wxc4 20 Ixd7, winning) 16 Id4 b5 17 e5 2d5 18 2xd5 exd5 19 b3 with the better chances for White.



12 dxe5 @xe5, and:

(a) 13 \bigcirc d5 \bigcirc xd5 14 &xd5 \bigcirc xf3+ 15 Wxf3 &e5 16 We4 g6 17 f4 &g7 with roughly equal chances (Makogonov-Myasnikov, USSR 1963);

(b) 13 2xe5 \$xe5 14 2d5 2xd5 15 \$xd5 \$e6 (15...g6 followed by ...\$g7 also comes into consideration) 16 \$xe6 fxe6 17 f4 \$d6, and White has only a symbolic advantage, since in this case the isolated pawn is not a weakness (Nemeth-Buljovcic, Yugoslavia 1974). 12 dxc5 &xc5 13 b3 We7 (13...e4 14 Od4 Oe5 15 Od5) 14 &b2 &e6 15 Od5 Oxd5 16 &xd5 &xd5 17 \blacksquare xd5 \blacksquare ad8 18 \blacksquare ad1 &d6 (after 18...e4 19 Oe5 \blacksquare xd5 20 \blacksquare xd5 \blacksquare d8 21 Oxc6 bxc6 22 \blacksquare e5 Black loses a pawn, Pinter-Radulescu, Baile Herculane 1982) 19 Wc4 &c7 20 e4, and White's control of d5 gives him the better position (Pancik-Radulov, Polanica Zdroj 1982). 12 dé is best ensured by 12 Oc5

12 d5 is best answered by 12... 2a5.

3.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6	;
4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4	ł
නිc6)	

8 Dc3



If 8...cxd4 White can recapture with the knight -9 (2) xd4! (9 exd4 leads to variation 3.2, p.82), and now:

≗e7

8

(a) 9... 2xd4 10 exd4, when the exchange of knights denies Black the chance of exploiting the b4 square, and, more important, he is unable to prevent d4-d5, after which White's lead in development tells, e.g. 10... 2e7 11 d5 exd5 12 2xd5 2xd5 13 2xd5 0-0 14 ∰f3 with advantage (Rubinstein-Tartakower, Marienbad 1925); (b) 9...₩c7 10 ⊡xc6 bxc6 (10... ₩xc6? 11 \$\Deltab5\$) 11 e4, again with advantage to White;

(c) 9...\$d7 is probably best, and if 10 e4 20xd4 11 ¥xd4 \$c6.

8....\c7 is possible:



(a) 9 $\forall e2$ leads to a position from the variation 6 0–0 a6 7 a4 \triangle c6 8 $\forall e2$ $\forall c7 9 \triangle$ c3 (p.76);

(b) 9 d5 exd5, and now:

(b1) 10 ②xd5 ②xd5 11 饗xd5 호d6 12 單d1 ④e5 13 螢xd6 螢xd6 14 罩xd6 ②xc4 15 單d5 (or 15 罩d3 ④a5! 16 호d2 c4) 15...b6 16 b3 ④a5 17 罩d3 c4, equalising (Uhlmann-Radulov, Hastings 1972/3);

(b2) 10 \$\overline\$xd5, and if 10...\$\overline\$d6 11 b3 followed by \$\overline\$b2 with some initiative.

9 ₩e2

Other possibilities:

9 dxc5 響xd1 (Black can avoid the simplification with 9...豐c7 followed by ..._\$xc5, which usually leads to the earlier variation 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 公c6 8 響e2 響c7 9 公c3 \$\overline\$ d6 10 dxc5 \$\overline\$ xc5, p.77) 10 \$\overline\$ xd1 \$\overline\$ xc5 (as in many similar positions, Black has wasted a tempo on ...\$\overline\$ rxc5, but here White has weakened his b4 square) 11 \$\overline\$ d2, and now:

(a) 11...b6, when White has:

(a1) 12 ②g5 ②a5 13 氢a2 氢b7 14 Ξac1 Ξc8 15 ②e2 ②c6 (SmejkalHübner, Rio de Janeiro 1979), when 16 a5 is not dangerous for Black, and the chances are equal;

(a2) 12 II ac1 $\triangle b7$ 13 $\triangle a2$ 0-0 14 $\triangle e1$ a5 15 $\triangle c3$ II fd8 16 $\triangle ef1$ $\triangle f8$ with an equal game (Karpov-Hjartarson, Candidates Match, Seattle 1989);

(b) 11...2a5 12 2a2 b6 13 2e2 (the gambit idea 13 b4 2xb4 14 2b5 axb5 15 2xb4 bxa4 16 1d6 0–0 is worth testing – Chernin) 13...2c6 14 a5 2b7 15 1dc1 (15 1ac1 1d8) 15...2d7 16 2ed4 (Black also maintains the balance after 16 axb6 2xb6 17 2ed4 2xd4 18 2xd4 2f6! 19 2b4 2d5! – Chernin) 16...2xd4 17 2xd4 (17 exd4 2d6) 17...b5 18 2c2 2e7 with an equal game (Smeikal-Chernin, Moscow 1989).

9 d5 exd5 10 \bigcirc xd5 &g4 (more interesting than the simplifying 10... \bigcirc xd5 11 &xd5 \bigcirc b4) 11 \bigcirc xe7 \textcircled xe7 12 b3 \blacksquare d8 13 \textcircled c2 &xf3 14 gxf3 \textcircled e5 15 &b2 \textcircled g5+ 16 \diamondsuit h1 \oiint h5 17 &e2 \bigcirc b4 with chances for both sides (Kaem-Lipnitsky, Kiev 1939).

9 ②e5 cxd4 10 ②xc6 bxc6 11 exd4 a5 (11...0-0 12 a5) 12 豐f3 (12 皇f4 is possible, intending 皇e5), and now:

(a) 12...0-0 13 요e3 (if 13 對xc6 置b8 14 兔b5 對xd4 15 兔e3 對e5, planning 16... ②g4 or 16... 兔d6) 13... ④d5 14 貫ac1 兔a6 15 b3 對b6 16 ②e4 罩ad8 (rather than 16... 兔xc4?!, Piket-Pr.Nikolic, Wijk aan Zee 1993) with roughly equal chances);

(b) 12...螢d7 13 鱼f4 鱼a6 14 b3 ④d5 15 鱼e5 ④xc3 16 螢xc3 鱼xc4 17 bxc4 (17 螢xc4 also came into consideration) 17...0-0 18 簋fd1, and White's position is slightly preferable (Skembris-Chiburdanidze, Karditsa 1995).

cxd4

9...0-0 10 **Zd1** ₩c7 leads to positions examined earlier.

10 Id1 e5

9

The eccentric 10... wa5 11 exd4 b5 has not justified itself. 12 2b3 0-0 13 d5! gave White the advantage after 13...b4 14 dxc6 bxc3 15 2f4 (Vaisman-Gracun, Romania 1984).

11 exd4 exd4 11... \bigcirc xd4 12 xe5 xf3+ 13 gxf3 favours White.

12 🖾 xd4

12 &e3 is possible. After 12...0-0 13 Xxd4 C7 14 h3 White's position is somewhat freer.

13 燮e3 0-0 14 邕xd4 燮c7 15 燮f4 燮xf4 16 এxf4 요c5 led to a completely equal position in Seirawan-Gheorghiu (Baden Baden 1981).

...

13

₩d6!

After 13...0-0 14 \equiv xd4 White stands better, e.g. 14...Wb6 15 \pounds e3! \pounds c5 (15... Wxb2? is bad in view of 16 \oiint xe7! Wxa1+ 17 \equiv d1 \oiint xc3 18 \oiint xf7+!, mating) 16 \oiint e4!? \pounds xd4 (after 16... \oiint xe4 17 \equiv xe4 \pounds xe3 18 \equiv xe3 White has the more active position) 17 \pounds xd4 \oiint d8 18 \equiv d1 \pounds e6 19 \equiv d3! with advantage to White (Gauglitz-Gelfand, Halle 1987).



Since the time of Vajda-P.Johner (Debrecen 1925) this position was considered absolutely equal after 15...2c5. Current practice and analysis shows that things are not so simple. Kir.Georgiev-Semkov (Bulgaria 1985) continued 16 $\Xi f4 \ 2d6 \ 17 \ \Xi f3 \ 0-0 \ 18 \ 2f4 \ 2xf4 \ 19 \ \Xi xf4 \ 19 \ \Xi xf4 \ 20 \ \Xi e1 \ 2f8 \ 21 \ f3 \ with an$ active position for White.

After 15... \$\overline\$ 5 16 \overline\$ h4 0-0 (16... \$\overline\$ e6 followed by queenside castling should be considered) 17 \$\overline\$ f4 \$\overline\$ xf4 (if 17... \$\overline\$ 8 18 \$\overline\$ e1 Black is faced with neutralising White's slight lead in development) 18 \$\overline\$ xf4 \$\overline\$ e6 18 \$\overline\$ xe6 fxe6 20 \$\overline\$ b4 \$\overline\$ f7 21 \$\overline\$ d1 White stands better (Mikhalchishin).

3.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 分f3 分f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4)

7 ... cxd4 8 exd4

8 公xd4 豐c7 9 公d2 e5 10 公e2 公c6 does not give Black any problems (Hort-Buljovcic, Sombor 1968).

8 ... Dc6

White has an isolated pawn, and he has played a2-a4, weakening the b4 square. Nevertheless, factors such as the active placing of his pieces, the halfopen e-file and the outpost at e5 play a significant role.

9 ∕Dc3 ≜e7

9... ②b4 removes White's concerns over his d4 pawn. After 10 ②e5 鱼e7 (10... ②bd5 can be met by 11 鱼g5 鱼e7 12 鱼xf6 ③xf6 13 d5) 11 f4 0-0 12 ₩e2 Black is behind in development.

Now White has:

10 单 e3 (3.21)

10 **g**5 (3.22) - p.83

For 10 變e2, cf. the move order 7...公c6 8 變e2 cxd4 9 單d1 塗e7 10 exd4 (p.62).

After 10 d5 exd5 11 2xd5 2xd5 12 盒xd5 (if 12 徵xd5 盒e6 13 徵xd8+ Dxd8) 12...0-0 (or 12...Db4) 13 2xc6 (13 \$f4 should be considered, to answer 13... \$ f6 with 14 \$xc6 bxc6 15 Le5) 13...bxc6 14 響xd8 IXd8 15 包e5 2d7 (Gheorghiu suggests the pawn sacrifice 15...\$f6 16 2xc6 \$\mathbb{L}d5) 16 2xd7 **Z**xd7 an equal ending was reached in Gheorghiu-Karpov (Dubai Olympiad 1986).

J. 21 (1 4 45 2 64 4.64 5 -215 -2	110
4 e3 e6 5 🗟 xc4 c5 6 0 -0 a6 7	a4
cxd4 8 exd4 2c6 9 2c3 单e7)	

10	Le3	00
11	We2	b6

b6 ₩e2

11.... 4 12 De5 has also been played:



The dangers awaiting Black in this variation are demonstrated well by Spassky-Nikolaevsky (USSR Ch. 1/2-Final 1963): 12...b6 (better 12...Dbd5, avoiding weakening the kingside) 13 f4 ②fd5?! 14 里ad1 皇f6 (measures should have been taken against f4-f5, by 14...g6 or even 14...f5) 15 De4 2b7 16 f5 exf5 (16... Dxe3 was essential) 17 Ixf5 ①xe3 18 ①xf6+! gxf6 19 對xe3 fxe5 20 \vert xe5, and White successfully concluded his attack: 20...h6 21 If6

會h7 22 邕df1 皇d5 23 響f5+ 會g8 24 ₩g4+ \$h7 25 \$\$xh6+! Black resigns.

12	Lad1	②b4
13	De5	皇 b7
14	f4	②bd5

if 15 f5 exf5 16 2h6 Dbd5 (16...Ze8? 17 (Dxf7) 17 (2xf8 (2xf8)

> 15 f5



After 15....⊙xe3 16 ₩xe3 exf5 17 "Ixf5 ₩d6 18 ₩g3! White has good attacking chances.

Lerner-Kharitonov (51st USSR Ch., Lvov 1984) went 15... Wd6 16 \$25 Dxc3 17 bxc3 De4 (17 ... Dd5 18 2xd5 exd5 19 @xe7 Wxe7 20 f6! gxf6 21 ₩g4+ \$h8 22 ₩h4 favours White) 18 £xe7 ₩xe7 19 ₩g4! 2f6 20 ₩h3 (20 ₩g5! would have set Black more difficult problems), and now Black should have defended with 20... 2d5. when after 21 \$d3 White stands better (Lerner).

3.22 (1 4 e3 e	l d4 6 5	d5 2 c4 ≌xc4	4 dxc4 3 c5_6_0-	句f3 0 a6	创f6 7 a4
cxd4 8	exd	4 4 <u>)</u> c6	9 හි c 3 දු	Le7)	
	10	≙g5 Tel	0-4	0	



11...2d5 12 2xe7 (or 12 2xd5 2xg5 13 2xc6 bxc6 14 2e5 with advantage to White, Petran-Schulz, Hungary 1983) 12...2cxe7 13 2b3 2f6 14 2ad1 2c7 15 2e5 with the more active position for White (Timoshchenko-Anikaev, USSR 1981).

11... 2 d7 12 We2 (12 De5 2e8), and now:

(a) 12...h6 13 象f4 2b4 14 2b5 星c8 15 星ad1 象c6 16 包xc6 星xc6 17 象e5 習a5 with roughly equal chances (Bertok-Geller, Bled 1961);

(b) $12...\Xic8 13 \Xiad1 2d5 (13...2b4)$ 14 2e5) 14 2xd5 2xg5 15 2e4 2f6 16 d5! exd5 17 2xd5 (17 Exd5 was also possible) 17...2e6 (17...2g4? 18 2xh7+) 18 2f4 Wb6 (18...We7 19 2xe6 fxe6 was the lesser evil) 19 2xe6 fxe6 20 Wd3 with advantage to White (Chekhov-Sveshnikov, Lvov 1983), and 20...g6? allowed a decisive bishop sacrifice.

11.... b4, when White has:

(a) 12 Wb3 (with the threat of 13 $\pounds xf6$) 12...Oc6 (defending against the threat, Black in turn threatens to exchange the bishop and to attack the d4 pawn) 13 \blacksquare ad1 Oa5 14 Wa2 Oxc4 15 Wxc4 h6 16 $\pounds xf6$ $\pounds xf6$, and now:



(a1) 17 20e4 17... 20e7 18 20e5 20d6 (19 d5 was threatened) 19 III with the better chances for White (Antoshin-Mascarinas, Frunze 1979);

(a2) 17 $\triangle e5$ &d7 18 $\triangle e4$ $\blacksquare c8$ 19 $\blacksquare b3$ &xe5 20 dxe5 $\blacksquare a5$ 21 $\triangle f6+$ gxf6 22 $\blacksquare g3+$ &h7 23 exf6 $\blacksquare g8$ 24 $\blacksquare d3+$ $\blacksquare g6$ 25 $\blacksquare xd7$ with advantage to White (Gligoric-Buljovcic, Novi Sad 1976).

(b) 12 De5 Dfd5 13 dd2 (13 dxe7Dxe7 14 Wb3 can also be considered, and if 14...Dbc6 15 Had1) 13...Db6 14 db3 (Pinter-Negulescu, Warsaw 1987). The acceptance of the pawn sacrifice by 14...Wxd4 15 a5 Dd7? (15...D6d5 16 Had4! was the lesser evil) 16 Had4! led to loss of material: 16...Wc5 17 Dxd7dxd7 18 Hxb4! Wxb4 19 Dd5.

If 11.... a5 White has a choice:

(a) 12 ₩d2 Ⅱd8 13 Ⅱad1 এd7 14 ₩e2 요e8 15 d5! with advantage;

(b) 12 d5 exd5 13 &xf6 &xf6 14 2xd5 @d8 (if 14...&xb2 15 \blacksquare b1 &a3 16 @d3 &c5 17 2g5 with an attack) 15 @e2 &g4 (15...&d7 is preferable, with the idea of ... \blacksquare e8) 16 \blacksquare ad1 &e5 17 h3 &xf3 18 @xf3 with a promising position (Osnos-Anikaev, USSR 1963).

11...b6 is weak in view of 12 d5! 2xd5 13 2xd5 exd5 14 4xd5 2xg515 4xg5 with advantage to White (Tarjan-Buljovcic, Novi Sad 1975).

4 Classical Variation: other 7th moves for White

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	④f 3	④f6
4	e3	e6
5	≜xc4	c5
6	00	a6

In this chapter we will consider the following:

7 b b3 (4.1) 7 c d3 (4.2) - p.89 7 e4 (4.3) - p.92 7 b3 (4.4) - p.96 7 dxc5 (4.5) - p.97 7 c bbd2 (4.6) - p.101

White also has 7 a3, when a standard plan is to play dxc5, after ... \pounds xc5 to drive back the bishop with b2-b4, and then to continue developing with \pounds b2 and \pounds d2-b3 or \pounds c3. But after 7...b5 play can also take a different direction:

(a) 8 2 e2 cxd4 9 2 xd4 (9 exd4 2 b7) 9...e5 10 2 f3 2 d6 11 a4! e4 (11...bxa4 is weak in view of 12 2 bd2 and 2 c4) 12 2 d4 b4 13 2 d2 2 c7 14 h3 2 c6 (Cvitan-Ye Rongguang (Belgrade 1988), and now 15 2 c4 2 e7 would lead to a double-edged position;

(b) 8 皇a2 皇b7 (8...cxd4 9 exd4 皇b7 10 ②c3 皇e7 11 皇g5 0-0 12 留d3 ②bd7 13 置ad1 leads to a position from the Steinitz Variation) 9 ②c3 ②bd7 10 置e1!? (10 響e2 響b8 11 置d1 would be more normal) 10....響b8 11 e4 cxd4 12 ②d5!?, when:

(b1) in Kozul-Sulava (Pula 1996) and Kozul-Ibragimov (Ljubljana 1996) Black stood worse after declining the sacrifice (12... 2 d6 13 2 xf6+ gxf6 14 ¥xd4); (b2) critical is 12...exd5 13 exd5+ 全e7 (13...全d8 14 公g5) 14 公xd4 (regaining the piece with 14 變e2 0-0 15 變xe7 置e8 16 變b4 置xe1+ leaves White with nothing) 14...全f8 15 公c6 全xc6 16 dxc6 (analysis by Sale).

4.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 分f3 分f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0−0 a6)

7 **≜b**3



White withdraws his bishop to b3 in advance, intending to meet ...b7-b5 with the flank attack a2-a4. In contrast to the variation 7 $\forall e2$ b5 8 $\pm b3$ $\pm b7$ 9 a4, Black's queen's bishop is still at c8, and he is forced to weaken his pawn chain.

For example: 7...b5 8 a4, and now:

(a) 8...2b7 9 axb5 axb5 10 Ξ xa8 2xa8 11 \Im e2 (recommended by Rublevsky; Black is also in difficulties after 11 \Box a3) 11... \Im b6 (11...2c6 12 \Box e5, or 11...c4 12 2c2 followed by b2-b3, and in both cases White's positional pluses are evident) 12 dxc5 &xc5 13 &c3, and Black faces serious problems;

(b) if 8...bxa4 White has the strong 9 2xa4+ 2bd7 10 e4! (10...2xe4 11 2c6) (Rublevsky-Vaulin, Russia 1992);

(c) 8...b4, when the white knight gains the convenient square c4. Lalic-Sadler (England 1995) continued 9 2bd2 2b7 10 e4 cxd4 (10...2xe4 is dangerous in view of 11 2xe4 2xe4 12 2g5, and if 12...2e7? 13 2xe7 Wxe714 Ξ e1 with the threat of d4-d5, or 12... Wd7 13 Ξ e1 2d5 14 dxc5! - Lalic) 11 e5 2d5 (Lalic considers 11...2fd7 to be relatively acceptable, although even then 12 2c4 2c5 13 2g5 Wc7 - if here 13...f6 14 exf6 gxf6 15 2e5! - 14 2xe4 gives White the better prospects) 12 2e4 2e7 13 2g5 0-0 14 2d6! with advantage to White;

(d) 8...c4 9 &c2, and White is threatening to break up the opponent's queenside by b2-b3.

Therefore Black should not be in a hurry to play ...b7-b5.

7

··· 2c6

7...b6 was recommended by H.Müller.

7...cxd4 8 exd4 ①c6 9 ①c3 单e7 leads to the Steinitz Variation.

Yermolinsky-Jones (Las Vegas 1994) went 7...2bd7 8 e4! b5 (if 8...2xe4there could have followed 9 E1 = 2d610 d5 e5 11 2xe5 + 2xe5 + 12 + 642 2d5 = 11 + 2xe5 + 2xe5 + 12 + 642 2d5 = 2d5 + 12 + 242 2d5 = 2d5 + 242 2d As in previous variations, White vacates d1 for his rook. Then, according to circumstances, he intends dxc5 and e3-e4, or 2c3 and d4-d5.

Karpov-Gulko (Spain 1996) went 8 cxd4 9 exd4 2a5 10 2c2 2e7, is more promising for White) 9 dxc5 \vert xd1 (after 9... 2xc5 10 We2 and e3-e4 White has the initiative) 10 Exd1 exc5 11 호d2 호d7 (after 11...쓯e7 12 프ac1 호a7 13 e4 2g4 14 2e1 2d7 15 2a4 f6 16 ②c5 皇xc5 17 国xc5 国hd8 18 h3 ②ge5 19 ②xe5 fxe5 20 f4! White gained the advantage in Piskov-Relange, France 1994) 12 Iacl 2a7 (if 12.... a5 Karpov was intending 13 2b5! 2xb3 14 ②c7+ ��d8 15 axb3 ��xc7 16 罩xc5+. which gave White the advantage in Malanyuk-Yakovich, Yerevan 1996) 13 Lel Def 14 Da4 b6, and now the original combination 15 Xd7+! \$xd7 16 ②xb6+! 盒xb6 17 皇a4 left Black in difficulties (Karpov).

... cxd4

8

In view of the final evaluation of this variation, we should point out that Black can maintain the tension: 8... Wc7 9 ②c3 单d6 10 单d2 0-0 11 罩ac1 b6 (after 11...cxd4 12 exd4 \$14 13 \$\$161 \$d7 14 ወe4 ወd5 15 ወc5 \$xd2 16 對 xd2 里ad8 17 皇xd5 exd5 18 ②e5 White's knight is stronger than the bishop, A.Petrosian-Gulko, Tashkent 1984) 12 dxc5 @xc5 13 @c2 (or 13 2a4 @e7 14 2c3 b5 15 2c5 2xc5 16 2xf6 2d6 17 \$h4 \$b7 18 \$\$fd1, and in this advantageous position for White a draw was agreed in A.Rodriguez-Vera, Havana 1986; 13 Zfd1 is also possible) 13... 2b7 14 De4 2e7 15 Dxf6+ 2xf6 16 \$c3 (if 16 \$e4 b5 followed by ...響b6) Le4 ₩e7, and Black equalised (Langeweg-Radulov, Amsterdam 1973).

8 ₩e2

If 8.... e7, then:

(a) 9 dxc5 2xc5 10 ¤d1 ₩e7 11 ②c3 with the better position for White;

(b) 9 Ξ d1 Ξ c7 10 \triangle c3 0-0 11 2d2 b6 12 Ξ ac1 2b7 13 dxc5 bxc5 (or 13... 2xc5 14 \triangle a4 2d6 15 2c3, as in the previous variation) 14 2c2 (Lerner-Garcia Palermo, Polanica Zdroj 1985) 14... Ξ fd8 15 \triangle e4 with the better prospects for White (Lerner).

8...b6 was tried in Lputian-Van Wely (Strasbourg 1994). After 9 \blacksquare d1 $extsf{W}$ c7 10 Oc3 Qc7 11 d5 exd5 12 Qxd5 (if 12 Oxd5 Oxd5 13 \blacksquare xd5 0–0 14 e4 Qb7 followed by ... \blacksquare ad8) 12...Oxd5 13 Oxd5 Wb7 14 b3 0–0 15 Qb2 \blacksquare e8 16 Oe5 Oxe5 17 Qxe5 Qd8 18 Qc3 Wc6 19 \blacksquare d2 Qb7 20 \blacksquare ad1 b5 21 h4 White had the initiative, but Black's position was defensible.



9...d3 10 IXd3 IVC7 11 IC3 also comes into consideration:

(a) 11... add 12 e4 2e5 13 2xe5 axe5 14 f4 axf4 15 axf4 Wxf4 16 e5 2d7 17 If Wxe5 18 Ie3 Wd4 19 Id1Wa7 20 2e4 0-0 21 ch1, and for the sacrificed pawns White has attacking chances on the kingside (Yusupov-Ivanchuk, Riga 1995); (b) 11... 2 c5, when:

(b1) 12 e4 인g4 13 인d1 인d4! 14 인xd4 요xd4 15 h3 h5 favours Black;

(b2) 12 a3 0-0 13 皇d2 b5 14 異c1 對b6 15 e4 ②g4 16 公d1 皇b7 with chances for both sides (Piket-Lautier, Amsterdam 1995);

(b3) 12 h3 0–0 13 e4 (planning e4e5, &f4 and \bigcirc e4). Lalic-Hartman (Isle of Man 1995) continued 13... \bigcirc d7 14 &e3 &xe3 (if 14...b6 15 \bigcirc a4) 15 \textcircled xe3 b6 16 \bigcirc a4 b5 17 \bigcirc c5 \bigcirc ce5 18 \bigcirc xd7 \bigcirc xf3+ 19 gxf3 &xd7 20 \blacksquare c1 \textcircled b7 21 \textcircled h1 \blacksquare fc8 22 \blacksquare g1 g6 23 h4 \textcircled a7, and now 24 \textcircled h6! followed by h4-h5 would have given White the advantage;

(b4) 12 2a4 2a7 13 2d2, and now:

(b41) 13...0-0 14 **E**c1 e5 15 e4 (Salov-Waitzkin, New York 1996) 15... **\$**g4 with a double-edged position;

(b422) 13...b5 is an interesting gambit variation: 14 \equiv c1! \bigcirc e4 (14...bxa4? 15 \bigcirc xa4) 15 \bigcirc d4 \bigcirc d7 16 \bigcirc xc6 \bigcirc xc6 17 \bigcirc b4 Wb7 18 \bigcirc xe6 fxe6 (18...bxa4 19 \boxplus xc6) 19 Wb5+ g6 (after 19... \oiint f7 20 Wxf7+ \diamondsuit xf7 21 \blacksquare xc6 bxa4 22 \blacksquare d7+ White doubles rooks on the 7th rank) 20 Wh4 bxa4 21 \blacksquare xc6 \oiint xb4 22 \blacksquare xe6+ \diamondsuit f7 23 \blacksquare d7+ \oiint g8 (23... \boxdot xe6? allows a quick mate) 24 \blacksquare d8+ \oiint f7 25 \blacksquare d7+ with perpetual check (Salov);

(c) 11... 2e7 12 e4 2d7, when:

(c1) 13 &e3 \bigtriangleup c5 14 \blacksquare dd1 (14 &xc5 &xc5 15 \blacksquare ad1 0-0 16 e5 comes into consideration) 14...0-0 15 \blacksquare ac1 2xb3 16 axb3, and with exact play Black managed to neutralise the pressure: 16... \blacksquare d8 17 2a4 \blacksquare xd1+ 18 \blacksquare xd1 &d7 19 &b6 \blacksquare c8 20 $\Huge{2}$ e5 &e8 21 $\Huge{2}$ d3 e5! (Topalov-Karpov, Las Palmas 1996);

(c2) 13 公d5!? exd5 14 exd5 ℃c5
(seemingly best) 15 d6 貿d8 (15...
(すべい) 16 ②g5 公xd3 17 ②xf7 貿d7
(Akopian-Volzin, Ubeda 1996) 18<
②g5! (Akopian).

Now White does best to retreat his bishop, after which the typical break d4-d5 is no longer so dangerous.

Black suffered a crushing defeat in Filip-Konradi (Varna Olympiad 1962): 10...0-0 11 Dc3 Db4 (here too 11... Da5 is possible, whereas 11...b5 is dangerous in view of 12 d5; there is also 11... d5 with the idea of ... f6 and ...Dce7) 12 De5 Dbd5 (now White switches his rook to the kingside; 12 ... 2d7 was relatively best, planning ... g6 (14.... sh8 was more tenacious) 15 \$h6 ≣e8 16 h4 \$f8? (16...\$c6 was essential) 17 2g5 Wc7 (the bishop can no longer go back on account of 17 ... \$e7 18 h5 2xh5 19 ₩xh5!) 18 ₩f3 2g7 19 2xd5, and Black resigned.

11 2c2 b5

The white bishop has left the a2-g8 diagonal (i.e. it is no longer trained on e6), and Black fianchettos his bishop.

12 Dc3

Vaganian-Seirawan (Montpellier Candidates 1985) went 12 &g5 &b7 13 &xf6 &xf6 14 $\textcircledarcolor 0-0$ 15 $\&e4 \ @c7$ 16 $\&xb7 \ @xb7$ 17 $\textcircledarcolor 0-0$ 15 $\&e4 \ @c7$ 16 $\&xb7 \ @xb7$ 17 $\textcircledarcolor 0-0$ 18 $\blacksquareac1$ $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 19 $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 17 $\textcircledarcolor 0-0$ 18 $\blacksquareac1$ $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 19 $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 17 $\textcircledarcolor 0-0$ 18 $\blacksquareac1$ $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 19 $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 19 $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 19 $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 19 $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 10 $\textcircledarcolor xb7$ 10 arcolor xb7 10 $\rule{black xb7}{arcolor xb7}$ 10 $\rule{black xb7}{arcol$

12		≗b7
13	≗g5	00
14	De5	

Another attacking possibility involves a pawn sacrifice: 14 d5!?, and if 14...exd5 15 \forall d3 or 15 \bigcirc d4. 14... \bigcirc xd5 is not good view of 15 \equiv xd5 \bigcirc xd5 16 \bigcirc xe7 \bigcirc xf3 17 \bigcirc xd8 \oslash xe2 18 \bigcirc xa5, when White has two minor pieces for a rook and a pawn.

In the 20th game of the Botvinnik-Petrosian match, (Moscow 1963), with which this variation began, White played 14 **프ac1**, and after 14...**프c8** 15 오b1 ②c4 16 ④e5 ④b6 17 豐d3 g6 Black parried the attack.



14 ... 2d5 White was threatening not only to switch his rook to the kingside. Thus the plausible 14...Ic8 allows him to put Black's queenside under siege: 15 2xf6 (after the direct 15 Id3 b4 16 Ih3 g6 17 2a4 Wxd4 18 Id1 Black has the tactical 18...Ixc2!) 15...2xf6 16 2e4, with the idea of 2xb7, 2e4 and a2-a4.

A slight improvement in this variation from the 60s was made in Lerner-Dokhoian (Kharkov 1985), where the prophylactic 14...g6 was played. After 15 &h6 \blacksquare e8 16 a3 Oh5 17 b4 \blacksquare c8! (in the game Black went wrong by allowing a pin: 17...Oc6 18 &e4! Cc7 19 &xc6 &xc6 20 \blacksquare ac1 \oiint b7 21 Oxc6 \oiint xc6 22 d5!, which gave White the advantage) 18 Oe4 \oiint c4 19 Oc5 &d5 (with the idea of ...&g5) both sides have chances (Dokhoian, Kishnev).

15 **Q**xe7

After 15 \pounds d2 Black can play 15... \triangle xc3 16 bxc3 \forall d5, and if 17 f3 f5.

15 ₩xe7

16 De4

White's chances are better (analysis).

4.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 €)f3 €)f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6)

7 单d3

A relatively new continuation. White is ready to meet 7...b5 with 8 a4, or else 8 dxc5 &xc5 9 e4!

The position of the bishop on the blh7 diagonal dictates a plan of active play on the kingside. However, the d4-d5 advance will not longer play such a role, as with the bishop at c4 or b3.

7 ... cxd4

By isolating the central pawn, Black avoids the variation with the exchange on c5 followed by a2-a3, b2-b4 and &b2. Note that with the bishop at d3, dxc5 does not involve simplification.

Other possibilities:

7.... 公c6 8 纪c3 (White usually waits until the opponent develops his king's bishop), and now:

(a) 8...\$e7 9 dxc5 \$xc5 10 a3 0-0 11 b4 \$d6 12 \$b2:



(a1) 12....We7 13 Oe4 Oxe4 14 Qxe4 e5 (14...Qd7 is not good in view of 15 Wd3 f5 16 \blacksquare fd1!) 15 \blacksquare c1 Qd7 16 \blacksquare c2 (intending \blacksquare d2 and Wa1) 16...f5 17 Qd5+ Ch8 (Eingorn-Dokhoian, Kharkov 1985), and here instead of 18 \blacksquare d2, when 18...e4 was possible, Black would have faced pressure after 18 e4;

(a1) 12...e5 13 2e4 2c7 14 2c2 h6 15 Zad1 2e7 16 2xf6+ 2xf6 17 2e4with advantage to White (Gavrilov-Donchenko, Moscow 1989);

(b) 8...₩c7 9 a3:



(b1) 9...2e7 10 dxc5 2xc5 11 b4 2e7 12 2b2 0-0 13 ac1 2d7 14 ac4! ad5 (Polugayevsky-Barlov, Haninge 1988; after 14...2xe4 15 2xe4 followed by ad4 Black experiences difficulties), and now 15 ad4 would have been strong (Polugayevsky);

(b2) 9...b5 10 dxc5 (otherwise Black may exchange on d4) 10...\$xc5 11 b4 \$e7 12 \$b2 \$b7 13 De4! White's position is better (Novikov-Sarvinsky, USSR 1988);

(b3) 9...b6 10 全d2 (in Kasparov-Kamsky, New York 1994, Black met 10 dxc5 with 10...bxc5, which permanently weakened his queenside pawns) 10...全b7 11 置c1 cxd4 12 exd4 全e7 13 包e4 單d7 14 全g5 包d5 (14... 置d8 is sounder) 15 全b1! f6 (after 15... 全xg5 16 包exg5 h6 17 包e4 0-0 18 包e5 包xe5 19 dxe5 White has the advantage) 16 全d2 0-0 17 置e1 置ae8 (M.Gurevich-Speelman, France 1994) and now 18 包c3 should have been considered.

7.... 2bd7, and now:

(a) 8 a4 (as the reader will already know, this is a logical reaction to the

development of the queen's knight at d7 - cf. the variation 6...a6 7 $extsf{We2}$ $extsf{Dbd7}$ 8 a4, p.60). Eingorn-Ehlvest (55th USSR Ch., Moscow 1988) continued 8...b6 9 $extsf{We2}$ $extsf{Db1}$ 10 $extsf{Ed1}$ $extsf{Wc5}$ 11 h3 $extsf{Dc1}$ 2 $extsf{Cc3}$ 0-0 (12...e5 is premature: 13 dxe5 $extsf{Dxe5}$ 14 $extsf{Dxe5}$ $extsf{Wxe5}$ 15 f4 followed by e3-e4) 13 $extsf{Dc2}$ $extsf{Dc3}$ 17 $extsf{Eac1}$ e5 15 $extsf{Db1}$ $extsf{Efe8}$ 16 dxc5 $extsf{Dxc5}$ 17 $extsf{Dc2}$ (17 $extsf{Wc4}$?) 17... $extsf{We7}$ 18 e4!? $extsf{Dcxe4}$ 19 $extsf{Dg5}$ $extsf{Dxg5}$ 20 $extsf{Dxg5}$ e4 when a draw was agreed;

(b) 8 We2, when Black has:

(b1) 8...豐c7 (if 8...b5 9 a4!) 9 ②bd2 b6 10 트e1 (after 10 e4 cxd4 11 e5 ④d5 12 ②b3 ②c5 13 ③bxd4 ②xd3 14 豐xd3 兔b7 Black has no problems) 10....兔b7 11 ②f1 ゑe7 12 ゑd2 @e4 13 亘ac1 豐b8 14 ゑc3 0-0 15 ゑxe4 ゑxe4 16 ②g3 ゑb7 17 e4 cxd4 18 ゑxd4 亘c8 19 ゑc3 亘c7 20 寶e3 ゑf8 (Salov-Kamsky, Dortmund 1992) 21 亘cd1 with a promising position for White;

(b2) 8...&e7 9 2c3 0-0 10 dxc5 2xc5 (10...&xc5 11 e4) 11 &c2 b5 12 e4! b4 (12...&b7 13 Ed1 and e4-e5) 13 e5 2fd7 (after 13...bxc3 14 exf6 &xf615 b4 2b7 16 2e5 @d5 17 &f4 White has compensation for the sacrificed pawn – Tukmakov) 14 2e4 &b7 15 Ed1 &d5 16 &f4, with somewhat the more promising position for White (Raetsky-Tukmakov, Bern 1995);

(b3) 8...b6 9 $\blacksquare d1 \pounds b7$ 10 2bd2(Black answers 10 2c3 with 10...9b8, moving off the c-file in anticipation of $\pounds d2$ and $\blacksquare ac1$, with equal chances) 10... $\pounds e7$ 11 2c4 9c7 12 $\pounds d2$ 0–0 13 $\blacksquare ac1$ $\blacksquare fe8$ 14 e4 with a favourable position for White (Malanyuk-D.Prasad, Ubeda 1996);

(c) 8 **E**e1!? is a promising idea, planning e4-e5, e.g. 8...\$e7 (if 8...b5 9 a4!, weakening Black's queenside, or 8...cxd4 9 exd4 and the rook is well placed at e1) 9 e4 cxd4 10 e5 0d5 11 0c4 0c5 (11...07b6 12 0f1) 12 0xd4 0-0 13 b3!? with the better chances (Gelfand-Lautier, Belgrade 1995).

8...2c6 9 2c3 2c7 10 2c5 0-0 transposes into the main line. A position from the Steinitz Variation has been reached with White's king's bishop at d3, which introduces certain corrections into the actions of the two sides.

After 8...g6?! (planning to fianchetto the king's bishop despite the associated weakening of the dark squares) 9 $\cancel{2}$ c3 2g7 10 2g5 h6 (after 10...2c6 11 2e4! 2e7 12 2e5 White has pressure) 11 2h4 2c6 12 2e4! 2e7 (or 12....0-0 13 2xc6 bxc6 14 2e5, and Black's pawns are weakened) 13 2xf6 2xf6 14 2e5 0-0 15 2f3 2g7 16 \blacksquare ad1 Black has problems developing his queenside (Lukacs, Hazai).

9 Dc3

9 ②e5 is possible, when 9...b5?! 10 ₩f3 ₩d5 11 ₩g3 is good for White.

9 ... 0-0

In Karpov-Short (Linares 1995) White instructively exploited the premature 9...b5: 10 a4 b4 11 2e4 2b7 12 We2 0-0 13 Id1 2bd7 (the simplifying 13...2xe4 14 2xe4 2xe4 15 Wxe4 Wd5 16 Wxd5 exd5 17 2e5 gives White the better chances) 14 2ed2! (14 2eg5 a5!) 14...a5 (14...2d5 15 2b3) 15 2b5 2b6 16 2b3 2d5 17 2c5 2bd7 18 2e3 Ia7 19 2e5! Black has a cramped and inferior position (Karpov).

Moskalenko-Karolyi (Lvov 1988) went 9... \triangle c6 10 &g5 Db4 11 \blacksquare e1 0–0 (better 11...Dxd3 12 Wxd3 0–0) 12 &xf6 &xf6 13 &e4 Wd6 (or 13...Dc6 14 &xc6 bxc6 15 De5 Wb6 16 De4 with advantage to White) 14 De5! Dd5 15 Wf3 Dxc3 16 bxc3, and White gained the advantage.

10 **L**g5

10

Here too we must mention 10 2e5:

(a) 10...b5 (10... 公c6 11 公xc6 favours White 11 智行 單石 12 全g5 罩c7 13 罩ad1 全b7 14 對h3 g6 15 罩fe1 b4 16 ②a4 全d5 17 ②c5 with a positional bind (Gelfand-Lautier, Cap d'Agde 1994);

(b) in order to solve his development problems, Black should try 10... \hat{x} d7, not being afraid to concede the two bishops (Dorfman).

... Dc6

10...b5 is still premature: after 11 a4! bxa4 (11...b4 12 2b1 2b7 13 2bd2followed by 2c4 gives White a promising position) 12 2xa4 the a6 pawn is weak and White has a strong point at c5. Hjartarson-Korchnoi (match, Saint John 1988) continued 12...2bd7 13 2b2 2b7 14 2fd1 a5 15 2b5 2c8 16 2b3 2xe5 (16...2e8 17 2b3 2f8 18 2b5) 17 dxe5 2d5 18 2e4 g6 19 2b62e8 20 2b5 2c6 21 2xc6 2xc6 222c3 with a clear advantage.

11 Ic1



11... 全d7 12 里e1 單c8 13 a3 全d5 14 全xd5 全xg5 (14... exd5 15 單xc6 全xg5 16 單d6! favours White) 15 全xg5 豐xg5 16 全b6 單cd8 17 單c5 with the initiative (Gligoric-Marjanovic, Belgrade 1987).

11...b6, when Dreev-Chekhov (Protvino 1982) continued 12 \$xf6 (the unhurried 12 Wd2 and Efd1 should also <u>گ</u>e4 گb7 14 d5 exd5 15 Dxd5 looks tempting, but according to Dreev 15... Black gradually to Ac8 enables neutralise the activity of the opponent's pieces; instead 16 Wb3 b5 17 Zfd1 can be suggested) 13... 金b7 (if 13... 盒d7 strong is 14 ①xf6+ 豐xf6 15 全e4 邕ac8 16 \vert d3 \vert b4 17 \vert b3 with the threat of 18 a3) 14 Dxf6+ gxf6 (even after 14... ₩xf6 15 Qe4 Zac8 16 De5 Dxe5 17 \$xb7 \arrow xc1 18 \arrow xc1 White stands better) 15 2e4 Zc8 16 Zc3 f5 17 2g5! ₩xg5 (17...h6? 18 \$xc6 \$\,\$xc6 19 ₩h5!) 18 \$\overline\$xc6 \$\overline\$e7 19 d5! \$\overline\$xc6 20 dxc6, and White's passed pawn secures him the advantage (Dreev).

11.... \forall d6 12 \forall d2 (the pawn sacrifice 12 \forall e2 2xd4 13 2xd4 \forall xd4 14 Ξ td1 \forall b6 is unclear) 12... Ξ d8 13 Ξ fd1 (13 2xf4 e5!). White stands better, and the exchanging operation 13...2xd4? 14 2xd4 \forall xd4 15 2xh7+ 2xh7 16 \forall xd4 Ξ xd4 17 2xe7 e5 (17... Ξ d7 18 2a4) 18 2d5 2e6 (18...2f5 19 2d6) 19 2c7 gave White a clear advantage in the ending (Eingorn-Seirawan, Zagreb 1987).

11.... \as 12 De4, and now:

Seirawan's recommendation of 11... 2d5 was tested in Cvitan-Kharlov (Biel 1992): 12 2xd5 \$\Delta xg5! (after 12...exd5 13 오xe7 對xe7 14 眞el White has a clear positional advantage) 13 ②xg5 對xg5 14 ②b6 簋b8 15 對c2 (15 오e4 對d8 16 오xc6 對xb6) 15...g6 16 對c5 對d8 17 簋c4 오d7 with equal chances.

We should also mention another setup, typical of such positions: 11...②b4 12 金b1 金d7 13 ②e5 罩c8 14 響f3 金c6 15 斷h3 with the initiative for White (Vera-Borges Mateos, Cuba 1995).

4.3 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6)

7 e4

'The modern interpretation of the Queen's Gambit by White is to advance his central pawns at the very first opportunity, even at the cost of sacrifices' (Alekhine). The sharp gambit move 7 e4, introduced by Geller in 1958, is fully in accordance with this idea of the World Champion.

Black can reply: 7...2xe4 (4.31) 7...cxd4 (4.32) - p.94 7...b5 (4.33) - p.95

4.31 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 €)f3 €)f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7 e4)

... Dxe4

In accepting the pawn, Black opens the e-file for the opponent and falls behind in development. Now 8 **Ze1** is possible, but White's main moves are:

8 ¥e2 (4.311) 8 d5 (4.312) - p.93

7

4.311 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≙xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7 e4 ③xe4)

8 ₩e2 ᡚf6

positional advantage in Geller-Kots (Ukrainian Ch. 1958).

9 d5

The prelude to an interesting bishop sacrifice, suggested by the Bulgarian master Pantaleev.

The alternative is 9 **Id1**:



(a) 9.... 金e7 10 dxc5 豐a5 (if 10... 豐c7 11 b4) 11 亞c3 0-0 12 全g5 豐xc5 13 萬ac1 亞c6 14 全b3 豐a5 15 亞e4! 亞xe4 16 全xe7 亞xe7 17 豐xe4 with a lead in development for the pawn (Kots-Zurakhov, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1958);

(b) 9...b5 10 dxc5?! (10 d5 bxc4 transposes into the main line) 10...@c711 &b3 &xc5 12 &g5 &bd7, when Black keeps his extra pawn, and the bishop sacrifice made in Hije-Romanov (corr. 1964) does not seem dangerous: 13 &xe6 fxe6 14 @xe6+ &e7 15 @e1&c5 16 @e3 @e6 17 @c3 0–0 18 &xf6&xf6 19 @d5 @b7 20 @b6 @c7 21 @xa8 @xa8.

)... b5

It is extremely dangerous to take the second central pawn: 9...2xd5 10 II ac7 11 2c3 2c6 (or 11...0-0 12 axd5exd5 13 2xd5 ad6 14 af4 II ac7 16 II 2xd5 ad6 14 af4 II ac7 16 II axd6 12 2xd5 exd5 13 axd5 ad7 14 II 15 II 16 II 16 II 17 II 16 II 17 II 16 II 17 II 18 II

10	dxe6	bxc4
11	Id1	



The correctness of Pantaleev's idea depends on the evaluation of this position.

11...,堂e7 12 exf7+ 安xf7 13 豐xc4+ 安g6 (13...全e6 14 包g5+) 14 里e1 leads to a win for White.

11... \forall c7 also loses in view of 12 exf7+ \Rightarrow xf7 13 \odot e5+.

11... \forall b6 12 exf7+ \Leftrightarrow xf7 is the critical line:



13 Øg5+ (this is clearer than 13 ₩xc4+ analysed by Pantaleev) 13...

(b) meanwhile a deadly check at c2 is threatened, and if 14... f5 15 Exf5(15... rxf5 16 g4+);

(c) 14...₩c6 15 ₩c2+ \$h5 16 De6+ ₩xd5 (16...Dxd5 17 ₩f5+) 17 Df4+;

(d) 14...皇g4 15 f3 ②xd5 (15...皇xf3 16 豐xf3) 16 豐e8+ 當f6 17 ②e4+ 當f5 18 fxg4+ 當xg4 19 豐c8+;

(e) 14...h6 15 ₩c2+ \$h5 16 De6+ Dxd5 17 ₩f5+.

This analysis from the 1980s by the Russian player Buzin was successfully used by White in Trofimov-Metlyakhin (Kolontaevo 1994). If Buzin's variations are not refuted, Black should definitely avoid taking the e4 pawn.

4.312 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 e4 2xe4)

8 d5



'Leave well alone' – the fate of this variation depends on the evaluation of the previous one. But such is the nature of chess: that which today is considered strongest may tomorrow be refuted by practice and analysis, and so it is worth devoting attention to this and other branches.

8...exd5 9 &xd5 \bigtriangledown d6 (9... \circlearrowright f6? 10 &xf7+) 10 \exists e1+ &e7 11 &g5 f6 (if 11... \circlearrowright f5 12 \circlearrowright e5 0-0 13 \circlearrowright xf7 \exists xf7 14 &xf7+ \diamondsuit xf7 15 \oiint xd8 winning the exchange) 12 &f4, and White has a powerful position for the sacrificed pawn.

8.... 2d6 9 dxe6 fxe6 (not 9... 2xc4? 10 exf7+; after 9... xe6 10 xe6 fxe6 11 Ze1 White has sufficient compensation for the pawn, although for Black this is probably the lesser evil) 10 2d3 (or 10 @xe6 @xe6 11 Hel with a strong attacking position, Zilberman-Levin, USSR 1962) 10... 2e7 11 Wc2 (11 De5 is also good) 11...Df5 (if 11... g6 12 Id1! and 2h6) 12 Id1 Wc7 13 Qxf5! exf5 14 包c3 Qe6 (15 包d5 and \$f4 was threatened) 15 He1 \$f7 16 對xf5 0-0 17 皇f4 皇d6 18 包g5 g6 19 谢h3 h5 20 ②e6 劉d7 21 皇xd6 劉xd6 22 Zad1! 2xe6 23 Zxe6 Black resigns (Klüger-Szily, Hungary 1959);

8...b5. In this line too the play favours White: 9 dxe6 兔xe6 (bad is 9...bxc4 10 exf7+ 슣e7 11 蠻e2 or 9...變xd1 10 exf7+ 슣e7 11 簋xd1 bxc4 12 簋e1) 10 螢xd8+ 슣xd8 11 兔xe6 fxe6 12 簋e1 ④d6 13 兔g5+ 兔e7 14 ଢc3.

8... 2 e7 9 dxe6 2 xe6, and now:

(a) 10 ₩xd8+ \$\overline\$xd8 11 \$\overline\$xe6 fxe6 12 \$\overline\$16 13 \$\overline\$25 (13 \$\overline\$xe6+ is worth trying) 13...0-0 14 \$\overline\$xe6 \$\overline\$8 15 \$\overline\$2c3 \$\overline\$bd7 16 \$\overline\$f4 \$\overline\$a5, and Neikirch-Clarke (Leipzig Olympiad 1960) ended in a quick draw;

(b) 10 ≜xe6 ₩xd1 (it is unfavourable to leave the queens on) 11 ¤xd1 fxe6 12 **E**e1, and in contrast to Neikirch-Clarke, Black's bishop is at e7 rather than d8, which favours White.

4.32 (1	d4 d5	2 c4	dxc4	3	ଏମ୍ଡ	句f6 4	1
e3 e6 5	€xc4	c5 6	0–0 a6	57	' e4)		

7 ... cxd4 Black declines the sacrifice. He can also do this with 7... \bigcirc c6, e.g. 8 e5 \bigcirc d7 (if 8... \bigcirc d5 9 &g5 wc7 10 dxc5, when 10... \bigcirc xe5 fails to 11 &xd5) 9 \blacksquare e1 cxd4 10 &f4 (paying no attention to the d4 pawn, White supports his outpost at e5 and uses the e4 square to transfer his knight to the kingside, or in some cases to d6) 10...c5 11 \bigcirc bd2 b5 12 &d3 &b7 13 \bigcirc e4 with an excellent position.

8	e5	乞fd7

Or 8.... 2 d5 9 ₩xd4.

9 ₩xd4 ᡚc6

Vaisman-Novopashin (USSR 1968) went 9... $box{wc7}$ 10 \pounds f4 b5 11 \pounds c2 (11 \pounds b3!?) 11... \pounds b7 12 \triangle c3 \triangle c6 13 $box{wd2}$ \triangle dxe5 14 \triangle xe5 \triangle xe5 15 $\box{we3}$ \pounds d6 (15... $\box{wc6}$ 16 $\box{wg3}$, and if 16... \pounds d6 17 $\box{ad1}$) 16 \pounds xb5+ \pounds f8 17 \pounds c2 \triangle f3+ 18 \pounds xf3 \pounds xf4 19 $\box{wc2}$ \pounds xh2+ 20 $\box{ch1}$ \pounds d6. Black has been prevented from castling, but it is not clear if White has sufficient compensation for the pawn.

10	₩e4	₩c7
11	⊈f4	

After supporting his e5 pawn, White counts on using his spatial advantage.

11		b5
12	≌ h3	De5

This position was reached in Petrosian-Sherwin (Portoroz 1959), which continued 13 變e2 ②xb3 14 axb3 ②b7 15 ②c3 鱼e7 16 ②e4 0-0. If Black can play his knight to d5, he will feel secure, but it is White to move, and by preventing ... ②b4-d5 with 17 星ac1, he gains the better chances.



13 營e3 should be considered. Compared with the Petrosian-Sherwin game, after 13...公xb3 14 axb3 全b7 15 公c3 全e7 16 公e4 Black is unable to castle: 16...0-0? 17 公f6+! 空h8 (of course, the knight cannot be taken) 18 公g5.

4.33 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 2 f6 4
e3 e6 5 🗟 xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 e4)

b5

7 ... 8 单d3

After 8 2b3 Black can take the pawn - 8...2xc4, and answer 9 d5 with 9...c4. If 8 e5, then 8...bxc4 9 exf6 cxd4.

8... ⊈b7

8... 2c6 is weaker in view of 9 e5 10 a4.

But 8...cxd4 is possible - 9 e5 (9 公xd4 金b7) 9...公d5 10 a4, and now:

(a) 10...bxa4 11 豐xa4+ 全d7 12 豐xd4 g6 (12...公c6 13 豐g4) 13 公bd2 全g7 14 公c4 0-0 15 h4 f6 with chances for both sides (Lengyel-Gunnarsson, Vrnjacka Banja 1967);

(b) 10...b4 11 $2bd2 \pm b7$ 12 2e4occurred in Solovyev-Liberzon (Moscow 1964): 12...2c6 (better 12...2d7, and if 13 $\pm g5 \cong b8$) 13 $\pm g5$ (he should have prevented White's next move with 13...,豐a5) and by sacrificing a pawn White created strong threats on the a4-e8 diagonal: 14 a5! ①xa5 15 豐a4+ ②c6 16 昌fc1!

8... 2bd7 is another possibility: 9 d5 2b6 (9...c4), or 9 e5 2d5 10 2c3 \$b7.



9 e5

Portisch-Petrosian (Stockholm 1962) continued 9 **Tel** cxd4 (if $9... \pounds e7$ 10 dxc5 \pounds xc5 11 \pounds g5, threatening e4-e5) 10 a4. This appears to put Black in a difficult position, but Petrosian managed to maintain equality: 10...bxa4! 11 **T**xa4 \pounds fd7 (this forces White to take the pawn with the knight, since after 12 **T**xd4 \pounds c6 the rook comes under attack by the knights) 12 \pounds xd4 \pounds e7 13 \pounds c2 \pounds c6. White has no advantage.

Kasparov-Gulko (Kislovodsk 1982) went 9 & g5 cxd4 10 @ xd4 (weak is 10 e5 h6 11 &h4 g5 12 @ xg5 hxg5 13& xg5 @ d5, but 10 a4 comes into consideration) 10...@ bd7 11 @ c3 @ e5!(after 11...& c5 12 @ b3 & e7 13 @ e2 or11...& e7 12 @ e2 @ e5 13 @ ad1 White'sposition is preferable) 12 @ cxb5?(against careful defence this dashing sacrifice does not achieve its aim; however, after the quiet 12 & e2 & e7 or 12...& c5 13 @ b3 & b6 Black has a good position) 12...2xd3 13 $\forall xd3$ axb5 14 Ξ fd1 &e7 (14...&xe4 leads only to equality - 15 &xf6 &xd3 16 &xd8 Ξ xd8 17 Ξ xd3 &c5; if 14... \forall b6 15 &xf6 gxf6 16 \bigotimes xe6! with an attack) 15 $\forall xb5+ \forall d7$ 16 $\forall b3$ (16 $\forall e2 \forall a4!$) 16...&xe4 17 \bigotimes f5 &d5 18 \bigotimes xg7+ &f8 19 \forall h3 h5 20 \forall g3 &xg7 21 &xf6+ &xf6 22 Ξ d4 &d6. Black's king is exposed, but there is nothing to attack it with, and meanwhile he is already two bishops up (Gulko).

Ød5

The alternative is 9...2677 10 2c3(after 10 25 Wb6 chances are roughly equal, Petrosian-Van Scheltinga, Beverwijk 1960; as in the main line 10 a4 is worth considering) 10... cxd4 11 2c4with active prospects on the kingside.

10 a4

9

White gains no advantage by 10 ②c3 ②xc3 11 bxc3 鱼e7 12 a4 b4 13 dxc5 bxc3 14 覺c2 ②d7 15 覺xc3 ③xc5 16 鱼e2 0-0 (Khodos-Tarasov, USSR 1961).

Avrukh-Baburin (Groningen 1995) went 10 &g5 Wb6 11 dxc5 &xc5 12 Cc3 h6 13 &h4 Cd7 14 a4, when Black's simplest would have been 14...Cxc3 15 bxc3 0–0 16 \blacksquare e1 &c6 with roughly equal chances.



10 ... b4

10...bxa4 11 dxc5 \pounds xc5 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ xa4+ \pounds c6 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ g6 14 \pounds bd2 leaves White with slightly the better prospects.

11 Dbd2 cxd4

We have already met this position under a different move order (cf. the notes to Black's 8th move). We should add that after 12 Db3 (12 De4, as in Solovvev-Liberzon. looks stronger) 12... 2d7 13 里e1 包c5 14 包xc5 皇xc5 15 包g5 包e3 16 包xe6 fxe6 17 fxe3 ₩g5 18 e4 ₩xe5, which occurred in Geller-Keres (Bled 1961) White preferred to restore material equality by 19 **≙**f4 **₩**xf4 20 **₩**h5+ **₩**f7 21 **₩**xc5 (one of the pawns is lost), and 21... We7 22 Zac1 ₩xc5 23 Zxc5 Zc8 24 Zxc8+ \$xc8 25 \arrowcelled to a draw.

There is a more tense battle after 19 If 1, when White has compensation for the pawn.

4.4 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 2 f6 4 e3				
e6 5 🗟 xc4 c5 6 00 a6)				

7 b3

A comparatively new, but by no means harmless move.



7.... 2c6 and now:

(a) 8 单b2 cxd4 9 纪xd4 单d7 (or 9... 2xd4 10 2xd4 b5 11 2e2 2b7 12 a4 b4 13 2d2 \$e7 14 2c4 0-0 15 a5 響d5 16 皇f3 響b5 with equality. Illescas Cordoba-Adams. Dos Hermanas 1995) 10 幻了 皇e7 11 幻bd2 0-0 12 ②g5 (12 Wb1 is worth considering, threatening by 13 2g5 to provoke ...g7-g6 -Speelman) 12...h6 13 2ge4 b5 14 2e2 2b4 15 a3 (or 15 2xf6+ \$xf6 16 ≜xf6 ₩xf6 17 ④e4 ₩b2 18 ₩xd7 Wxe2 with an equal position - Speelman) 15... Dbd5 16 2d3 Ic8 17 We2 Dxe4 18 Dxe4 f5 19 Dg3 \$ f6 with equal chances (Chernin-Speelman, Subotica 1987);

(b) 8 dxc5 $\forall xd1$ 9 $\exists xd1$ &xc5 10 &b2, when White's pieces are more actively placed: 10...b5 11 &e2 &b7 12 a4, or 10...&d7 11 &bd2 &e7 12 &xf6+gxf6 13 &e4.

7...cxd4 8 公xd4 兔d6 (or 8...兔d7 9 兔b2 公c6 10 公d2, Chekhov-L.B.Hansen, Germany 1996, 10...兔d6! 11 兔e2 暫c7 12 公4f3 0-0 13 罩c1 罩fd8 14 暫c2 冨ac8 15 公c4 兔e7 with an equal game - Chekhov) 9 兔b2 0-0 10 公d2 요c7 11 罩c1 斷d6 12 f4 b5 13 兔d3 兔b7 14 罾c2 兔b6 15 公e4 兔xe4 16 兔xe4 罩a7 17 兔f3 罩c7 18 斷e2 罩fc8 with equal chances (Miles-Ivanchuk, Moscow 1990).

7...b5 8 @e2, and now:

(a) 8... ②bd7 9 金b2 金b7 10 a4 bxa4 11 罩xa4 (11 bxa4!?) 11... 金e7 12 ②bd2 ②b6 13 罩a5 (13 罩a1 is more natural, but White wants to put pressure on the a6 pawn) 13...cxd4 14 金xd4 ②bd5 15 罾a1 0-0 16 罩c1 ②b4 17 ②c4 罩c8 18 ③fe5 ④fd5 with equal chances (Agdestein-Ehlvest, Belgrade 1989);

(b) 8... \pounds b7 9 a4! bxa4 (after 9...b4 10 \pounds b2 followed by \triangle bd2-c4 White has a definite positional advantage) 10 bxa4 \triangle bd7 11 \triangle bd2 \triangle d5 12 \pounds b2 cxd4 13 \triangle xd4 \pounds b4 (13... \pounds e7? 14 2xe6!) 14 Ec1 Ec8 15 Exc8 Wxc8 16 $2e4 \ 0-0 \ 17 \ Wb1 Wa8 \ 18 \ 2g5! g6$ (weaker is $18...25f6 \ 19 \ Id1 \ h6 \ 20$ $2dxe6 \ hxg5 \ 21 \ 2xg5! 2e4 \ 22 \ Ixd7$ $2xg5 \ 23 \ Wf5 \ 2e6 \ 24 \ 2d3 \ when White$ $wins, or 20...fxe6 \ 21 \ Ixd7 \ hxg5 \ 22$ $Wg6 \ 2xd7 \ 23 \ Wxg7 \ mate - Miles) \ 19$ $We4! \ with a \ very \ dangerous \ initiative$ (Miles-Davidovic, Sydney 1991).

7... 2bd7 8 单b2 b6 (8...单e7 would seem better, and only then ... b7-b6) 9 d5! exd5 10 皇xd5 邕a7 (if 10... 纪xd5 11 Wxd5 Ia7 12 Id1 with advantage) 11 包c3 皇e7 12 堂c2 0-0 (12...包xd5 13 ①xd5 favours White: 13... ①f6 14 ②xe7 ₩xe7 15 ②e5 皇b7 16 置fd1 0-0 17 Dc4, 13... 全f6 14 曾e4+, or 13...0-0 13...\$b7 14 \$xb7 \$\$xb7 15 e4) 14 \$e4 h6 (after 14 ... Ie8 15 2d5, 14 ... 2xe4 15 回d5 or 14... 皇b7 15 皇xb7 豐xb7 and 16 e4 White has the advantage) 15 \mathbb{Z} d2 (15 a4 is also good), with the more promising position for White (Malanyuk-Hübner, Moscow Olympiad 1994).

4.5 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ③f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0−0 a6)

7 dxc5



This simplifying move looks completely harmless. White himself offers the exchange of queens, and with a symmetrical pawn structure. Black can indeed obtain an equal game, but, as shown by the games examined below, this occurs by no means automatically.

Black has:

7...₩xd1 (4.51)

7... 2xc5 (4.52) - p.100

By 7... \forall c7 Black can avoid the exchange of queens:

(b) 8 b4!? (the evaluation of 7...) (b) 8 b4!? (the evaluation of 7...) (b) 8...a5 (after 8...b6 9 全b2 bxc5 10 b5 White's position is the more promising) 9 公c3 axb4 10 公b5 對xc5 11 對e2 followed by 全b2 and 單ac1 (Gligoric).

4.51 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 创f3 创f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 dxc5)

> 7 ... 響xd1 8 罩xd1 全xc5



This allows White to vary his plan in accordance with the opponent's actions.

Other continuations:

9 b3 2 bd7 10 2 b2 occurred several times in the Spassky-Fischer match (Sveti Stefan/Belgrade 1992):

(a) 10...b6 11 2c3 b7 12 ac1 ac7 13 2d4 ac8 (13...0-0? 14 2xe6) 14 f3 (instead of this routine move, White should have considered 14 ac2 0-0 15 af3 axf3 16 gxf3) 14...b5 15 ac2 ac5! 16 bf1 bc7 17 e4 g5! and Black took the initiative (4th game);

(b) 10...b5 11 皇e2 皇b7 12 ②bd2 and now:

(b1) 12...2e7 13 a4 bxa4 14 Ξ xa4 Ξ hb8 15 Ξ c1 2d5 (if 15...2d6 16 2c42c5 17 2a3 with a great advantage for White) 16 2e5, and White's position is preferable (6th game);

(b2) 12...0-0 (dissatisfied with the previous game, Fischer introduces an improvement) 13 I ac1 I fc8 14 h3 \$78 15 \$f1 \$e7 16 \$e1 \$d6 17 a4 \$c6 (17...b4 18 \$c4 \$c7 19 \$d4 would have given White some positional advantage, but 17...bxa4! 18 \$c4 \$b4 19 \$2d3 a5 20 bxa4 \$c6 21 I a1 \$d5 would have secured Black a good game) 18 axb5 axb5 19 I c2 I c7 with an equal position (14th game).

9 a3:



9 ②bd2

(a) 9...b5 10 &c2 &b7 11 b4 &c7 (or 11...&b6 12 &b2 &bd7 13 &c3 0–0 14 \blacksquare ac1 \blacksquare fc8 with equality, Lilienthal-Keres, Budapest Candidates 1950) 12 &b2 \bigotimes bd7 13 \bigotimes bd2 \bigotimes b6 (or 13... \blacksquare c8, Ivkov-Pr.Nikolic, Yugoslavia 1982) 14 \bigotimes b3 \bigotimes a4 15 &d4 \blacksquare c8 16 \blacksquare ac1 0–0 with an equal position (Flohr-Alekhine, Kemeri 1937);

(b) 9... $\pounds e^7$ 10 b4 $\pounds d6$ 11 $\pounds b2$ b5 12 $\pounds e^2$ $\triangle bd7$ 13 $\triangle bd2$ $\pounds b7$ 14 $\triangle b3$ $\blacksquare ac8$ 15 $\triangle fd4$ (Dorfman-Lerner, Lvov 1981; or 15 $\triangle a5$ $\pounds e4$ 16 $\blacksquare dc1$ e5 17 $\pounds f1$ h6, Andersson-Rodriguez, Moscow 1982), and after 15... $\triangle b6$ White's chances of strengthening his position are minimal.

9 2c3 b5 10 2c2 2c5 11 2cd2 2bd7 12 b4 2cd6 13 a4 bxa4 14 2xa4 2c4 with a roughly equal game (Angos-Lundin, Leipzig 1960).



Despite the symmetrical pawns and the quiet nature of the forthcoming play, accuracy is required of Black.

Bronstein-Spassky (Moscow 1964) took an instructive course: 9...b5 10 \$e2 \$b7 11 €b3 \$e7 (11...\$b6 12 全d2 ②c6 13 a4 bxa4 14 罩xa4 0-0 15 Idal ②b8 16 ②a5 皇xa5 17 皇xa5 allows White to create strong pressure on the a-pawn, Trifunovic-Bilek, Yugoslavia v. Hungary 1962) 12 Da5! 2d5 13 2d2 Dc6 (13...Dbd7 14 Dd4 is good for White) 14 2xc6 2xc6 15 ②d4 盒d5 (15... 盒b7 16 a4 is unpleasant for Black) 16 f3 2c5 17 2c2 \$e7 (17...0-0!?) 18 當f1 幻d7 19 e4 皇b7 20 a4 bxa4 21 Ixa4 Ihc8 22 2c3 f6, and now 23 2d4! (intending 2b3) would have been very strong, when 23... 2d6 fails to 24 Dxe6! \$xe6 25 Had4 Hc6 26 Qc4+ ge7 27 Zxd6 Zxd6 28 Qb4. Black has a difficult position.

(a) 10 a3 b5 11 \$\overline{2}\$ \$\overline{b7}\$ 12 b4 \$\overline{2}\$ e7 13 \$\overline{b2}\$ 0-0 14 \$\overline{b3}\$ \$\overlin{b3}\$ \$\overlin{b3}\$ \$\overline{b3}\$ \$\overline{b3}\$

(b) 10 2b3 2b6 11 2d2 2d7 12 ac1 e 7 13 2bd4 ad8 14 2xc6+ 2xc6 15 2b4+ e 8. White's advantage is minimal, and soon Black equalised completely: 16 2e5 2d5 17 2xd5 axd5 18 2c4 axd1+ 19 axd1 2c7(Averbakh-Suetin, Moscow 1982).

9...0-0 10 a3 b5 11 \pounds e2 \pounds b7 12 b4 \pounds e7 13 \pounds b2 \bigstar bd7 14 \ddagger ac1 \ddagger fc8 15 \oiint b3 \ddagger xc1 16 \ddagger xc1 \ddagger c8 17 \ddagger xc8+ \pounds xc8 18 \bigstar fd4 \oiint b8 19 \pounds f3 \pounds f8 20 \oiint a5! Despite the limited material and symmetrical pawns, White's position is preferable (Spassky-Fischer, 18th match game, Sveti Stefan/Belgrade 1992).

9... 2 bd7 10 2 b3 2 e7 11 2 d2 b6 12 2 fd4 2 b7 13 Zac1 Zc8 14 2 e2 0-0 with an equal game (Gligoric-Keres, Bled 1961).

The set-up 9... \$e7 10 2b3 皇d6 11 2d2 2c6 looks satisfactory. After 12 ②fd4 ②xd4 13 ③xd4 皇d7 14 里ac1 Zhc8 the game is equal (Gligoric-Donner, match, Eersel 1968).

4.52 (1	d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4
e3 e6 5	≗xc4 c5 6 0–0 a6 7 dxc5)

≜xc5 . . .

It is not essential for Black himself to exchange the queens.

₩xd8+ 8

7

White gains no advantage by:

8 a3 0-0 9 b4 \$e7 10 \$b2 b5 11 ≜e2 \$b7 12 9bd2 9bd7 (Uddenfeldt-Petrosian, Nice Olympiad 1974).

8 We2 Wc7 9 2bd2 2c6 10 a3 0-0 11 b4 2d6 12 2b2 2g4 13 h3 2ge5 14 Zac1 We7 with an equal game (Furman-Korchnoi, USSR 1965, and, by transposition, Gligoric-Portisch, Yugoslavia v. Hungary 1966). ∲xd8 8

. . .



The black king will feel fine at e7. 9 例hd2 Other continuations: 9 a3. and now: (a) 9...b5 10 \$e2 \$b7 11 b4 \$d6 12 2b2 \$e7 13 Dbd2 Dbd7 14 Hac1 Zac8 with equal chances (Najdorf-Pilnik, Mar del Plata 1943, and, by a somewhat different move order, Csom-Portisch, Palma de Mallorca 1971);

(b) 9... ④bd7 10 b4 单d6 11 单b2 空e7 12 Dbd2 (12 Dc3!?, Keres) 12... Id8 13 ②d4 ④b6 14 单b3 皇d7 with equal chances (Rytov-Keres, Tallinn 1975).

9 b3 b5 (9...b6, 9... 2 bd7 and 9... \$e7 are also possible) 10 2e2 2b7 11 2b2 \$e7!:



(a) 12 2bd2 Ic8 13 a4 b4 14 Iac1 Dbd7 with an equal game (Pr.Nikolic-Liubojevic, Belgrade 1989);

(b) 12 a4 b4 (after 12...bxa4 13 Xxa4 Dbd7 14 Dbd2 单d6 15 ᡚc4 ᡚc5 16 Ia3 or 14...Ihb8 15 Ifa1 皇d5 16 皇c4 ≜xc4 17 IIxc4 a5 18 2c3 the advantage is with White, who has appreciable pressure on the a-pawn) 13 a5! 2bd7 14 ②bd2 單hd8 15 單fc1 (Spassky-equal chances.

9 2c3 b5 10 单d3 单b7 11 2g5 當e7 12 Dce4 Dxe4 13 Dxe4 2b6 14 b3 ②c6 with an equal game (Letelier-Filip, Mar del Plata 1961).

Let us return to 9 Dbd2.

2b6 13 2b2 2b7 14 Hac1 Hac8 15 2b3 2b8, and a draw was soon agreed in Trifunovic-Petrosian (Bled 1961).



9...\$e7 10 b3 b6 11 \$b2 \$b7 12 \$e2 Øbd7 13 Øc4 \$d5 14 Ød4 Inc8 15 Lac1 Lc7 with equal chances (Shamkovich-Keres, 29th USSR Ch., Baku 1961). Note that (in this and other games given earlier) Keres avoided playing ... b7-b5.

4.6 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3	ମ୍ବାପ୍ତ		4 e3
e6 5 🕰 xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6)			

7 ②bd2

The latest word in fashion. The main virtue of this development of the knight is the possibility of deviating from well studied variations.

. . .

cxd4 $2e^2$ and then a2-a4) 8 dxc5 2xc5 9 b3 (9 響e2 is also played; after 9 纪b3 皇a7 10 豐xd8+ 雲xd8 11 邕d1+ 雲e7 12 2bd4 2xd4 13 2xd4 Zd8 14 b3 2xd4 the ending is equal) 9...0-0 10 \$b2 We7 11 Wc2 (Atalik-Ibragimov, Anoliosia 1995, went 11 Wb1 2a3 12 2xa3 ₩xa3 13 De4 ₩e7 14 Id1 Id8 15 $\exists xd8 + 2 xd8$; White has no advantage)

11... ④b4 (after 11... 皇a3 12 皇xa3 ₩xa3 13 De4 ₩e7 14 Zad1 Db4 15 $\Omega x f 6 + W x f 6 16 W d 2 9 c 6 17 W d 6$ White has some positional advantage) 12 Wb1 (if immediately 12 Wc3, then 12...b5 13 2e2 2b7 equalises) 12...b5 (12... 萬d8 13 包e4 包xe4 14 豐xe4 包d5 15 Zad1 favours White) 13 2g5 e5 14 \$e2 g6. Both sides have chances (Ibragimov).

> Dxd4 拿d6

8... 2bd7 comes into consideration.

After 8... @e7 9 b3 0-0 10 @b2 @d7 11 2e2 Dc6 12 2f3 in this position with symmetrical pawns White retains some initiative.

£1413 9

9 b3 and 2b2 is possible, as well as 9 \$e2, to meet 9...b5 with 10 a4.

> 9 0--0 . . .



/e are following D.Gurevich-Gulko (U A 1995). After 10 b3 b5 11 \$e2 فَ 12 فَ b2 كَbd7 13 a4 bxa4 14 كَc4 **≜** (also 14...**≜**b4!?) 15 bxa4 Black sh ild have played 15...\$d5, after which it is difficult for White to count on .ny advantage (Gurevich).

Steinitz Variation 6...cxd4

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	ହ୍ୟା ସ	④f6
4	e3	e6
5	≜xc4	c5
6	00	cxd4
	•	1 .1 .

The prelude to a plan that was successfully employed by Steinitz in his match with Zukertort (1886).

7 exd4

7 2xd4 is soundly answered by 7... a6, e.g. 8 2c3 c5 9 2b3 d6 when we reach a position from the variation 6 0-0 a6 7 2c3 cxd4 8 2xd4.



The basic position of the Steinitz Variation. After blockading the d4 pawn (or in some other way preventing d4-d5) Black aims to simplify the position and to begin besieging the pawn. At the same time he takes measures against the opponent's threats on the kingside. We have already met positions of this type, except that the exchange in the centre was made at a later stage.

We will consider:

7.....Ôc6 (5.1)

7... **e**7 (5.2) – p.110

5.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 句f3 句f6 4 e3 e6 5 象xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4)

7 ... ②c6 Black puts the d4 pawn under attack. 8 ②c3

The classic set-up for White is queen at e2, bishop at g5, and king's rook at d1. However, 8 We2 leaves his d-pawn undefended. But what if he sacrifices it, gaining time for development? - 8... 2xd4 9 2xd4 W xd4 10 **Ed1** W b6:

(a) 11 \$b5+ \$d7, and now:

(a1) $12 \mod c3 \mod xb5 13 \oiint xb5+ \oiint c6!$ 14 \overline e3 \overline c7 15 \u2223 ac1 0-0 16 \u2223 xc6 bxc6. White's lead in mobilisation is sufficient to regain his pawn, with a probable draw (Lutikov-Flohr, USSR Ch. $\frac{1}{2}$ -Final 1952);

(a2) 12 오xd7+ 公xd7 13 公3, intensifying the pressure. After 13...2f6 14 오e3 單c6 15 罩ac1 Black, who is a pawn up, gave up his queen for rook and bishop in order to parry the threats - 15...a6 16 公d5 單xd5 17 罩xd5 公xd5, but the compensation seems inadequate, and White's chances are better (Malich-Uhlmann, Zinnowitz 1966);

(b) 11 ②c3 এc7 12 এc3 饗a5 13 鱼b5+ 鱼d7 14 鱼xd7+ ②xd7 15 饗g4, and White retains a lead in development. Thus it is advisable for Black to reject the win of the pawn and to continue his development with 8...\$e7 or 8...a6, transposing into the main line.

We therefore consider: 8...≙e7 (5.11) 8...a6 (5.12) - p.107

5.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 包f3 包f6 4 e3 e6 5 皇xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4 包c6 8 包c3)

8 ... ⊈e7



9 ₩e2

The positions after 9 Ξ e1 0–0 10 a3 (or 9 a3 0–0 10 Ξ e1 or 10 Ψ d3 occur in the Nimzo-Indian and Caro-Kann Defences (1 d4 \Box)f6 2 c4 e6 3 \Box c3 \pm b4 4 e3 0–0 5 \pm d3 d5 6 \Box f3 c5 7 0–0 \Box c6 8 a3 dxc4 9 \pm xc4 cxd4 10 exd4 \pm e7 11 Ξ e1 or 11 Ψ d3, and 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 exd5 cxd5 4 c4 \Box)f6 5 \Box c3 e6 6 \Box f3 dxc4 7 \pm xc4 \Box c6 8 0–0 \pm e7 9 Ξ e1 0–0 10 a3 or 9 a3 0–0 10 Ψ d3). The reader will find a detailed analysis in appropriate books.

The point of the move a2-a3 is to vacate a2 for the bishop (for example, in the event of $\dots a7$ -a6 and $\dots b7$ -b5). While exerting pressure on e6, at the

same time the bishop can be switched to the b1-h7 diagonal, where in tandem with the queen ($\forall d3$) it can force a weakening of the opponent's kingside. And one more point: when the black knight is developed at c6, the move a2a3 prevents the blockading manoeuvre ... \triangle b4-d5.

Another possible strategy for White is the d4-d5 break, in order to open up the position and exploit his spatial advantage.

9 全e3. This unpretentious move is now rarely played, but it is by no means harmless. According to Euwe, after 9...0-0 10 包e5 包xe5 (10...全d7 11 響e2 單c8 12 單ad1 or 10...包b4 11 暫f3) 11 dxe5 豐xd1 (if 11...包d7 12 f4) 12 單fxd1 包d7 13 f4 Black is cramped.

9 **▲**f4 is an old continuation, dating back to games between Pillsbury and Steinitz. After 9...0-0 10 **∠**c1 (the natural 10 **∠**e1 was played in Sveshnikov-I.Ivanov, USSR 1976, but after 10...b6 White hurried to force events: 11 d5 **∠**a5 12 d6 **∠**xc4 13 dxe7 **∀**xe7 14 **¥**e2, which could have been met by 14...**△**a6, and if 15 b3 **¥**a3!) Steinitz played the provocative 10...**¥**b6?!



(a) 11 ②b5 ②e8 12 里e1 ④a5 13 皇d3 皇d7 14 ④c7 里c8, and now: (a1) 15 ④d5 exd5 16 里xe7 ⑤f6 17

2g5 &g4! 18 &xh7+ ∂xh7 19 ¥xg43xc1+ 20 &xc1 ∂f6 (if 20...∂xg5 21 &xg5 ¥xb2 22 h4 with a dangerous attack) 21 ¥d1 <math>2c6 22 3ac1 ¥xd4, and the wild complications have led to a position with roughly equal chances (Pillsbury-Steinitz, New York 1894);

(a2) 15 2 xe8! This seemingly simple exchange is a significant improvement suggested by Ravinsky:



15... Ξ xc1 (if 15... Ξ fxe8 16 \bigcirc e5, threatening not only to take the bishop, but also 17 \bigcirc xf7 and 17 \bigcirc xh7+) 16 \textcircled xc1 \blacksquare xe8 17 \bigcirc c7 \oiint b4 18 a3 \oiint a4 19 \bigcirc c2 \bigcirc b3 (19... \oiint b5 20 \blacksquare e5) 20 \oiint f4. White threatens 21 \blacksquare e3, 21 \blacksquare e5, and also 21 \bigcirc d2 – Black's position is desperate (this analysis dates from 1970);

(b) Meanwhile in St Petersburg (1895/6) the same players repeated the variation. This time Pillsbury decided on the positional 11 Wd2 Id8 12 Ifd1 \$\overline{2}d7 13 We2 \$\overline{2}d8 14 \$\overline{2}d3 Iac8 15 h3\$ \$\overline{2}b4 16 \$\overline{2}bd5 17 \$\overline{2}e5 \$\overline{2}c6 - both sides have chances.

0--0

Compared with Lutikov-Flohr (p.102) here the capture of the d4 pawn is even more dangerous: 9...公xd4 10 公xd4 徵xd4 11 置d1 (11 公b5 is also unpleasant) 11...徵b6 (11...徵g4 12 全b5+) 12 全e3 蹤c7 13 公b5.

9

10 **X**d1

The 3rd game of the Spassky-Petrosian match (Moscow 1966), where this position was reached from a Caro-Kann Defence, went 10 &e3 \bigotimes a5 11 &d3 b6 12 &g5 (if 12 \bigotimes e5 &b7 13 f4 \bigotimes d5!) 12...&b7 13 \blacksquare ad1 \blacksquare c8 14 \blacksquare fe1 (14 \bigotimes e5 \bigotimes d5 15 &d2 \bigotimes b4) 14...h6! 15 &c1 (better 15 &d2) 15...&b4! 16 &d2 &xc3 17 bxc3 \blacksquare d5. The loss of time (&c1-e3-g5-c1-d2) has allowed the black pieces to take up ideal positions.



We now consider: 10...\2a5 (5.111) 10...\2b4 (5.112) - p.105 10...a6 (5.113) - p.106 10...\\$c7 is strongly met by 11 \\$g5 and \$\\$ac1.

5.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 幻f3 幻f6 4
e3 e6 5 🛳 xc4 c5 6 00 cxd4 7 exd4
තිc6 8 තිc3

10 ... 4∆a5 Directed against d4-d5 (10...b6? 11 d5).

The alternative is **12 De5 £**b7 13 **£**a6 (13 **¥**e3 **Dd5** 14 **¥**h3 f5 leads to a

double-edged situation, Lengyel-Van Scheltinga, Beverwijk 1965; 13 &g5 transposes into the main line) 13...&xa6 (13...&c8!? – Averbakh) 14 &xa6 2d5 15 &d2 (or 15 &c2) 15...&b4 (Black is tempted by the win of a pawn; 15...f6 16 2f3 &d7 was possible) 16 &c2 2c2 (16...2ac6 is correct) 17 \blacksquare ac1 2xd4 (a dangerous pin) 18 &e4 f6 19 &f4 fxe5 20 &xe5 2ac6 21 &xd4 with advantage to White (Szabo-Van Scheltinga, Amsterdam 1966).

•••

13 Hacl

12

13 金c2 ②d5 14 单d2 罩c8 15 ②e5 and 13 ②e5 ③d5 14 单d2 have also been played.

≜b7

13 ... Dd5

(b) 14...2c6 15 2b1 g6 (the d4 pawn is indirectly defended: 15... 2xd4? 16 We3 2d5 17 Wh3) 16 h4! with fair attacking chances (Gulko-Lombard, Biel 1976).

14 ₩e4 g6

15	₩h4	f6
16	\$£h6	Dxc3
17	bxc3	

17 Ixc3 is weaker in view of 17... 全xf3! 18 gxf3 f5 19 寶3 單f7, and White has difficulties over the defence of his d4 pawn.

This position was reached in Vukic-Marjanovic (Nis 1979). Due to the weakness of the e6 pawn on the open file, Black began to experience difficulties: 19...全d6 20 f4 單f7 21 罩e1 彎d7 22 罩e3.





10 ... ②b4



11 **L**g5

11 De5 also has a good reputation:

(a) Botvinnik-Alatortsev (Leningrad 1932) continued 11... ②bd5 12 兔g5 h6 (this weakens the kingside, or more precisely g6, and therefore 12... 愈d7 is more advisable) 13 2h4 2d7 (after 13... ②xc3 14 bxc3 ②d5 15 盒xe7 Black has to recapture with his knight, since 15... 響xe7 16 2g6! fxg6 17 皇xd5 leads to an unfavourable position, similar to 15 皇xf6 gxf6 16 ②xd7 劉xd7 17 皇d3 Black stands badly) 15 \$xe7 \$xe7 (15... 2xe7 16 d5!) 16 2g6! fxg6 17 2xd5. The black pawns are compromised, and White has a clear advantage (Botvinnik):

(b) 11... 2 d7 12 d5 (since Black has not blockaded the pawn, this move suggests itself, but 12 \$25 is preferable, when White retains a definite initiative) 12...exd5 13 ②xd5 ②bxd5 14 单xd5 a clever tactical reply, found by Chekhover - 15... g4! (16 Wc4 Wxd5 17 對xd5 里ad8).

11 2f4. This plan was employed by Ryumin in the 1930s. The queen's bishop had also been developed at f4 in the past, but Ryumin's idea was then to play it to e5, exploiting the fact that Black's queen's knight is at b4 or d5. Ryumin-Kasparian (7th USSR Ch., Moscow 1931) continued 11...a6 12 Hacl b5 13 2b3 2b7 14 2e5 Hc8 (14...h6! should have been considered. not allowing the enemy knight to go to g5) 15 2g5 2bd5 16 Wd3 h6 17 2xd5 hxg5 18 簋xc8 盒xc8 19 ②xe7+ 螢xe7, and now 20 Wg3 would have placed Black in a critical position (Botvinnik) 11 のbd5

12 Hac1 Or 12 De5. when after 12...Dxc3 13 bxc3 20d5 14 @xe7 \xe7 15 \xf3 \df4d6 16 皇b3 邕b8 17 c4 幻f6 18 響e3 皇d7 19 f4 White stands better (Pachman-Yanofsky, Natanya 1973).

. . .

Now 12...b6 is strongly met by 13 のxd5 exd5 14 单d3.



After 12... 皇d7 13 ②xd5 ②xd5 14 @xd5 @xg5 15 @xb7 @xc1 16 @xa8 ♠xb2 17 ♠e4 the bishop at b2 has no good retreat square, and by a double attack White wins a pawn (analysis).

If 12... @xc3 13 bxc3 2d7 14 De5 IC8 15 對f3 单c6 16 ⊙xc6 Ixc6 17 White £b5 has the advantage (Alekhine-Hönlinger, Vienna 1936).

5.113 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 e6 5 🔍 xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4 ②c6 8 ②c3 皇e7 9 e2 0-0 10 罩d1)

> 10 a6 . . .



This move does not prevent White's planned advance in the centre, and after 11 d5 exd5 12 2xd5 2xd5 2xd5 13 2xd5 3xd5 W c7 White can gain an advantage in various ways:

(a) $14 \ \&g5 \ \&xg5 \ 15 \ @xg5 \ \&f5 \ 16$ $@f3 \ \&g6 \ 17 \ h4 \ @e5 \ (if \ 17...)@e5 \ 18$ $@f1 \ @xb2 \ 19 \ h5) \ 18 \ @g3 \ @ae8 \ 19$ $@f1 \ @b8 \ 20 \ @e3 \ b5 \ 21 \ @ae1 \ (Rubin$ $stein-Duras, San Sebastian \ 1911);$

(b) 14 $\forall e4 \& f6$ 15 2g5 & xg5 16 &xg5 & d7 17 $\&f4 \forall c8$ (Shestoperov-Guldin, Moscow 1963), when White could have intensified the pressure by 18 $\&d6 \blacksquare e8$ 19 $\forall f4 \& e6$ 20 &e4;

(c) 14 \$\overline\$xc6 bxc6 15 \$\overline\$f4 ₩xf4 16 ₩xe7 (analysis).

5.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 句f3 句f6 4 e3 e6 5 鱼xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4 句c6 8 句c3)

8 ... a6



As in the previous variation, the question arises: is it not possible to exploit Black's slight lag in development by making the break in the centre?

We consider: 9 d5 (5.121) 9 a3 (5.122) 9 **₩e2 (5.123)** – p.108 9 **≜e3 (5.124)** – p.109

5.121 (1 d4 d5	2 c4	dxc4	3 幻63	• ②f6 4
e3 e6 5 🔍 xc4	c5 6	0–0	cxd4	7 exd4
⑦c6 8 ②c3 a6)	ı			

9 d5 🖓 a5

It is on this move and the subsequent forcing variation that the evaluation of this variation depends. If **9...exd5** 10 2xd5 2xd5 11 2xd5 (after 11 2xd52e6 12 2xd8+ 2xd8 the game is equal) 11...2e7 12 2e1 (White can also avoid simplification with 12 2b3 0–0 13 2d1) 12...0–0 (12...2d7 13 2e2) 13 2xc6 bxc6 14 2xd8 2xd8 Black has to reckon with the weakness of his c6 pawn.

Now after 10 dxe6 響xd1 11 exf7+ 曾e7 12 罩xd1 纪xc4 13 b3:



Black is a piece up, but his king is in danger (13...2b6 14 2g5), Kampars-Kotek (Austria 1958).

9 a3
White defers d4-d5. If his bishop at c4 is attacked (...2a5 or ...b7-b5) it will have a convenient retreat square at a2. In addition, Black is deprived of the manoeuvre ...2b4-d5.

9 ... ⊈e7 10 d5

10 \blacksquare e1 0–0 or 10 \blacksquare d3 0–0 transposes into the variations 6 0–0 cxd4 7 exd4 \bigtriangleup c6 8 \bigtriangleup c3 \pounds e7 9 \blacksquare e1 0–0 10 a3 a6 or 9 a3 0–0 10 \blacksquare d3 a6.

10		exd5
11	②xd5	②xd5
12	≜xd5	00



13 Wb3!

If 13 兔e3 Black has the acceptable reply 13... 皇f6 14 劉b3 ②e7 15 皇e4 劉a5.

13 ...

. ₩a5

An important detail of the position (and the 9 a3 variation) is that after 13...2a5 the queen retreats to a2. 13...2f6 is strongly met by 14 Ed1, while if 13...C7 14 2e3 2d7 15 Eac1with mounting pressure.

Black's queen move has the aim of simplifying the position at the cost of a weakening of his pawns. At the same time he sets a trap: on the 'automatic' 14 **Le1**? there follows 14...2)d4! Furman-Borisenko (22nd USSR Ch., Moscow 1955) now continued 14 2e3 2055 15 2055 (the only way, otherwise Black will play 15...266 and White will achieve nothing) 15...2855 16 22ac1 with advantage to White.

5.123 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2)f3 2)f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$ xc4 c5 6 0−0 cxd4 7 exd4 2)c6 8 2)c3 a6)

9 ₩e2



Compared with the variation 8...2e79 We2 2xd4 10 2xd4 Wxd4 the b5 square is covered against the invasion of the white knight. But here too it is extremely dangerous for Black to take the central pawn.

9 ... b5 After the immediate 9... 2xd4 10 2xd4 ₩xd4 11 Id1 ₩g4 White has two ways of continuing the offensive:

(a) 12 20b5 axb5 13 \$\overline{2}xb5+ \$\overline{2}e7 14 \$\overline{2}e3 with a powerful attack;

(b) 12 2d5 (suggested by the German master Herrmann) 12...@xe2 13 2c7+ @e7 14 2xe2 15 4d4...12a7 15 2e3 and wins) 15 2f4 2d7 16 2d6+@d8 (16...@f6 17 2e8+) 17 2xe6+fxe6 18 2xb8, winning the exchange. 9... \$e7 10 Hd1 leads to a position from variation 5.113 (p.106).

10 **2**b3

Suetin's recommendation of 10 d5 should also be considered.

10 ... $\triangle xd4$ As the final evaluation of the variation shows, it is more prudent to decline the sacrifice by 10... & e7.

11 ②xd4 ₩xd4



12 신d5! 신xd5 13 보d1 신c3

If 13... 2 f4 White wins by 14 4 f3. 13... 4 and 2 xd5 2 b7 also does not help in view of 15 2 xe6, while after 13... 4 xd1 2 b7 15 4 d4 Black does not obtain sufficient compensation for his queen.

Bolbochan-Evans (Helsinki Olympiad 1952), now continued 14 bxc3 徵b6 (if 14...徵xc3 15 徵e4!) 15 徵e5! 愈b7 16 愈e3 徵c6 17 愈d5 徵c8 18 愈xb7 螢xb7 19 a4, when Black was in serious difficulties.

5.124 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 2)f6 4 e3 e6 5 ≙xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4 2)c6 8 2)c3 a6)

9 **Le**3

This was played at the time when it was thought that the d4 pawn should not be left undefended. Then, by continuing 9 $\underline{W}e2$, $\underline{O}e5$ and f2-f4-f5, White would prepare an offensive on the kingside. We have already encountered a similar plan in previous sections.

¹9... ⊈e7 10 ₩e2

Keres-Flohr (22nd USSR Ch., Moscow 1955) went 10 a3 0–0 11 265, and after the poor move 11...27 (11...2d7 and ...28 was correct) 12 2xc6 2xc6 2xc6 13 2a2 2d8 14 2c1 2d6 15 2f3 2d7 16 d5 White gained the advantage.

10		b5
11	≗b3	Da5
12	De5	⊈b7

After 12...(2)xb3 13 axb3 Black does not have time to fianchetto his bishop in view of (2)xb5, and he has to play 13...(2)d7, when 14 Ξ fd1 with the threat of d4-d5 gives White the advantage.

Ĩ3	≜c2	00
14	f4	

White's plan is to attack e6 and f7, and he now threatens 15 f5. However, the advance of the f-pawn has left weaknesses in his position. But in the event of 14 f3 followed by De4 or 2e4 the position is simplified, and Black stands quite satisfactorily.

14	• • •	Dc6
15	Had1	②b4
16	≗b3	②bd5
17	f5	

This position was reached in two of Flohr's games in 1954:

Borisenko-Flohr (21st USSR Ch., Kiev 1954) went 17...exf5 18 \blacksquare xf5 \blacksquare c8 19 \pounds d2 \boxdot xc3 20 bxc3 \blacksquare c7 21 \blacksquare df1 b4! 22 cxb4 \blacksquare xd4+ 23 \clubsuit h1 (as shown by Konstantinopolsky, 23 \blacksquare f2 was stronger, although even then by 23... \blacksquare xf2+ 24 \blacksquare 5xf2 \pounds d5! 25 \pounds xd5 \boxdot xd5 26 Ixf7 Ixf7 27 Ixf7 Ic2 Black avoids danger) 23... 2xb4 24 2g5 We4 25 Wxe4 Qxe4 26 I5f2 Qe7 27 Ie2 皇a8 28 萬fe1 皇b4 29 萬d1 列e4 30 皇f4 g5! and Black took the initiative.



When a few months later the same position arose (via a different move order) in Vistaneckis-Flohr (Yerevan 1954) the grandmaster, evidently fearing a prepared variation, deviated with 17... Ic8, but the move proved unfortunate, and 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 2g5 Wd6 20 20d3 led to an advantage for White.

5.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3
e6 5 🛳 xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4)

7 **≗e7** . . . The development of the bishop at e7 also comes into Black's plans in the 7... Dc6 variation, so that things often reduce to a transposition of moves. Of independent significance is the variation where Black carries out Steinitz's plan.

In the 9th game of his match with Zukertort (1886), Steinitz blockaded the d-pawn with ... Dbd7-b6-d5. He then developed his queen at a5 and played his king's rook to d8, preparing a siege of the pawn, or (in the event of the exchange on c3 and c3-c4) counterplay against the 'hanging' c- and d-pawns.

₩e2 8 Now Black has: 8...0-0 (5.21) 8....a6 9 2c3 (9 Id1) 9...b5 (5.22) p.111

5.21 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4 ⊈e7 8 ₩e2)

Zukertort played 10 \$b3 (the position was reached by transposition from a Oueen's Gambit Declined) 10...Db6 11 \$ f4 \$ bd5 12 \$ g3 (12 \$ e5 came into consideration, as in Ryumin's Variation, p.106) 12... Wa5 13 Zac1 皇d7 14 包e5 萬fd8 15 響f3 (and here 15 f4 was interesting, by analogy with the plan employed in Borisenko-Flohr, p.109) 15... e8 16 eh4 2xc3 (forced in view of the threats of 17 \$xf6 and 17 ②xd5) 17 bxc3 螢c7 (playing for a blockade by 17...b5 would have been premature in view of 18 2g4; with the move played Steinitz defends his bishop at e7 and thereby parries the threat of 18 2g4) 18 Ifel Iac8. Both sides have chances. 10

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Attempts have been made to modernise Steinitz's plan by linking it to the fianchetto of the queen's bishop with 10...a6:

(a) 11 \$\overline{15}\$ b5 12 \$\overline{15}\$ b5 12 \$\overline{15}\$ b5 13 d5 exd5 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 2xd5 2xd5 16 Ixd5 2xg5 17 2xg5 h6 (18 Wd3 was threatened) 18 Wd2 hxg5 19 Xxd7 Wf6, and Black should not lose the heavy-piece ending (Levenfish-Rauzer, Leningrad 1936);

(b) 11 d5 seems more energetic: after 1...exd5 12 2xd5 2xd5 13 2xd5 2f6 4 2f4 White has the advantage.

11 单b3 ②bd5 12 单g5



White has a promising position. Against Steinitz's plan 12... 留a5 13 国ac1 單d8 he continues 14 色e5, setting his opponent serious problems.

12... \triangle xc3 13 bxc3 is evidently the lesser evil for Black, although in this case White has ideal development and well-placed pieces.

5.22 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 d	xc4 3 තිf3 තිf6 4
e3 e6 5 $\pounds xc4 c5 6$	0-0 cxd4 7 exd4
⊈e7 8 ₩e2)	

8 ... a6 9 9)c3

The other development of White's queen's knight is illustrated by the variation 9 \blacksquare d1 b5 10 &b3 (or 10 &d3 &b7 11 a4 b4 12 \bigtriangleup bd2) 10...&d7 11 a4 b4 12 \bigstar bd2 (12 a5 \bigstar c6!) 12...a5 (if 12...0-0 13 a5!) 13 \bigstar c4.

... b5

9

In this variation Black delays the development of his queen's knight and first fianchettos his bishop.



White has: 10 \$b3 (5.221) 10 \$d3 (5.222) - p.113

Interesting complications can arise after 11 2650-012 2xf7?! As shown by Furman-Bannik (25th USSR Ch., Riga 1958) the sacrifice is problematic: 12...Ixf7 13 Wxe6 Wf8 14 I el 2c6154f4 Id8 16 I ad1 2d617 Wf5 2e718xd6 (forced, since if the queen moves there follows 18...2fd5) 18...2xf5 19 xf8 xf8 20 xf7 xf7. Black, with two minor pieces for a rook and two pawns, has perhaps slightly the better chances.

Of course, White is not obliged to sacrifice on f7. By continuing 12 Id1 he retains the initiative. Nevertheless (as becomes clear later) it is more favourable to post the rooks at d1 and e1.

11 0-0 If 11.... 2⊂c6, then 12 ≜xf6 and 13 d5. If 11... 2bd7, with the intention after ...2b6 of blockading the d4 pawn, then apart from 12 2e5 White also has the more effective 12 d5!:



(b) 12... 2xd5 13 2xd5 exd5 14 Ife1;

(c) 12...exd5 13 \blacksquare fe1 b4 14 a4, and in view of the threats on the e-file Black has to give the right to castle, after which White gains more than sufficient compensation for the pawn.

12 Ife1!

Note the deployment of the rooks. Uhlmann-Spassky (Amsterdam 1970) went 12 Ifd1 2bd7, and White achieved nothing by the break 13 d5 (the other typical move 13 2c5 is more promising) 13...exd5 14 2xd5 2xd5!15 2xd5 2xd5 16 Ixd5 2xd5!15 2xd5 2xd5 16 Ixd5 2xg5 17 2xg5 h6 18 Id2 hxg5 19 Ixd7 Iff6, and we reach the pre-endgame position from Levenfish-Rauzer (cf. the note to Black's 10th move, p.110).

12 ... Dc6

With the rook at el the knight can no longer be developed at d7: 12...2bd7? 13 d5! 2xd5 (if 13...2xd5 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 2xd5 and White wins) 14 2xd5! 2xd5 15 2xe7 2xf3 16 2xd8 Axe2 17 오e7 里fe8 18 里xe2 里xe7 19 20d5 里ee8 20 纪c7, winning the exchange.

In order to prevent d4-d5, Black must first drive away the knight with 12...b4, and after 13 2a4 play 13... 2bd7, but then 14 2e5 gives White strong pressure.

13 **X**ad1



13 ... 🖗 a5

This does not prevent d4-d5, but nor, however, does 13...2b4. After 14 d5 2bxd5? 15 2xd5 2xd5 16 2xd5 2xd5 17 2xe7 2xe

Black can defend his bishop with 13...Ie8, but 14 2e5! (with the threat of 15 2xf7; 14 d5 leads merely to simplification) gives White a strong attack:

(b2) 14... ①xe5 15 dxe5 ②d7 16 单f4 豐c7 17 호c2 ②f8 18 ②e4 with a clear advantage (Boleslavsky).

13... Δ d5 is met by 14 \pounds xd5 (14 Δ xd5 \pounds xg5 15 Δ b6 is refuted by 15... Δ xd4!) 14 \pounds xd5 \pounds xg5 15 \pounds e4, when d4-d5 cannot be prevented.

14 d5!

This leads to the win of a pawn.

14 ... **Dxb3**

It is easy to see that the d5 pawn cannot be taken.

15 dxe6 增b6 16 axb3 fxe6 17 公d4

Strategically the game is decided. After 17... 全d6 18 對xe6+ 容h8 (Boleslavsky-Kotov, Zurich Candidates 1953) the simplest was 19 全f4! 空c5 (or 19... 眞ad8 20 오xd6 眞xd6 21 獸e7) 20 獸xb6 오xb6 21 眞e7 (Boleslavsky).

17...全c5 18 資xe6+ 空h8 19 螢xb6 全xb6 20 單e7 is also unsatisfactory for Black.

The entire variation in which Black, by playing ...a7-a6 and ...b7-b5, delays the development of his queen's knight, must be considered unfavourable. Exploiting the lack of pressure on his centre, White deploys his forces in the most advantageous manner.

5.222 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4		
e3 e6 5 axc4 c5 6 0-0 cxd4 7 exd4		
≜ e7 8 ∰e2 a6 9		

10 单d3

This retreat is less promising for White than 10 \pounds b3, since now the break in the centre is possible only in exceptional cases.

> 10 ... 11 \$g5

≗b7 :5

Ryumin's idea of 11 \pounds f4 followed by \pounds e5 comes into consideration:

(a) 11... ②bd7, when the standard setup 12 單fd1 0-0 13 單ac1 單c8 14 ②e5 ②b6 15 皇g3 ②bd5 promises White little (Garcia Padron-Tereshchenko, Malta Olympiad 1980); (b) 11... 2c6 12 Iad1 2b4 13 2b1 2bd5 14 2e5 (Antoshin-O.Chernikov, Lipetsk 1960).



11 ... 0-0 11....2d5 is premature in view of 12 2xe7 ¥xe7 13 2e4! 2)f6 14 2xb7¥xb7 15 d5 2)xd5 (if 15...b4 16 2)e4 2)xe4 17 ¥xe4 ¥xd5 18 ¥xb4 2)c6 19 ¥a3 with advantage to White) 16 2)xd5 ¥xd5 17 Ifd1 ¥b7 18 2)g5 0-0 19 ¥d3 g6 20 ¥h3 h5 21 g4 ¥e7 22 ¥g2! 2)c6 23 gxh5 with the better prospects for White (Korchnoi-Borisenko, 28th USSR Ch.. Moscow 1961)

13 **2c1** could be tried, to answer 13... 20d5 with 14 De4.

If 13 里fel ②b6 (not 13... ②d5? 14 響e4 g6 15 এxe7 獸xe7 16 ②xd5) 14 ②e5 b4! 15 এxf6 এxf6 with equal chances.

Lasker-Reshevsky (Nottingham 1936) now continued 13...公d5 14 皇c1 ②xc3 15 bxc3 公f6 with chances for both sides.

Furman Variation 6 營e2

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	ହ୍ୟା	Df6
4	e3	e6
5	\$£xc4	c5
6	₩e2	



White hurries to remove his queen from the d-file, in order then to play dxc5, 0-0 and e3-e4, or else immediately e3-e4 before castling. This plan was first employed by Furman.

... аб

6...cxd4 or 6...2c6 normally leads to positions examined earlier.

We must mention only the recent idea of developing Black's bishop at b4: 6...cxd4 7 exd4 2b4+8 2c3 0-0 (or 8...2c6 9 0-0 0-0 10 Id1 2d5 11 2d2 2e7 12 Iac1 with the better prospects for White, Psakhis-Gofstein, Zagreb 1993) 9 2g5! 2c6 10 Id1 h6 11 2h4 2xc3+?! (11...2e7 would have led to a favourable position for White from the Steinitz Variation with an extra tempo) 12 bxc3 @a5 13 @xf6!@xc3+14 @d2 gxf6 15 0-0! @xd4 16@g4+ @h8 17 @h5 @f5 18 g4 andWhite built up a very strong attack (Yakovich-Steinbacher, Ostende 1993).

\$xc5

7 dxc5 We now consider: 8 0-0 (6.1) 8 e4 (6.2) - p.120

6.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 e6 5 \$xc4 c5 6 ₩e2 a6 7 dxc5 \$xc5)

 $\begin{array}{c|c} 8 & 0 - 0 & \textcircled{} c6 \\ \hline \\ \text{Other continuations:} \\ 8...b5 9 & \textcircled{} d3; \end{array}$



(a) 9...0-0 10 e4 e5!? (after 10...\$b7 11 e5 White has the initiative), offering a clever pawn sacrifice:

(a1) 11 ②xe5 置e8 12 ④f3 单g4 13 響c2 ②bd7 14 ②bd2 置c8 15 獸b1 单d6 16 置e1 ②c5 17 单c2 单f4 with a powerful attacking position (Furman-Ibdalaev, Tashkent 1960);

6

(a2) 11 a4! b4 (11...bxa4 12 2c3gives White good chances) 12 2bd2(here too the acceptance of the sacrifice gives Black serious counterplay: 12 $2xe5 \blacksquare e8$ 13 2c4 2c6) 12... 2g4 13 2b3 followed by $\blacksquare d1$ and 2e3;

(b) 9... 2bd7 10 e4 \$b7, and now:

(b1) 11 a4 b4 (11...bxa4 12 $2c_3 0-0$ 13 $2c_3 4 a_5 14 c_5! 2c_3 3 c_0 d_5$ 16 $2c_3 c_5 c_3 c_0 d_5$ 16 $2c_3 c_5 c_3 c_0 d_5$ 17 $2c_3 c_3 c_0 d_5$ 18 $2c_3 c_0 d_5$ 1996, with advantage to White) 12 2bd2 2c_7 (vacating c5 for the knight) 13 $2c_3 b_3 a_5 14 2c_4 c_0 h_5 15 2c_3 0-0 16$ 2bfd2 $2c_3 h_6 17 f_3 2c_5 18 2c_5 a_0 d_16$ White held the initiative (Malanyuk-Yakovich, Kiev 1986);

(b2) 11 2bd2 e5 (11...0-0 12 e5 2g4 13 2e4 1c8 14 2f4 with an excellent game for White, Taimanov-Bazan, Buenos Aires 1960) 12 2b3 0-0 13 1d1 2b6 14 2h4 1b8 15 2f5 with a strong attacking position;

(c) 9....Dc6:



(c1) 10 ②c3 兔b7 11 e4 ②d7 12 單d1 響c7 (12...)對b6 13 e5) 13 兔g5 0-0 14 国ac1 with the initiative for White (Korchnoi-Hübner, Merano 1980/1);

(c2) 10 ②bd2 单b7 11 ②e4 (11 單d1, 11 a3 and 11 ②b3 have also been played) 11...单e7 12 單d1 斷b6 13 单d2 0-0 14 單ac1 (intending ②g3 and e3-e4), and in Malanyuk-Ehlvest (55th USSR Ch., Moscow 1988) 14...單fd8 would have given roughly equal chances;

8...₩c7:



(a) 9 e4 2 g4, and now:

(a1) 10 20bd2 20c6 11 20b3 20d6 12 h3 20ge5, and by keeping secure control of e5, Black solves his opening problems (Taimanov-Filip, Mallorca 1970);

(a2) 10 &g5 &c6 11 &bd2 (11 h3 &bd4!) 11...&d6 12 h3 h6 (the simplest was 12...&ge5 13 &xe5 &xe5 with equality) 13 &h4 &ge5 14 &xe5 &xe5 15 &bf3 g5 (Black accepts the offered pawn; after 15...&bd4 16 &xd4 &xd4 the position is completely equal) 16 &g3 &xg3 17 fxg3 &xg3 18 &ad1 g4 19 hxg4 &d7 20 b4 b5 21 &d5! &g8

with chances for both sides (Farago-Zs.Polgar, Hungary 1991);

(b) 9 a3 b5 10 \$\overline{2}\$ d3 \$\overline{2}\$ b7 11 b4 \$\overline{2}\$ d6 12 \$\overline{2}\$ b2 \$\overline{2}\$ bd7 13 \$\overline{2}\$ bd2 0-0 14 \$\verline{2}\$ ac1 \$\verline{2}\$ b8 15 h3 \$\overline{2}\$ cs 5 16 \$\overline{2}\$ xcs 5 17 \$\overline{2}\$ b3. White stands better, since the opponent's c5 square is weak (Ruban-Ibragimov, Smolesnk 1991);

(c) 9 2bd2:

(c1) 9... 2c6, and now:

(c11) 10 a3 2d6 (or 10...b5 11 2d32e5 12 2xe5 3263 353 351 3514 a4 b4 15 e4 2b7 with equal chances, Timman-Hubner, Tilburg 1987) 11 b4 2g4 12 h3 2ge5 13 2b2 0-0 14 32c12d7 15 3fd1 3fd8 16 2e4 2xc4 17 3xc4. White's position looks more promising, but after 17...2e7 18 3c3 f6 19 3c4 2b8 20 2c5 2xc5 21 3c5 3c822 2d2 e5 23 2e4 2e6 Black equalised (Nogueiras-Karpov, Belfort 1988);

(ci2) 10 \pounds d3 b5 11 2b3 \pounds d6 12 \pounds d2 \pounds b7 13 \ddagger fc1! \clubsuit e7 14 a4 b4 15 \ddagger c4! \triangle d7?! (15...0-0 is more natural, although even then White's position is preferable) 16 \pounds e4 2de5 17 \pounds xc6+ 2dxc6 18 \ddagger ac1, and Black ended up in a difficult position (Ehlvest-Zs.Polgar, Pamplona 1991/2);

(c2) 9... 2 bd7 10 公b3 单d6 11 单d2 b6 12 耳ac1 對b8 13 单d3 单b7 14 h3 0-0 15 e4 耳d8 with equal chances (Stangl-Sadler, Altensteig 1992).

9 e4

9 2bd2 0-0, and now:

(a) 10 a3 20d5 (or 10...b5 11 2d3 2d6 12 20e4 20xe4 13 2xe4 2b7 14 Ed1 We7 with an equal position, Zs.Polgar-Anand, Monaco 1993) 11 20e4 2e7 12 b4 (the less sharp 12 Ed1 12...Wa5 13 2d2 Wb6 leads to an equal game) 13...b5 13 2d3 (13 2b3 a5! 14 Wxb5 2d7) 13...f5 14 20g3 (14 20c5 can be met by 14...20xb4 15 axb4 20xb4 16 Ed1 2xc5 17 2xf5 We7 or 17... \forall f6) 14...&f6 15 &b2 &xb2 16 \forall xb2 &xc3 17 &xb5 axb5 (17...&xf1 18 &xc6) 18 fxe3 (Lautier-Dorfman, Barcelona 1992), and now after 18... \forall b6 (instead of 18... \forall f6) 19 \blacksquare ae1 f4 20 &h5 \blacksquare a7 both sides have chances (Dorfman);

(b) Astrom-Sadler (Yerevan Olympiad 1996) went 10 \$\overline{2}d3 \$\overline{2}e7\$ (10...\2)b4 11 \$\overline{2}b1\$ \$\overline{2}d7\$ also comes into consideration) 11 b3 (11 e4 e5; after 11 2)e4 2)b4 12 2)xf6+ \$\overline{2}xf6\$ 13 \$\overline{2}e4\$ \$\overline{2}d7! 14 \$\overline{2}d7\$ 15 \$\overline{2}d2 \$\overline{2}a4!\$ Black even stands better) 11...2)b4 12 \$\overline{2}b1\$ b5 13 \$\overline{2}b2\$ \$\overline{2}b7\$ 14 \$\overline{2}d1\$ \$\overline{2}c8\$ and Black successfully solved his opening problems. After 15 \$\overline{2}e4\$ \$\overline{2}b5\$ 16 \$\overline{2}e5\$ \$\overline{3}b5\$ both sides have chances (Sadler).

Topalov-Lautier (Amsterdam 1996) went 9 a3 &d6 10 Obd2 0-0 11 &d3 b5 12 Oe4 Oxe4 13 &xe4 &b7 14 \blacksquare d1 f5 15 &b1 Wc7 16 a4 (if 16 &a2 \blacksquare f6 with attacking chances), and now 16...Oa5! 17 &a2 (17 axb5 Ob3) 17...Oc4 would have given Black a good game (Topalov).

9 ... b5 Other possibilities: 9...€2g4:



(a) 10 h3 2)ge5 11 2)xe5 2)xe5 with an equal game;

(b) 10 ac3 Wc7 with the threat of

.... 2d4 (11 h3? 2d4, and Black wins);

(c) $10 \triangleq f4 e5 11 \triangleq g5 #d6 12 h3 h6$ 13 $\&h4 \textcircled{2} f6 14 \blacksquare d1 #e7 15 \textcircled{2} c3 with$ the better position for White (Illescas Cordoba-de la Villa, Lyon 1992);

(d) 10 e5 ④d4 (10...) Wc7 leads to the variation 9... 窗c7 10 e5 包g4) 11 包xd4 Wxd4. The e5 pawn cannot be defended, but by continuing his development White obtains a strong attacking position: 12 2d2 2xe5 (if 12...b5 13 2d3 Dxe5 14 2e4, or 13...2b7 14 Db3) 13 Db3 ₩xc4 14 ₩xe5. Black is obliged to return his bishop to its initial position, and after 14... \$18 15 \$e3 White has more than sufficient compensation for the pawn:

(a) 15...f6 16 對h5+ g6 17 對f3, and this analysis of mine of 30 years ago was repeated in Lerner-Sorokin (Moscow 1992);

(b) 15...對d5 16 對g3 全d6 17 f4! (stronger than 17 對xg7 對e5 18 對h6 耳g8) 17...對e4 18 耳ad1 全e7 19 f5! exf5 20 單fe1! with a dangerous attack for the sacrificed pawns (Gelfand-Salov, Madrid 1996).

9....₩c7 10 e5, and now:

(a) 10... 2 g4 11 \$\mathbb{L}\$f4 f6, when Black wins the e5 pawn, but at a high price:



(a2) 12 2c3! 2gxe5 13 2xe5 2xe5 14 Hael 2d6 15 2xe5 2xe5 16 f4 2xc3 17 bxc3 0-0 18 f5, and White restores material equality with a positional advantage (analysis);

(a32) is less promising: 15...2d4 16 2xd4 2xd4 17 Iacl Wa5 18 Icel (if 18 We4 2d7! 19 Wxb7 Ia7 20 We4 2b5 with counterplay) 18... Wc5 19 2d3 2d7 20 2xe5 (if 20 Wh5 Black would have replied 20...If5! 21 2xf5 exf5 - Mikhalchishin) 20...2xe5 21 Wxe5 Wxe5 22 Ixe5 Iac8);

(b) Black has begun giving preference to 10... 2d7.



There can follow 11 \$\overline{f4}\$ b5 (11....\dd 12 \overline{Dxd4}\$ \$\overline{xd4}\$ 13 \$\overline{c1}\$! is

good for White, Topalov-Santo Roman, Las Palmas 1991) 12 \pounds d3 \pounds b7 13 \pounds c3 \pounds e7 14 \triangle e4 0–0 (Black loses material after 14... \triangle dxe5? 15 \triangle xe5 \triangle xe5 16 \blacksquare ac1 \clubsuit b8 17 \clubsuit h5 \pounds f6 18 \blacksquare c5) 15 \blacksquare ac1 \clubsuit d8 16 a3 \triangle b6 17 \triangle fg5! g6 18 \triangle xh7! \triangle d5 (if 18... \pounds xh7 19 \triangle d6! \pounds xd6 20 \clubsuit h5+ followed by the bishop sacrifice on g6 and \blacksquare c3 with decisive threats) 19 \triangle hf6+ \pounds xf6 20 \triangle xf6+ \triangle xf6 21 exf6 \clubsuit xf6 22 \clubsuit e3 with the better chances for White (Yakovich-Ye Rongguang, Calcutta 1991) – analysis by Flear and Yakovich.

After 9...b5 White has: 10 e5 (6.11) 10 \$\\$b3 (6.12) - p.119

10 e5 bxc4

10....2d7 (also 10....2d5) can be considered:

(a) 11 253 257 12 Ξ d1 Ξ b6 13 2c3 2e7 with chances for both sides (Gelfand-Balashov, Minsk 1986). 14 2e4? is bad in view of 14...2xe4 15 $\Xi xe4$ 2xf2+ 16 2f1 Ξ d8 17 Ξ d6 Ξ a7 18 2g5 2c5 with advantage to Black, while 14 2g5 Ξ c6 leads to very sharp play;

(b) 11 \$\Delta d3 \$\Delta b7 12 a4 (or 12 \$\Delta c3\$ \$\Delta d4\$) 12...bxa4 13 \$\Delta xa4 \$\Delta b4\$ with equal chances (Gelfand, Kapengut).

11 exf6 gxf6

11..., 徵d3, as played in Yakovich-Kallai (Sochi 1989) comes into consideration. After 12 fxg7 耳g8 13 螢xd3 cxd3 14 免h6 ②d4 15 ④xd4 免xd4 16 ②c3 耳b8 17 耳ad1 耳xb2 18 耳xd3 兔xg7 19 耳fd1 免f6 20 ④e4 兔e7 21 ②d6+ the complications ended in a draw. 12 Wxc4

12 Idl is a possible improvement in this well known variation. White answers 12... Wb6 with 13 2 bd2, when he regains the pawn in more favourable circumstances than in the main line.

After the aggressive 13 $\forall g4 \ b7 14$ $\forall g7 \ c7 \ c7 be black king is securely de$ fended, and the open g-file causesWhite serious problems.

13 &e3!? is an interesting pawn sacrifice, suggested by Shatskes. After 13...&xe3 14 fxe3 ildetxe3+ 15 ildesh1 White has the initiative. It is dangerous for Black to take a second time on e3, opening the e-file for the opponent.

13 ... ₩b4!



14 世e2 兔e7 (if 14...0-0 15 ②e4) 15 h3 (15 兔h6!? - Suetin) 15...兔b7 16 a3 智a5 17 兔f4 單g8 with a sharp game and chances for both sides (Furman-Suetin, 27th USSR Ch., Tallinn 1960).

Averbakh-Suetin, from the same tournament, developed more quietly: 14 豐xb4 鱼xb4 15 包e4 鱼e7 16 耳d1 鱼b7 17 鱼f4 耳g8 18 包e1 包b4 19 包d6+ 鱼xd6 20 鱼xd6 包d5 with a roughly equal ending.

6.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4
e3 e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 ¥e2 a6 7 dxc5
\$xc5 8 0-0 2c6 9 e4 b5)

10 **L**b3

10 单d3 allows Black to exchange the bishop by 10...心b4 11 單d1 公xd3 12 罩xd3 對b6.

10 ... e5 10... \pounds b7 11 e5 \pounds d7 12 \pounds c3 Wc7 13 \pounds f4 \pounds a5 (if 13... \pounds d4 14 \pounds xd4 \pounds xd4 15 \blacksquare ac1; 13...g5?! leads to great complications, most probably favourable to White: 14 \pounds xg5 \pounds d4 15 Wh5 0–0–0 16 \oiint h1!) 14 \pounds c2 \blacksquare c8 (Vera-Espinoza, Durango 1989) 15 \pounds g5 h6 16 Wh5 0–0 17 \pounds ge4 with a strong position for White.



11 **Le3**

White achieves nothing by 11 h3 金b7 12 公c3 公d4.

The attempt by 11 $rac{1}{2}$ to create threats on the c-file does not succeed: 11... $ac{1}{2}$ $ac{1}{2}$ ac



16...0-0! This entire variation, analysed by Ravinsky in 1964, was repeated in Lengyel-Földi (Budapest 1965). If now 17 ¥xb8 2h3 18 ¥xf8+ (18 ¥c7 Ic8, or 18 ¥b7 ¥g5 19 g3 2xf1 20 \$xf1 ¥c1+, and Black gains a decisive material advantage) 18...\$xf8 19 gxh3 2xb2 20 2d2 2xa1 21 Ixa1 ¥g5+ and 22...¥xd2. Therefore White has to leave the rook at b8 in peace, and can merely regret his futile queen raid.

11 ... **Wb6** White has the better chances after 11... 2d4 12 2xd4 \$\overline{x}xd4 13 \$\overline{x}d4\$ 12 \$\overline{x}xd4 13 \$\overline{x}d4\$ 20 \$\overline{x}c4\$ 14 \$\overline{x}d4\$ 13 \$\overline{x}d4\$ 20 \$\overline{x}c4\$ 14 \$\overline{x}d4\$ 14 \$\overline{x}d4\$ 20 \$\overline{x}c4\$ 20 \$\overline{x}c4\$ \$\overline{

12 De3

The tactical 12 $\blacksquare c1 \triangleq xe3$ 13 $\triangleq xf7+$ $\triangleq xf7$ 14 $\blacksquare xc6$ does not succeed after 14... $\triangleq xf2+$ 15 $\triangleq f1$ (15 $\blacksquare xf2?$ $\blacksquare xf2+$ 16 $\triangleq xf2 \triangleq xe4+$) 15... $\blacksquare e3$ (Spragett). 12 ... $\triangleq xe3$

12 13 fxe3

In view of the positional threat of 20d5, White's position is the more promising. Nogueiras-Spraggett (Szirak

1986) continued 13...0-0 14 2d5 2xd5 15 exd5 Da5 16 Dxe5 Dxb3 17 axb3 f6 18 2c6 耳e8 19 ¥d2 皇b7 20 ¥d4 Wxd4 21 exd4 Jac8 22 Jfc1 Jc7 23 **E**c5 – White has supported his pawns and stands better.

6.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3
e6 5 ≜xc4 c5 6 ₩e2 a6 7 dxc5 ≜xc5)

8 e4

After White castles this usually transposes into variation 6.1, e.g. 8....2c6 9 e5 2g4 10 0-0 Wc7 11 \$f4, or 8...b5 9 \$d3 42bd7 10 0-0 \$b7 11 Dbd2. Of independent significance is the variation in which White hastens to seize space in the centre.

8		₩c7
9	e5	②g 4
10	00	•

White deliberately allow a combination by which Black wins the exchange.



のxf2 10 If Black first drives back the bishop by 10...b5, in order to take on f2 later. then 11 \$b3! is strong, and if 11... Dxf2 (11... xf2+ 12 $rac{1}{2}h1$ leads to a similar

position, since the threat of h2-h3 forces Black to retreat his bishop) 12 2c3!, and after any discovery by the knight White has good attacking chances.

Dc3! 11

Thirty years after my analysis, this move, allowing the discovered check (without ... b5 and \$b3 first being played) was made in I.Sokolov-Brenninkmeijer (Holland 1995).

After 11 $\exists xf2 \ exf2+ 12 \ exf2 \ b5$ (one of White's bishops is lost, but the point of his plan becomes clear after his next move) 13 b3 0-0 (prudently declining the gift; after 13...bxc4 14 2a3! Black is prevented from castling) 14 **2**a3 bxc4 15 **2**xf8 **2**xf8 16 ₩xc4 (or 16 bxc4, but little is promised by the pawn sacrifice 16 2bd2 cxb3 17 2xb3) 16... Wxc4 17 bxc4 material equality is restored (analysis). 11

. . .

<u>Фе4+</u>

A development of the above variation was seen in I.Sokolov-Kir. Georgiev (Tilburg 1994): 11...b5 12 \$b3 De4+ 13 Sh1 Dxc3 14 bxc3 h6 15 2d4 We7 16 Wg4 g6 17 2e3 h5 18 Wh3 Ia7 19 If6 0-0 20 Iaf1 2xd4 21 ≜xd4 Ic7 22 We3 \$g7 23 \$c2 2d7 24 \g5, and White won.

I.Sokolov-Brenninkmeijer continued 12 \$h1 @xc3 (if 12... 创f2+ there follows 13 Ixf2 2xf2 14 De4 2c5 15 \$e3 \$e7 16 \$g5! 0−0 17 \$f6+! gxf6 18 exf6 \$d6 19 \$d3 \$c5 20 \$c1 \$d5 21 Zd1, and Black has no defence -Sokolov) 13 bxc3 皇e7 14 ②g5! 皇xg5 15 皇xg5 纪c6 16 斷h5 h6 (if 16... ④xe5? 17 单f4 ₩xc4 18 单xe5 0-0 19 Wg5 f6 20 Ixf6 and wins) 17 Iad1 If8 18 单h4 单d7 19 單d6 20xe5 (the sacrifice on e6 was threatened) 20 \wxe5 ₩xc4 21 Ifd1, and White won.

4....皇g4 Variation

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	ହାତ	Df6
4	e3	≜ g4

With this variation we begin considering deviations by Black from the Classical Variation. By developing his bishop at g4, he aims to solve one of the main problems of the Queen's Gambit.



White can capture immediately on c4, or first drive back the bishop:

5 🗟 xc4 (7.1)

5 h3 \$h5 6 g4 \$g6 7 \$2e5 (7.2) - p.146

After 5 2bd2 (intending to take on c4 with the knight) 5...2bd7 6 2xc4 e6 7 2c2 2c7 8 0–0 0–0 9 2d2 c5 10 \mathbf{I} c1 \mathbf{I} c8 chances are equal (Osnos-Borisenko, 32nd USSR Ch., Kiev 1964/5).

7.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 创f3 创f6 4 e3 单g4)

5 \$xc4 e6

6 ₩b3 (7.11)

6 h3 2 h5 7 2 c3 or 7 g4 (7.12) - p.129

6 2c3 (7.13) - p.143

6 0-0 (7.14) - p.144

6 2bd2 (7.15) - p.145

If 6 a3 (with the idea of meetingc7-c5 with the standard manoeuvre dxc5, b2-b4 and b2), Black should reply 6...bd7, preparing e6-e5. The loss of time prevents White from gaining an opening advantage.

7.11	(1 d	l4 d5	2 c4	dxc4	3	幻f 3	幻f6	4
e3 单	g4 5	5 Âxc	:4 e6)				

6 ₩b3

6

At one time the $4...\hat{\mathbf{x}}g4$ variation was considered unfavourable for Black on account of this queen sortie. Now the evaluation has changed, and most players prefer the developing moves examined in the other sections.

... Âxf3

The sacrifice of the b7 pawn without first exchanging on f3 is unjustified: 6... ②bd7 7 ₩xb7 \$\overline{d6} 8 @bd2 0-0 9 ₩c6 \$\overline{b8} 10 \$\overline{d3} d3 e5 11 h3 \$\overline{c6} e6 12 ₩c2 (Spassky-Klaman, Leningrad 1963).

An absolutely correct sacrifice. If Black defends the pawn, he has to withstand a strong attack:

7...b6 (this weakens the queenside) 8 $2c_3 \& e_7 9 d_5$ (White wants to open the position, to exploit his two bishops) 9...exd5 10 2xd5 0-0 11 & 2xe7+ @xe712 $\&d2 a_6$ (an attempt to restrict the white bishops by advancing the pawns) 13 $\blacksquare g_1 b_5 14 \& d5 \blacksquare a_7 (14...c6? 15 \& b_4, or 14...2xd5 15 @xd5 <math>2d_7 16$ **2**c3 g6 17 0−0−0 with a strong attacking position) 15 **2**c3 with advantage to White (I.Zaitsev-Spassky, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1960)*.

Here and later an asterisk is used to indicate games in which h^2-h^3 and $\dots \pounds h^5$ have already been played, when therefore the white pawn is not at h^2 , but at h^3 .

7... \forall c8 (this move was also employed by the young Spassky) 8 2c3 (White also gains a strong position after 8 f4 c6 9 2c3 2c7 10 e4 0–0 11 2c3 a5 12 2c1 2b4 13 2d3 2a6 14 a3 2xc3+ 15 3c3 2c7 16 2g1, Shishkin-Spassky, Kislovodsk 1960) 8...2bd7 9 e4 2b6 10 2c2 2c7 11 2c3 0–0 12 2c1 3d7 13 0–0 with the better game for White (Evans-Simos, Hollywood 1954).

7...c5. Now 8 ₩xb7 2bd7 leads to positions examined below. Of independent significance are lines where White does not take the b7 pawn, or does this later:

(a) 8 dxc5 堂xc5 9 堂d2 0-0 10 堂c3 ②bd7 11 ②d2 **Ic**8 12 **Ig**1 g6 13 0-0-0 斷b6 14 斷xb6 堂xb6 (Khodos-Shiyanovsky, 30th USSR Ch., Yerevan 1962) with an equal game;

(b) 8 f4 cxd4. If now 9 ₩xb7 2bd7 10 exd4 it transpires that White has deprived his bishop of the important square f4. As in the main line Black can continue\$e7, ...0-0 and then\$b6d5 with the initiative.

8 ₩xb7

Declining the pawn gives Black a good game, for example:

8 (2c3) (2b6) (in Panno-Olafsson, Los Angeles 1963, Black, leaving his b7 pawn en prise, continued his development with 8... (2c) 9 f4 0–0 10 (2c) c5 11 d5, and then carried out a clever gambit idea: 11...c4! 12 (2c) xc4 exd5 13 2xd5 2xd5 2xd5 14 2xd5 2c5 15 32d532d5 2xd5 14 2xd5 2c5 15 32d532d5 32d5 2d5 3d5 3d53d5 3d5 3d5 3d5 3d5 3d5 3d53d5 3d5 3d5



(a) 10 2 d2 0-0 11 2 d1 (or 11 0-0-0 c5 12 dxc5 @xc5 13 Ing1 We7 14 Ig5 Ifd8 15 Idg1 g6 with chances for both sides, Kaldor-Ghitescu, Spain 1975) 11...c5 (after exchanging the d4 pawn, Black completes his mobilisation) 12 dxc5 axc5 13 0-0 Zc8. Gligoric-Smyslov (Hastings 1962/3) continued 14 當h1 豐c7 15 里g1 里fd8 16 包b5 豐b8 17 \$c3 \$xd1! (this exchange of rooks is essential; 17...Dbd5? loses to 18 IXd5!) 18 ₩xd1 ②bd5 19 皇d2 a6 20 ᡚc3 Id8 21 ᡚxd5 ᡚxd5 22 堂c2 皇e7 ≜xb4 ₩xb4 26 Xxd8+ \$xd8 27 ₩c8 ₩d2) 25...₩c6 26 ₩xc6 ᡚxc6. Black's position is preferable; after 27 2e1 Zxd1 28 2xd1 2b4! the knight proved stronger than the bishop;

(b) 10 0-0 0-0 11 Id1 Wb8, and:

(b1) 12 e4 (this attempt to begin play in the centre encounters an energetic response) 12...c5 13 dxc5 &xc5 14 f4 e5 15 f5 a6 16 &e3 &xe3 17 fxe3 Wa7!, and the white king was obliged to defend the e3 pawn (Alatortsev-Zakharov, Yalta 1962);

(b2) 12 单d2 is better, although even then after 12...c5 13 dxc5 单xc5 14 国ac1 營e5 15 空h1 營h5 16 国g1 單fd8 17 单e1 單ac8 and Black's chances are not worse (Gheorghiu-Zakharov, Vrnjacka Banja 1963)*;

(c) 10 f4 c5 11 全f3 0-0! 12 dxc5 (if 12 兔xb7 cxd4 13 exd4 單b8) 12... 兔xc5 13 兔d2 蠻e7 14 單g1 單fd8 15 單g5 冨ac8 16 0-0-0 h6 17 單g2 蠻d7 with chances for both sides (Szabo-Larsen, Portoroz 1958).

8 Ig1, played in Quinones-Stein (Amsterdam 1964) is unpromising for White. After 8...2b69 & e2 g6 10 & d2a5 (here this plan is justified: the advance of the f-pawn is not threatened, and besides, he is intending to fianchetto his bishop) 11 2c3 a4 12 @c2a3! 13 bxa3 &g7 14 Ic1 0-0 Black obtained good counterplay.

8 ... c5



White's queen, stuck in enemy territory, is for a time shut out of the game. What is better for him: in the interests of mobilisation to make a useful move but allow the exchange on d4, or himself to exchange on c5? In the first case White's pawn structure in the centre and on the kingside is significantly weakened. In the second case he falls behind in development.

We will consider these possibilities in the following order:

9 (2)c3 (7.111) 9 Ig1 (7.112) - p.126 9 0-0 (7.113) - p.126 9 dxc5 (7.114) - p.127

7.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4
e3 \$\overline\$g4 5 \$\overline\$xc4 e6 6 \$\overline\$b3 \$\overline\$xf3 7
gxf3 Ōbd7 8 ₩xb7 c5)

9 Dc3 cxd4

This is also the strongest reply to 9 f4. Black breaks up the enemy pawns and prepares ... Db6-d5.

If 9... \$e7 there can follow 10 d5 (10 dxc5 \$xc5 11 f4 can also be considered, along the lines of Tal-Shiyanovsky examined below, but with an extra tempo for White):



(a) 10...0-0 11 dxe6 ②e5 12 exf7+ Sh8 13 2c2 Ixf7 14 f4, and Black does not have compensation for the lost material (Smolny-Sushkov, Leningrad 1963); (b) 10... \blacksquare b8 is another way of sacrificing a second pawn – 11 \textcircled xa7 (after 11 \textcircled a6 exd5 12 \pounds xd5 0–0 13 \textcircled e2 \bumpeq e5 14 e4 \pounds d6 15 f4 \boxdot g6 Black has a substantial lead in development for the pawn, Spassky-Hort, Palma de Mallorca 1969) 11... \blacksquare a8 (to be considered is 11... exd5 12 \Huge xd5 \Huge xd5 13 \pounds xd5 0–0 14 0–0 \Huge b6 15 \pounds b3 \pounds d6 16 f4 \textcircled h4 with an attacking position, BirbragerShakh-Zade, USSR 1964) 12 \textcircled b7 \blacksquare b8 13 \textcircled a6 \blacksquare a8, and now:

(b1) 14 $\underline{\ }$ (b1) 15 dxe6 $\underline{\ }$ (b1) 14 $\underline{\ }$ (b1) 15 dxe6 $\underline{\$

(b2) 14 b5! $\blacksquare b8$ 15 b8 4 $\blacksquare b4$ 16 b8 4 cb8 (if 16...0-0 17 dxe6 cb8 18 exf7+ cb8 19 b6!) 17 cb5+ cf8 18 b7 cxd5 19 cxd5 exd5 20 a4, and the threat of the passed a-pawn's further advance gives White a clear advantage;

(c) 10...exd5 11 \triangle xd5 0-0 is more promising for Black:



(c1) 12 f4 ②xd5 13 螢xd5 盒f6 14 0-0 螢e7 15 兔e2 單ab8 with the initiative for the sacrificed pawn (Donner-Johannessen, Halle 1963);

(c2) Pomar-Palasios (Spain 1964) concluded with a spectacular attack: 12

Qd2 **Z**b8 13 \bigcirc xe7+ **W**xe7 14 **W**xa7 **Z**xb2 15 \bigcirc b3 (White is intending to castle long, but a series of tactical blows awaits him) 15... \bigcirc ce4! 16 0–0–0 (if 16 fxe4 **W**xe4 17 0–0 **Z**xd2 with the threat of ... \bigcirc ce5, or 16 **Z**d1 ce4! 17 \bigcirc xce4 \bigcirc xd2 18 **Z**xd2 **Z**b1+ 19 **Z**d1 **W**b4+ etc.) 16... \bigcirc ce5!! 17 **W**a6 (17 **W**xe7 \bigcirc d3 mate!) 17...**W**a7! 18 \bigcirc ce4 **W**b8 19 \bigcirc b3 **W**a8! 20 \bigcirc xb2 (if 20 \bigcirc ce4 \bigcirc xce4 21 **W**xc4 **W**a3 or 21 **W**xa8 **Z**xa8 with the threat of ...**Z**axa2) 20...**W**xa6 21 fxe4 \bigcirc dd3+ 22 \bigcirc b1 \bigcirc xf2, and Black won.

Let us now analyse the sacrifice of the second pawn on the 9th move – 9...**L**b8 10 **W**xa7 **L**a8 (preferable to 10...**\overline** 7 11 0-0 0-0 12 **Overline** e2!, when Black has insufficient compensation for the lost material (Uhlmann-Polugayevsky, Bad Liebenstein 1963) 11 **W**b7 **L**b8 12 **W**a6 **L**b6 13 **W**a7 cxd4 14 exd4 **Overline** Overline e1 (Minev-Bobotsov, Bulgaria 1964).

10 exd4 🔍 🕰 d6

Black prevents £f4.

After 10... \$e7 11 \$f4 0-0 12 \$c7 White retains his extra pawn:

(a) 12... Wc8? 13 2a6! We8 14 0-0 with advantage to White (Gligoric-Kozomara, Sarajevo 1963);

(b) 12... **We8**, and now:

(b1) 13 0-0-0 2b6 14 2b5 (forcing the exchange of queens) 14...\#c8 15 \#xc8 (a more complicated game results from 15 2a6 \#d7 16 2b1 2bd5 17 2xd5 2xd5 18 2e5, Johannsson-Gaprindashvili, Reykjavik 1964, and now 18...\#fd8 and ...\$f6) 15...\#axc8 16 2xb6 axb6 17 2b1 \#fd8. White has retained his extra pawn, but with opposite-colour bishops and numerous pawn 'islands' the most probable outcome is a draw (Zilber-Shiyanovsky, Kiev 1963);

(b2) 13 \$\overline{b5}\$ \$\overline{b4}\$ 14 \$\overline{b65}\$ (Euwe recommended 14 0-0, and if 14...\u00effer

15 &g3, retaining the pawn) 14...@c8 15 @xc8 \blacksquare axc8 16 &f4 &xc3+ 17 bxc3 \blacksquare xc3 18 @c2 \blacksquare c2+ 19 &d2 Ob6 with chances for both sides (Khodos-Birbrager, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1964).



11 De4

Other continuations:

11 2b5 2b4+ 12 \$f1 0-0, and:

(a) 13 **Z**g1 (Bisguier-Van Scheltinga, Beverwijk 1962), and by 13...**Z**c8 Black would have gained a couple of tempi compared with Maslov-Spassky and gained strong counterplay;

(b) 13 单f4 ②b6 14 单e2 ④bd5 15 单g3 a6 with advantage to Black (Shatskes-Ageichenko, Moscow 1964) – after 16 ④a7 豐e7 17 獸xe7 ④xe7 18 a3 单d2 the knight perished in enemy territory.

11 2d2 (before playing his knight to b5, White takes measures against the check at b4) 11...0-0 12 2b5 2b6 13

▲b3 a6 14 ∑xd6 ₩xd6 (threatening 15..., If b8). White has two bishops, but the chances are with Black (Gadalinski-Porebski, Poland 1963).

11 &e3 0–0 12 0–0 &b6, and Black would appear to have sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

11 **X**g1:



(a) 11...g6 is strongly met by 12 愈h6!, e.g. 12....重b8 13 螢xa7 重xb2 14 愈b5! when the rook is in danger, and meanwhile 15 愈g7 and 16 愈xf6 is threatened;

(b) 11...0-0 12 ♣h6 g6 (this exchange sacrifice is forced; if 12...20e8 13 ₩e4) 13 ♠xf8 ♠xf8. White has a material advantage, but from the practical viewpoint Black's activity cannot be underestimated (Khodos-Zilber, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1964);

(c) 11...**里**b8 12 **₩**xa7 0–0 is an unclear pawn sacrifice (Artsukevich-Korolev, Leningrad 1963).

11 f4 0-0 12 \pounds b3 b6 (better 12...h5! with double-edged play – Pachman) 13 f3 \blacksquare c8 14 0-0 \pounds b4 15 2e2 fd5 16 \pounds e3 f6 17 \blacksquare ac1 \pounds d6 18 g4 (Uhlmann-Bukic, Sarajevo 1964). White has consolidated, and in view of the threatened manoeuvre g3e4(h5) he has the advantage.

11 ... Ōxe4

11... ≜e7 is weak in view of 12 ≜f4. 12 fxe4

After 12 $rac{1}{2}$ $rac{1}{2}$ $ac{1}{2}$ $ac{1}{$

Blagidze-Klavins (Tbilisi 1962) now continued 12...0-0 13 e5 \triangle b6 14 \triangle d3 \triangle b4+ 15 \triangle e2, when Black blockaded the central pawn with 15... \triangle d5, although he could well have taken it: 15... \square xd4 16 \blacksquare e4 \blacksquare xe4+ 17 \triangle xe4 \blacksquare ac8 (or 17... \blacksquare ab8) 18 \triangle e3 \triangle c5 with an equal game.

7.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4
e3 \$\overline{g4} 5 \$\overline{xc4}\$ e6 6 \$\overline{b3}\$ \$\overline{xc3}\$ 7
gxf3 🖞bd7 8 ₩xb7 c5)

9 Ig1

White wants to delay the opponent's kingside development.

If 10...cxd4 11 exd4 \pounds d6 (by analogy with variation 7.111) White gains the advantage by 12 \pounds h6! – this is the idea of 9 Ξ g1.

11 dxc5

11 d5 fails to 11...De5 (12 dxe6 [b8!).

11 ... Dxc5

12 ₩c6+

12 Wb5+ comes into consideration (Pachman).

12 ... 🕸f8

If 12....2)fd7 White has the strong move 13 f4, ensuring the return of his queen.

13 f4 Dfe4!

14 **£**a6

After 14 2xe4? Ic8 15 Wb5 a6 the queen is lost.



Khodos-Tal (30th USSR Ch., Yerevan 1962) now continued 14...**Eb8** 15 2xe4 **Eb6** 16 **W**c8 **W**xc8 17 2xc82xe4 18 a4 2b4+! 19 2e2 2c5 20 **Eg5** f5 21 e4 2g7, when White's bishop at c8 was surrounded, and he resigned. As shown by Shamkovich, he should have given up his queen for rook and bishop - 16 **W**xc5 2xc5 17 2xc5**Exa6** 18 2xa6 **Wa5+** 19 2d2 **W**xa6 20 2c3, when the outcome is still unclear.

Tal in turn could have played more strongly with 14...2xc3! 15 bxc3 and only now 15...**Eb8**, after which Black has the advantage (16 2a3 **W**a5).

7.113 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4		
e3 \$\$g4 5 \$\$xc4 e6 6 \$\)\$b3 \$\\$xf3 7		
gxf3 Dbd7 8 ₩xb7 c5)		

9	00	cxd4
10	∐ d1	

An idea of Volovich. By returning the pawn, White brings his bishop into play and, what is very important, opens the d-file.

 (not 14...基xb2? 15 单d4 and 16 单xf6) 15 单xd7+ ④xd7 16 单xa7 White realised his material advantage.



Smith-Engel (corr. 1966) went 10... **Ib8** 11 $rall xa7 \ cc5 \ 12 \ rall a4 \ 0-0 \ 13$ exd4 $cd6 \ 14 \ rall c2 \ rall a5 \ 15 \ rall c2 \ rall b1 \ 16$ f4 $rall h4 \ 17 \ f3 \ cxf4 \ 18 \ cxf4 \ rall xf4$, when Black had reasonable compensation for the missing pawn.

Also to be considered is my old recommendation of $10... \pounds c5$, and if 11 exd4 $\pounds b6$.

7.114 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ②f6 4 e3 盒g4 5 盒xc4 e6 6 徵b3 盒xf3 7 gxf3 ②bd7 8 螢xb7 c5)

9 dxc5

White does not allow his pawns to be spoiled, but he loses time.

9 ... \$xc5 10 f4

So that the queen will be able to return to the kingside. After 10 230-011 3630-02d and castling queenside, Black can reply 11...36712262(12...2ab8 wasthreatened, then 13...2xe3 and ...36xc4) 12...2ab8 13 3622266 14 2d22d5, when he maintains strong pressure. 10 ... 0-0 The alternative is 10...**I**b8:



(a) 11 @f3 @b4+ 12 @f1 0-0 13 @g2 e5 14 b3 e4? (of course, Black should not relieve the tension in the centre; correct is 14...exf4, or 14...@b6 15 @b2 exf4, when after 16 @xf4 @h5 he gains counterplay - H.Müller) 15 @e2 @a5 16 @b2 @f5 17 @g1 @b6 18 @h1 @xc4 19 bxc4 and White retained his material advantage (Lubensky-Lenchiner, Rovno 1963);

(b) 11 $rac{2}{2} \ 2b4 + 12 \ 2c2 \ 0-0 \ 13 \ b3 \ 2b6 \ 14 \ 2d3 \ 2bd5 \ 15 \ 2b2 \ Ec8 \ 16 \ 2c4 \ rac{2}{3}a5 \ 17 \ Ec1 \ Efd8, and for the pawn Black has an active position (Eliskases-Schweber, Mar del Plata 1968).$

11 0-0

A risky continuation, to say the least, since Black can separate the white queen from the kingside defenders.

Other possibilities:

11 Dc3, and now:

(a) 11...**⊑**b8 12 **₩**f3:

(a1) 12...金b4 13 0-0 오xc3 14 bxc3 對a5 15 全位 單b2 16 單ad1 全c5 with sharp play and chances for both sides (Bukic-Damjanovic, Yugoslavia 1963)*;

(a2) 12... #c7 13 2b3 2b4, when Tal-Shiyanovsky (30th USSR Ch., Yerevan 1962), which is considered the origin of this variation, continued 14 호d2 (it is not essential for White to defend his knight; 14 0-0 comes seriously into consideration) 14... むた 15 호c2 호a5 16 里b1 單fd8 (Black's initiative fully compensates for the pawn) 17 暫e2:



Here, as shown by Shiyanovsky, after the strongest move 21 bxc3 基xb1+ 22 螢xb1 螢xc3+23 堂e2 螢d2+24 當f3 f5 the probable outcome is a draw.

Tal incorrectly played 21 \oplus 2, when 21...f5 22 \blacksquare hc1 \blacksquare d8 23 \blacksquare xc3 \blacksquare e7! 24 \blacksquare c2 \blacksquare h4 25 \blacksquare f1 could have led to a slight advantage for Black after 25... \blacksquare h5+ 26 \oplus e1 \boxdot xc3 27 bxc3 \blacksquare xh2.

Let us return to the last diagram and play 17... ②a4. After 18 호xa4 單xd2 19 響xd2 호xc3 20 響xc3 豐xc3+ 21 bxc3 幫xb1+ 22 호d1 ②e4 Black has the advantage, so White would have had to give up his b2 pawn with 18 0-0.

(b) 11... \triangle b6 was played in Quinteros-Miles (Amsterdam 1974). After 12 \triangle e2 Black 'arrested' the enemy queen by 12... \triangle fd5, and 13 0–0 Wh4 14 \triangle f3 Zab8 15 Wa6 (if 15 Wxa7? f5 16 \triangle e2 Za8 17 Wb7 Zf6 with very strong threats – Miles) 15... \triangle xc3 16 bxc3 f5 17 \triangle g2 Zf6 enabled him to build up an attack (if 18 We2 \triangle d5!). With 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ White can seize the opportunity to return his queen to the kingside, when there follows 11... **Z**c8:



(a) 12 b3 2b6 13 0-0 2xc4 14 bxc4 ₩e7 and Black gains sufficient compensation for the pawn (Spassky-Gurgenidze, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1963);

11 ... 创d5



12 Cc3 Foguelman-Bronstein (Amsterdam 1964) went 12 Idl (a dubious move:

the queen's path to the kingside has been cut off, and the rook should not be moved away) 12... Ξ b8 13 c6 h4 (threatening 14... g4+, so that White has no time to take on d7) 14 c3 (if 14 \amalg c45 g4+ 15 \oiint f1 exd5 16 \oiint c3 bb 17 \oiint c5 \varXi fc8 with a great advantage to Black) 14... \blacksquare b6! 15 \oiint c47 cxf4! 16 c2 (the knight cannot be taken on account of mate; 16 \pounds f1 also does not help in view of 16... g4+ 17 ch1 \oiint f3+ 18 \oiint g1 e5!) 16... h3+ 17 c2 \oiint c18 \blacksquare d4 g4!, and Black won.

After 12 全xd5 單b8 13 徵c6 單b6 14 徵a4 exd5 Black has good chances of an attack against the opponent's weakened kingside.

If White returns his queen to the defence of the kingside via b3 - 12 ****b3 **b8** (also interesting is 12...*****h4** 13 ****b1** (2)e5!? 14 fxe5 ******xc4 15 (2)d2 ****b14** 16 ****b13** f5, again with attacking chances for the pawn, Stupen-Kots, USSR 1962) 13 ****b11** Black replies 13...(2)7b6, and after 14 (2)e2 (weaker is 14 (2)b3 f5!) he has the initiative, but White is a pawn up with chances of a successful defence.

7.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 创f3 创f6 4 e3 单g4 5 单xc4 e6)

The variation with the exchange of the bishop at g6 - 7 g4 $\pounds g6$ 8 $\pounds e5$ $\pounds bd7$ (8... $\pounds e4$ comes into consideration) 9 $\pounds xg6$ hxg6 is not so harmless:



(a) 10 ₩f3, and now:

(a1) 10...c5 11 0–0 cxd4 12 exd4 &c7 13 2c3 2b6 14 &b5+ \Leftrightarrow f8 15 &c3 2bd5 16 &d3 2xc3 17 bxc3 &d5 18 &g2 &xg2+ 19 \Leftrightarrow xg2 2d5 20 c4 2xc3+ 21 fxc3 with the initiative for White in the ending (Hort-Miles, Amsterdam 1978);

(a2) 10...重b8 11 公c3 c5 12 d5 exd5 13 公xd5 象d6 14 g5 包e5 15 包xf6+ 會f8 16 斷d5 gxf6 17 象e2 象e7 18 斷e4 包c6 (Gerusel-Hübner, Busum 1969), and after 19 象d2, preparing queenside castling, both sides have chances;

(b) 10 ②c3 鱼e7 11 響f3 c6 12 鱼d2 響c7 13 鱼b3 ②d5 14 ③xd5 cxd5 15 罩c1 獸b6 16 雪f1 0--0 17 h4 ③f6 18 h5 ②e4 with chances for both sides (Portisch-Padevsky, Havana 1964).

7 **Wb3** \pounds xf3 8 gxf3 leads to a position from variation 7.11, with the difference that the pawn is not at h2, but h3. In certain cases (mainly when Black attacks on the kingside) this may be significant.

7 0-0 and 7 2 bd2 usually lead to positions from sections 7.14 and 7.15. Of course, here too the inclusion of the moves h2-h3 and ... 2 h5 has its nuances. We should mention Rubinetti-Miles (Buenos Aires 1979), which went 7 0-0 2 bd7 8 b3 c5 9 dxc5 2 xc5 10 2b2 0-0 11 2bd2 2 12 a3 a5 13 e42b6 14 2d3 15 2b1 2g6 with double-edged play (compare with Botvinnik-Smyslov in variation 7.15, p.146).



Black has available several replies: 7...2bd7 (7.121)

7...a6 (7.122) - p.138

7....2c6 (7.123) - p.143

7....c5 has not been refuted, yet it is rarely played:

(a) in Klasups-Zilber (Riga 1963) White replied with the energetic 8 響a4+ 公bd7 9 g4 全g6 10 公e5, but after 10...a6 11 公xg6 hxg6 12 全e2 b5 Black obtained a good position;

(b) 8 25 is an interesting try, and if 8...2bd7 9 g4 26 10 dxc5 2xc5 11 g5, aiming to exploit the pin on the knight. After 11...a6 (if 11...2d5 12 2c5 25b6 13 2a4) 12 gxf6 axb5 13 fxg7 Ξ g8 14 2xb5 Ξ a5+ 15 2c3 Ξ xg7 (15...2c4 16 Ξ g1) 16 Ξ g1 White is a pawn up.

7.121 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 皇g4 5 皇xc4 e6 6 h3 皇h5 7 公c3)				
7 8	 0–0	④bd7		

Other continuations:

8 e4, when Black has:

(a) 8...e5, exploiting the fact that f7 is securely defended:



(a2) 9 g4 meets with a vigorous rejoinder: 9...exd4 (not 9... \pounds g6 10 dxe5 \textcircled xe4 11 \pounds xf7+!) 10 e5 dxc3 (10... \oiint g8 11 \textcircled xd4 favours White) 11 gxh5 \oiint b6! with advantage to Black (analysis);

(a3) 9 dxe5 \$\overline\$xf3 10 \$\overline\$xf3 \$\overline\$\overline\$xe5 \$\overline\$xe5 11 \$\overline\$e2 \$\overline\$b4 12 0−0 c6 13 \$\overline\$g5 and Black still has to fight for equality;



(b1) 9 \$\Delta 5 \$\Delta xf3 10 gxf3 (the pawn sacrifice 10 \$\Vert xf3 can also be considered) 10...c5 11 \$\Delta e3 cxd4 12 \$\Vert xd4 \$\Vert xd4 13 \$\Delta xd4 \$\Delta fd7 14 \$\Delta b5 \$\Delta b4+ 15 \$\Vert e2 with the more promising position for White (Marovic-Mestrovic, Yugo-slavia 1963);

(b2) 9 &d3 &xf3 10 gxf3 c5 11 &g5 (White sacrifices a pawn) 11...@xd4 12 &b5+ \bigtriangleup fd7 13 @e2 &e7 14 \blacksquare d1 (Kozma-Smejkal, Czechoslovakia 1964). After 14...@e5 15 \blacksquare xd7! Black managed to parry the attack: 15... \boxdot xd7 16 &xd7+ \Leftrightarrow d8 (forced, since if 16... \Leftrightarrow xd7 17 @b5+ \Leftrightarrow d8 18 @xb7 or 17... \Leftrightarrow d6 18 @d3+ White wins) 17 f4 @c7 18 &a4 &xg5 19 fxg5 \Leftrightarrow e7 20 @e3, but with two minor pieces for rook and pawn, White has the better chances;

(c) 8... 🕹 b4:



(c1) 9 e5 2d5 10 2xd5 (or 10 2d227b6 11 2d3 0-0 12 a3 2xc3 13 bxc3 2e7 14 2d2 2g6 15 h4 c5 16 h5 2xd317 2dxd3 2dc8 with an equal position, Lerner-Lukin, USSR Ch. 1991) 10... exd5 11 2dxd3 2xc3+ (11...c5 is sharper) 12 bxc3 2b6 with an equal game;

(c2) 9 单d3 c5 (9...e5 is probably simplest: 10 dxe5 公xe5 11 徵a4+ 徵d7 12 徵xd7+ ②fxd7 13 ②xe5 公xe5, Meissner-Kraut, Altensteig 1993) 10 a3 塗a5 11 b4 cxd4 (after 11...cxb4 12 $2b5 bxa3+ 13 \ cm 1$ White has an active position for the pawn – Matulovic) 12 $2b5 \ cm 13 \ cm 2 \ cm 8$ 14 $2bxd4 \ 0-0$ $15 \ cm 2 b2 \ a5 \ 16 \ cm 2 d2 \ axb4 \ 17 \ axb4$ $cm 18 \ cm 2 a1 \ cm 6 \ 19 \ cm 5 3 \ cm 7 \ 20 \ cm 3 \ cm 6 \ m 19 \ cm 19 \ cm 19 \ cm 198$ (I.Sokolov-Matulovic, Yugoslavia 1988).

8 g4 &g6 9 Oh4 (to exchange the black bishop) 9...&e4 (or 9...Ob6 10 Oxg6 hxg6 11 &e2 c5!, Moskalenko-Matulovic, Yugoslavia 1988) 10 Oxe4 Oxe4 11 Of3 h5 12 &d3 Og5! 13 gxh5 Oxf3+ 14 Wxf3 Oe5 15 We4 Oxd3+ 16 Wxd3 Wd5 17 e4 Wxh5 18 We2 Wa5+ 19 Of1 0-0-0. Black's position is preferable (Bondarevsky-Krogius, Sochi 1964).

8 \$e2, relieving the pin on the knight:

(a) 8...&g6 9 0–0 &e7 (9...&d6!? – Gligoric) 10 h4! 0–0 11 xg6 hxg6 12 e4 c6 13 &e3 e5 14 \blacksquare c1 with the better position for White (Gligoric-Ghitescu, Busum 1969);

(b) 8...c5 9 d5 exd5 10 2xd5 2xd6 11 2xf4 2xf4 12 exf4 2xg6 13 0-0 0-0 14 2xe5 (Ghitescu-Matulovic, Wijk aan Zee 1974), and White's position is preferable;

(c) 8... \pounds d6 9 e4 (9 0–0 transposes into the main line) 9... \pounds b4! 10 e5 Od5 11 Wb3 c5 12 0–0 \pounds xc3 13 bxc3 Wb6! with chances for both sides (Gligoric-Matulovic, Novi Sad 1976).

Now Black has:

8... 2d6 (7.1211)

8... \$e7 (7.1212) - p.137

If 8...\$b4 the simplest is 9 ¥b3 (9...¥e7 10 a3 \$xc3 11 bxc3).

7.1211 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 \$\overline{9}g4 5 \$\overline{8}xc4 e6 6 h3 \$\overline{9}h5 7 \$\overline{9}c3\$
لَکَbd7 8 0–0)

8 ... 🖄 🕹 d6

9 e4

This is more energetic than 9 **2e2**:

(a) 9...e5? fails to 10 dxe5 ①xe5 11 ②xe5 এxe2 12 營a4+;

(b) 9....\u00fcr 7 10 e4 \u00e9xf3 11 \u00e9xf3 e5 12 d5 h6 13 \u00c9e3 e3 0-0 14 \u00e4c1 a6 (Osnos-Kovacs, Debrecen 1969) 15 \u00fcrb3! with advantage to White;

(c) 9...皇g6, when both 10 ②h4 and 10 b3 e5 11 dxe5 ②xe5 12 ②d4 are possible;

(d) 9...0-0 10 b3 (in Korchnoi-Matulovic, Ohrid 1972, 10 b3 led to an advantage for White after 10...c8?! 11 g4 ag6 12 bh4; Black should have played 10...b6) 10...a6 (a roughly equal position results from 10...b7 11 ab2aa3 12 axa3 $\oiint{x}a3$ 13 cd2 axe2 14 $\oiint{x}e2$ $\oiint{e}7$, Damjanovic-Matulovic, Sarajevo 1971, or 10...c5 11 ab2 cxd4 12 cxd4 axe2 13 $\oiint{x}e2$ a6 14 \blacksquare fd1 $\oiint{e}7$ 15 \blacksquare ac1 \blacksquare ac8, Tukmakov-Smyslov, Hastings 1972/3) 11 ab2 $\oiint{e}7$ 12 cd2 (Flear recommends 12 ce5) 12...axe2, and now:



(d1) 13 螢xe2 兔a3 14 兔xa3 螢xa3 15 簋ac1 螢e7 16 e4 e5 17 d5 簋fc8 18 公d1 a5 19 ②e3 a4 20 簋c2 axb3 21 axb3 g6 with equal chances (Romanishin-Matulovic, Novi Sad 1975);

(d2) 13 ②xe2 b5 (after the exchange of the dark-square bishops - 13... 2a3

14 &xa3 @xa3 15 @c1, White exerts some pressure on his opponent's queenside) 14 e4 &b4 (14...e5 15 f4!) 15 2g3 with slightly the better chances for White (Skembris-Flear, Paris 1983).

... e5



White's main continuations are:

- 10 dxe5 (7.12111)
- 10 2e2 (7.12112) p.133

10 g4 (7.12113) - p.135

If White prevents the opening of the position by 10 d5, then after 10...0-011 \$\overline{2}g5 a6 12 \$\overline{2}e2\$ Black should consider 12...\$\overline{2}e7, planning ...\$\overline{2}e8-d6.

10 2b5 does not set Black any problems. After 10...0-0 11 2xd6 cxd6 12 dxe5 dxe5 passive play by White in Khodos-Gurgenidze (USSR Ch. ½-Final 1963) - 13 2e1 2c7 14 2f1 2c5 allowed Black to take the initiative.

The chances are roughly equal after 10 \$e3 0-0 11 \$\equiv e1\$ (Hort-Hübner, Athens 1969; 11 \$\equiv e2\$ is considered below) 11...c6.

7.12111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 \$\$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$
②bd7 8 0-0 单d6 9 e4 e5)

10 dxe5

White bases his plan on exploiting his active pawn chain on the kingside.

10 ... ᡚxe5 11 \$e2 ᡚxf3+

11...0-0 leads to position from variation 7.12112.

Black can retreat his bishop with 11... \$g6:

(a) $12 \bigcirc h4 \&c5$ (not 12...&xe4 13 $\boxdot xe4 \oslash xe4$ 14 $\textcircledad4$; $12...\oslash xe4$ also fails to 13 $\textcircledad4$ + $\textcircledad4$; $12...\oslash xe4$ also fails to 13 $\textcircledad4$ + $\textcircledadd4$; 14 &b5 c6 15 $\boxdot xe4$ cxb5 16 $\boxdot xd6$ + $\oiint xd6$ 17 $\textcircledadxb5$ +) 13 $\boxdot xg6$ hxg6 14 &g5 c6 15 $\textcircledadxd8$ + $\blacksquare xd8$ 16 $\blacksquare fd1 0-0$ 17 $\clubsuit f1$ $\blacksquare xd1$ + 18 $\blacksquare xd1 \oslash h7$ 19 &d8 b5 20 f4 f5 21 $\&c7 \oslash f7$ 22 e5 $\blacksquare c8$ 23 &a5 with advantage to White (Korchnoi-Szabo, Belgrade 1964);

(b) 12 &e3 \bigotimes xf3+ (12... \bigotimes xe4? is again not possible for the same reason: 13 \textcircled a4+ \textcircled d7 14 &b5 c6 15 \bigotimes xe4) 13 &xf3 0-0 14 \oiint b3 \textcircled e7 15 \blacksquare fe1 (Ghitescu-Kovacs, Debrecen 1968) 15...c6 16 &d4 with the better position for White.

11... 2xf3 is of independent significance, if after 12 2xf3 Black avoids the second exchange:

(a) 12... $2e^7$ 13 $2e^2$ 0-0-0 (13... $2g^6$ 14 $2a^4 + c^6$ 15 f4! - Marovic) 14 $2a^4$ $2c^5$ 15 $2g^5$ c6 16 b4! $2x^4$ (16... $2d^4$ 17 Eac1!) 17 Eab1 $2c^5$ (17... $2x^3$? 18 $2a^7$) 18 $2a^4$, and White gained excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn (Boleslavsky-Peterson, Moscow 1966);

(b) 12...0-0 13 全2 公g6 14 f4 全c5+ 15 空h2 豐xd1 16 基xd1 革fd8 17 e5 公e8 18 公e4 (Szabo-Haag, Budapest 1965), with the better position for White.

12	≜xf3	≜xf3
13	₩xf3	₩e7

14 单f4

14 Ie1 can also be considered.

14 ... 🔍 xf4

After 14....2e5 15 2xe5 ¥xe5 16 ¥e3 0-0 17 f4 ¥e7 18 e5 White stands better (Taimanov-Matulovic, Mar del Plata 1970).

15 ₩xf4 0-0



Spassky-Szabo (Belgrade 1964) now continued 16 I adl I fe8 17 I fe1 I ad8 18 We3 a6 19 f4 I xd1 20 I xd1 I d8 21 I xd8+ Wxd8 22 e5 2 d7 23 Wd4. Within a few moves the position simplified still further, but Black still did not manage to equalise: 23.... Ve7 24 2 e4 h6 25 Wd5 c6 26 Wd6 Wxd6 27 2 xd6.

7.12112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 \$\overline{4} g4 5 \$\overline{xc4} e6 6 h3 \$\overline{h5} 7 \$\overline{c3}\$
④bd7 8 0-0 盒d6 9 e4 e5)

10 **2**.e2 0-0

The alternative is 10... $\pounds xf3$ 11 $\pounds xf3$ exd4 12 Wxd4 (or 12 2b5 $\pounds e5$ 13 2xd4 0-0, when Black has no difficulties), and now:

(a) 12...0-0 13 g3! 星8 14 堂g2 a5 15 堂e3 堂e5 16 螢a4 螢e7 17 單fe1 and, thanks to his two bishops and mobile centre, White stands better;

(b) 12... De5, when after 13 ₩e3 (13 Le2 immediately is not possible on account of 13...分f3+ and 14...单h2+) 13...c6 14 单e2 徵e7 or 13 徵a4+ c6 14 单e2 单c5 both sides have chances.



11 dxe5

If 11 &e3 Black releases the tension: 11...exd4 12 Oxd4 &xe2 (12...&g6 13 f3) 13 Wxe2 $\blacksquaree8$ 14 Of5, and White's activity is extinguished by 14...&e5 15 &g5 c6 16 $\blacksquaread1 \textcircled{W}c7$ 17 Wf3 $\blacksquaree6$ (Gligoric-Rukavina, Leningrad 1973).

Dxe5

11 ... 12 例d4

12 2004

The most promising.

After 12 $2 \times e5$ $2 \times e2$ 13 $2 \times e2$ $2 \times e5$ 14 2 g5 $2 \times e5$ $2 \times e5$ 14 2 g5 $2 \times e5$ 14 2 g5 $2 \times e5$ 14 2 g5 $2 \times e5$ 17 $2 \times e5$ 16 12 1

An equal position results from 12 全e3 旦e8 13 纪d4 全xe2 14 敏xe2 纪g6 15 敏b5 敏b8 16 f3 c6 17 敏b3 全f4 18 纪ce2 全xe3+ 19 敏xe3 纪d5 20 敏d2 创df4 (Gligoric-Matulovic, Yugoslavia 1975.

Other possibilities:

12

12...\$2g6 13 \$2g5 (13 \$2cc comes into consideration, and also the plan of restricting the g6 bishop: 13 f3 \$2c5 14 \$2e3 \$2c6 15 \$2c2 \$2e7 16 \$2c1 \$2fd8 17 \$2xc5 \$2xc5+ 18 \$2e3, Tatai-Matulovic, Stip 1979) 13...\$2e7 (after 13...2e8 14 \$2db5 \$2c6 15 \$2xd6 cxd6 16 f3 White's position is the more promising, Portisch-Spassky, Candidates Match, Geneva 1977), and now:



(a) 14 2f3 (aiming for control of e5; here too the quiet 14 f3 comes into consideration) $14...\textcircled{2}xf3 + 15 \pounds xf3$ $\textcircled{2}d7 16 \pounds xe7 \textcircled{2}xe7 17 \textcircled{2}d4 c6 18$ $\blacksquare ad1 \blacksquare fd8 19 \textcircled{2}e3$ with slightly the better prospects for White (Ljubojevic-Andersson, Turin 1982);

(b1) 16 對xd8 耳fxd8 17 国ad1 国xd1 18 国xd1 国d8 19 国xd8+ 全xd8 20 g4 with a favourable ending (Smyslov-Matulovic, Palma de Mallorca 1970);

(b2) 16 Wc2 (avoiding the exchange) 16...h6 17 Iadl 2 ed7 18 2 h4 Ie8 19 2 c4 (Lukacs-Mikhalchishin, USSR 1978). 12... \pounds c5 13 \triangle b3 (White has a minimal initiative after 13 \pounds xh5 \pounds xd4 14 \triangle d5 c5 15 \pounds g5 \triangle ed7 16 \blacksquare e1 h6 17 \pounds e3! – Miles), and now:



(b) 13... \forall xd1 14 &xd1 &b6 (14... &xd1 15 \bigotimes xc5 &c2 16 &g5 favours White) 15 a4 &xd1 16 \blacksquare xd1 a5 (16... c6? is weak in view of 17 a5 &c7 18 f4 \bigotimes g6 19 e5, Portisch-Miles, Lone Pine 1978, but 16...a6 17 &g5 c6 18 &xf6 gxf6 19 \bigotimes d4 \blacksquare fd8 20 \bigotimes f5 \bigotimes d3 is possible) 17 &g5 c6 18 &rf6 \blacksquare fd8 19 &e2 \bigotimes c4 20 \blacksquare xd8+ \blacksquare xd8 21 \bigotimes d1 \blacksquare e8 and Black gained a draw in this slightly inferior ending (Andersson-Miles, Wijk aan Zee 1979).

13 Wxe2 2g6

Black must watch closely for the possible advance of the e-pawn, and therefore it is important to keep the f4 square under fire.

14 **H**d1

Alternatives:

14 215 \$e5, and now:

(a) 15 f4 愈xc3 16 bxc3 單e8 17 e5 包d5 18 暫f3 包b6 19 單d1 暫c8 (Lukacs-Marszalek, Budapest 1976) 20 包e3! with the more active position for White: (b) 15 全g5 豐e8 16 全xf6 全xf6 17 ②d5 豐d8 (17...全d8, planning ...c7-c6, comes into consideration) 18 豐g4. White's position is preferable (Tarjan-Cordes, corr. 1979).

14 2db5 (14 2g5 2e7) 14...2c5 (in contrast to the previous variation, 14... 2e5 does not threaten to weaken White's queenside by exchanging on c3, but 14...2b4 comes into consideration) 15 2a4 2e7 (after 15...2e7 16 2d1 2e8 17 2e2 2e8 18 2e3 c5 19 2bc3 White has pressure on the queenside and in the centre, Ivkov-Miles, Buenos Aires 1979) 16 2xc5 2xc5 17 2c3. White's position is preferable (Kuligowski-Ghitescu, Warsaw 1979).

14		₩c8
15	¢g5	Le5
16	₩e3	④h5

17 f4 was threatened.

After 16...h6 17 $\pounds xf6 \pounds xf6$ 18 $\pounds f5$ c6 19 \blacksquare acl or 18 $\pounds d5 \pounds xd4$ 19 $\blacksquare xd4$ c6 20 $\pounds c3$ and \blacksquare ad1 White has the initiative.

17 単f3 ②hf4 17...②f6 is weaker in view of 18 ②f5 響e6 19 h4! h6 20 오xf6 오xf6 21 ②d5.

18 \bigtriangleup f5 We6After 18... \blacksquare e8 19 h4! h6 (or 19... \pounds xc3 20 bxc3 $\Huge{Q}e6$ 21 \pounds e3 with the idea of Wg3) 20 \pounds xf4 $\Huge{Q}xf4$ 21 \blacksquare d2 We6 22 \blacksquare ad1 White, who controls the d-file, has the initiative (Portisch-Miles, Tilburg 1978).

Now after 19 h4 h6 20 \$\overline{x}xf4 \$\overline{x}xf4 \$2\$ \$\overline{x}xf4 \$\overline{x}x

7.12113 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 2 f6 4 e3 \$\overline{g}4 5 \$\overline{x}xc4 e6 6 h3 \$\overline{h}5 7 \$\overline{c}3 2 bd7 8 0-0 \$\overline{d}6 9 e4 e5)

10 g4



This, a more aggressive continuation than 10 dxe5, was first employed in Flear-Norman (London 1979). It may have been borrowed from Euwe-Bogoljubow (Bern 1932), where the same idea occurred in a Slav Defence: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 \bigcirc f3 \bigcirc f6 4 \bigcirc c3 dxc4 5 a4 \bigcirc f5 6 e3 e6 7 \bigcirc xc4 \bigcirc bd7 8 0–0 \bigcirc d6 9 \blacksquare e2 \bigcirc g4 10 h3 \bigcirc h5 11 e4 e5 12 g4.

10 ...

£g6

The sacrifice does not give anything: 10...2xg4 11 hxg4 2xg4 12 d5 3f6 13 2e2, and White parries the attack, retaining a material advantage: 13...3fg614 2h4 2xe2+ 15 2xg6 2xd1 16 2xh8, or 13...2h3 14 2e1 3fg6+ 15 2g5 h6 16 2h5.

It is considered that after 10...exd4 11 公xd4 the piece sacrifice 11...公xg4 is refuted by the spectacular 12 公f5 (not 12 hxg4? 衢h4!):

(a) in Skembris-Stomatopulos (Thessaloniki 1980), White won by repeating an analysis by P.Littlewood: $12... \pm h2+$ $13 \pm h1 \pm xf2+ 14 \pm xf2 \pm xd1 15 \pm xg7+ \pm e7 16 \pm xf7+ \pm d6 17 \pm e3 c5$ $18 \pm xd1+ \pm c6 19 \pm b5+ \pm b6 20 \pm dxd7 \pm b8 21 b4;$

(b) 12... 包e3 13 包xg7+ 全f8 (if 13... 全e7 14 螢xh5 包xc4 15 皇g5+ f6 16 2d5+ 17 2e6+), when various sources suggest that White wins immediately by 14 fxe3, since the queen cannot be taken on account of mate. However, after 14...g5+ the outcome is completely unclear: 15 2h1 (15 g42xg7) 15...g5. Probably White should be content with positional gains after 14 gxh5 2xc4 15 2f5.

11 dxe5 2xe5 11...\$xe5 12 2xe5 2xe5 13 \$e2!

with the threat of f4-f5 favours White.

This leads to an extremely sharp situation, in view of the critical position of the bishop at g6.

13 ... Wd4+ 13... 2d4+ 14 2h2 2xc3 15 bxc3 Wxd1 16 Zxd1 favours White (Zs.Polgar-Dückstein, Vienna 1993).

14	₩xd4	£xd4+
15	≌h2	≜xc3
16	bxc3	≜xe4
17	ø5	



This occurred in the source game Flear-Norman.

17 ... 单d5 The only move. After 17... 纪d7 18 置e1 f5 19 gxf6 公xf6 20 单d3 the pin on the e-file is extremely unpleasant for Black:

(a) 20...0-0-0? 21 \$\Delta xe4 \$\Dot\$ he8 22 \$\Delta f5+;

(b) 20...0-0 21 \$\overline{2}xe4\$ Tae8 (21...12fe8 22 \$\overline{2}xb7!) 22 \$\overline{2}a3\$, and White wins the exchange for a pawn (P.Littlewood-Muir, England 1979);

(c) 20...\$f7 21 \$\overline{2}\$xe4 \$\overline{2}\$xe4, and the two bishops give White winning chances.

18 Ie1+ \$\$f8

Not 18...\$d7 (Hulak-Matulovic, Yugoslavia 1981) in view of 19 \$d3! \$\De8 20 c4 \$\Dec6 21 \$\Def5+\$d8 22 \$\Dec33.



This position was reached in Ftacnik-Matulovic (Vrsac 1981). After 19 \$\Delta 3+ \$\Delta 8 20 gxf6 \$\Delta xc4 21 \$\Delta 67 h5! 22 \$\Delta xc7 b5 23 \$\Delta 91 \$\Delta h6! 24 \$\Delta xg7+ \$\Delta h8\$ the opposite-colour bishops led to a draw.

7.1212 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 e3 皇g4 5 皇xc4 e6 6 h3 皇h5 7 公c3 公bd7 8 0-0)

Compared with 8... **2**d6, this allows White better chances of developing an initiative.

8

9 e4

9 2 e2 is also logical, e.g. 9...0-0 (9...2 g6 10 2 h4 0-0 11 2 xg6 hxg6 12 e4 c6 13 2 e3 favours White) 10 e4, and now:



(a1) 14... $\hat{a}xe2$?! 15 $\underline{\ } 2$ g6 (if 15... $\underline{\ } 8$ White was intending 16 $\underline{\ } xh7+$ $\underline{\ } 68$ 17 $\underline{\ } h8+$ $\underline{\ } e7$ 18 $\underline{\ } xg7$ $\underline{\ } h5$ 19 $\underline{\ } xf7$, winning) 16 $\underline{\ } xe2$ $\underline{\ } e8$ 17 $\underline{\ } g4$ f5 (forced, since if 17... $\underline{\ } f8$ 18 $\underline{\ } h4$ $\underline{\ } e7$ 19 $\underline{\ } h6$) 18 exf6 $\underline{\ } xf6$ 19 $\underline{\ } g3$ $\underline{\ } ac8$ 20 $\underline{\ } ac1$ $\underline{\ } e7$ 21 $\underline{\ } f4$ $\underline{\ } f6$ 22 $\underline{\ } e3$ gives White a clear advantage (Krogius-Damjanovic, Sochi 1964);

(a2) 14... 免g6 should be considered,
e.g. 15 免d3 免e7 16 免xg6 hxg6 17
豐g4 免xg5 18 免xg5 豐b6;

(b) 10...2b6 (10...c5 11 e5) 11 \$e3 (or 11 \$g5 h6 12 \$e3), when:

(b1) 11.... 愈g6 12 愈d3 仑)fd7 (12... IC8 13 鄧c2 c5 14 Ifd1 is promising for White) 13 愈f4 愈d6 14 e5 愈xd3 15 獸xd3 愈e7 16 Iad1 c6 17 鄧e4 Ie8 18 Id3 with advantage to White (Korchnoi-Peterson, 32nd USSR Ch., Kiev 1964/5);

(b2) 11...單c8 12 ②e5 皇xe2 13 響xe2 c5 14 單fd1 響e8 (after 14...cxd4 15

\$xd4 ₩c7 16 2b5 ₩b8 17 2g4 2fd7 18 a4 a6 19 a5 axb5 20 axb6 Ifd8 21 Wxb5 White has an obvious advantage. Gligoric-Ankerst, Yugoslavia 1965) 15 a4 a6 16 a5 cxd4 17 \$xd4 2bd7 (Asafov-Yudovich, corr. 1967), when 18 2a4! retains an active position.

9 b3 0-0 10 \$b2 5b6 11 \$e2 c5 12 dxc5 2xc5 13 Wxd8 Ifxd8 led to an equal position in Kholmov-Spassky (31st USSR Ch., Leningrad 1963).

> 9 . . . Db6

9...c6 (9...0-0 10 e5!) 10 \$e3 \$g6 11 2d3 0-0 12 a3 Ic8 13 Ie1 2h5 14 Ic1 a5 15 单e2 单g6 16 纪d2 Ia8 17 e5 (after 17) b3 b 8 18 \$ f 3 h 6 19 g 3 Ec8 20 g2 b5 21 e5 a4 both sides had chances in Larsen-Spassky, Santa Monica 1966) 17... 2d5 18 2xd5 cxd5 19 Wb3 with a positional advantage for White (Ivkov).

______ e2 10

10 ad3 0-0 11 ae3 Zc8 12 We2 c5 13 dxc5 &xc5 14 &g5 h6 15 &h4 Wc7 16 \$h1 \$f4 17 \$g3 \$xf3 18 gxf3 ₩g5 led to a roughly equal position (Vaisman-Klovans, USSR 1964).

> 10 . . .

Lg6

Razuvayev-Mestrovic (Keszthely 1981) went 10...0-0 11 \$e3 \$b4 (the idea is to press on the e4 pawn; 11... Ic8 12 De5! exe2 13 Wxe2 c5 14 Ifd1 favours White) 12 2d2 2g6 13 £f3 ₩e7 14 a3 £xc3 15 bxc3 e5 16 d5 ②fd7 17 對b3 對d6 (17... ②c5 18 對b4) 18 c4 ②c5 19 皇xc5 劉xc5 20 劉b4 ②d7 21 2b3 Wb6 22 c5, with a clear positional advantage for White.

11 **≜d**3 12 ≜e3

Or immediately 12 We2 c5 13 dxc5 ≜xc5 14 ≜g5 ¥b8 (Gligoric-Matulovic, Skopje 1970, when 15 \$xf6! gxf6 16 \$h1 (intending Dh2 and f2-f4) would have been promising for White.

0-0



14 Ifd1 (White wants to post the other rook at c1) 14...cxd4 15 axd4, and now:

(a) 15... 2 fd7? 16 2 b5, and Black experiences serious difficulties: if 16... 黉c7 17 貫ac1 賞b8 18 ≜xd7 ④xd7 19 \$xg7 winning material (Trifunovic);

(b) Black should simplify the position by 15... 2c5 (Smejkal-Matulovic, Vrsac 1981).

14 Zad1 15 2xd4!, and:

(a) 15... 2 fd7 16 2 b3, and if 16...e5 (if Black does not play this, he has to reckon with f2-f4) 17 \u00abb5!;

(b) 15... \$b4, when there can follow 16 2db5 a6 17 2b1 2bd7 18 a3 2c5 19 幻d6 (Matulovic);

(c) 15....皇c5 16 包c2 皇xe3 17 包xe3 e5 (otherwise f2-f4) 18 2c4 We7 19 Ded5 Dfxd5 20 Dxd5 Dxd5 21 2xd5 with advantage to White (Petronic-Matulovic, Yugoslavia 1993).

7.122 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4	
e3 单g4 5 单xc4 e6 6 h3 单h5 7 纪c3)	

a6

Other continuations: 8 g4 \$ g6:



(a) 9 ②e5 ③bd7 (after 9...②fd7 10 ③xg6 hxg6 11 暫f3 ②c6 12 氢d2 ②b6 13 氢b3, Borisenko-Lutikov, 35th USSR Ch., Kharkov 1967, White stands better) 10 ③xg6 hxg6:



(a1) 11 g5 2d5 (after 11...2g8 12 #f3 leftab b8 13 h4 c5 14 2d5 b5 15 2d2White's lead in development gives him the advantage, Mochalov-Vorotnikov, USSR 1981), and now:

(a11) 12 20xd5 exd5 13 2xd5 c6 14 2b3 37xg5 15 37f3 2b4+ (if 15...37f516 37xg5 17 2d2 26 18 0-0-0 2h4 19 f3 2d6 20 2b1 2f8 21 e4 2a8, Tal-Romanishin, 46th USSR Ch., Tbilisi 1978, when White could have gained the better chances by 22 e5 2e7 23 f4, intending d4-d5 - Tal) 16 单d2 单xd2+ 17 \$\phixd2 \$\pmasstyle{a}_{5} + 18 \$\phice c2 \$\pmasstyle{a}_{5} + 19 \$\pmasstyle{a}_{5} \$\pmasstyle{b}_{5} + 10 \$\pmasstyle{a}_{5} \$\pmasstyle{a}_{5} \$\pmasstyle{b}_{5} + 10 \$\pmasstyle{a}_{5} \$\pmasstyle{b}_{5} + 10 \$\pmasstyle{a}_{5} \$\pmasstyle{b}_{5} + 10 \$\pmasstyle{b}_{5} \$\pmasstyle{

(a12) 12 $\forall g 4 27b6$ (in the modern game Lev-Murshed, London 1991, after 12...c6 13 &d2 &e7 14 e4 2b4 15 0-0-0 c5 16 &e3 $\exists c8$ both sides had chances) 13 &b3 c5 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 dxc5 &xc5 16 &d2 $\exists c8$ 17 $\exists d1$ $\exists h5$ 18 h4 2e7 19 &c3 $\forall b6$ 20 &xg7 $\forall c6$ 21 &e2 2bf5 (Petrosian-Polugayevsky, Moscow 1963), and with 22 &c3 White would have retained his extra pawn with a sound position;

(a2) 11 \$\overline{1}\$, switching the bishop to the long diagonal:

(a21) 11...\$d6 12 \$g2 \$\overline\$ b8 13 g5 \$\overline\$ d5 14 \$\overline\$ e7 15 h4 and White's position is preferable (Pytel-Pokojowczyk, Poland 1971);

(a22) 11...e5 12 &g2 exd4 13 exd4 \blacksquare b8 14 \blacksquare e2+ &e7 15 g5 Oh5 16 Od5 Ob6 (E.Vladimirov-Bagirov, Yerevan 1982), when the double exchange on e7 gives White slightly the better ending;

(a23) 11...c5 12 兔g2 cxd4 13 exd4 對b6 14 0-0 兔d6 15 d5! e5 16 g5 わち 17 ②e4 with advantage to White (Pinter-Forintos, Hungary 1981);

(a24) 11...c6 12 &g2 &c7 13 0–0 &c7 14 f4 \bigtriangleup b6 15 g5 \bigtriangleup fd7 (15... \boxdot fd5 16 e4!) 16 &g4 0–0–0 (relatively best; 16...0–0 is more than dangerous in view of 17 h4 followed by h4-h5) 17 \blacksquare b1 bbs 18 b4! with active play for White on the queenside (Kasparov-Petrosian, Tilburg 1981);

(a3) 11 @e2 c5 12 d5 exd5 13 @xd5@e5 14 @a4 + @c6 15 @xf6 + @xf6 16 @e4 + @e5 17 @xe5 + @xe5 18 @d2with some endgame advantage for White (Bondarevsky-Alatortsev, 15th USSR Ch., Moscow 1947); (a4) 11 @f3 \equiv b8 12 &d2 c5 13 0-0-0 b5 14 &e2 cxd4 15 exd4 \bigtriangleup b6 16 sb1 cfd5 17 &d3 \Huge{c} xc3+ 18 &xc3 \Huge{c} d5 19 &e4 &e7 20 &d2 @d7?! 21 h4! when White stands better (Larsen-Speelman, Hastings 1990/1), since it is unfavourable to take the h4 pawn: 21... \blacksquare xh4? 22 \blacksquare xh4 &xh4 23 \blacksquare h1, or 21...&xh4 22 \blacksquare xh4 \blacksquare xh4 23 \blacksquare g3 \blacksquare d8 24 &xd5 exd5 25 &g5! (Larsen).

(b) 9 h4!? (instead of the traditional 9 ②e5) is an interesting possibility:



(a) 9... 2xg4? loses to 10 h5 \$f5 11 e4, and 9... 2e4 is strongly met by 10 2d2;

(b) 9... 2b4 10 h5 2e4 11 g5 2d5 12 2d2 2xc3 13 bxc3, with a complicated position where White has better chances (Balashov-Kupreichik, USSR 1967).

8 &e2 \checkmark c6 9 g4 (Black also has no problems after 9 a3 &d6 10 e4 &xf3 11 &xf3 e5 12 d5 \checkmark d4 13 &e3 &c5, Milev-Smyslov, Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964) 9...&g6 10 \checkmark h4 &e4 11 f3 &d6! 12 \Leftrightarrow f2 \checkmark d5 13 \checkmark g2 &g6. White's kingside resembles an ancient 'tabia', and Black stands better (Panno-Rossetto, Mar del Plata 1965).

8 2d2 2c6 9 2da 5 10 2d3 c5 11 dxc5 2xc5 12 2de 2e7 13 2c3 2xe4 14 2xe4 2f6. The game is equal (Boleslavsky-Smyslov, USSR 1959). 8 a4 2c6 is worth considering:

(a) 9 兔e2 兔d6 10 0-0 0-0 11 b3 響e7 12 兔b2 單fd8 (after 13 全e5 兔xe2 14 ②xc6 響e8!? or 14...bxc6 15 豐xe2 Idb8 both sides have chances) 13 ②d2 13...兔g6 with a double-edged position (Kovacevic-Marjanovic, Novi Sad 1984);

(b) 9 0–0 \pounds d6 10 Ψ e2 0–0 11 Ξ d1 and White has the better prospects (Agzamov-Reyes, Lima 1985).

8 ... 2c6 Black prepares ...e6-e5. 8...c5 is possible:



(a) 9 dxc5 螢xd1 10 罩xd1, and the exchanging operation promises White some activity:

(a1) 10....全xf3 11 gxf3 全xc5 12 b3 ②bd7 13 f4 堂e7 (more accurate is 13....重c8 and only then堂e7, which hampers the manoeuvre 鱼f1-g2) 14 鱼f1 里ac8 15 鱼g2 鱼b4 16 ②e2, and the two bishops give White the better chances (Belyavsky-Romanishin, 46th USSR Ch., Tbilisi 1978);

(a2) 10... \pounds xc5 11 g4 \pounds g6 12 \pounds e5 \pounds bd7 13 \pounds xg6 hxg6 14 g5 \blacksquare h4 15 \pounds d3! (stronger than 15 gxf6 \blacksquare xc4 16 fxg7 \pounds e7 17 e4 f6 18 \pounds g2 \blacksquare g8 19 \pounds h6 \pounds e5 when Black stands better, A.Petrosian-Bronstein, Rostov-on-Don 1980) 15... \pounds g8 16 \pounds f1 \blacksquare c8 17 \pounds g2 \blacksquare c7 18 \pounds e4 with a sharp game and slightly the better prospects for White (Magerramov-Vorotnikov, Beltsy 1979).

(b) 9 \$e2, and now:

(b1) 9...之c6 10 之e5 오xe2 11 豐xe2 ②xe5 (quieter is 11...宣c8 12 眞d1 cxd4 13 ②xc6 簋xc6 14 簋xd4 全d6 15 全d2 0-0 16 眞d1 螢c7 17 全e1 with a slight initiative for White, Browne-Romanishin, Amsterdam 1978) 12 dxe5 ②d7 13 f4 with chances of a kingside attack for White, Podgaets-Bagirov, 37th USSR Ch., Moscow 1969);

(b2) 9...cxd4 10 公xd4 皇xe2 11 響xe2 ②bd7 12 e4 with the more active position for White.

8...公bd7 9 e4 c5 (9...b5 10 皇e2 b4 comes into consideration) 10 e5 cxd4 11 谢xd4 公b6 12 斷f4 公xc4 13 exf6 皇xf3 14 谢xf3, and in Spassky-Mnatsakanian (USSR Ch. ½-Final 1958) Black ended up in a difficult position.

9 ≜.e2 Other continuations: 9 ⊯e2:



(a) 9...b5 10 单d3 b4 11 ④e4 斷d5 is very strongly met by 12 ④xf6+ gxf6 13 e4 单xf3 14 斷xf3 斷xd4 15 e5!;

(b) 9...2d6 10 g4 (or 10 Ξ d1 0–0 11 g4 b5 12 2d3 2g6 13 2xg6 hxg6 14 e4 2d7 15 2g5 f6 16 2e3 with advantage to White, Kapengut-Zakharov, USSR 1964) 10...2g6 11 e4 2d7 (if 11...e5 12 dxe5 2xe5 13 2xe5 2xe5 14 f4 2d4+ 15 2g2 h5 16 Id1, but 11...2b4 is possible) 12 Id1 0-0 13 e5 2b4 14 d5! with advantage to White (Kholmov-Sajtar, Bucharest 1962);

(c) 9...2a5 10 2d3 c5 11 2d1 2c712 dxc5 2xc5 13 2d2 2c6 14 2ac12e7 15 2e4 with the more active position (Pollak-Kupreichik, Holland 1966).

9 Iel 2d6 10 e4 e5 11 g4 2g6 (the sacrifice 11...2xg4 12 hxg4 2xg4 is unclear) 12 d5 2b8 13 2f1 2bd7 14 2d2 h5 with chances for both sides (Chukaev-Maryasin, Moscow 1972).

9 b3 2 d6 10 2 b2 0-0 11 2 c2 (or 11 Ic1 e5) 11...Ie8 12 Ic1 We7 13 2 e5 2 xe2 14 2 xc6 2 xd1 15 2 xe7+ 2 xe7 16 Ifxd1 c6 led to an equal ending (Bronstein-Stein, 31st USSR Ch., Leningrad 1963).

... 单d6

Gligoric-Andric (Belgrade 1962) went 9...全g6 10 ②h4 全e7 11 ②xg6 hxg6 12 單b3 單b8 13 單d1 with somewhat the better prospects for White.

10 b3

9

Other possibilities:

10 a3 0-0 (not 10...e5? 11 오xe5 오xe2 12 오xc6) 11 b4:



(a) 11.... ₩e7 (a natural development of the queen, which, however, does not assist ...e6-e5) 12 2b2 Zad8 (12...e5? 13 2xe5) 13 II cl h6 14 b5 2b8 15 II b3 2bd7 (15...e5? again does not work in view of 16 dxe5 2xe5 17 2xe5 2xe2 18 2d6 and White wins) 16 If d1 2g6 17 a4 a5 18 2b1 with the idea of playing the knight to c4. White stands better (Geller-Zakharov, 31st USSR Ch., Leningrad 1963);

(b) 11...@e8 12 b5 (or 12 @b2 e5 13 d5 @a7 14 e4 @xf3 15 @xf3 a5 16 bxa5 @b5 with an equal game, Voiculescu-Boljovcic, Hamburg 1965) 12...axb5 13 @xb5 @a5 (or 13...@b814 g4 @g6 15 @h4 @e7 16 @xg6 hxg6 17 @b2 @a5 18 @c1 c6 19 @c3 @d8with equal chances, Uhlmann-Emma, Mar del Plata 1966) 14 a4 @b8 15 @b2@d8 16 @d2 @g6 17 @c3 @e7 18 @b3@xb3 19 @xb3 @e4. The game is equal (Minev-Matulovic, Halle 1967).

10 ②g5 兔xe2 11 鄧xe2 0-0 12 f4 鄧e7 13 兔d2 單fd8 14 單ac1 兔b4 with an equal game (Golombek-Sliwa, Moscow Olympiad 1956).

10 De5 2xe2 11 Dxc6 2xd1 12 Dxd8 2xe2 13 Dxe2 IXd8 leads to complete equality (Sokolsky-Ragozin, Moscow 1947).

10 ... 0-0

11 ≜b2 ₩e8



(a1) 13... 鱼xe2 14 對xe2 鱼a3 (14... e5 15 d5 favours White, Uhlmann-W.Schmidt, Polanica Zdroj 1967) 15 鱼xa3 對xa3 16 包de4 包xe4 17 包xe4 with the better prospects for White (Antoshin-Bukal, Sarajevo 1970);

(a2) 13... 2g6 was played in Yusupov-Timman (Sarajevo 1984), where 14 2c4 e5! 15 2xd6 (15 d5 is dubious in view of 15... 2b4, Andersson-Marjanovic, Reggio Emilia 1985/6; Marjanovic recommends 15 dxe5) 15...exd4 (15... cxd6 16 d5 favours White) 16 2xb7 dxc3 17 2xd8 Ixd8 18 2xc3 Ixd1 19 Ifxd1 h6 20 2xa6 led to a complicated, double-edged position;

(b) 12 e4 &xi 13 &xi 13 &xf 13 add (Axelson-Alekhine, Örebro 1935) or 13... If d8 14 &ae2 e5 15 d5 &a7 16 &ai 3 &ai 5 (Suarez-Lebredo, Cienfuegos 1981) with roughly equal chances;

(c) 12 ②e5 ④xe2 13 ②xc6 does not give White anything after 13...避e8! 14 避xe2 避xc6 15 罩ac1 ②e4 (Paunovic-Lalic, Yugoslavia 1983);

12 2d2 \$g6

This is more favourable than 12... $\pounds xe2$ 13 $\forall xe2$ e5 14 d5, when:

(a) the tempting 14... 创b4 is strongly met by 15 ①c4! ②bxd5 16 ②xd5 ②xd5 17 單fd1 豐e6 18 ②xd6 豐xd6 (White also has the better ending after 18...cxd6 19 徵c4 followed by 20 徵xe6 and 21 互xd6) 19 徵c4 ②b6 20 徵e4 徵e6 21 徵xb7 with a clear advantage (Najdorf-Ivkov, Santa Monica 1966);

(b) 14... 2e7 15 e4 2d7 16 ac1, and White's position is preferable (Reshevsky-Barczay, Switzerland 1967).

13 Dc4 2b4

White's chances are also better after 13... 全e7 14 全行 單d8 15 豐e2 (Shereshevsky-Kupreichik, Minsk 1972).

Marovic-Ivkov (Amsterdam 1968) now continued 14 全行 星d8 15 全xc6 響xc6 16 包e5 響e8 17 包xg6 hxg6 with an equal game.

White should not have relieved the tension in a position where the opponent was cramped. With 15 Ic1 he would have retained the initiative.

7.123 (1 d4 d5 2 c4	dxc4 3 包f3 包f6 4
e3 2g4 5 2xc4 e6 6	5 h3 皇h5 7 ②c3)

Øc6

7



8 2e2 2d6 9 0-0 0-0 10 b3, and:

(a) 10...a6 11 金b2 避e7 12 包e5 (or 12 a3 里ad8 13 包h4 兔xe2 14 豐xe2 包d5 15 包xd5 豐xh4 16 包c3 e5, Van Seeters-Dückstein, Nice Olympiad 1974) 12...兔xe2 13 包xc6 兔xd1 14 2xe7+ فيxe7 المتعامة المتعامة المتعامة المتعامة المتعامة المتعامة المتعامة المتعامة (Krogius-Matulovic, Sochi 1964);

(b) 10... 20d5 11 2 b2 2 xc3 12 2 xc3 響 7 13 2 d2 2 xc2 14 響 xc2 2 b4 with an equal position (Filip-Antoshin, Zagreb 1965).

8 Wa4 오xf3 9 gxf3 요e7 10 오b5 0-0!? 11 오xc6 bxc6 12 Wxc6 置b8 13 a3 置b6 14 Wc4 Wd7. For the sacrificed pawn Black has definite compensation (Kapu-Barczay, Hungary 1964).

8 \pm b5! (I recommended this move in 1965) 8... \pm d6 9 e4 \pm d7 10 \pm e3 0–0 11 e5 \pm e7 12 \pm e2 \pm b4?! (Kotov suggests 12... \pm b6, although even then White stands better) 13 a3 \pm d5 14 \pm xd5 exd5 15 \pm b3 with advantage to White (Shamkovich-Ghitescu, Moscow 1969).

7.13 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乞f3 乞f6 4 e3 皇g4 5 皇xc4 e6)

6 Dc3

Compared with the variation 6 h3 2h5 7 2c3, it would appear that here White is no longer able to drive back the bishop from g4 and that therefore Black has greater freedom of action. However, in certain cases the position of the bishop at g4 has its drawbacks.

6 ... ⊘bd7 Other possibilities:

6...c5 is weak in view of 7 ₩a4+ 2bd7 8 2e5.

6... 20c6 7 205 204 (compare this with variation 7.123; with the inclusion of h2-h3 and ... 20h5 White could advantageously continue g2-g4, 20e5 and Wa4, whereas here if 8 h3 Black exchanges on f3) 8 Wa4 2xf3 9 gxf3 Wd6 10 20d2 0-0 11 a3 2xc3 12 2xc3 20d5. This position was reached from another variation in Yakin-Boleslavsky (Moscow 1964). Black has a sound position.
6...a6:



After 7 h3 $\pounds xf3$ 8 $\oiint xf3$ $\pounds c6$ (this position can also be reached by transposition in the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 $\pounds f3$ a6 4 e3 $\pounds g4$ 5 $\pounds xc4$ e6) White has two plans:

(a) 9 0-0 호d6 10 單d1 0-0 11 b3 智e8 (11...e5 12 公d5) 12 호b2 單b8 13 ②e4 ②xe4 14 豐xe4, when his position is preferable (Farago-Kierzek, Dortmund 1978);

(b) 9 \$d2 \$d6 10 0-0-0 0-0 11 g4 is sharper with attacking chances (Pachman-Lundin, Leipzig Olympiad 1960).

7 0-0

Or 7 e4 2b4 (in contrast to variation 7.121. Black cannot reply 7 ... e5? on account of 8 \b3!) 8 e5 \Dd5 (8...\De4 is weak in view of 9 Wb3 \$xf3 10 gxf3, and if 10 ... Wh4 11 2e3 2xc3+ 12 bxc3 ②g5 13 ¥xb7 0-0 14 f4 ②b6 15 单b3. when White is a pawn up with an excelposition, Lilienthal-Bokuchava, lent USSR 1965) 9 2d2 (9 Wb3 c5) 9... \$xc3 (9...€7b6 10 \$d3 0-0 11 a3 \$h5 15 ④h2 \$g5 16 0-0 \$xd2 17 White, ₩xd2 favours Lilienthal-Gurgenidze, USSR 1964) 10 bxc3 0-0 11 0-0 c5 with roughly equal chances (Korchnoi-Matanovic, USSR v. Yugoslavia 1972).

If $7 \& e2 \& d6 \ 8 \ e4$, despite the loss of a tempo, Black can reply 8...&b4. Gligoric-Miles (Bugojno 1978) went 9 $\& g5 \ (9 \ e5 \ 2)d5 \ 10 \ 2053 \ c5) \ 9...h6$ (9...c5 10 e5!) 10 $\& xf6 \& xc3+11 \ bxc3$ $\& xf6 \ 12 \& e5 \& xe2 \ 13 \ 20x6 \ 12 \ 0-0 \ 14$ 0-0 c5 with an equal position. For the development of the bishop at b4 with the inclusion of h2-h3 and ...& h5, cf. section 7.121 (p.131).



7... 2d6 8 e4 e5 9 dxe5 2xe5 10 2e2, and play develops in analogy with the variation on p.133, with an insignificant difference – the pawn is at h2.

7....2b6 is also acceptable: 8 2e2 2e7 9 a4 a6 10 2e5 2xe2 11 2xe2 c5 12 dxc5 2xc5 13 2d3 2e7 14 e4 0-0 15 Id1 Ic8 16 2f4 2e8 with a draw (Donner-Bronstein, Beverwijk 1963).

7.14 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 包f3 包f6 4 e3 皇g4 5 皇xc4 e6)

6 0--0 a6

6... ②bd7 7 兔e2 兔d6 8 ②bd2 0-0 9 ②c4 兔e7 10 b3 c5 11 兔b2 星c8 12 星c1 a6 with an equal position (Kavalek-Miles, Tilburg 1977).

6.... 2 c6 7 2 b5 2 d6 8 2 bd2 0-0 9 2 xc6 bxc6 10 ₩c2 ₩e8 11 e4 2 f4 12 265 2xe5 13 dxe5 2d7 14 f3 2h5 15 2c4, and the weakness of the isolated pawns and the out of play bishop at h5 give White the advantage (Averbakh-Damianovic, Hamburg 1965).

6...c5 7 24+2bd7 8 2e5 592xd7 2xd7 10 d5 e5 11 e4 with advantage to White (Vistaneckis-Zilber, Riga 1963).



7 **營e2** (7 **營**b3 b5) 7... ④c6 (Black's plan is to hinder e3-e4, and when this move is nevertheless made, to be able to reply ... e6-e5; the alternative is 7... c5) 8 Id1 皇d6 9 h3 皇h5 10 e4 皇xf3 11 ₩xf3 e5 12 ₩g3 (if 12 d5 包d4 13 ₩d3 b5 14 2b3 2d7 Black has a good game) 12... We7 13 d5 2 d4 14 2 c3. This position was reached in Korchnoi-Spassky (27th USSR Ch., Leningrad 1960). Instead of 14...g6, which allowed White to gain a clear advantage by 15 \$g5!, Black had several other possibilities: 14...b5 15 2d3 b4 16 De2 ②xe4 17 ₩xg7 ②xe2+ 18 \$\overline\$xe2 \nother f6 with roughly equal chances, 14... Ig8, and finally, the pawn sacrifice 14 ... 0-0-0 15 Wg7 Ing8 16 Wh6 Ig6.

7 **2**e2, and now:

(a) 7... 2 c6 8 b3 全e7 9 全b2 0-0 10 2 bd2 (Osnos-Bronstein, Moscow 1967), when 10... 包a7 lost time, and after 11 包e5 盒xe2 12 豐xe2 包d7 13 耳fd1 White gained the better game;

(b) 7...c5 (or 7...2bd7) is more logical: 8 h3 ≜h5 9 2bd2 2c6 10 dxc5 ≜xc5 11 a3 0-0 12 b4 ≜a7 13 ≜b2 ₩e7 with equal chances.

7 b4 is interesting, with the aim of preventing(7-c5, e.g. 7... 2)bd7 (7... 2xb4 8 Ub3) 8 a3 2d6 9 2b2 Ue7 102bd2 e5 11 Uc2 0-0 12 dxe5 2xe5 132xe5 2xe5 14 Iae1. White has a minimal advantage (Fairhurst-Dückstein, Moscow Olympiad 1956).

7.15 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 \$g4 5 \$xc4 e6)



6 ... ⊘bd7

6...a6 7 **W**b3 b5 leads to a position from the Alekhine Variation.

7 b3

If 7 **b**3, and now:

(a) 7... 2b6 (the natural reply) 8 2e5 2h5 9 0-0 2d6 10 a4 0-0 with roughly equal chances (I.Ivanov-Lerner, USSR 1979);

(b) 7...里b8 8 0-0 c6 9 包e5 包xe5 10 dxe5 包d7 11 單c3 b5 12 单b3 單b6 13 2e4 c5 14 a4!? b4 15 2e4 c5 16 a52e4 c5 14 a4!? b4 15 2e4 c5 16 a52e5 c7 17 2e4+, when Black can avoid the immediate danger by 17...2c6, although White's pressure would seem to compensate for the sacrificed pawn (Aronson-Klaman, Leningrad 1963).

Or 7 0-0 &e7 (if 7...c5 8 e4 2b6with a good game for Black) 8 b3 c5 9 &e2 0-0 10 &b2 \blacksquare c8 11 \blacksquare c1 cxd4 12 \blacksquare xc8 \blacksquare xc8 13 2bxd4 &xe2 14 \blacksquare xe2 \blacksquare b8 15 \blacksquare c1 \blacksquare c8 16 \blacksquare xc8+ \blacksquare xc8 with an equal position (Petrosian-Spassky, 28th USSR Ch., Moscow 1961).

Botvinnik-Smyslov (Monte Carlo 1968) continued 7...c5 8 dxc5 \$\overline{2}xc5 9 \$\overline{2}b2 0-0 10 0-0 \$\overline{7} 11 \$\overline{2}e2 \$\overline{1}d8 12\$ \$\overline{2}d4 \$\overline{2}xc2 13 \$\overline{7}xc2 \$\overline{2}a3 14 \$\overline{2}xc3 \$\overline{7}xc3 15 \$\overline{2}c4 \$\overline{7}a6 \$\overline{7}c1 \$\overline{7}c1 \$\overline{7}c2 \$\overline{7}c3 \$\verline{7}c3 \$\overline{7}c3 \$\overline{7}c3 \$\overline{7}c3 \$\overline{7}c3 \$\overline{7}c3 \$\verline{7}c3 \$\verline{7}c3 \$\verline{7}c3 \$\verline{7}c3 \$\verline{7}c3 \$\verli

7.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 \$\overline{g}_{g4})

5 h3

Before taking the c4 pawn, White drives back and then exchanges the bishop. In some lines the c4 pawn is taken by the knight after 265. 5 ... 2h5

5 ... 6 g4

This move can also be made after the development of the queen's knight: 6 20c3 e6 7 g4 2 g6 8 2 e5 2 bd7 9 2 xg6 hxg6 10 2 xc4 2 b6 11 2 f1 c5. Black's position is perfectly satisfactory (Van Seeters-Smyslov, Hastings 1962/3).

If 6 ②bd2 e6 7 g4 兔g6 8 ②e5 ②bd7 9 ③xg6 hxg6 10 兔g2 兔b4 (after 10...c6 11 ④xc4 ②b6 12 ④a5 螢d7 13 a3 兔d6 14 b4 Black ended up in a difficult position, V.Bykov-Birbrager, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1965) 11 ℃c c5 12 \\\\\xxc4 \\\xxb6 13 dxc5 ④xc5 with equal chances (V.Bykov-Nei, USSR 1963).

6 ... 皇g6 7 ②e5 ②bd7 Without waiting for 2xg6, Black can himself exchange his bishop: 7...2e4 8 f3 2xb1 9 2xb1:



(a) 9...e6 10 $\triangle xc4 \triangle bd7$ 11 $\triangle d2$ with the more promising position for White (Solntsev-Ravinsky, Moscow 1964);

(b) 9...2fd7 10 2xc4 2b6 11 Wc2 e6 12 2g2 28d7 13 b4 2d6 14 2a5 Eb8 15 f4 with the better chances for White (B.Vladimirov-Korolev, Leningrad 1964);

(c) 9... 2bd7 10 2xc4 e6 11 皇g2 b5!? 12 2a3 2d5 13 2xb5 量b8 14 單d3 獸h4+ 15 \$f1 (15 \$c2 is more accurate, and only if 15..., 3 16 \$f1) 15... \$b4 16 2c3 0-0 17 \$d2 a5. For the pawn Black has a definite initiative (Korelov-Korolev, Leningrad 1964).

7....e6:



(a) 8 ⁽²⁾xg6 hxg6 9 ⁽²⁾g2 (this leads by a slight transposition to a position typical of the main line) 9...c6 10 0-0 2bd7 11 2d2 2b6 12 We2 Wc7 13 f4 c5 14 Dxc4 cxd4 15 De5 d3 (15...dxe3 allows White a significant lead in development) 16 Wxd3 Zd8 17 Wb5+ ②fd7 18 皇d2. White has the advantage (Farago-Lebredo, Cienfuegos 1973);

(b) 8 @g2 @e4 9 f3 @xb1 10 \xb1. and now:

(b1) 10...b5. Nogueiras considers this to be dangerous in view of 11 f4 2d5 12 0-0 f6 13 f5 fxe5 14 fxe6 with an attack, but its correctness still has to be demonstrated if Black defends by 14...c6 15 邕f7 營c8 or 15 dxe5 皇c5 16 If7 ₩g5 (Flear):

(b2) $10... \odot d5 11 \odot xc4 (11 0-0!?)$ 11...皇b4+ 12 當e2 乞d7 13 a3 (Nogueiras-Hort, Lugano 1987), and here Black should have considered the sharp 13...b5 14 axb4 (or 14 De5 Dxe5 15 dxe5 @a5 16 \dd d3 c6 17 b4 @b6) 14...bxc4 15 賞c2 幻7b6 16 皇d2 賞d6 (Nogueiras).

۵xg6 8

Lputian-Fominykh (Rimavska Sobota 1991) went 8 2xc4 2b6 9 2c3 2xc4 10 2xc4 e6 11 f3 a6 12 e4 c5 13 \$e3 cxd4 14 ₩xd4 ₩xd4 15 \$xd4 Ec8 16 2b3 2c5 17 2xf6 gxf6 18 f4 f5 19 h4! h5 20 gxf5 exf5 21 e5, and due to the poor position of his bishop Black was in some difficulty.

> 8 hxg6 . . . Âg2 9

The start of a plan devised by Furman. After the fianchetto of his bishop, White intends to take the c4 pawn with his knight.

9 $\pounds xc4$ e6 leads to a position from variation 7.12 (p.129).



10 **幻d2**

c6

9

Furman-Geller (31st USSR Ch., Leningrad 1963) continued 10... 2b6 11 c2 e6 12 ⊙xc4 皇b4+ 13 ⊙d2 皇e7 (13... ad6!?) 14 a3 a5 (14...0-0 15 b4 ②bd7 was more cautious) 15 ②b3 豐c7 16 2d2 2bd7 17 2c1! 2d6 18 2e2 e5 19 dxe5 @xe5 20 f4 @d6 21 e4 @e7 22 e5 Ω h7 with advantage to White. By 23 0-0-0 he could have denied his opponent any counterplay.

After 10....e5 11 2xc4 Black has:

(a) 11...,) c7 12 dxe5 公xe5 13) d4 Dfd7 14 Dxe5 Dxe5 15 f4 Dd7 16 0-0 with some advantage to White (Forintos-Sapi, Hungary 1964);

(b) 11...exd4 12 \vert xd4 \vert b4+ and then ... 0–0 with roughly equal chances.

Bany-Marjanovic (Istanbul 1988) went 10.... #a5 11 0-0 Db6 12 b3!? (the quiet 12 \cong c2 e6 13 \cong xc4 \cong xc4 14 ₩xc4 ₩c7 15 f4 or 15 里d1 皇e7 16 b4 a6 17 a4 0-0 18 2d2 also promises White an advantage - Bany) 12...cxb3 13 ①xb3 ¥a4 14 ¥e2 e6 15 里b1. White has definite compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

Smyslov Variation 4...g6

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	ହାର	④f6
4	e3	g6



The idea of fianchettoing the bishop, and then transferring the knight via d7 to b6, belongs to Smyslov. Black does not prevent the opponent from setting up a pawn centre, but exerts piece pressure on it. The queen's bishop is usually developed at g4. Thus Black takes the play into positions typical of another opening – the Grünfeld Defence.

In certain variations the d4 pawn is attacked by ...c7-c5, and other set-ups, apart from the ...公d7-b6 manoeuvre, are also employed.

5 £xc4

5 2a3 looks artificial. After 5...2g7 6 2xc4 0-0 7 2c2 c5 8 0-0 2c6 9 dxc5 2e4 Black has a good position (Donner-Bouwmeester, Beverwijk 1958). If 5 #a4+ the simplest is 5...c6 6 #xc4 & g7. Also possible is 5...@fd7, but 5...@bd7 cannot be recommended, since White plays 6 &xc4, when 6... &g7? loses to 7 &xf7+.

7

Other continuations:

6 ②e5 (this activity is premature) 6...0-0 7 ₩b3 e6 8 0-0, and now:

(a) 8... 2fd7 9 f4 c5 10 **E**d1 cxd4 11 exd4 2c6! 12 2e3 (or 12 2xc6 bxc6) 12... 2a5, and Black's position is preferable (Padevsky-Mechkarov, Bulgaria 1954);

(b) 8....c5 9 dxc5 (after 9 \blacksquare d1 \clubsuit c7 10 Dc3 a6 11 a4 cxd4 12 exd4 Dc6 Black's position is slightly preferable) 9...De4 (or 9...Wc7 10 Dd3 Dbd7 11 Dd2 De4 12 Wa3 a5!) 10 Dd3 Dd7 11 Dc3 Ddxc5 12 Dxc5 Dxc5 13 \oiint{W} a3 b6, when the white queen is badly placed and Black has a comfortable game (Sazhaev-Tarasov, RSFSR Ch. ½-Final 1963).

To 6 rad + Black replies 6...c6 (but not 6...2d7? 7 rad b3, or 6...2d7? 7 2xf7 + 4xf7 8 2g5 + 4f6 9 <math>rad 1!), and if 7 rad b3 0-0 followed by ...2bd7-b6and ...2e6.

After 6 Wb3 0 - 0 7 a4 Oc6?! (Black should have prevented the advance of the a-pawn by 7...a5) 8 a5! Od7 9 Oc3e5 10 d5 Oe7 11 e4 $\oiint{B}h8$ 12 Ae3 h6 13 h4 f5 14 Og5! Of6 15 d6 White gained a great advantage in Makogonov-Kalashian (Moscow 1963).

6 Dc3:



(a) after 6...c5?! White has a choice of several alternatives:

(a1) the 'naïve' 7 dxc5 \Im a5 (7... \Im xd1+ 8 \Im xd1 \square bd7 9 \pounds b5 0-0 10 c6 bxc6 11 \pounds xc6 \blacksquare b8 is unclear -Black has a certain compensation for the pawn, Khodos-Tarasov, RSFSR Team Ch. 1962) 8 \Im a4+ \Im xa4 9 \square xa4 \square bd7 10 \square d2;

(a2) the strategic 7 d5, e.g. 7...\$f5 (for other moves, see below under a different move order) 8 0-0 0-0 9 **1**e1 (2)bd7 10 e4 (2)b6 11 \$f1 \$c8 12 \$e3 with the better game for White (Furman-Klaman, USSR 1960);

(b) after 6... 包fd7 some opening guides suggest 7 h3 包b6 8 单e2 0-0 9 e4 'with a strong defended centre and the better prospects for White', but in fact he can win immediately by 7 \$\overline{x}r7+! \$\overline{x}r7 8 \$\overline{x}g5+\$\overline{x}f6 9 \$\overline{x}ce4+, mating;

(c) 6...0-0, and now:

(c1) 7 e4 (7 0–0 transposes into the main line), when 7...2fd7 8 e5 c5 leads to complications favourable for White: 9 e6 2b6 10 exf7+ 2h8 11 2b3 c4 12 2c2 2c6 13 h4 (Cherepkov-Kholmov (Minsk 1961):

(c2) 7 h3, a prophylactic move:



(c21) 7...a6 8 a4 c5 9 d5 2 e8 10 e4 2 d6 11 2 b3 c4 12 2 c2 2 d7 13 0-0 b6 14 2 e3 2 b7 15 2 d4 f6 16 2 e2 2 h6 17 2 c3 2 c5 with chances for both sides (Shamkovich-Smyslov, 27th USSR Ch., Leningrad 1960);

(c22) 7... \pounds f5 8 We2 (8 Oh4 is also worth trying) 8...Oe4 9 0–0 Od7 10 \blacksquare d1 Odf6 11 \pounds d2 c6 12 \pounds e1 Oxc3 13 \pounds xc3 \blacksquare c8 14 \blacksquare ac1 Oe4 15 \pounds e1 Od6 16 \pounds b3 Wb6 (Bielicki-Smyslov, Mar del Plata 1962). If 17 Od2 Black equalises by 17...c5, but, as pointed out by R.Schwarz, White can play 17 \blacksquare c5! with the threat of 18 \pounds a5. Nevertheless, as also after 7...a6, White achieves little in this variation.

We should also mention the possibility of 6 b4.

0-0

6 Or 6....c5, and:

. . .

(a) here too Black has to reckon with 7 \forall a4+, to which the correct reply is 7...Dbd7 (7...Dfd7? 8 \$xf7+; 7... #d7 8 £xf7+);

(b) 7 d5 0-0 8 2 c3 2 e8 9 ₩e2 (P.Ivanov-Mechkarov, Bulgaria 1954, went 9 a4?! 2d6 10 \$a2 2a6 11 We2 2b4 12 2b1 2g4 13 h3 2xf3 14 Wxf3 Dc4 15 We2 Da5 with the initiative for Black) 9.... 2d6 10 2d3 (if 10 2b3 strong is 10...b5) 10...e5 11 e4, with somewhat the better prospects for White (Mechkarov).

White's main continuations are:

7 2c3 (8.1) 7 **₩e2 (8.2)** – p.155

Other possibilities:

7 h3:



(a) 7....c5, and now:

(a1) 8 2c3 cxd4 9 2xd4 2d7! 10 e4 Dc6 11 2e3 Dxd4 (or 11... Ic8) 12 2xd4 Ic8 and Black equalises;

(a2) 8 ¥e2 cxd4 9 exd4 边bd7 10 皇f4 2b6 11 皇b3 2bd5 12 皇e5 b6 13 2c3 \$b7 14 Hac1, and White's position is slightly preferable (Malich-Packroff, Weimar 1968);

(b) 7... 2c6 8 2c3 2d7 9 ₩e2 (cf. variation 8.13 for White's other possibilities) 9....2b6 10 2b3 a5 11 a4.

White has the more active position (Kondratiev-Taimanov, USSR 1952).

7 b3 c6 (7...c5!?) 8 2b2 2g4 9 ②bd2 ②bd7 10 h3 单f5 (10...单xf3 11 2xf3 2b6 12 2e2 2fd7 13 a4 favours White) 11 **I**e1 (11 ⁽²⁾h4!? – Matanovic) 11... ②b6 12 单f1 ②e4 13 ②xe4 皇xe4 14 20d2 皇f5 15 萬c1 萬c8 16 豐e2 萬c7 (16...c5 17 ②f3) 17 a4 单c8 18 单a3. White has the initiative (Karpov-Korchnoi, Candidates, Moscow 1974).

7 b4 c6 8 ₩e2 (8 \$b2!?) 8... 2bd7 9 නිc3 නිb6 10 2b3 නිbd5 11 නිxd5 cxd5 12 De5 2e6 with an equal game (Fuderer-Sandor, Yugoslavia-Hungary 1957).

8.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4
e3 g6 5 \$xc4 \$g7 6 0-0 0-0)

De3 Øोfd7 7

Smyslov's manoeuvre, which recalls ideas from the Grünfeld Defence (1 d4 包f6 2 c4 g6 3 包c3 d5 4 包f3 皇g7 5 ₩b3 dxc4 6 ₩xc4 0-0 7 e4 \$g4 8 \$e3 ②fd7).

7... ④c6 is possible:

(a) 8 e4 2g4 9 d5 2a5 10 2e2 c6 11 h3 \$xf3 12 \$xf3 cxd5 13 exd5 \$\overline{4}c8 with roughly equal chances (Fuchs-Smyslov, Leipzig Olympiad 1960);

(b) 8 h3 a6 9 e4 b5 10 \$b3 @d7 with chances for both sides (Milev-Smyslov, Moscow 1959);

(c) 8 d5 2a5 9 2e2 c6 10 dxc6 ②xc6 11 e4 (White can avoid the exchange by 11 Wa4) 11 ... Wxd1 12 Xxd1 h6 13 a3 \$e6 with an equal position (Porath-Stahlberg, Leipzig Olympiad 1960).

7... ②bd7 is less good. In Mititelu-Zita (Sofia 1957) after 8 e4 2b6 9 2e2 c6 10 \$f4 \$g4 11 h3 \$xf3 12 \$xf3 ₩d7 13 a4 Iad8 14 a5 2c8 15 ₩b3 ②e8 16 里fd1 e6 17 d5 Black did not manage to create counterplay.

7...c6 also does not promise equality. After 8 h3 \pounds f5 9 Og5 b5 10 \pounds b3 (if 10 \pounds xf7+ \blacksquare xf7 11 Wb3 We8 12 e4 Oxe4! both sides have chances) 10...h6 11 e4 \pounds c8 12 Of3 White stands better (Suba-Negulescu, Romania 1981).

After Black has castled, 7....c5 no longer entails tactical difficulties:



(a) 8 d5 \$\mathbf{g}_g4, and now:

(a1) 9 a4 a6 10 £e2 Dbd7 11 e4 \$xf3 12 \$xf3 De8 planning the blockading ... Dd6, with an equal position (Polugayevsky-Matulovic, Palma de Mallorca 1970);

(a2) 9 e4 ②bd7 10 兔e2 兔xf3 11 兔xf3, when Black's plan of activity on the queenside combined with the blockade of the e4 pawn proved unsuccessful: 11...a6 12 單e1 斷c7 13 兔g5 h6 14 兔h4 ④e5 15 兔e2 g5 16 兔g3 b5 17 兔f1 ②fd7 18 斷d2, with advantage to White (Taimanov-Portisch, Leningrad v. Hungary 1959);

(b) 8 dxc5, when Black has:

(b2) 8...響a5 9 包b5 包e4 10 響c2 a6 11 b4! 響xb4 12 響xe4;

(b3) 8...豐c7 (to neutralise 9 包b5), and if 9 豐b3 豐xc5 10 e4 包c6 11 皇e3 豐h5. If 7....a6 White has:

(a) $\$ \triangleq e^2 c^5 9 dxc^5 \textcircled{b} bd7 10 c6!$ bxc6 11 e4 with the better chances (Vera-Giardelli, Buenos Aires 1987);

(b) 8 e4 b5 9 \$b3 \$b7 (9...b4 10

②d5 ②xe4 11 螢e2 favours White) 10 e5 ②d5 11 盒g5 with the initiative (Vera).

We now consider:

8 ₩e2 (8.11)

8 e4 (8.12) - p.153

- 8 h3 (8.13) p.154
- Other possibilities:

8 a4 a5 9 e4 公b6 10 金b3 金g4 11 金e3 公c6 12 公b5 公b4 13 h3 金xf3 14 翬xf3. White's position is preferable (Korchnoi-Bronstein, Moscow v. Leningrad 1962).

8 2 2 2 b6 9 h3 a5 10 e4 a4 11 2 e3 2 c6 (11...c6 and ...2 e6 comes into consideration) 12 I c1 2 d7 13 d5 2 a5 14 2 d4 2 h6 15 I c2. White's centralised pieces give him the advantage (Gligoric-Westerinen, Havana 1967).

8 24 2b6 9 2b3 as (after 9...2c610 2d2?! as 11 as es! Black equalises, Razuvaev-Tal, Jurmala 1987) 10 at 2c6 (10...2f5 11 2c5) 11 2c5 2d512 e4 2db4 13 d5 b6 14 2e6! fxe6 15 dxc6 2xc6 16 2e3 2xd1 (16...2xb2? 17 2c2! 2xa1 18 2xc6) 17 2fxd12d8 (17...2xb2 is again bad in view of 18 2a2 and 19 2c2) 18 2d2 2f7 19 2ad1. Black's extra doubled pawn does not play any part. The chances are with White, all of whose pieces are actively placed (Portisch-Plater, Balatonfured 1958).

8 a3 2b69 2a2 2c6 10 h3 e5 11 d5 2be7 12 e4 with some advantage to White (Hodgson-Barua, Dhaka 1993).

8 b3 c5 (if 8...e5 9 \$ a3 is good) 9 \$ b2 2c6 (or 9...2b6 10 \$ e2 cxd4 11 2xd4 with somewhat the better chances for White) 10 d5 2ce5 11 2xe5 2xe5 (Skembris-Barua, Manila Olympiad 1992) 12 f4 2g4 (or 12...2xc4 13 bxc4) 13 Ie1. White's position is preferable (Skembris).

8.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 g6 5 \$xc4 \$g7 6 0-0 0-0 7
තිc3 තිfd7)

8 We2



8 ... 公b6 8....c5 9 d5 公b6 10 单b3 单g4 also comes into consideration.

<u>گ</u>b3 a5

We must also consider:

9

9.... 2c6 10 Id1, and now:

(a) 10...2a5 11 2c2 2e6 (Mühring-Lehman, Utrecht 1954), after which 12 d5 is strong, when 12...2xd5 13 2xd52xd5 loses to 14 e4 2c4 15 We1!, and 12...2xc3 13 dxe6 favours White;

(b) 10... 2d7 11 2e4 a5 12 a4 2f5 13 2c5 2d7 14 2d3 e6 15 2d2 2e7 16 Eac1, and White stands better (Goldenberg-Filip, Mar del Plata 1961);

(c) 10...a5 11 a3 \pounds d7 12 h3 a4 13 \pounds a2 e5 (Panno-Rossetto, Argentina 1954) with equal chances, but 12 \pounds e4! gives White the better game (Pachman);

ັ 9....皇g4 10 h3 皇xf3 11 谢xf3 纪ć6 12 單d1, and now:



(a) 12...豐C8 13 包e4 包a5 14 호c2 包ac4 15 包c5 e6 16 b3 包d6 17 息b2 包d7 18 包d3 with the better position for White (Golombek-Gligoric, Moscow Olympiad 1956);

(b) 12...e5 13 d5 2a5 14 2c2 2ac4 15 e4 2c7 16 a4 with the better chances for White (Mühring-Jauregui, Moscow Olympiad 1956);

(c) 12... 劉d7 13 ②e4 單ad8 14 ②c5 劉c8 15 호d2 ②d7 16 ②d3 e6 17 罩ac1 with advantage (Kholmov-Nezhmetdinov, 26th USSR Ch., Tbilisi 1959);

(d) 12...e6 13 2 a4 (even so, 13 2 e4 suggests itself) 13... 2 xa4 14 2 xa4 Wd6 15 2 d2 and White stands better (Taimanov-Ravisekar, Delhi 1982).

10 a4

White physically prevents the further advance of the a-pawn.

Also possible is 10 \blacksquare d1 a4 (after 10... \triangle c6 11 a3 a4 12 \triangle a2 \triangle d7 13 h3 \blacksquare c8 14 e4 e5 15 dxe5 \triangle xe5 16 \triangle f4 White stands better, V.Sokolov-Maric, Belgrade 1962) 11 \triangle c2 \triangle c6, and now:

(a) 12 a3 &d7 13 d5 &a5 14 e4 &e8 15 &f4 &bc4 16 &d3 e5! 17 dxe6 (17 &g3 &d6) 17...&xe6 18 &xc7 \blacksquare c8 19 &xa5 &xa5 20 &b5 &c4! 21 &xc4 &xc4, when Black exerted strong pressure on the opponent's queenside (Golombek-Smyslov, Budapest 1952); (b) 12 De4 comes into consideration, and if 12... 2g4 13 Dc5 (I.Polgar-Gheorghiu, Örebro 1966);

(c) 12 ②e5 ②xe5 13 dxe5 ¥e8 14 f4 兔e6 15 e4 ¥c6 16 兔e3 a3 17 兔b3 axb2 18 ¥xb2 公c4 with chances for both sides (Bolic-Gheorghiu, Vrnjacka Banja 1963).

10 a3 also comes into consideration, in order to keep the bishop on the a2-g8 diagonal without weakening the b4 square (we have already met this idea in the Sokolov-Maric game, earlier in this note).

10		Dc6
11	Id1	≗g4
12	h3	≜xf3
13	₩xf3	e6
14	≙d2	

Or 14 20e4 20d5 15 20d2 20cb4 16 20e1 with somewhat the better prospects for White (Prokhorovich-Seleznev, Moscow 1958)

14 ... We7

Or 14... \forall c8, and if 15 d5 exd5 16 \triangle xd5 \triangle xd5 17 \triangle xd5 \triangle e5 and then ...c7-c6 with equal chances.

15 Åel



This position was reached in Geller-Plater (Szczawno Zdroj 1957). Instead of 15... \triangle c8?, which after 16 d5! led to an advantage for White, 15... \blacksquare fd8 was correct, although even then 16 \blacksquare ac1 leaves White with slightly the better chances.

8.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 g6 5 \$xc4 \$g7 6 0-0 0-0 7
තිc3 තිfd7)

8 e4

After the advance of the e-pawn, the weakening of the d4 square may tell. A classic example of the implementation of Smyslov's plan is his game with Evans (Helsinki Olympiad 1952).

9 **2**b3 was later played here:

(b) 9... 2c6 10 d5 2a5 11 2c3 2ac4 12 We2 2xe3 13 Wxe3 e6 14 dxe6 2xe6 15 2xe6 fxe6 16 b3 Wf6 17 Eac1 c6 18 a4 with slightly the better chances (Lein-Toshkov, Saint John 1988).

> 9 ... \$\\$g4 10 \$\\$e3

Or 10 d5 c6 11 h3 &xf3 12 &xf3 cxd5 13 exd5 \bigtriangleup 8d7 14 g3 \bigtriangleup e5 with roughly equal chances (Unzicker-Gheorghiu, Hamburg 1965).

10 ... Dc6!

If White restricts the g7 bishop by 11 e5, after 11... Wd7 Black creates pressure on the d4 pawn.

11 ... \$xf3 Not 11...\$e5? 12 \$\Delta xe5 \$\Delta xe2 13 \$\Delta xf7, when White wins a pawn.

12 🔍 xf3

12 gxf3 2e5 13 2d4?! is strongly

met by 13...g5! By controlling the f4 and e5 squares, Black obtains excellent play (Klaman-Taimanov, USSR 1952). White should play 13 **Wb3** with pressure on the opponent's queenside.

If 13...c6 14 **W**b3! cxd5 (Terpugov-Smyslov, 19th USSR Ch., Moscow 1951) 15 exd5! with the better chances.



14 **£**f4!

It is not essential to defend the b2 pawn. After the timid 14 &c1 Black plays 14...c6 with a good position:

(a) 15 dxc6 Wxd1 16 Xxd1 bxc6 with a favourable ending;

(b) 15 對b3 was played in Evans-Smyslov: 15...cxd5 16 公xd5 (after 16 exd5 互C8 Black exerts pressure on the queenside; in particular, it is not apparent how the bishop at c1 can be developed) 16...公a5 17 對b5 (better 17 對d3) 17...公xd5 18 exd5 (if 18 對xd5 對b6 19 全e3 Black can boldly take the pawn -19...對xb2 20 互fe1 b6) 18...a6 19 對d3 互c8. Black has a lead in development, and the d5 pawn is a convenient target to attack.

(c) 15 \$xc4 is comparatively best.

14 ... c6

It is bad to take the pawn: 14... 公xb2? 15 對b3 盒xc3 16 對xc3 公2a4 17 對a5.

15 dxc6

Uhlmann-Gheorghiu (Havana Olympiad 1966) went 15 \$xc4 2xc4 16 We2 cxd5 17 2xd5 2xb2 18 \$g5 f6 19 \$f4 f5 20 \$\overline{Lable}\$ fxe4 21 \$\overline{Lable}\$ xe4, when White's attempts to exploit the position of the b2 knight were parried.

15 ... bxc6

The ending after 15... Ward 16 Eaxd1 bxc6 17 &c1 is slightly more pleasant for White, who has the two bishops.

This looks risky, but the move has not been refuted.

17 ₩xb2

To the cunning 17 全a6 Black should reply 17...②6c4! (but not 17...徵d7 18 a4! ②6c4 19 單a2 單ad8 20 全c1! with a winning position for White, Portisch-Gheorghiu, Havana Olympiad 1966), and attempts by White to 'surround' the knight at b2 are parried: 18 ②e2 ②e5! 19 單ab1 斷b6! 20 오xe5 오xe5 21 오c4 a5, and Black remains a pawn up (Portisch).

Now after 17... Da4 18 Dxa4 2xb2 19 Dxb2 Wd4 20 Dc4 Wxe4 21 2e3 Black has a queen and two pawns for three minor pieces, but the c6 pawn can be attacked by superior forces. Both sides have chances.

8.13 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 e3 g6 5 \$xc4 \$g7 6 0-0 0-0 7
තිc3 නිfd7)

8 h3

Before occupying the centre, White prevents $\dots 2g4$.

8 ... 2b6 After 8....c5 9 ₩e2 2c6 10 Id1 cxd4 11 exd4 a6 12 皇g5! h6 13 皇h4 g5 14 皇g3 ②f6 15 ②e5 e6 16 ②xc6 bxc6 17 皇e5 White gained the advantage in Ghitescu-F.Olafsson (Reykjavik 1970).



9 2b3 2c6, and now:

(a) 10 a4 a5 11 營e2 e5 12 d5 ②b4 13 e4 单d7 14 单g5 營b8 15 單fc1 ④c8 16 ②b5 c6 with chances for both sides (Malich-Soos, Havana Olympiad 1966);

(b) 10 a3 e5 11 d5 2a5 12 2c2 (or 12 2a2 2ac4!) 12...c6 13 e4 cxd5 14 exd5 2ac4 15 a4 2d6 16 a2 2f5with a roughly equal position (Farago-Georgiev, Albena 1983);

(c) 10 旦e1 e5 11 d5 包a5 12 e4 c6 13 全g5 斷d6 14 dxc6 斷xd1 15 旦axd1 bxc6, and here a draw was agreed in W.Schmidt-Radulov (Indonesia 1983).

9 **£e2**, when:

(a) 9... ②c6 10 b3 a5 11 堂a3 罩e8 12 IIC1 ②b4 13 堂b2 ②6d5 14 斷d2 b6 15 ②xd5 ③xd5 16 e4 ④f6 17 斷c2 堂b7 18 d5 with the initiative (Lukacs-Velikov, Vrnjacka Banja 1985);

(b) 9...a5 10 e4 a4 11 全e3 c6 12 習d2 全e6 13 全h6 全c4 14 全xg7 全xg7 15 置fe1 全xe2 16 置xe2 with the more active position for White (Alburt-Gutman, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984).

8.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4
e3 g6 5 \$xc4 \$g7 6 0-0 0-0)

7 ₩e2

Play can transpose into variation 8.1, but independent branches are also possible.

7 ... ②fd7 After 7...②c6 8 旦dl 皇g4 9 h3 兔xf3 10 徵xf3 e5 11 ②c3 exd4 12 exd4 ②xd4 13 螢xb7 c5 14 兔e3 ②d7 15 旦ac1 ②b6 16 兔a6 the c5 pawn, defending the outpost, may come under attack. White stands better (Shersher-Kholmov, Moscow 1961).

> 8 Id1 Db6 9 \$b3



9....全g4 10 h3 全xf3 11 豐xf3 c6 (11.... ②c6 12 公c3 e5 13 d5 ④a5 leads to a position from Mühring-Jauregui, p.152) 12 ④d2 e6 13 ②e4 ④8d7 14 全d2 ④d5 15 罩ac1 with some initiative for White (Stahlberg-Bronstein, Moscow 1956).

9 Winawer Variation:4... â e6 and other 4th moves

 1
 d4
 d5

 2
 c4
 dxc4

 3
 2/f3
 2/f6

 4
 e3

In this chapter we will consider: 4... ♠e6 (9.1) 4... a6 (9.2) - p.158 4... ♠bd7 (9.3) - p.159 4... b5?! (9.4) - p.159

9.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 创f3 创f6 4 e3)

4 ... **≜**e6



This strange looking move was employed by Winawer in the 1896 Nürnberg tournament. In fact it is not so easy to refute. More recently it was successfully upheld by Keres and Flohr.

Black wants to exchange bishops on c4 (a logical solution to one of the main problems of the Queen's Gambit!). In some lines the bishop goes to d5. White can reply: 5 0c3 (9.11) 5 0bd2 (9.12) - p.157 5 0a3 (9.13) - p.158If 5 0g5 Black replies 5... 0d5, when maly Vyclouzyl (Prague 1959) contin-

Trmal-Vyslouzyl (Prague 1959) continued 6 $2c_3$ h6 7 e4 hxg5 8 exd5 2xd5 9 2xg5 2xc3 10 bxc3 11 2g4 e6 12 $2c_2$ 2d7 13 2f3 2g3 14 0-0 c6 15 2ab1 2d6 16 h4 $2c_7$ 17 2fe1 2b6. White has two bishops, good development and the initiative, but Black is a pawn up with no weaknesses.

9.11	(1	d4	d5	2	c4	dxc4	3	Øß	幻f 6
4 e3	<u>À</u> e	6).							

5 Dc3 c6

Other continuations:

5...&d5 6 &xd5 (after 6 &c2 &xf3 7gxf3 e6 8 &xc4 c5 the chances are equal, but 6 &c2e5 is also promising, preparing to occupy the centre by f2-f3 and e3-e4) 6...&xd5 7 &c2 e6 8 &xc4&b4+. Now 9 &d2 allows Black to equalise by 9...&xd2+ 10 &xd2 &a5+, but 9 &c2! retains the initiative.

5...g6 6 25 2 d5 7 e4 h6 8 exd5 (the simple 8 2xd5 hxg5 9 2c3 is also good) 8...hxg5 9 2xc4 g4 10 2b3 with the better position for White (Suetin-Fazekas, Debrecen 1961).

5...c5 is strongly met by 6 2g5 cxd4 7 2xe6 fxe6 8 exd4 2c6 9 2e3! 2d5 10 2xc4 with advantage to White.

5...a6 also fails to equalise: 6 包g5 全d5 7 e4 h6 8 包xd5 hxg5 9 包xf6+ exf6 10 全xc4 包c6 11 全e3 單d7 12 a3

立d6 13 g3 空f8 14 戦c2 互e8 15 0-0-0, and Black experiences difficulties (Petkevich-Kupreichik, USSR 1970);



White must act energetically, or Black may well hold on to his c4 pawn.

After 6 262 20bd7 7 205 255 8 2xc4 e6 9 e4 206 Black solved his opening problems in Ojanen-Keres (Finland v. Estonia 1966). His forces are well placed, the white centre comes under siege, and the knight at g5, so powerful in other lines, is out of play.

If 6 🖾 g5, then:

(a) 6... 单d5 (if 6... b5 7 公xe6 fxe6 8 a4) 7 e4 h6 8 exd5 hxg5 9 dxc6 公xc6 10 d5 ②e5 11 单xg5 暫b6 12 单e3! 暫xb2 13 单d4 ②d3+ 14 单xd3 cxd3 15 0-0 斷b4 16 獸xd3 a6 17 單fe1 with an overwhelming positional advantage (Timman-Ljubojevic, Hilversum 1987);

(b) 6...@d6 7 @xe6 @xe6 8 @e2@bd7 (8...b5 9 a4) 9 @xc4 @xc4 10 @xc4 e5 11 0-0 exd4 12 exd4 @b6 13@e1+ @e7 14 b3 @f8 (Boleslavsky-Kupreichik, USSR 1971) 15 @g5, maintaining some initiative;

(c) 6... 金g4 7 f3 堂h5 is the only way to avoid the exchange on e6, but after 8 堂xc4 e6 9 e4 公bd7 10 堂e3 堂e7 (Golz-Hennings, East Germany 1967) 11 徵d2 (more vigorous is 11 오xe6 fxe6 12 ②xe6 徵b6 13 ③xg7+ 全f7 14 ③xh5 ③xh5 15 變e2 or 14...變xb2 15 ③a4 變xg2 16 變b3+ 全f8 17 ②g3 – Maric) 11...h6 12 ④h3 and ④f4 White has the advantage.

6 a4 g6 7 e4 Da6 8 Dg5 Dc7 9 e5 Dfd5 10 Dxe6 Dxe6 11 2xc4 Dec7 12 h4! with good attacking chances (Pachman-Gerink, Czechoslovakia 1958).

5 ⊘bd2 c5 5...\$d5 6 ₩c2! and e3-e4 favours White (Miles-Larsen, Linares 1983).



6 \pounds xc4 \pounds xc4 7 \pounds xc4 2c6 8 0–0 (after 8 \pounds ce5 e6 9 \pounds xc6 bxc6 10 \blacksquare a4 White has a slight initiative, Florian-Klüger, Balatonfured 1959) 8...cxd4 9 exd4 e6 10 \blacksquare b3 \blacksquare d7 11 \pounds g5 \pounds e7 12 \pounds xf6! \pounds xf6 13 d5! exd5 14 \blacksquare fe1+ \pounds e7 (14... \pounds f8 15 \pounds ce5! favours White, Bobotsov-Keres, Bamberg 1968) 15 \pounds ce5, and Black is in some difficulties.

6 2g5, and now:

(a) 6... 1 d7. Flohr rejected this because of 7 2 xc4, when 8 2 e5 is threatened, but after 7... cxd4 8 exd4 (8

②e5? 響a5+) 8...e6 9 ②e5 Black is rescued by 9... ⊉b4+ 10 堂d2 皇xd2+ 11 響xd2 0-0 with an equal game;

(b) 6... 2d5 7 e4 h6 8 exd5 hxg5:

(b1) 9 ①xc4 徵xd5 10 dxc5 螢xc5 11 요e3 螢c7 with a good position (Szilagyi-Flohr (Marianske Lazne 1956);

(b2) 9 \pounds xc4! cxd4 10 \pounds b5+ \triangle bd7 11 \triangle c4 a6 (if 11... \triangle xd5 12 \pounds xg5 with the threat of 13 \triangle d6+) 12 We2 Wb8 (13 \triangle d6 mate was threatened) 13 \pounds xd7+ \triangle xd7 14 \pounds xg5 with advantage.

6 dxc5 can also be considered.

9.13	(1	d4	d5	2	c4	dxc4	3	②f3	
4 e3	٤	e6)							

5 Da3



5 ... c5 5...\$\\$d5 is also acceptable, e.g. 6 2xc4 e6 7 a3 (or 7 \$\$d3 \$\$e7 8 0-0 0-09 \$\$e2 \$\$e4 10 \$\$xe4 \$\$2xe4 11 \$\$c2\$\$d5 with an equal position, Vidmar-Schlechter, San Sebastian 1911) 7...c5 8dxc5 \$\$xc5 9 b4 \$\$e7 10 \$\$b2 \$\$c6 withequal chances (Tolush-Klaman, USSRCh. \$\$2-Final 1957).

6 ②xc4

6 \$xc4 \$xc4 7 ∑xc4 ∑c6 transposes into Florian-Klüger (p.157).

... ᡚc6 \$e2

6

After 7 Ba4 cxd4 8 Dce5 Ld5(possible is 8...Ld7 9 Dxd7 Dxd7 10 Dxd4 Dxd4 11 Bxd4 e5 12 Ba4 Bb6with an equal game, Van Scheltinga, Beverwijk 1960) 9 Lb5 a6 10 Lxc6+bxc6 11 exd4 Dd7! (the pawn cannot be taken – 12 Dxc6? Db6) Black has a sound position (Antoshin-Klaman, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1957).

Now after 7...g6 8 0-0 cxd4 9 exd4 全g7 10 ②cc5 0-0 11 ②xc6 bxc6 12 響a4 全d5 13 全f4 暫b6 the chances are equal (Sherwin-Berliner, USA 1961).



Now the variation acquires independent significance, whereas **5...e6** and ...c7-c5 leads to classical set-ups.

6	≜d3	⊈b7
7	a4	b4



8 0-0 e6 9 變e2 c5 10 dxc5 皇xc5 11 国目 ②bd7 12 ②bd2 0-0 13 ②b3 皇e7 14 e4 豐c7 15 皇g5 and White stands better (Tarasov-Drozd, USSR 1961).

8 \triangle bd2 e6 (if 8...c5 9 e4 cxd4 10 e5 intending e5-e6) 9 e4 c5 10 e5 \triangle d5 11 \triangle e4 cxd4 12 &g5 $extsf{bd7}$ (12...f6 13 exf6 gxf6 14 \triangle e5! h5 15 &e2, while 12... $extsf{bd2}$ as strongly met by 13 \triangle fd2 – Nenashev) 13 0–0 \triangle c6 (Nenashev-Adianto, Kuala Lumpur 1993). After 14 \mathbb{Z} c1 White has the more promising position.

9.3 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ∅f3 ∅f6 4 e3)

... ②bd7

A relatively new move, with the idea of playing the queen's knight to b6 and d5.

5	≜xc4	②b6
6	\$£b3	c6
7	De3	②bd5



8 h3 &f5 9 We2 e6 10 De5 &b4 (10...&d6 11 g4 is good for White) 11 &d2 Wa5 12 0–0! White stands better. The acceptance of the pawn sacrifice – 12...Dxc3 13 bxc3 &xc3 14 Dc4 Wb4 15 &xc3 Wxc3 16 Dd6+ is clearly unfavourable for Black (Oll-Bellon, Dos Hermanas 1992).

8 0-0 \$£f5 9 Дe1 (or 9 ¥e2 e6 10 De5 and f2-f4) 9...e6 10 Dd2. White's position is preferable. 9.4 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 5f3 2f6 4 e3)

In Taimanov-Benedictsson (Reykjavik 1968) Black immediately parted with the pawn – 5...b4 6 \pounds xc4 e6. After 7 0–0 \pounds b7 8 \pounds bd2 \pounds bd7 9 e4! \pounds b6 (9... \pounds xe4 is strongly met by 10 \pounds xe4 \pounds xe4 11 \blacksquare e1, and after the bishop moves – 12 d5) 10 \pounds b5+ c6 11 \pounds d3 a5 12 \pounds b3 White had the better position.

6	axb5	cxb5
7	b3	≜.e 6

We are following an old line, where Black clings on 'with his teeth' to the pawn. 7...e6 is relatively best, although after 8 bxc4 bxc4 9 \triangle xc4 White stands better thanks to his central superiority (Ruderfer-Mukhin, USSR 1968).

8 bxc4 bxc4



9 ₩a4+

9 \bigtriangleup e5 is also good. Some books give 9 \pounds xc4 \pounds xc4 10 W a4+ 'regaining the piece and retaining a positional advantage', but after 10...O bd7 11 W xc4 Z c8 White loses his bishop.

Now after 9... 2bd7 10 De5 White has an undisputed advantage.

10 Alekhine Variation 3...a6 4 e3 ዿg4 (4...b5)

1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3

In this and the following two chapters we will examine lines where Black deviates from the Classical Variation as early as the third move.

3 ... 26 4 e3 And now: 4...2g4 (10.1) 4...b5 (10.2) - p.172

10.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6 4 e3)

4 ... ≜g4



The idea of this, the Alekhine Variation (it was employed by the World Champion in the 3rd game of his 1934 match with Bogoljubow) is to solve the problem of developing the queenside. Against the frontal attack on the b7 pawn (after $\pounds xc4$ and Wb3) Black plans to reply ...b7-b5. Another, secondary idea of 3...a6 is to avoid the Mannheim Variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 \pounds f3 \pounds f6 4 Wa4+ (which nowadays, however, is not considered so dangerous).

White now has: 5 \$xc4 (10.11) 5 h3 (10.12) - p.171

10.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 🖄f3 a6 4 e3 🎕g4)

5 &xc4 e6 Of course, not 5...b5 6 &xf7+. White now has several possibilities: 6 $\verb""b3 (10.111)$ 6 h3 (10.112) - p.167x 6 &bd2 (10.113) - p.168 6 d5 (10.114) - p.169 6 0-0 (10.115) - p.170 6 &bd3 is not usually of independent

6 \triangle c3 is not usually of independent significance, leading to variation 10.1122 (after 6... \triangle d7 7 h3 &h5) or to variation 7.122 (after 6... \triangle f6 7 h3 &h5).



6 ₩b3

By attacking the b7 pawn, White practically forces the exchange of the g4 bishop, and he hopes, after ...b7-b5, to use the advantage of the two bishops to attack Black's weakened queenside.

6 ... \$\Delta xf3 Otherwise the knight goes to e5: 6... \$\Delta a77 \$\Delta e5! 6...b5 is also very strongly met by 7 ②e5 盒h5 (7...bxc4 8 營a4+) 8 g4 盒g6 9 ②xg6 hxg6 10 盒e2.

6... \bigcirc **c6** is unsatisfactory. White does not take the pawn (7 $\textcircled{b}xb7? \bigcirc$ as 8 be4bf5), but plays 7 cd2! (after which Black does not have ... \bigcirc as, and he is obliged to defend the b7 pawn) 7...cb88 d5!:



(a) 8... 全xf3 9 dxe6! fxe6 10 gxf3 對f6 11 全xe6 包h6 12 f4 全c5 13 包c3 會f8 14 包e4 響e7 15 包xc5 暫xc5 16 耳g1 and Black's position is hopeless (Alatortsev-Goglidze, Leningrad 1936);

(b) 8...b5 9 dxe6 (or 9 dxc6 bxc4 10 響xc4 皇xf3 11 gxf3 異xb2 12 豐xa6) 9...bxc4 10 exf7+ 容xf7 11 豐xc4+ and again Black stands badly;

7 gxf3

Black can defend his b7 pawn by:

7...b5 (10.1111)

7.... C8 (10.1112) - p.165

7....**I**a7 (10.1113) - p.166

7....c5 8 ₩xb7 2d7 9 dxc5 \$xc5 10 f4 Dgf6 11 Dc3 favours White.

7....2c6? fails to 8 ₩xb7 2a5 9 ₩e4 2xc4 10 ₩c6+. 10.1111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 a6 4 e3 堂g4 5 堂xc4 e6 6 斷b3 堂xf3 7 gxf3)

8 \pounds d3 is weaker in view of 8...c5 9 dxc5 \boxdot d7 and then ... \oiint xc5.

Now Black again has a choice:

8...c5 (10.11111)

8.... 2d7 (10.11112) - p.163

If he plays 8...216, disregarding his queenside which has just been weakened by ...b7-b5, this allows White to gain an advantage by 9 a4 b4 10 lash c4!2e7 (if 10...2bd7 the blockading 11 lash c6! is extremely unpleasant) 11 2d2 0-0 12 2b3 with advantage to White (Veltmander-Aratovsky, corr. 1955/6).

10.11111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乞f3
a6 4 e3 单g4 5 单xc4 e6 6 ₩b3
≜xf3 7 gxf3 b5 8 ≜e2)

8 ... c5 9 dxc5

9 a4 b4 (if 9...cxd4 10 axb5) 10 dxc5 \$\overline\$xc5 transposes into the main line.

Black can either recapture immediately on c5, or defer it:

9...\$xc5 (10.111111)

10.111111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3
≜xf3 7 gxf3 b5 8 ≜e2 c5 9 dxc5)

9 ... ≙xc5 At one time this was considered unfavourable on account of Foltys's move 10 III. However, as the reader will see, Black can successfully solve his opening problems.

10 **Ig1** Other possibilities:

10 a4 b4:



(a) 11 2d2 2f6, when White has:

(a1) 12 變c4 ②bd7 13 ②b3 (13 b3! and ②b2 comes seriously into consideration) 13... ③c7 14 c4 0-0 15 ③c3 變b8 16 篇c1 ③d6 17 ④a5 ②c5, and as a counter to the opponent's pressure on the queenside, Black gained counterplay in the centre and on the kingside (Van Scheltinga-Alekhine, Buenos Aires Olympiad 1939);

(a2) 12 谢c2 ②bd7 13 b3 0-0 14 愈b2 愈c7 15 萬g1 ④e8 (15...萬c8!?) 16 ②e4 ④df6 17 萬d1 谢b8 18 f4 ④xe4 19 谢xe4 愈f6 20 愈c5! 愈xe5 21 fxe5 ⑤c7 22 愈c4 and White gained the advantage (Gligoric-Puc, Yugoslavia 1947)*;

Here and later an asterisk is used to indicate games in which 6 h3 2h5 has been included, when therefore the white pawn is not at h2, but at h3.

(b) 11 0–0 \triangle f6 12 \triangle d2 \triangle bd7 13 \triangle c4 0–0 14 a5 \triangle d5 15 e4 \underline{W} e7 16 $\underline{\Leftrightarrow}$ h1 (if 16 exd5 exd5 17 \triangle e3 d4) 16... \triangle c7 17 f4 \triangle b5 (17...e5!? is unclear) 18 $\underline{\diamond}$ e3 \triangle d4 19 $\underline{\diamond}$ xd4 $\underline{\diamond}$ xd4 20 $\underline{\Box}$ ad1 $\underline{\diamond}$ a7 21 \triangle d6 with the better position for White (Tolush-Smyslov, 18th USSR Ch., Moscow 1950);

(c) 11 a5. White wants to 'surround' the b4 pawn, and with this aim he isolates it from the a-pawn. Mikenas-

Bagirov (Vilnius 1963) continued 11... 公f6 12 公d2 公bd7 13 營a4 0-0 14 公b3 營b8 15 全d2 全d6 16 0-0-0 公c5 17 公xc5 全xc5 18 容b1 單d8 with a complicated game.

10 螢c3, when 10... 全f8 (the pawn sacrifice 10... 全e7 11 螢xg7 全f6 12 螢g4 ②h6, suggested by Tolush, would appear to favour White after 13 螢e4) seems the most promising, followed by ... ②d7 and ... 트c8, as in the main line.

Now let us return to the position after Foltys's move 10 Ξ g1, which at one time seriously frightened devotees of the Alekhine Variation.



Black cannot play 10...g6 on account of 11 $rac{1}{2}$ c3, and meanwhile the g7 pawn has to be defended.

10 ... $\pounds f8$ 10.... $\forall h4$ was recommended by Euwe, and if 11 $\blacksquare xg7 \forall xh2$ 12 $\forall c3$ Dd7 13 $\blacksquare g5$ e5. Note that after the inclusion of 6 h3 $\pounds h5$ this variation does not work, since with his queen at h3 (11... $\forall xh3$) Black cannot play ...e6-e5.

After 10.... 18 White has a lead in development, but how can it be exploited? It would be good to fianchetto the dark-square bishop, but his own queen, which has no good square to go to, is in the way. And with his king in the centre he cannot connect his rooks.

11 a4

Experience suggests that it is better for White to complete his queenside development with 11 \triangle c3 \triangle f6 12 \triangle d2 followed by 0–0–0.

Milev-Smyslov (Leipzig Olympiad 1960) now continued 11...b4 12 a5 公f6 13 公d2 公bd7 14 饗a4 g6.



By defending his pawn, Black frees his bishop for other, more important matters. After 15 20c4 2c5 16 2d2? (with 16 206 2xb6 17 axb6 3xb6 18 2d2 White could have regained his pawn with roughly equal chances) 16... 0-0! 17 2f1 (if 17 2xb4 3b8!) 17... 3b8 18 2g2 Id8 19 Igd1 2f8 20 Iac1 2d5 Black threatens 21...2c5 and despite the fact that his bishop has twice moved from f8 to c5 and twice returned, he holds the initiative!

10.111112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3
≜xf3 7 gxf3 b5 8

9 ... 20d7 Black does not hurry to capture on c5, aiming to complete his development as quickly as possible, but events show that this is weaker than $9... \pounds xc5$.

10	c6!	Dc5
11	豐c2	Ic8
12	Dc3!	

This places Black in a difficult position. White immediately begins an attack on the opponent's weakened queenside. 13 b4 is threatened.

12 ... 国xc6 After 12...b4 13 包a4 響a5 (13...国xc6 14 鱼d2) 14 包xc5 鱼xc5 15 b3 White has an obvious advantage.



13 ②xb5! axb5 14 b4

Bratkovsky-Marchenko (corr. 1952/3), in which the plan of breaking up the queenside was first seen, continued 14...,158 15 Eb1 266 16 bxc5 Exc5 17 Exb5! 18 Exc5, and White won.

The lesser evil is 14...對b6 15 bxc5 国xc5 (15... 魚xc5 16 對b2!), although after 16 對b3 followed by 17 魚a3 or 17 a4 Black's position remains difficult.

10.11112	(1 d4 d	5 2 c4	dxc4 3	3 句f3
a6 4 e3	≜ g4 5	≜xc4	e6 6	₩b3
≜xf3 7 g	xf3 b5 8	<u>\$e2)</u>		

Md7

9 a4

In the first instance White forces the opponent to weaken the c4 square.

After 9 f4 2gf6 10 \$\overline{4}f3 Black sacrifices the exchange by 10...c5 11 \$\overline{4}xa8 \$\overline{4}xa8 12 \$\overline{4}g1 cxd4 (or 12...g6 13 dxc5 \$\overline{4}xc5 14 \$\overline{4}c2 \$\overline{4}c7\$ with a very active position, Kondratiev-Solovyev, Leningrad v. Moscow 1960) 13 exd4 \$\overline{4}d6 14 \$\overline{4}c3 0-0\$, and the weakness of the isolated pawns and the light squares (c4, d5, e4 and f5) allows him to create counterplay (Boronstein-Solovyev, Moscow 1956).

The exchange sacrifice with the inclusion of 9 a4 b4 is analysed below.

> 9 ... b4 10 f4

This was played by Botvinnik in the 10th game of his match with Smyslov (Moscow 1954).

10 2 d2 2 gf6 (if 10...c5 11 d5!), as played earlier in the same match, is considered less promising for White:



(a) 11 2e4 c5, and now:

(a1) 12 2xf6+ Wxf6 (Botvinnik considers that 12...2xf6 equalises) 13 d5 e5 (13...2xf6 equalises) 13 d5 leads to an advantage for White) 14 a5! 2xd6 15 e4 (now ...e5-e4 is no longer possible, and if ...f7-f5 and ...fxe4 White's queen's bishop will be able to defend f2; 15 Wc4 and 15 Wa4 are not dangerous for Black) 15...0-0 16 2e3 (4th game of the match). Here, instead of the pawn sacrifice 16...c4 Botvinnik suggested 16...Wh4 followed by ...f7-f5 with a double-edged position;

(a2) the main point is that with 12 2xc5 2xc5 13 dxc5 2xc5 14 2d2 (or 14 f4) 14...0-0 15 0-0-0 2b6 16 2b1White can count on an advantage;

(b) 11 \pounds c4 c5 12 d5 exd5 13 \pounds xd5 Dxd5 14 Wxd5 \pounds c7 15 Dc4 0–0 16 e4 with the better position for White (Donner-Dückstein, Wageningen 1957);

(c) 11 f4 c5 12 2 f3 cxd4 13 2 xd4 2 c5 14 2 c4 a5 15 2 c6 2 c7 16 2 f3 0-0 17 b3 2 ac8 18 2 b2 2 d5 with a complicated game and chances for both sides (Reshevsky-Dückstein, Munich Olympiad 1958);

(d) 11 堂c4 c5 12 dxc5 ②xc5 13 0-0 国b8 14 ②b3 ④fd7 with equal chances (Zhukhovitsky-Mnatsakanian, USSR 1957).

If 10...c5 11 d5! with an excellent game for White, e.g. 11...exd5 12 \cong xd5 20gf6 13 \cong g2 2e7 14 20d2 0-0 15 e4! (Szabo-Hajtun, Hungary 1954).



11 ... c5!

This exchange sacrifice was suggested by Grechkin. From the note to White's 9th move the reader will already know how the play can develop. To demonstrate the superiority of rook over knight in the resulting position is extremely difficult: Black has strong points in the centre and chances of an attack on the enemy king.

12 **£**xa8

12 d5!? (Taimanov). 12 ...

₩xa8

13 **X**g1

13 0–0 @f3 is unpleasant for White, and if 14 @d1 @h3 15 @e2 (...@g4 was threatened) 15...cxd4.

13 ... cxd4

This capture can be delayed, since it is unfavourable for White himself to take on c5.

14 exd4 \$\overline\$d6 15 \$\overline\$e3

In contrast to Boronstein-Solovyev (cf. the note to White's 9th move) the black pawn is not at b5, but b4, and so White does not have 15 2Co. On the other hand he can occupy c4 with his knight or queen.

15		00
16	②d2	Ic8

After detaining the enemy king in the centre, Black is not obliged to attack it. The central white pawns are insufficiently well defended, and this determines his subsequent plan. Ilivitsky-Grechkin (RSFSR Ch. 1954) continued 17 222 dd5 18 ac1 ad8 (it is important to retain the rook) 19 h4 2766 20 ad2 cdf4 + (Black could have tried for more with 20...<math>2xf4) 21 2f1 cdh3 22 ag2 df4 with a draw by repetition.

10.1112 (1 d4	d5	2 c4	dxc4	3	ମ୍ବାପ୍ତ
a6 4 e3 单g4	5	≜xc4	e6	6	₩b3
≜xf3 7 gxf3)					

7 ... Wec8 Black avoids the weakening of his queenside, but at c8 his queen is badly placed. White makes a break in the centre and gains the advantage.

8 Dc3!

The most energetic. 8 a4 also promises White the better chances.

Less good is 8 f4 c5 9 dxc5 公d7 10 0-0 公gf6 11 公d2 金e7 with roughly equal chances (Ghitescu-Szilagyi, Moscow Olympiad 1956).

c5

d5

8



After 9 dxc5 \$\overline\$ xc5 Black has no difficulties, whereas now he is forced to go in for complications, since 9...e5 10 d6! is unfavourable.

9 ... b5 From this point events develop by force. The black king is forced to remain in the centre, where it comes under attack.

10 ②xb5 axb5 11 皇xb5+ 鞏d8

11...\$e7 is strongly met by 12 e4, and if 12...e5 13 d6+.

After 11...2 d7 12 dxe6 fxe6 13 #xe6+ White has more than sufficient compensation for the piece.

12 dxe6 fxe6 If 12....≝xe6 13 ≜c4. 13 e4 ⊙f6

There appears to be nothing better. After 13...2d6 14 2g5+ 2f6 15 Id1 c7 16 f4 h6 (16...2xe4 does not help in view of 17 Id3! Ib7 18 f3) 17 e5 hxg5 18 exd6+ cata 19 fxg5 Black cannot hope to resist successfully.

Now after 14 \$e3 \$e7 15 \$\exists cl White has a strong attack (Uhlmann-Dückstein, East Germany v. Austria 1957).

10.1113 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 纪3 a6 4 e3 皇g4 5 皇xc4 e6 6 斷b3 皇xf3 7 gxf3)

... 🎞 a7

An awkward and anti-positional move, or, on the contrary, a subtle and unusual one? The idea of defending the pawn with the rook, thereby avoiding weakening the queenside pawns, belongs to Alekhine.



After 8 $\pm d2$ ≥ 16 9 $\geq c3$ $\geq bd7$ 10 $\pm e2$ c5 (10...b5 11 a4) 11 d5 Black has: (a) 11...e5 12 a4 $\pm d6$ 13 0–0 $\pm e7$ 14 \Rightarrow h1 e4 (otherwise White himself plays e3-e4) 15 $\pm g1$ exf3 16 $\pm xf3$ $\geq e5$ (Botvinnik recommends 16... $\pm e5$ 17 $\pm g2$ g5! followed by ...g5-g4, preventing f2-f4 and controlling e5) 17 $\pm e2$ 0–0 18 f4 $\geq g6$ 19 $\pm d3$ and White gained the advantage (Botvinnik-Flohr, 14th USSR Ch., Moscow 1945);

Keres-Flohr (17th USSR Ch., Moscow 1949) went 8 $2c_3$ $2f_6$ 9 0–0 c5 10 Id_1 (here the sacrifice 10 d5?! b5 11 2xb5 axb5 12 2xb5+2e7 is not so promising as in variation 10.1112: the rook on the 7th rank plays an important defensive role, and the queen is better placed at d8 than c8) 10...cxd4 11 Ixd4 Vc_7 12 2e2 $2c_6$ 13 Id_1 2e7 14 $2d_2$ 0–0 and Black achieved a roughly equal position.

White did not gain anything from the opening in Pirc-Flohr (Saltsjöbaden

1948): 8 ②d2 ②f6 9 變c2 ②bd7 10 ②b3 逸b4+ 11 逾d2 逸xd2+ 12 變xd2 變e7. The game is equal.

We must also mention the plan of playing the knight to b3: 8 e e 2 and 69and c5 10 dxc5 e xc5 11 e and c2



12 ②b3 金b4+ 13 堂f1 0-0 14 a3 호d6 15 호d2 單a8 16 單d1 單c8 17 豐b1 豐e7 18 ②a5. White has slightly the better chances (Gligoric-Flohr, Hastings 1961/2).

10.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 a6 4 e3 요g4 5 요xc4 e6)

6 h3 ♠h5 White's main alternatives are: 7 ₩b3 (10.1121) 7 △c3 (10.1122)

10.1121	(1	d4	d5	2	c4	dxc4	3	Df3
a64 e3.	<u>o</u> g	45	Ŷх	c4	e6	6 h3	्री	h5)

7 ≝b3

Now 7... $\pounds xf3$ 8 gxf3 leads to a position from variation 10.111 with the pawn at h3. In some cases this factor is insignificant, but in others the position of the h-pawn influences the evaluation.

The variations of independent significance are those where Black does not exchange on f3: 7... $\blacksquare a7$ (with the bishop at g4 this move is frankly bad – cf. p.160):



8 &e2! (after 8 a4 \triangle c6 9 &d2 \triangle f6 10 &c3 \triangle d5 the game is equal, Zinner-Alekhine, Podebrady 1936) 8... \triangle f6 9 0–0 \triangle c6 10 \triangle c3 &d6 11 \blacksquare d1! (directed against ...e6-e5) 11... 0–0 12 e4, and if 12...&xf3 13 &xf3 e5 14 dxe5 \triangle xe5 15 &e2 \triangle g6 16 &e3 b6 17 g3 with a significant positional advantage (S.Vukovic-Tomovic, Yugoslavia 1949).

7....2c6 is interesting, when 8 2d2, preventing ...2a5, is probably best, as in variation 10.111.

Note that with the bishop at h5 the move 7...b5? is refuted by 8 2xb5+ axb5 9 2xb5+ and 10 2xb5.

10.1122 (1 d4 d5 2	c4 dxc4 3 幻f3
a6 4 e3 2g4 5 2xc4	e6 6 h3 单h5)

7 Dc3

6... \$xf3 7 豐xf3 公c6 8 公c3 公f6 is examined under a different move order on p.144.

7 ... Od7Black makes this move when he does t want to allow the exchange of his

not want to allow the exchange of his bishop (8 g4 皇g6 7 乞e5). 7...公f6 leads to the variation 1 d4 d5

2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f5 2 f6 4 c3 2 g4 5 2 xc4 e6 6 h3 2 h5 7 2 c3 a6 (p.138).

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8 e4 c5

Petrosian-Lombardy (Zurich 1961) went 8... $\pounds xf3$ 9 $\forall xf3$ c5 10 d5 \bigcirc e5 11 $\forall e2 \oslash xc4$ 12 $\forall xc4$ e5 13 a4 b6 14 0–0 with the better position for White.

He also stands better after 8... 2b6 9 \$e2 c5 10 \$e3.

9 d5



9 ... e5

Interesting complications can arise after 9... $2e^{5}$:

(a) 10 @a4+ (reckless) 10...b5, when it would appear that Black can parry the threats, retaining a material advantage: 11 @xb5 (or 11 @xb5+ axb5 12 @xb5+@d7) 11...@xf3+ 12 gxf3 axb5 13 @xb5+ @e7 14 e5 (if 14 d6+ @xd6 15 @f4+ @e7 or 15 e5+ @c7) 14...f6! (but not 14...@xa4? 15 d6+ or 14...@xd5 15 @h4+) – Prokhorovich;

(b) instead 10 &e2 gives White an excellent position: 10...@xf3+11 &xf3 &xf3 12 @xf3 e5 13 @g3!

10 a4 \$\Delta d6 11 0-0

After 11 b3 20gf6 12 2c3 2c7 13 2d2 0-0 14 0-0 2a5 15 IIe1 2c8 16 2c2 2d6 17 Wc2 IIc8 18 2d1 2xf3 19 2xf3 a draw was agreed in Bronstein-Flohr (USSR 1949). **11** ... Preparing ...f7-f5.

12 \$e2 \$xf3

④e7

Otherwise White will play his knight to c4.

13 **x**f3 0-0

13...c4 comes into consideration.

Prokhorovich-Bagirov (USSR Ch. ½-Final 1957) now continued 14 2 e2 f5 15 exf5 2xf5 16 2 e4 2 f6 17 2 g5 2 d4 18 IC1 Wb6 19 2 d3 2 xe4 20 2 xe4 If7 with a double-edged position. The b2 pawn is in danger, but Black's kingside may come under attack.

10.113 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6
4 e3 单g4 5 单xc4 e6)



6... ∅d7

After 6...公f6 White has two good replies:

(a) 7 h3 (it is useful to exchange the bishop) 7...免h5 8 g4 免g6 9 色e5 色bd7 10 色xg6 hxg6 11 斷f3;

(b) 7 a3 c5 8 dxc5 &xc5 9 b4 followed by &b2, with the better prospects, (Antoshin-Fuchs, Kinnbaum 1958). The immediate 6...c5 is met by 7 dxc5 \triangleq xc5 8 a3 b2-b4 and \triangleq b2.

The fianchetto of the bishop is also possible after 6... \bigcirc c6, e.g. 7 h3 &h5 8 a3 (directed against ... \bigcirc a5 and ...c7-c5) 8... \bigcirc f6 9 b4 &d6 10 &b2.

7 0—0 公gf6 8 h3

8 b3 \$e7 9 \$b2 0-0 10 \$e2 c5 11 \$\Def \$\Delta c8 12 dxc5 \$\Delta xc5 led to an equal position in Neishtadt-Berezin (Leningrad 1964).

8		≜h5
9	b3	c5
10	≗e2	

10 單e1 cxd4 11 exd4 公b6 12 单b2 鱼e7 13 公f1 單c8 14 單c1 0-0 does not cause Black any problems (Osnos-Bagirov, 31st USSR Ch., Leningrad 1963).

10		cxd4
11	②xd4	\$_xe2
12	₩xe2	¢c5
13	.⊈b2	



The position has simplified, but in order to equalise Black still has to make several accurate moves.

In Bronstein-Anagnostou (Amsterdam Olympiad 1954) after 13... 變e7 14 ②c4 0-0 15 黉f3! Black began to experience difficulties. If 15...b5 16 公c6 **268** 17 24e5 with a positional advantage for White. The Greek player decided to get rid of the knight, but after 15...2xd4 16 2xd4 he still had an inferior position.

Smyslov-Botvinnik (The Hague/ Moscow 1948) went 13...0-0! 14 里ac1 (now Black can answer 14 ②c4 with 14...b5) 14...里c8 15 里fd1 單e7 with an equal game.

10.114 (1	d4 d5 2 c4	dxc4	3	ЮſЗ	a6
4 e3 单 g4	5 💁 xc4 e6))			

6 d5

This energetic move of Alatortsev is parried by an invention by Flohr.





6.... 6 is an alternative:

(a) 7 ②c3 exd5 8 ②xd5 ②bd7 9 對d4 c6 10 ②xf6+ ③xf6 with an equal game (Averbakh-Foltys, Szczawno Zdroj 1957);

(b) 7 營b3 b5 8 dxe6 bxc4 9 營b7 營d5 10 營c8+ 營d8 11 營b7 營d5, and this sharp line gives White no more than a draw;

(c) 7 dxe6 豐xd1+ 8 \$xd1 \$xe6 9 \$xe6 fxe6, when Black's queenside majority gives him some compensation for his weak e6 pawn. Nevertheless after 10 \triangle g5 White's position is slightly preferable.

A similar structure arises after 6...b5 7 单b3 单b4+ 8 ②c3 ②f6 9 dxe6 對xd1+ 10 當xd1 单xe6 11 单xe6 fxe6 12 单d2, with roughly the same evaluation (Alatortsev-Ravinsky, Moscow 1942).

6...e5 7 h3 is good for White.

7 🔍 xd5 🖉 e7!

幻c3

Other continuations are also not dangerous for Black:

8 **₩b3**, and now:

8

(a2) 10 2xb3 2d7 11 e4 2d6 12 h3 2xf3 13 gxf3 2d5 14 2d2 2d6 15 1d5 1d

(b) 8....c6 9 &c4 (here too the capture on f7 loses a piece) 9...&xf3 (9...&b4+ 10 &xb4 &xb4+ 11 &d2 &xd2+ 12 2bxd2 &d7 13 &e2 &gf6 14 &d4 &xe2 led to an equal position in Flohr-Bronstein, 16th USSR Ch., Moscow 1948) 10 gxf3 &b4+ 11 &xb4 &xb4+ 12 &d2 &xd2+ 13 &xd2 &f6 14 &e2 &bd7 15 f4 &e7 16 &f3 \blacksquare ad8 17 \blacksquare ad1

8 **Wd4 Wb4+**, and now:

(b) 9 2d2 410 exd4. Now 10...c6 no longer works in view of 11 2xf7+2xf7 12 2e5+2e6 13 2xg4h5, since the knight can go to e3 or e5, but 10...2f6! is good (White cannot take on b7 on account of 11...2a7, when the bishop is lost).

After 8 \#a4+ \\$d7 9 \#b3 \#b4+ 10 \\$d2 \#xb3 11 \\$xb3 the game is equal.

8		c6
9	<u>۹</u> c4	幻d7
10	₩c2	

Now after 10...2gf6 11 0–0 $\pounds xf3$ 12 gxf3 $rac{1}{2}c5$ 13 2e4 2xe4 14 $rac{1}{2}xe4$ $\pounds c7$ 15 b4 (after 15 $\pounds c2$ 0–0–0 16 $rac{1}{2}c4$ $rac{1}{2}xc4$ 2e5 18 $\pounds c2$ $\pounds f6$ the initiative passes to Black, Boleslavsky-Flohr, Pärnu 1947) 15... $rac{1}{2}c5$! (weaker is 15... $rac{1}{2}g5$ + 16 $rac{1}{2}h6$ 17 $rac{1}{2}c2$ $rac{1}{2}h5$ 18 $\pounds c2$ $\pounds d6$ 19 f4, when 19...2g4 fails to 20 $rac{1}{2}e4$ and 21 $rac{1}{2}g2$ – Boleslavsky) 16 $rac{1}{2}b1$ the chances are equal.

10.115 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 a6 4 e3 \$\overline{g} g4 5 \$\overline{x} xc4 e6)

6 0--0

A similar variation is 6 象e2 公f6 7 0-0 c5 8 b3 公c6 9 象b2 星c8 10 公bd2 象e7 (10...豐c7 11 ②e5) 11 dxc5 象xc5 12 覧c1 全e7 13 公c4 0-0 with an equal position (Speelman-Vorotnikov, Leningrad 1984).

6 ... Dí6



7 b3

Other possibilities:

7 $\forall e2 2 2c6 8 \exists d1 2 d6 9 e4 (9 h3 2 h5 leads to lines examined earlier)$ 9...e5 10 d5 <math>2e7 11 h3 2 d7 12 2c3 h6 with a double-edged position (Borisenko-Tarasov, USSR 1967).

7 b4?!, when Black can boldly take the pawn: 7...2xb4, and if 8 a4+2c69 2e5 2d6 10 2xc6 gd7.

Now after 7...c5 8 dxc5 $\forall xd1 9$ $\exists xd1 \& xc5 10 \& b2 @ c6 (or 10... \& xf3 11 gxf3 @ bd7 12 @ d2 @ e7, Langeweg-$ Smyslov, Wijk aan Zee 1972) 11 @ bd20-0 the game is equal (Korchnoi-Hort, Beverwijk 1968).

10.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 5f3 a6 4 e3 \$g4)

5 h3

Before taking the c4 pawn, White drives back the bishop.

5		L h5
6	g4	£ g6
7	De5	U



White has weakened his kingside pawns, but on the other hand he has got rid of the pin. He will develop his king's bishop at g2 and will pick up the c4 pawn with one of his knights. In some variations White exchanges his knight for the g6 bishop, gaining the advantage of the two bishops.

Compared with the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 263 266 4 e3 264 5 h3 265 6 g4 267 265 Black has spent a tempo on ...a7-a6, which is of considerable importance. His opening problems are illustrated by the following variations:

7...e6 (7...b5? loses to 8 lg2 la7 92c6) 8 lg2 c6 9 ld2 ld7 10 lxd7Wxd7 11 2xc4 Wc7 (after 11...lb4+ 12 se2 the white king is securely placed in the centre) 12 ld2 a5 13 e4, and Black has difficulties in developing his kingside (Pachman-Sajtar, Bucharest 1949).

7... 2e4 8 2xc4! e6 (or 8... 2d5 9 2xd5 4xd5 10 0–0 and 11 2c3 with advantage) 9 f3 2xb1 10 4xb1 2d7 11 4xb1 2xc5 12 dxe5 b5 13 2d3 2e7(Nei-Solovyev, USSR 1964) 14 a4! and White stands better.

better chances after 8 公xg6 hxg6 9 全g2 耳b8 10 響a4 公gf6 11 公c3 c6 12 響xc4 e5 13 0-0 or 9...c6 10 公d2 e5 11 公xc4 - Pachman), and now:



(b) 8...b5 9 $2a5 c5 10 \pm d2$ (if 10 $2c6 = b6 11 \pm g2 = a5 c8 10...2gf6$ (10...b4 11 $\pm g2!$) 11 $\pm g2 \pm e4 12 \pm xe4 = 2xe4 13 = 32xd2 14 = 2xe4 c12 = 6$ 15 = 2c6 = c8 16 a4 with advantage to White (Taimanov-Smyslov, USSR 1960).

This list of failures for Black after the retreat of his bishop suggests the idea of exchanging it - 5... \$xf3 6 ₩xf3, and then continuing 6... Dc6.e7-e6, £16, £16 and0-0. Nevertheless, after 7 axc4 (7 d5 2e5 8 響e4 響d6) 7... 句f6 8 句c3 e6 White gains the better chances both with the positional 9 0-0 2 d6 10 2 d1 0-0 11 a3 e5 12 幻d5 幻xd5 13 皇xd5 劉e8 14 **2**d2 exd4 15 **2**xc6 ₩xc6 16 ₩xc6 bxc6 17 exd4 (Geller-Saitar, Helsinki Olympiad 1952) and with 9 2d2 2d6 10 0-0-0 0-0 11 g4!, preparing an attack (Pachman-Lundin, Leipzig Olympiad 1960).

10.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6 4 e3)

4 ... b5

Of course, Black cannot hold on to the gambit pawn, but the attempt to revive this condemned variation, made by the Viennese theoretician Gaberditz, is of interest. Black aims to exploit the time spent by the opponent on regaining the pawn, for the purposes of rapid development.

Of course, not 5...c6 6 axb5 cxb5 7 b3 cxb3 8 \hat{a} xb5+.





The alternative is 6 axb5 axb5 7 2xa8 &xa8 8 b3 e6 9 bxc4 bxc4 10 &xc4 (if 10 2e5 2d7, e.g. 11 2a4 2gf6 12 2c6 2b6! 13 25 2d7 14 2a7 2xb5 or 12 &a3 &xa3 13 2xa3 c5 14 2xd7 2xd7 15 dxc5 0-0 16 f3 2c7 with an equal game - Gaberditz) 10...2f6, and now:

(a) 11 444 + 2bd7 12 0-0 (the attempt to pin Black's pieces by 12 2b5 does not work: 12...2d6 13 2e5 2xg2 14 4g1 c6!, while after 12 2e5 2xg2 13 4g1 4a8! White loses a pawn) 12...2d6 13 2e5, when Gaberditz con-

tinues 13...0-0 14 \bigcirc c6 \oslash b6 15 \oslash xd8 \oslash xa4 16 ob5 \blacksquare xd8 17 oxa4 c5 with an equal game;

(b) 11 0-0 2bd7 (in the almost modern game Skembris-Popchev, Prokuplje 1987, 11... 2e7 12 2a4+1 2c6 13 2b52xb5 14 2b5+c6 15 2a4 0-0 16 2a3 gave White the better prospects) 12 2c3 (nothing is promised by 12 2bd2 2e7 13 2b2 0-0 14 2c5 15 Ec1 cxd4 16 2xd4, Dolezal-Podgorny, Prague 1946, 16... 2a3 17 Ea1 2e7 18 2a4 2c5, while 12 2a4 2d6 13 2e50-0 leads to a variation examined earlier) 12... 2e7, when:



(a) 13 谢e2 ②e4 14 鱼b2 0-0 15 鱼d3 ②xc3 16 鱼xc3 c5 17 亘d1 鱼f6 and Black equalised (Grünfeld-Gaberditz, Vienna 1946);

(b) 13 d5!, with the idea of exploiting the weakness of the c7 pawn after both the exchange on d5, and 13...e5 14 e4.

6... еб

6...②f6 is weak in view of 7 bxc4 bxc4 8 ≗a3!

6...cxb3 7 axb5 axb5 8 Xxa8 2xa8 9 2xb5+ also favours White.

6...c5 is possible, when White should probably reply 7 bxc4 (7 axb5 axb5 8 国xa8 鱼xa8 9 bxc4 is weaker in view of 9...鱼xf3) 7...b4 8 鱼d3 ②f6 9 ②bd2, obtaining a strong centre.

bxc4 bxc4

Here 7...b4 is not good on account of 8 c5.



Weiner-Gaberditz (Vienna 1948) continued 8 \$\overline{2}xc4 2\overline{2}d7 9 0-0 2\overline{2}gf6 10 2\overline{2}bd2 c5 11 \$\overline{2}a3 \$\overline{2}r67 12 \$\verline{2}c2 cxd4 13 2\overline{2}xd4, when with 13...\$\overline{2}xa3 14 \$\verline{2}xa3 \$\verline{2}r67 followed by ...\$\overline{2}c5 Black could have expected to equalise.

In Euwe's opinion, 8 2a3 ensures White the better chances.

11 Borisenko-Furman Variation 3...a6 4 e4 (4 a4, 4 公c3)

11.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6)

4 e4

This gambit continuation was developed by Borisenko and Furman, and became popular after the game Botvinnik-Flohr (18th USSR Ch., Moscow 1950). White allows his opponent to defend the c4 pawn and to keep a material advantage. Exploiting the fact that 3...46 (rather than 3...2)f6) has been played, he occupies the centre.

Black can reply: 4...b5 (11.11) 4...c5 (11.12) – p.179 4...2∩f6 (11.13) – p.179 4...2g4 (11.14) – p.180

11.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6 4 e4)

5...c6 is weak in view of 6 b3 cxb3 7 axb5 or 6...bxa4 7 bxc4.

In contrast to the variation 4 e3 b5 5 a4 \pm b7, in which, by attacking the enemy queenside pawns, White quickly

restores material equality, here his e4 pawn is threatened. We consider:

6 b3 (11.111) 6 ∕⊇c3 (11.112) – p.175 6 axb5 (11.113) – p.178

11.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 包f3 a6 4 e4 b5 5 a4 皇b7)

	6	b3	٤	.xe4	
The	restrai	ned	6e6 is a	lso pl	ayed:



7 bxc4 (if 7 axb5 axb5 8 星xa8 金xa8 9 bxc4 Black can defend by 9...金xe4 10 ②bd2 金b7 11 cxb5 ②f6, basing his play on control of d5, Beil-Krnavek, Olomouc 1976) 7...bxc4, and now:

(a) 8 ₩c2 2/66 9 e5 2/d5 or 9...2xf3 with a satisfactory position for Black;

(b) 8 2c3, when:

15 ⁽¹⁾/₂ and the play favours White (Borisenko-Feldman (Lipeck 1960);

(b2) 8...2f6 9 e5 2b4 10 2d2 2d5 11 2c1 a5! (after 11...2xc3?! 12 2xc3 2xc3 13 2xc3 2xf3 14 gxf3 2d7 15 a5 c5 16 2xc4 0–0 17 f4 cxd4 18 2xd4 2c7 19 0–0 the a6 pawn needs constant protection, Borisenko-Aratovsky, corr. 1955/7) 12 2e2 0–0 13 0–0 2xc3 14 2xc3 2d5 and Black held the gambit pawn (Jakobson-Belokurov, corr. 1968);

(c) 8 2xc4 (it is not essential to defend the e4 pawn) 8...2xe4, when the dangers facing Black are illustrated by Bronstein-Beylin (Moscow 1953): 9 0-0 2f6 (better 9...2c6 or 9...2b4) 10 2c3 2d5 11 2xd5 2xd5 12 2e5 2e713 2b1 0-0 14 2b3 f6 15 2c4 fxe5 162c6+, and White gained an attack.

7	Dc3	≗b 7
8	axb5	
If 8 bxc4	b4.	
0		avh

8		axb5
9	X xa8	单 xa8
10	bxc4	

10 公xb5 e6 11 오xc4 오b4+ 12 오d2 오xd2+ gives equal play (B.Vladimirov-Vasiliev, RSFSR Team Ch. 1958).



In the late 50s to early 60s, when this variation was popular, it was thought

that 10...bxc4 would give Black an acceptable position. In 1965 I suggested that White should play 11 d5 (if 11...g6, 11...c6 or 11...公d7, then 12 營a4+) or 11 公e5 with a clear advantage.

After this a successful attempt was made to improve Black's play with 10...e6. Vaiser-Bagirov (Novosibirsk 1971) continued 11 \(\Delta\)xb5 (if 11 cxb5 (\Delta\)xf3 12 gxf3 \(\Delta\)b4) 11...\(\Delta\)b4+ 12 \(\Delta\)d2 (\Delta\)xf3 13 gxf3 \(\Delta\)xd2+ 14 \(\Delta\)xd2 c6 15 (\Delta\)c3 (\Delta\)e7 (Vaiser-Chekhov, USSR 1983) would seem to be even more convincing, keeping ...c7-c6 in reserve and forcing White to consider how to defend his pawn weaknesses.

11.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6 4 e4 b5 5 a4 \$b7)

 $6 \bigtriangleup c3$ The prelude to a highly complicated

variation, full of combinational ideas.

6 ... b4 7 全xc4 e6 Of course, not 7...bxc3? 8 對b3! 8 對b3



After 8 d5 bxc3 9 ₩b3 exd5 10 ₩xb7 dxc4 11 ₩xa8 cxb2 12 \$\overline{xb2} 2b4+ 13 ⊈f1 c3 Black gained good attacking chances for the sacrificed exchange (Gufeld-Bagirov, Baku 1964).

Now if 8...2 f6 there follows 9 2 g5! 2 c7 10 2 xf7! with a strong attack. The evaluation of 6 2 c3 rested on this variation, until Gaberditz suggested that Black should defend by counterattacking.

Dc6

8

Threatening ... Da5.

8...2d7 is a new idea in this interesting variation, when 9 2g5 threatens the sacrifice on f7 (9...h6? 10 2xf7; 9...bxc3 10 2xf7!), and 9...2e7 10 2e2 leads to a very tense situation:



(a) 10.... gf6, and now:

(a1) 11 e5 2d5 12 0-0 h6 13 2e4 (13 對h3 c5 14 2e4 對d8 requires testing) 13...對h4 14 f4 c5 15 對f3 cxd4 16 公xd4 單c8 17 b3 公c3 (17...公7b6 or 17...公c5 comes into consideration) 18 2d6+ 盒xd6 19 對xb7 單xc4! 20 bxc4 盒c5 21 盒e3 盒xd4 22 盒xd4 公e2+ 23 容h1 公g3+ with perpetual check;

(a2) 11 ②f4 (according to Van Wely, a substantial improvement) 11... ②xe4 12 ②xe4 ①xe4 13 0-0 ②f6 14 單e1 c6 15 耳xe4 ②xe4 16 斷f3 f5 17 ③xe6 with an attack for the sacrificed exchange;

(b) 10... 20b6 (this is sounder) 11 요d3 h6 12 신f3 신f6 13 신g3 (also 13 9 a5 bxc3

The acceptance of the pawn sacrifice looks dangerous: 9...2xd4 10 2xd4Wxd4 11 2e3 (or 11 0–0) 11...Wd7 (the other queen moves to e5, f6 and d6 require testing) 12 f3 2d6 13 2a4 We714 e5!? (if 14 0–0 Black defends by 14...2f6 15 Ifc1 2d7) 14 2xe5 15 2c5 (S.Pedersen-Sadler, Cannes 1995), when Pedersen analyses 15...2c6!:

(a) 16 2xa6 2d6! 17 0-0 (if 17 2c1 What + 18 2f2 Wg5 19 0-0 Wxa5) 17... 2b7 18 Wd3 2f6 with advantage to Black, since the knight at a6 is out of play;

10 ₩xb7 ᡚb4

By 'surrounding' the queen, Black creates counter-threats. Gaberditz's idea has seen some interesting developments.

Lilienthal suggested that White could gain the advantage by 11 e5, with the threat of d4-d5, when one of his variations is: $11... \textcircled{C}c^2 + 12 \textcircled{C}d1 \textcircled{C}xd4$ 13 Cxd4 Wxd4 + 14 Cc2.

However, after 11...cxb2 12 皇xb2 国b8 13 豐e4 公e7 14 0-0 公ed5 Black has a solid position and the battle is only just beginning. The gambit play beginning with 11 $\pounds xa6$ (an idea of I.Zaitsev) is quite fantastic:



(a) 11...互xa6 12 bxc3 公c2+ 13 當d1 公xa1 14 豐xa6 with a winning position for White;

(b) 11... ①xa6 12 徵c6+ 李e7 13 bxc3 f6 (14 皇a3+ was threatened) 14 d5 exd5 15 ②d4! (15 exd5 徵e8) 15... \$f7 16 徵e6+ \$ff 26 17 ④f3 徵c8 (18 ④e5+ and 18 ④h4+ were threatened) 18 ④e5+ \$ff 5 19 g4+ \$ff 20 ④f3+ \$ff 5 21 罩g1, and Black is mated;

(c) 11... $\Xi b8!$, when White is obliged to sacrifice his queen, burning his boats: 12 $\Delta b5+ \Phi e7$ 13 a6 $\Xi xb7$ 14 axb7 $\Psi b8$ (15 $\Xi a8$ was threatened; if 14... $\Delta c2+ 15 \Phi e2 \Delta xa1$ 16 $\Delta e5!$, and Black cannot even give up his queen for the b-pawn: 16... $\Phi f6$ 17 $\Delta g5+$, or 16... $\Psi d6$ 17 $\Delta c6+$) 15 $\Xi a8 \Psi xb7$ 16 $\Xi e8+ \Phi f6$ 17 $\Delta g5+ \Phi g6$ 18 $\Xi xe6+$ $\Delta f6$ (18...fxe6 19 $\Delta e8$ mate), and now:

(c1) in analysis published in 1965 it was suggested that after 19 265+20 20 2xf7+26 fb game should end in a draw, since the king's journey into enemy territory leads to mate: 20...265 21 2e2+26 h4 22 g3+263 23 23225+262 24 263 mate. But Ardashev found that the king can boldly advance, only to a different square: 20...264!: (c11) 21 0--0 豐xb5 22 g3+ 當f3 23 置el 纪d3, or

(c12) 21 g3+ $rac{1}{2}$ f3 22 $ac{1}{2}$ e2+ $rac{1}{2}$ g2, hiding in the enemy position;

(c13) 21 单c2 (threatening 22 h3 mate) 21... 包c2+ 22 슣f1 包xe4 23 置e5 包c3+! 24 슣g1 (24 fxe3+ 슣xe3) 24... 包xg2;

(c2) 19 2h4+ was then suggested by Zaitsev, which after 19...2xg5 20 1e5+2h6 (or 20...2xh4 21 g3+ 2g4 222e2+ 2h3 23 2f1+ 2g4) 21 2f5+nevertheless leads to perpetual check, but what if Black declines to take the bishop and plays 19...2h5 20 2e2+2g4?...

In view of this, Izeta-E.Vladimirov (Ceuta 1992) is of great interest. White played 11 0–0, and after 11...**E**b8 12 **a**xa6 he again gave up his queen, but with a different idea: 12...**E**xb7 13 **a**xb7 cxb2 14 **a**xb2 **w**b8 15 a6.



In contrast to the above variations with the pursuit of the king, here after castling White bases his play on exploiting his passed pawn. Black's kingside is completely undeveloped, and his queen is unable to combat the passed pawn: 15... and 16 ds (16 Ξ fc1 also comes into consideration), with the threat of \pounds d4, and if 16... \pounds c5, then simply 17 \pounds xg7. The game continued 15...2xa6 16 $\pounds c6+ \pounds c7$ 17 $\exists fb1$ f6 (the more tenacious 17...2b4 would also have lost after 18 $\exists a8 \ b6 \ 19 \ best{after} e8+ \pounds f6 \ 20 \ d5+$ $\pounds g6 \ 21 \ best{best{bf}} e5+ \pounds b5 \ 22 \ best{after} a4!, or$ 19... $\pounds d6 \ 20 \ ba3 \ best{bf} e57 \ 19 \ best{after} a8$ and Black resigned.

A position from this game can also be reached in the Zaitsev variation if White transposes moves: 11 \pounds xa6, and if 11... Ξ b8 12 0-0, so the ball is very much in Black's court.

11.113 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6
4 e4 b5 5 a4 单b7)

6 axb5

Recent games have shown that this branch is perhaps the most unpleasant one for Black.

6		axb5
7	IIxa8	≜xa8
8	Dc3	



8...b4 is weak in view of 9 ₩a4+ 2c6 10 2b5 or 10 2d5.

8...c6 leads to a position similar in structure to gambit lines of the Slav Defence. Black securely holds on to his pawn, but his bishop at a8 is shut in. In

modern play White usually prefers:

(a) 9 &g5 (to hamper Black's kingside development) 9...h6 (if 9... \bigcirc f6 10 e5 \bigcirc d5 11 \textcircledall – Lputian) 10 &h4 \textcircledall b6 11 &c2 e6 12 0–0 &c7 13 b3 &xh4 (accepting the sacrifice 13...cxb3 14 \textcircledall xb3 &xh4 15 \oslash xh4 \oiintx d4 is dangerous in view of 16 \textcircledall a &b7 17 \blacksquare d1 \textcircledall b6 18 \textcircledall d6) 14 \oslash xh4 cxb3 15 d51 exd5 16 \bigtriangledown f5 g6 17 \bigtriangledown d6+ \oiint f8 18 exd5 cxd5 19 \boxdot cxb5 &c6 (19... \boxdot f6? 20 \textcircledall a1) 20 \oiint xb3 with a a promising position for the pawn (Knaak-Chekhov, Leipzig 1986)

(b) 9 \pounds e2 10 0-0 \pounds f6 11 \pounds g5! h6 12 \pounds xf6 gxf6 (12... \forall xf6? 13 \forall a1 and 14 \forall a7) 13 \forall a1 \pounds d7 14 d5! (this strategy is dictated by White's lead in development) 14...cxd5 15 exd5 \pounds xd5 16 \pounds xd5 exd5 17 \blacksquare d1, and Black's position is difficult (Lputian-Semkov, Saint John 1988).

8...e6 9 2xb5 2xe4 (after 9...2b4+ 10 2c3 2xe4 11 2xc4 2f6 12 0-0 White stands better) 10 2xc4 (10 2c3!?), and now:

(c) 10... 2b4+ is a new idea in this sharp variation:

(c1) 11 ②c3 ②e7 12 0-0 (if 12 Wa4+ ②bc6 13 ②e5 Wxd4, while after 13 0-0 兔xf3 14 gxf3 0-0 followed by Wa8 White's pawns are weak) 12... 兔xf3 13 Wxf3 0-0 (not 13.... Wxd4? 14 Wb7 Wb6 15 兔b5+ 会f8 16 單d1 ③g6 17 Wc8+ 会e7 18 兔g5+ f6 19 Id7+) 14 Id1 c6 with a roughly equal position (Krasenkov);

(c2) 11 堂e2!? (Korchnoi-Seirawan, Biel 1993) is an attempted improvement for White. After 11... 包e7 12 全f4 全a5 13 窗a4 ②bc6 14 ②d2 单d5 15 ③b3 0-0! Black maintained material equality, with an equal game.

11.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Df3 a6 4 e4)

4 ... c5

Black does not try to hold the pawn, but takes measures against the strengthening of White's central position.

5 单xc4

5 d5 also comes into consideration, seizing space in the centre.





The exchange of queens -6 arrow xd4arrow xd4 7 arrow xd4 e6 leads to a position which can be reached in the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5 4 arrow f3 cxd4 5 arrow xd4 arrow xd4 if Black, to defend against the threat of arrow b5, plays 6...a6. Despite the absence of the queens and the symmetric pawn formation, White retains a slight advantage thanks to his better development and the weakening of Black's queenside.

 $6 \pm g5$ (with the threat of 7 $\forall b3$) deserves being tested in practice.

б... еб

The attempt to simplify by 6...e5 may cost Black dearly after 7 $\frac{1}{2}a4+:$

(a) 7...@d7 8 &b5! axb5 9 @xa8 @xd4 10 @xb8 &b4+ 11 \bigtriangleup c3! @xe4+ (11...&xc3+ 12 bxc3 @xc3+ 13 &d2 @xa1+ 14 &e2 @xh1 leads to mate after 15 @xc8+ &e7 16 &b4+ &f6 17 @f5 mate, while if 14...@d4 15 @xc8+ @d8 16 @xb7 and wins) 12 &e3 \boxdot e7 13 @c7 &xc3+ 14 bxc3 @c6 (14... @xg2 15 0-0-0 is no better) 15 @xc5 Black resigns (Borisenko-Grechkin, corr. 1955/7);

(b) 7... 호d7 8 對b3 對e7 9 0-0! (9 對xb7? 對b4+), and if 9... exd4 (9... 之c6 10 對xb7 單b8 11 之xc6 or 9... 호c6 10 公f5 also favours White) 10 對xb7 호c6 11 對c8+ 對d8 12 호xf7+ 空e7 13 對e6 mate;

(c) 7... ②c6 8 ③xc6 螢d7 is bad in view of 9 \$\overline\$xf7+, winning;

(d) 7...2d7 8 2f5 g6 9 2xf7+ 2xf7 10 2b3+ 2f6 11 h4 with a very strong attack, e.g. 11...h6 12 2g5+ hxg5 13 hxg5+ 2xg5 14 2xh8 gxf5 15 2xg8+ 2f6 16 2h6+ winning the queen.

7 Dc3

Similar positions arise in the variations 3 e4 c5, 3 263 c5, 3 263 e6 and 3 263 266 4 2c3. White stands better thanks to his lead in development.

11.13 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 分f3 a6 4 e4)

> 4 ... ᡚf6 5 e5

White concedes the d5 square, but gains a spatial advantage.

5 ... Dd5
6 \$xc4 e6

6... \$£g4 is not good in view of 7 ₩b3, but 6...b5 7 \$£d3 (7 \$£xd5 ₩xd5 8 \$2c3 is interesting) 7...e6 is possible (after 7... \$£g4 8 h3 \$£h5 Black has to reckon with the double-edged pawn sacrifice 9 e6, while if 8...\$£xf3 9 ₩xf3 e6 10 \$2c3\$ with the better prospects for White).

7 Dc3



Dxc3

After 7...2b6 8 &b3 Black does not have time for the manoeuvre ...&d7-c6, since 8...&d7 is met by the breakthrough 9 d5!, e.g., 9...exd5 10 &xd5&e6 (or 10...&c6) 11 &g5 followed by 12 &xb6 with advantage to White.

8	bxc3	c5
9	00	Dc6
10	₩e2	≜e 7

10...cxd4 11 cxd4 2xd4 12 2xd4 Wxd4 13 2g5 is dangerous, since Black is well behind in development.

11 **X**d1

7 ...

11.14 (1	d4	d5 :	2	c4	dxc4	3	句f3	a6	4
e4)									

4... ≜g4

This move was made by Flohr in his game with Borisenko from the 18th USSR Ch. (Moscow 1950), where the variation 4 e4 was first employed.

> 5 \$Lxc4 e6 6 0--0 නිර

6 0-0 公d7 Balanel-Lundin (Prague/Marianske

Lazne 1954) went 6...2 f6 7 2 c3 2 e7 8 2^{10} e2 0-0 (if 8...2 xf3 9 2^{10} xf3 2^{10} xd4 10 e5!) 9 2^{10} d1 b5 10 2^{10} b3 b4 11 2^{10} a4 2^{10} bd7 12 2^{10} g5 2^{10} e8 13 2^{10} ac1 with the better game for White.

7	Dc3	c5
8	d5	e5
9	a 4	âd6



We have reached a position from Bronstein-Flohr, p.168 (cf. the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2 f3 a6 4 e3 2 g4 5 h3 2 h5, in which the pawn advanced to e4 in two moves), but with an extra tempo for White, which is significant.

10 Le2 Lxf3

The transfer of the knight to c4 was threatened, but now the light squares become weak.

11 单xf3 ④e7 12 ④b1

The other knight heads for c4!

12 ... 0-0 13 \$\alpha_3

White stands better. The Borisenko-Flohr game continued 13...2c8 14 2d2 2e7 15 a5 2d6 16 b4 2g5 17 2c3 Ic8 18 We2 cxb4 19 2xb4 2c5 20 Iab1 Ie8 21 Ib2 2e7 22 Ifb1 Ic7 23 Ic2 2d7, and now 24 g3! would have consolidated his advantage.

11.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 分f3 a6)

4 a4

White prevents ...b7-b5, but weakens the b4 square.

4 ... ②f6 5 e3

Note that 2c3 (here or later) can lead to a position from the variation 3...2f6 4 2c3 a6 5 a4 (p.231).



5 ... ⊈g4 5...⊈f5 6 ⊈xc4 e6 7 ∑c3 ∑c6 (7...∑bd7!?) is the alternative:

(a) 8 堂 2 2 4 9 0-0 堂 7 10 星 d1 星 d8 11 h3 ② e4 12 ② a2 2 d6 13 2 d3 全 g6 14 堂 c2 ② f6 15 e4 e5 16 d5 ② b8 17 ② h4 with a slight but enduring advantage to White (Agzamov-Kuzmin, Yerevan 1982);

(b) $80-0 \& g69 h3 \& d610 \blacksquare e10-0$ 11 e4 e5 (after 11... $\& e712 \& f4 \blacksquare c813$ $\blacksquare c1 \& b414 \& g5 h615 \& h4$ White has complete control of the centre, Tukmakov-Kuzmin, Yerevan 1982) 12 d5 (12 & g5!?) 12... & b813 & g5 & bd714 $\Im d2$ with slightly the better prospects for White.

6 单xc4

If 6 h3 the simplest is 6...&xf3 (after 6...&h5 White can count on an advantage by 7 g4 &g6 8 $\bigtriangleupe5$) 7 ilde xf3 $\boxdotc6$ 8 &xc4 e6 9 0–0 &d6 with equal chances.

Other continuations:

7 163 2c6 8 2c2 (or 8 2d2 1b8 90-0 2d6 10 2c2, Novotelnov-Flohr, USSR 1948, but not 8 1257, 2a5) 8...2b4+9 2d2 10 2c4 10 2c4 112xb4 12 12 12 10 2c4 13 2a32xf3 14 gxf3 c5 (Udovcic-Rabar, Yugoslavia 1957), in both cases with equal chances.

7 0-0 c5 8 公c3 公c6 9 d5 公e5 10 全2 堂c7 11 公xe5 全xe2 12 堂xe2 螢xe5 with an equal game (Berezhnoi-Solovyev, USSR 1966).

7 26 bd2 2c6 8 0-0 2d6 (or 8...2e7 9 2c2 0-0 10 2c4 2b4, Vaganian-Kim, USSR 1969) 9 2c2 0-0 10 2c42c4 2c4 (Cardoso-Fuster, Portoroz 1958), in both cases with an equal game.

After 8... 2d6 9 h3 2h5 10 2d2 (against developing moves Black plays ... e6-e5 after ... #e7) 10... 2xe2 11


Ahues-Alekhine (Bad Nauheim 1936) went $8... \pm b4$ 9 0–0 0–0 10 2d2 (10 \pm d2!?) 10... \pm xe2 11 \pm xe2 e5 12 2f3 \pm e8 13 \pm d2 \pm d6 14 \pm g3 (after the double exchange on e5, the h2 and b2 pawns would be simultaneously attacked) 14...e4! 15 2e1 \pm xg3 16 hxg3 2e7, when Alekhine transferred his knight to d5 and obtained a promising position.

11.3 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 a6)

4 ②c3 b5

4.... ②f6 and 4...e6 transpose into other variations.

b4

5 a4

5 e4 comes into consideration.

5 ...

6 Da2

Or 6 De4 Dd7, and now:

(a) 7 ②ed2, which allows Black to gain a favourable position by 7...c3 8 bxc3 bxc3 9 ②e4 ②gf6 10 ②xc3 e6 11 e3 2b4 12 2d2 c5 (Karpov-Portisch, Tilburg 1983);

(b) 7 WC2 2gf6 8 Ded2 with slightly the better chances for White (Portisch).



6 ... 2c6If 6...e6, then 7 e4 2b7 8 e5 2d5 is unfavourable for White, but 7 e3 leads to a position from the variation 3 2f32f6 4 2c3 a6 5 e3 b5 6 a4 b4 7 2a2 – cf. Reshevsky-Smyslov (p.217).

7 e3

. . .

7

Against the fanciful 7 d5 2a5 8 2xb4 Black replies 8...2b7!, planning ...e7-e6 (Magerramov).

This leads to great complications. Black gains a material advantage, but comes under attack. 7... 2a5 is strongly met by 8 De5.

Magerramov-Vorotnikov (USSR 1986) continued 8 \bigtriangleup c3 \backsim b4 9 \pounds xc4 \boxdot c2+ 10 \Leftrightarrow f1 \circlearrowright xa1 11 \circlearrowright e5 e6 12 \circledast f3 f6 13 \circledast c6+ \Leftrightarrow e7 14 \circledast xa8 fxe5 15 dxe5. The evaluation of this sharp position, where White has given up a knight, is unclear.

Other 3rd Moves for Black

3...b5 (12.5) – p.195

3

12.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3)

... c5

Inviting the opponent to cross the demarcation line, so as then to attack the d5 pawn with ...e7-e6 and thus resolve the situation in the centre. Another plan involves active play on the queenside.



Now White has a choice between: **4 d5 (12.11)** - p.184 **4 e3 (12.12)** - p.190 For **4 e4** cf. the move order **4** 2 c3 e6 **5 e4 (p.215)**.

Here we should mention the original development of events in Dautov-Van Wely (Ter Apel 1995): 4 e4 cxd4 5 Wxd4 Wxd4 6 2xd4 26?! 7 e5 2fd7 8 e6 (8 f4!? - Dautov) 8...2e5 9 exf7+ \$\proptoxrf 10 2d2 2d3+ 11 \$\proptoxrf xd3 cxd3 12 22f3 2d7 13 2g5+ and 2ge6 with a sharp, complicated situation.

After 4 2c3 Black can continue:

(a) 4...cxd4 5 螢xd4 螢xd4 6 公xd4, and now:

(a1) 6... 2d7 7 2db5, when:

(a11) 7... ②a6 8 e4 ②f6 (8...e6 comes into consideration, with the idea of ... 逸b4, and if 9 愈xc4 單c8 10 愈e2 ②b4, Magerramov-Psakhis, Groningen 1993) 9 f3 愈xb5 10 ②xb5 e5 11 愈e3 愈b4+ 12 슣f2 슣e7 13 愈xc4 單hc8 14 單ac1 愈c5 15 單hd1 with the better position for White (Kasparov-Seirawan, Thesalloniki Olympiad 1988);

(a12) 7... 全d8 (suggested by Kasparov) 8 金e3 公c6 9 0-0-0 公f6 10 g4! e6 (10...公xg4 11 金h3 公ge5 12 星d2 and 〓hd1 is strong for White) 11 金h3 (the simple 11 h3 is also good) 11...h6 (Krasenkov-Bus, Pardubice 1994), and now the doubling of rooks on the d-file would have given White good chances;

(a2) $6...\overline{20}$ f6 7 $\overline{20}$ db5 $\overline{20}$ d8 8 $\underline{2}$ f4 $\underline{20}$ c6 9 $\underline{20}$ c7+ $\underline{20}$ e8 10 $\underline{20}$ g3 $\underline{20}$ d8 11 e4 a6 12 0-0-0+ $\underline{20}$ d7 (Knaak-Sermek, Bad Wörishofen 1993), and White was unable to utilise his active forces;

(a3) 6...e5 7 包db5 包a6 (7...堂d8 8 金e3 包c6 9 0-0-0+ 单d7 10 g3, 鱼g2 and f2-f4 favours White, Knaak-Kallai, Budapest 1986) 8 单e3 (8 包d5!? - Magerramov) 8...2d7 9 0–0–0 2)f6 10 g3 2c6 11 f3 (Magerramov-Vaiser, Groningen 1993), and here 11...2b4should have been considered (Vaiser);

(b) 4...e6 5 e4 cxd4 6 ₩xd4, when:



(b1) 6...金d7 7 包5 包6 8 包xc4 包c6 9 包d6+ 盒xd6 10 對xd6 對e7 (10... 對b6!? intending ...0-0-0) 11 對xe7+ \$xe7 12 盒e3 with advantage to White (Miles-Korchnoi, Tilburg 1985);

(b2) with the simplifying 6... Wxd4 7 2xd4 a6 8 a4?! (8 2xc4) 8... 2d7 9 2xc4 2c6 10 2c3 IC8 11 2c2 2f6 12 0-0 2b4 and ... 2c7 Black equalised in Knaak-Bialas (Germany 1990).

12.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 🖓 f3 c5)

4 d5 And now: 4...e6 (12.111) 4...⊙16 (12.112) - p.186

12.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 c5 4 d5)

> 4 ... e6 5 Dc3

Or 5 e4 exd5 6 exd5 ⁽²⁾f6, and now:

(a) 7 \$\overline\$xc4 \$\overline\$d6 8 0-0 0-0 and Black equalised (Sosonko-Bukhman, Leningrad 1965); (b) 7 2c3, when Bany-Csala (Kecskemet 1986) showed that even in this comparatively quiet variation a delay in development is dangerous: 7...a6?! 8 2xc4 2d6 (8...b5 is strongly met by 9 0-0!, and if 9...bxc4 10 2e1+ 2e7 11 d6 2e6 12 2a4+ 2d7 13 dxe7 with advantage) 9 0-0 0-0 10 2g5 h6 11 2h4 2f5 12 2d3! 2xd3 13 2xd3, and the threat of 2e4 forced Black to weaken his kingside with 13...g5.

5...2e7 6 e4 exd5 7 exd5 2d5 8 2xc4 2d6 is rather artificial. After 9 0-0! 2e7 (9...2xc4 10 2a4+!) 10 h3! 0-0 11 2d3, intending the set-up 2f4, 2d2, $\fbox{2}fe1$ and $\fbox{2}ad1$, White gains the advantage (Farago).

6	₩xd5	₩xd5
7	②xd5	2 d6

The alternative is 7.... a6 8 e4 De7:



(a) 9 乞e3 乞c7 10 乞xc4 乞g6 11 兔e3 b6 12 0-0-0 兔b7 13 兔d3 f6 14 兔c2 and White retains the initiative in this simplified position (Shipov-Zvyagintsev, St Petersburg 1993);

(b) 9 $\pounds xc4 \ angle xd5 10 \ begin{aligned} \hline xd5 & 10 \$

(c) 9 \pounds f4 2xd5 10 exd5 b5 (or 10... 2b4 11 \pounds xc4! 2c2+ 12 \pounds d2 2xa1 13 Ee1+ \pounds d8 14 2e5 with advantage – Vaiser) 11 0–0–0 f6 12 a4, and White's lead in development is a real factor (Ikonnikov-Afek, Paris 1992).



8 2d2!

Black has fewer problems after 8 e4 2c6 9 2xc4 2g4 10 2e3 2xf3 11 gxf3 2ge7.

. ∅e7

In recent years 8... 2c6 9 2xc4 2b8 has often been played:

(a) 10 e4 20d4 11 20d3 20e7 and then ... 20e6 with chances for both sides (Farago-Kallai, Budapest 1990);

(b) 10 g3, when:

8

(b1) 10... 2d4 11 公ce3 单d7 12 b4! is promising for White: 12... 单c6 (the acceptance of the sacrifice is dangerous - 12... cxb4 13 单g2 色e7 14 单b2) 13 单b2 色e6 14 色f5 单c6 15 单g2 with advantage to White (E.Vladimirov-Westerinen, Östersund 1990);

(b2) 10...2ge7 11 2xe7 2xe7 12 2e3! b6 13 2g2 2b7 (Komarov-Peric, Reims 1994) 14 0-0 2c7 15 a3, and White's position is preferable (Khenkin);

(c) 10 호e3 호e6 11 0-0-0 친ge7 12 신xe7 신xe7 13 b3 b5 14 신a3 신d5? (14...c4 is relatively best, although after 15 g3! White's position is preferable) 15 金xc5 公c3 16 里d3 金e5 17 全d4 金xd4 18 里xd4 單d8 (Bareev-Garcia Palermo, Aosta 1989), and with 19 e3! White could have remained a pawn up.

9	②xc4	Dxd5
0	②xd6+	⊈e 7
1	Dxc8+	¤ xc8
2	g3	

After 12 &g5+ f6 13 0–0–0 $\Xid8$ (if 13...Db4? 14 &f4 Dxa2+ 15 Bb1 Db416 e4 Black wins a pawn, but comes under attack) 14 e4 (the quiet 14 &d2also comes into consideration) 14...fxg5 15 exd5 Dd7 16 h4 g4 17 &d3 Df6 18 \blacksquare he1+ $\oiintf8$ 19 &f5 $\Xid6$ 20 &e6 $\Xiad8$ Black maintained the balance (Ribli-Seirawan, Montpellier Candidates 1985).

12 ... ②b4

White's position is preferable after 12...2c6 13 2g2 Ξ d8 14 2g5+ f6 15 2d2 Ξ d6 (or 15...2d4 16 Ξ c1 Ξ ac8 17 e3 2e6 18 2e2 b6 19 Ξ hd1 Ξ c7 20 a3, Zvyagintsev-Namgilov, Rostov 1993) 16 0-0 Ξ ad8 17 Ξ fc1 b6 18 2f1 a5 19 2e1 g6 20 Ξ ab1 (Psakhis-Speelman, Hastings 1987/8).

13	Lh3
14	00

IId8 ∅8c6



15 &g2 (15 &e3 \bigcirc d4) 15... \blacksquare d7 16 &c3 b6 17 a3 \bigcirc d5 18 &g5+ f6 19 e4 \bigcirc c7 20 e5 \bigcirc d5 21 exf6+ gxf6 22 &d2 \bigcirc f7. White has two active bishops, but Black has managed to equalise (Timman-Seirawan, Brussels 1986).

15 \$g5+ f6 16 \$e3, and now:

(a) 16...b6 17 Efc1 2 d4 (17...a5!?, and if 18 2 g2 2 e6 – Khalifman) 18 2 xd4 Exd4 19 a3 2 a6 20 b4! and White stands better (Salov-Seirawan, Wijk aan Zee 1992);

(b) 16...2)d4 17 2g2 2bc2 18 2xd4 2xd4 19 e3 2be6 20 2xb7 Labs 21 2e4 2g5 (the immediate 21...Lxb2 is more tenacious) 22 2g2 Lxb2 23 h4 with a favourable ending (Lputian-Seirawan, Manila Olympiad 1992).

12.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 c5 4 d5)

4		④f6
5	Dc3	e6



5....\$f5, preventing 6 e4, is possible: (a) 6 ≥ 5 a6 7 ≥ xc4 b5 8 ≥ e3 ≥ c8 9 g3 ≥ b7 10 ≥ g2 ≥ bd7 11 0-0 g6 12 a4 b4 13 ≥ e4 ≥ xe4 14 ≥ xe4 ≥ g7 (14...a5!?) 15 a5 0-0 16 ≥ g2 ≥ f6 17 ¥b3 with the better chances for White (Furman-Suetin, 33rd USSR Ch., Tallinn 1965);

(b) $6 \ge g5 \boxdot 4 7 \ a 4 + \boxdot 4 7 \ a 2 x e 4$ $\ge x e 4 9 \ a x c 4 \ge g 6 \ 10 \ e 4 \ with a good position for White (Klüger-Hennings, East Germany 1976);$

(d) 6 劉a4+ 2bd7 7 劉xc4 e6 8 劉f4 劉b6 9 e4 兔g4 10 兔b5 兔xf3 11 劉xf3 0-0-0 12 0-0 exd5 13 exd5 兔d6 14 兔e3 with an excellent position for White (D.Garcia-Ezsöl, Mamaia 1991);

(e) 6 b3 cxb3 7 ∰xb3 is an original gambit, with the idea after e2-e4 of setting the centre in motion.

5...b5, tried in Bareev-Fedorov (Naberezhnye Chelny 1988), led after 6 2xb5 &b7 7 g3 & xd5 8 &d2 e6 9 &g22d7 10 0-0 @b6 11 a4 &e7 to a roughly equal position.

6

e4 exd5

6...b5 7 ②xb5 ¥a5+ 8 ②c3 ②xe4 did not justify itself in Shamkovich-Mukhin (40th USSR Ch., Baku 1972). After 9 单d2 ②xd2 10 ¥xd2 单e7 11 逾xc4 鱼a6 12 逾xa6 ¥xa6 13 0-0-0 0-0 14 〓he1 White gained an imposing advantage in the centre.

After 6... \triangle xe4 7 \triangle xe4 exd5 the three pawns (with White having a lead in development) hardly compensate for the piece. This old conclusion has been tested in several games:

(a) 8 兔g5 獸a5+9 公c3 兔e6 10 兔d2 獸d8 11 公g5 公c6 12 兔e2 兔e7 13 公xe6 fxe6 14 兔h5+g6 15 兔g4 全f7 16 0-0 兔f6 17 萬e1 萬e8 18 獸f3 公d4 19 獸d1 with an unclear position (Tal-Karolyi, Tbilisi 1986);

(b) 8 2 c3 \$e6 (8...d4? 9 \$xc4 dxc3 10 \$xf7+) 9 2 g5 (9 b3!? cxb3 10 axb3, or 9...鬯a5 10 皇d2 d4 11 包e4 c3 12 皇f4 – Mokry), and now:

7 e5

7 exd5 \$\overline\$d6 8 \$\overline\$xc4 0-0 does not cause Black any problems.





②fd7

Other replies: 7...公g8 8 徵xd5 公c6 9 호xc4 호e6 10 徵e4 徵d7 11 호g5 호xc4 12 徵xc4 徵e6 13 徵e4 호e7 14 0-0-0 with advantage to White (B.Vladimirov-

Khodos, USSR 1958).

7...d4, and now:

(a) 8 exf6 gxf6 (8...dxc3 9 $\forall xd8+$ $\Rightarrow xd8$ 10 \bigtriangleup g5 or 10 \pounds g5 \Rightarrow e8 11 0-0-0 is clearly to White's advantage) 9 $\pounds xc4!$ dxc3 10 $\pounds xf7+$ \oint e7 11 $\forall b3$ $\forall b6$ 12 0-0 $\forall xb3$ 13 $\pounds xb3$ and Black ended up in a difficult position (B.Vladimirov-Heuer, USSR 1961);

) (b) 8 兔xc4 ②c6 (if 8... ②fd7 9 響b3 響a5 10 兔xf7+ 堂d8 11 0-0 dxc3 12 單d1 with a strong attack) 9 exf6 dxc3 10 豐e2+, and after 10... 當d7 11 皇f4 豐a5 12 置d1+ ②d4 13 皇b5+ Black lost his queen (Uhlmann-Wade, Hastings 1958/9).

8 \wxd5 has also been played:

(a) 8... ②c6, and now:

(a1) 9 \$\overline\$xc4, when Black is rescued by 9...\Ddxe5 10 \Dxe5 \\ \$\verline\$xd5 11 \Dxd5 \Dxe5 (Petrosian), although 11 \$\overline\$xd5 \Dxe5 12 0-0!? requires testing, with compensation for the pawn;

(a2) 9 We4 2b6 10 2g5 2e7 11 Id1 2d7 12 2f6 gxf6 13 exf6 2f8 14 fxe7+ Wxe7 15 2e2 Wxe4 16 2xe4Ie8 17 2xc5 2c8 18 Id2 with slightly the better position for White (Ubilava-Zaichik, Tbilisi 1986);

(a3) 9 \$g5 \$e7 10 \$xc4 0-0 11 e6! (Farago);

(b) 8... ②b6 9 對xd8+ 當xd8 10 皇g5+, when:

(b1) 10...\$e8 11 0-0-0 \$e7 12 \$\D5\$ \$\Da6 13 \$\Dackstrue{xe7}\$ \$\Dackstrue{xe7}\$ 14 \$\Dackstrue{\Dackstrue{A}}\$ d6 with the better chances for White (Torre-Seirawan, London 1984);

(b2) 10...\$c7 11 0-0-0 \$\overline\$ 6 12 \$\overline\$ d8+ \$c8 (or 12...\$c6 13 b4!!, Piskov-Grotnes, Copenhagen 1991) 13 \$\overline\$ xb6 axb6 14 \$\overline\$ g6 15 \$\overline\$ xc6 fxe6 16 \$\overline\$ xc4 and Black stands badly (Ubilava-Zs.Polgar, Trencinske Teplice 1985);

(b3) 10...兔e7 11 0-0-0+ 兔d7 12 ②e4 兔xg5+ 13 ②fxg5 空e7 14 ②d6! h6 (14...③c6 15 f4) 15 ②ge4 with an active position (Goldin-Makarov, USSR 1986).

8 ... Âe7

Or 8.... f6 9 exf6 and now:

(a) 9... 2xf6 10 \$\overline\$xf6 gxf6 (10... ₩xf6 11 \$\overline\$xd5 \$\overline\$\overline\$\overline\$\overline\$\overline\$xf6 12 \$\overline\$\overlin

(b) 9...gxf6, when White has:

(b2) 10 \pounds h4 d4 (10...2b6? 11 \pounds e5!) 11 \pounds xc4 Ψ e7+ (11...dxc3 12 0-0 \pounds e7 13 \pounds g5 with an irresistible attack, Kharitonov, Gagarin) 12 \pounds e2 \pounds b6 13 0-0 \pounds xc4 with a sharp, unclear position (Gagarin-Malyutin, Moscow 1990), and if 14 \blacksquare e1 \pounds f7!;

(b3) 10 $\forall e2+ rac{1}{2}f7$ 11 $2 dx d5 rac{1}{2}g7$ (after 11...fxg5 12 0-0-0 White has an attack for the sacrificed piece, J.Watson) 12 2 e3 b5 13 0-0-0 (Ivanchuk-Zs.Polgar, Roquebrune 1992). White has the initiative for the sacrificed pawn: 13... Is 14 $\forall c2 rac{1}{2}g8$ 15 2 f4.

9	≜xe7	₩xe7
10	ᡚxd5	₩d8



11 £xc4

11 \cong c2 is also possible:

(a) 11... 響a5+ fails to the simple 12 響c3 響xc3+ 13 bxc3 當d8 (13... 应a6 14 魚xc4) 14 0-0-0 b5 15 空g5 單f8 16 e6;

(b) 11...0-0 12 0-0-0 2c6 13 \$xc4 2dxe5 14 2xe5 2xe5 15 \$he1!;

(c) 11... 公c6 is strongly met by 12 0-0-0, when 12... 公dxe5? loses to 13 ②xe5 ②xe5 14 豐e4;

(d) 11...②xe5 12 We4 象e6 13 Wxe5 Wxd5 14 Wxg7 算f8 15 罩d1 We4+ 16 象e2 ②d7 17 ②g5! Wg6 18 ②xe6 Wxe6, and now:

(d1) 19 $extsf{w}$ g5 f6 20 $extsf{w}$ h5+ $extsf{m}$ f7 21 0-0 0-0-0 22 $extsf{w}$ d6 23 $extsf{w}$ xf7 $extsf{w}$ e5 24 $extsf{w}$ xh7 $extsf{w}$ e6 25 $extsf{w}$ e4 $extsf{m}$ d4 26 $extsf{w}$ e3 $extsf{w}$ f5 27 h4 b6 28 h5 $extsf{m}$ e4 29 $extsf{w}$ d2 $extsf{m}$ d4 (Piket-E.Vladimirov, Rotterdam 1988), when the game should have ended in a draw by repetition - 30 $extsf{w}$ e3 $extsf{m}$ e4 31 $extsf{w}$ d2 $extsf{m}$ d4;

(d2) the no less complicated variation 19 Wxh7 0-0-0 20 Wc2 Ife8 21 h4 20e5 22 0-0 Idd 23 Ixd4 cxd4 24 Ic1 b5 25 We4, analysed by Vladimirov and assessed in favour of White, was tested in Brenninkmeijer-Zs.Polgar (Wijk aan Zee 1990): 25...Wb6! 26 Pf1 Ie6 27 h5 Pb8 28 Qg4 Oxg4 29 Wxg4 d3 30 Wg8+Pb7 31 Wxf7+Pa6 32 a4 b4 33 Wf4 Wc5 34 h6 Wd5 35 Id1 We4 36 Wxe4 Ixe4 37 g3 Ie6 38 Pg2 Ixh6 39 f4 Id6 40 f5 c3 - the black pawnsproved stronger, and White resigned;

(d3) 19 0-0 0-0-0 20 \$\overline{2}g4 f5 21 \$\overline{2}h3 \$\overline{2}h6 22 \$\overline{2}h6 with the better chances for White (Lobron-Zs.Polgar, Munich 1991);

(e) 11...2a6 12 0-0-0 b5 13 We4 2b7 14 e6 2b6 15 Wf5! (15 2f6+Wxf6 16 Wxb7 2b4; 15 exf7+ 2f8) 15...f6 (Farago-Hertneck, Altensteig 1987), and now 16 2xb6! Wxb6 17 Ed7 2c6 (17...0-0 18 Wg4! g6 19 Wh4) 18 Exg7 0-0-0 19 e7+ Ed7 20 Wxf6 leads to an advantage for White (Farago);

(f) 11...4 b6 12 0-0-0, and:

(f1) 12... ②8d7 13 ④xb6 (or 13 e6! fxe6 14 ②f4) 13...豐xb6 14 鱼xc4 豐h6+ 15 슣b1 0-0 16 單d6 豐f4 (Lukacs-Zs.Polgar, Budapest 1986) 17 罝e1! ②b6 18 兔d3 and White wins;

(f2) 12...2xd5 13 2xc4 0-0 (13... 2e6? 14 2xd5 2xd5 15 3xc5, or 14... 2e6? 15 2xe6 3xc5 16 3xc5 2d7, Lukacs-Pekarek, Polanica Zdroj 1986, 17 3xd6! with a decisive material advantage for White) 14 3xd5 (14 2xd53xc7 15 h4, when in Lukacs's opinion White stands better, but after 15...2a6Black would appear to have counterplay) 14...3xc7 15 h4, and here too, with 15...2c6 16 3xc6 18 2xc6 fxe6 19 3d62d4 Black can successfully defend (Averkin-Mirkovic, Belgrade 1992);

(g) 11...b5 12 0-0-0 (or 12 賀e4 皇b7 13 e6 0-0 14 exd7 徵a5+) 12...皇b7 leads to an extremely sharp position:

(g2) 13 g3! Wa5 (13... 2c6 14 £h3, and the capture of the e5 pawn gives White a dangerous attack after **Zhe1**; if 13...0-0 White attacks with 14 h4 h6 15 2g5! hxg5 16 hxg5 g6 17 f4!) 14 We4 2xd5 15 Wxd5 Wxa2 16 Wxa8 with a decisive material advantage (Ivanchuk-Zs.Polgar, Monaco 1993).

11 ...

Or 11.... 2c6, and:

(a) 12 0-0 0-0 13 萬日 ②b6 14 ②xb6 axb6 15 變xd8 ②xd8 16 a3 ②c6 17 国ad1 ②g4 18 e6 ③xe6 19 ④xe6 fxe6 20 邕xe6 邕fd8 21 邕de1 邕d3 with an equal game (Karpov-Ehlvest, Belfort 1988);

0-0

(b) 12 @a4 0-0 (or 12...@a5+ 13 @xa5 2xa5 14 ab5 with some initiative for White) 13 0-0-0 2d4(13...2cxe5 14 2xe5 2xe5 15 \blacksquare he1 gives White a menacing position, Flear-Garcia Palermo, Szirak 1986) 14 \blacksquare he1 2b6 15 2xb6 @xb6 16 2xd4 ccd4 17 @b3 (17 $\blacksquarexd4$ af5) 17...@c5 18 @c2with the better position for White (Cvitan-Ehlvest, Vrsac 1987);

(c) 12 營e2! 營a5+ (12...公b6 is probably best, althought after the simple 13 公xb6 Black still has problems):



13 b4! (first played by Shcherbakov, who, in *New in Chess Yearbook* No.42, mentions that the same move occurred earlier in a similar situation in a game Dautov-Donchenko – cf. p.249; 13 \$f1 or 13 \$2d2 allows Black time to consolidate) 13...\$2xb4 (after 13...cxb4 14 e6 White wins) 14 0-0 \$2xd5, and now:

(c1) 15 e6 ②7f6 16 exf7+ 全xf7 17 Iad1 Ie8 18 全xd5+ 全f8 19 ℃c2 (Shcherbakov-Vaulin, Chelyabinsk 1990) when Black's best chance was to return the pawn by 19...全g4 20 全xb7 Iad8 21 Ixd8 Ixd8 22 ②e5, after which White retains the initiative thanks to the exposed position of the black king (Shcherbakov);

(c2) 15 皇xd5 创f8 (White has a winning attack after 15...创b6 16 皇xf7+! 11...2b6 can be met by 12 2x66 3x66 13 0-0 0-0 14 2g5 h6 15 2xf7 3xf7 16 3d5 3c7 17 3ad1 2c6 18 3xc5 3c8 19 3xf7 3c7 3c7 20 b4! (Vaiser-Mirkovic, Vrnjacka Banja 1984) or 20 f4. With material roughly equal, White's position looks more promising.

12 Wc2

12 0-0 ②c6 13 罩e1 ②b6 14 ②xb6 axb6 15 窗c2 兔g4 16 窗e4 兔xf3 17 窗xf3 窗d4 leads to an equal position (Krasenkov-Bus, Budapest 1989).

12 ...

. ් නිc6

If he wishes, Black can transpose into the variation from the previous note by 12...2b6.

After 12... $\blacksquare e8$ 13 0–0–0 it is more than dangerous for Black to take the pawn: 13... $\boxdot xe5$ (13... $\boxdot c6$ 14 \blacksquare hel leads to a position from the main line) 14 \blacksquare hel \boxdot bc6 15 $\boxdot xe5$ $\boxdot xe5$ (15... $\exists xe5$ 16 $\blacksquare xe5$ $\boxdot xe5$ 17 $\blacksquare e4!$) 16 $\bumpeq b5!$ $\blacksquare e6$ (16... $\bumpeq d7?$ 17 $\oiint xd7$ $\boxdot xd7$ 18 $\exists xe8+ \blacksquare xe8$ 19 $\boxdot c7$ and wins, or 16... $\circlearrowright g4$ 17 $\oiint xe8$ $\circlearrowright xd1$ 18 $\blacksquare xd1$ c4 19 $\blacksquare f5$ $\blacksquare xe8$ 20 $\oiint c7$ and White won, Salov-Radulov, Leningrad 1984) 17 $\boxdot f4$ $\blacksquare f6$ 18 $\blacksquare d2!$ g6 19 $\blacksquare d8+ \oiint g7$ 20 $\boxdot xe6+$ and wins (Belyavsky-Seirawan, USSR v. Rest of the World, 1984).

The sharp 12...b5 is parried by 13 2xb5 2xe5 14 24 2xf3+ 15 gxf3 2e6 16 0-0-0 with advantage to White (W.Watson).

13 0-0-0 **Ze8**

If 13.... @dxe5 14 @xe5 @xe5 15 Ehe1.

Now there can follow 14 **I**hel 20d4 15 2xd4 cxd4 16 f4 2b6 17 **I**xd4 The character of the positions arising in this complicated variation suggests that corrections and even radical reassessments can be expected.

12.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 c5)

4 e3

5

5

A quiet continuation, inviting Black to revert to classical lines with 4...e6 5 &xc4 @f6.

If 5 exd4 Black can play 5... \$e6 with a favourable version of the Winawer Variation:

(a) 6 ②c3 ②f6 7 ②e5 ③c6 8 ③xc6 bxc6 9 賀a4 賀d7 10 皇xc4 皇xc4 11 徵xc4 e6 with a roughly equal position (Chekhov-Lukin, USSR 1982);

(b) 6 包a3 包f6 7 包xc4 包c6 8 包ce5 象d5 9 象d3 g6 10 0-0 象g7 11 象e3 0-0 and ... 包d7, and Black overcomes his problems (Hebert-Lputian, Saint John 1988).

₩c7

The prelude to the modern variation. Of course, not 5...dxe3? 6 \pounds xf7+.

5...d3 is possible (Nenashev-Afek, Hania 1994): 6 0-0 ②f6 7 ②c3 (7 单d3 g6!) 7...②c6 8 a3 g6 9 斷b3 e6 10 單d1 鱼g7 11 鱼xd3 釁e7 12 ②e4 0-0 13 鱼d2 and 單ac1 with the initiative.

5...e6 6 exd4 创f6 leads to the Steinitz Variation.

6 ₩b3

After 6 ₩c2 e6 7 2xd4 2c6 8 2xc6 ₩xc6 9 0-0 2f6 the game is equal (Guseinov-A.Mikhalchishin, Klaipeda 1988). Christiansen-de la Villa (Szirak 1987) went 6 2a3 e6 7 @a4+ 2d7 82b5 @d8 9 0-0 a6 10 2e2 2f6 112e5 d3 12 2xd3 2c6 13 2xd7 2xd714 2d4 2c5 15 2xc6 @xd3 16 2e5+2xa4 17 2xd3 Zd8 18 b3 2c3 19 2f42d6 with equal chances.

6 ... e6 6...皇e6? is bad: 7 皇xe6 豐xc1+ 8 宮e2 豐xh1 9 皇xf7+ 當d8 10 豐xb7.

7 exd4

7 ...

Little is promised by playing for a lead in development: $7 \oslash xd4$ a6 $8 \oslash c3$ $\boxdot f6 9 \pounds d2 \pounds d7 10 \blacksquare c1 \boxdot c6 11 \pounds e2$ $\boxdot xd4 12 exd4 \pounds c6 13 \pounds f3 \pounds e7 (13...$ $\pounds xf3 14 \boxdot b5! extstyle xc1 + 15 \pounds xc1 \blacksquare c8 16$ $extstyle xd5 extstyle xc1 + 15 \pounds xc1 \blacksquare c8 16$ $extstyle xd5 extstyle xc1 + 17 \pounds d2 extstyle xc1 extstyle xc1 extstyle xd5 18 \pounds c7 +$ $\u03c9 d8 19 extstyle xd5 16 \u03c9 b6 extstyle xd5 15 \pounds xd5 exd5 16 \u03c9 b6 extstyle xd5 17 0-0 extstyle d6 18 extstyle fe1 0-0 (Gaprindashvili-$ Levitina, match, Lvov 1983).

Dc6

7... $\pounds d7 \ge 0-0$ 6 is strongly met by 9 d5! $2 a \le 10$ dxe6! $2 x \ge 311$ exf7+ $\pounds d \ge 12$ fxg8= \blacksquare $\exists xg \ge 13$ $\pounds x \ge 3$ $\exists h \ge 14$ 14 $2 g \le 5$. For the moment the material equivalent for the queen is insufficient, but Black has to defend against the threat of 15 2 f = 7+, and White gains time to include his reserves in the attack.



8 2c3 a6 (or 8...2f6 9 0–0 2d7 10 Wd1 2e7 11 2g5 2f8, Dorfman-Lukin, USSR 1984) 9 Wd1 (...2a5 was threatened) 9...2f6 10 0–0 2e7(Vyzhmanavin-Kaidanov, Norilsk 1987). 11 We2 and Zd1 leads to a position typical of the Steinitz Variation with an extra tempo for Black. Chances are roughly equal.

8 \forall d1 \pm b4+ 9 \therefore c3 \pm d7. The white queen has returned prematurely, and Black has the typical positional threat of seizing control of c4. After 10 0–0 \pm xc3 11 bxc3 \therefore a5 12 \pm d3 \therefore f6 (with development incomplete it is dangerous to take the c3 pawn) his position is slightly preferable (Timoshchenko-Lputian, Pavlodar 1982).

8 0–0 a6 9 \pounds e2 comes into consideration, e.g. 9... \pounds f6 10 \pounds c3 \pounds e7 11 \pounds e3 0–0 12 \exists ac1 \pounds d7 13 \pounds a4 \pounds d5 14 \pounds c5 \exists ab8 15 \exists fd1 with the initiative for White (Yermolinsky-Lima, Manila Olympiad 1992).

12.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3)

3... еб



This position (more usually reached via the move order 2...e6 3 乞f3 dxc4)

has been popular recently on account of its transpositional possibilities.

4 e4

The prophylactic 4 a4 is well met by 4..., 2c6, and if 5 e4 2a5.

The restrained 4 e3 can lead to a position in which Black, while conceding the centre, obtains two passed pawns on the queenside: 4...b5 5 a4 c6 6 axb5 cxb5 7 b3 and now 7...2b4+8 2d2 2xd2+9 2bxd2 a5 10 bxc4 b4. White's chances look better, but Ruban has regularly employed this variation with quite good results (it is examined in more detail under a different move order on p.195).

4 Wa4+ has been popular of late:

(a) 4...2c65 $\forall xc4 2f666 gg5$ (for 6 2c3 cf. the Mannheim Variation p.205) 6...h67 gxf6 $\forall xf68$ 2c3 gd69 g3 0-0 10 gg2 (Kramnik-Ivanchuk, Dortmund 1995) and now Black should have played the active 10...e5;

(b) 4.... 2) d7 5 e4, when:

(b1) 5...2)f6 6 2c3 a6 7 2xc4 2b8 8 2c2 b5 9 2d3 2b7 10 2f4 2c8 11 2d1 c5 12 d5 c4 13 dxe6 (better 13 2c2) 13...cxd3 (Kramnik-Ehlvest, Novgorod 1995), and now the sacrifice 14 exf7+? proved unsound;

(b2) 5...c5 6 오xc4 cxd4 7 ②xd4 智b6!? (a provocative move aimed at disrupting White's development) 8 ②b3 (after 8 ④b5 a6 9 오f4 e5 10 오xe5? ②xe5! 11 ②c7+ 當d8 12 ③xa8 智b4+! Black wins material) 8...오d6 9 오e3 智c7 and the white queen looks rather misplaced at a4 (Piket-Lautier, match, Monaco 1996) – analysis by Speelman;

(c) 4...c6 5 螢xc4 ②f6 6 金g5 兔e7 7 e3 0-0 8 兔e2 螢a5+ 9 ②c3 ②bd7 10 0-0 e5 with a roughly equal game (Ivanchuk-Anand, Las Palmas 1996).

4 ... c5

Or 4...b5 5 a4, and now:

(a) 5... 堂b7 6 axb5 堂xe4 7 堂xc4 堂xb1 8 罩xb1 (Osnos-Zavernyaev, Moscow 1959) 8... 堂b4+ 9 堂f1 (or even 9 堂e2) with the better position for White;

(b) 5...c6 leads to complicated play:

(b1) $6 \triangleq g5 \triangleq b4+7 \textcircled{2}c3 \textcircled{2}e7 8 \triangleq e2$ $\triangleq b7 9 0-0 a6$ (Lputian-Kupreichik, Yerevan 1984) 9...a6, when Black keeps his pawn but White has a strong centre;

5 \$xc4 cxd4 6 2xd4

After further simplification -6 $\forall xd4$ 2b4+7 2d2 2xd2+8 2bxd2 $\forall xd49$ 2xd4 White, with his excellent development, retains the initiative, e.g. 9...a6 10 e5 2d7 11 f4 b5 12 2e2 2b713 a4 (Elbilia-Afek, Tel Aviv 1992).



Now 6...a6 7 0c3 leads to a position considered on p.179, while for 6...0f6 7 0c3 cf. p.216.

 2xd4 9 2xd4 2f6 10 2c3 0-0 11 2c5Ee8 12 0-0 2d7 13 Ee1 b6 14 2e3 a6 15 2f1 b5 16 2g5 with somewhat the better game for White (Sosonko-Radulov, Surokarta-Denpasar 1982).

12.3 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 分f3)

3 ... 创d7

The early development of the queen's knight followed by playing it to b6 is an idea of the Russian player Godes.

e4!

The most energetic. Other options:

4 e3 2b6 (4...b5 5 a4 c6 6 axb5 cxb5 7 b3 2b6 8 2a3! favours White), and now:

(a) $5 \text{ (arcd)} \text{(arcd)} \text{$

(b) 5 2bd2 2e6, when:

(b1) 6 ②g5?! 兔d5 7 e4 e6! 8 exd5 (8 ②gf3 요c6; 8 ②df3 요c6 9 ②e5 is unfavourable in view of 9... 金b4+) 8...豐xg5 9 dxe6 0-0-0! 10 exf7 (if 10 ②f3 金b4+ 11 兔d2 兔xd2+ 12 獸xd2 獸xd2+ 13 敏xd2 fxe6) 10... ③h6 11 ②f3 饗g6 and Black seized the initiative (Nikolac-Kovacevic, Yugoslavia 1976);

(b2) 6 @c2 266 7 2xc4 2xc4 8 2xc4 2xc4 9 @xc4 c6 10 0-0 e6 11 2d2 @d5 12 Ifc1 2e4 13 2e1 2d6 14 b4 and White retained a slight initiative (Lukacs-Kovacevic, Tuzla 1981).

4 2c3 should be considered. After 4...2b652e5g662xc42g772xb6axb682f4c69e32f6102e50-011 2e2b512a4 White gained the better chances in Mishuchkov-Godes (USSR 1981). With 4 $\forall a4$ White can invite transposition into the Mannheim Variation (by 4...2)f6). If 4...a6 5 $\forall xc4$, then 5...b5? fails to 6 $\forall c6 \exists b8 7 \& f4$.

4 \triangle bd2 is dubious: 4...b5! 5 b3 c3 6 \triangle b1 (if 6 \triangle e4 b4 7 a3 \triangle b7 8 \triangle g3 a5 it is not apparent how White can regain the pawn) 6...b4 7 a3 c5 8 dxc5 \triangle xc5 9 C2 \triangle e6! with advantage to Black (Borisenko-Dorfman, Chelyabinsk 1975).

4 ... ②b6



5 公 c3 单g4 6 单e2 (6 单e3 or 6 单xc4 公xc4 7 響a4+ and 8 響xc4 is possible) 6...e6 7 0-0 公f6 8 单e3 单b4 9 豐c2 单xc3 10 bxc3 h6 11 单c1 0-0 12 单a3 置e8 13 ④e5 单xe2 14 響xe2 公fd7 with roughly equal chances (Grigorian-Skvortsov, Moscow 1981).

If White prevents ... &g4 by 5 h3, Black develops with 5... @f6 6 @c3 e6 7&xc4 @xc4 8 @a4+ c6 9 @xc4, and inZilberman-Godes (Chelyabinsk 1975)he sacrificed a pawn: 9... b5 10 @xc6+<math>&d7 11 @a6 b4 12 @b5 @b8! 13 a4 bxa3 14 @xa3 &b4+ 15 &c2 @xe4 and gained the advantage.

It is more advisable for White to take on c4 with a knight, and with this aim 5 **②e5** looks logical: 5...①f6 (Godes recommends 5...g6) 6 ②c3 e6 (6...①fd7 and ...g7-g6 is possible, as in the variation 5 at a5 6 \bigcirc e5) 7 \bigcirc xc4 & b4 8 f3 0-0 9 & e3 c6 10 a3 & e7 11 \bigotimes d2 with a solid centre and good prospects.

5 a4 a5 6 De5 Df6 7 Dc3, and now:

(a) 7....g6 8 ②xc4 ②xc4 9 ③xc4 鱼g7 10 e5 ②d7 11 徵b3 e6 (not 11...0-0? 12 ③xf7+ 菖xf7 13 e6) 12 ④e4 with advantage to White (Brilla-Banfalvi-Godes, corr. 1981/4);

(b) 7...2fd7 8 2xc4 g6 9 2f4 c6 10 Ud2 2g7 11 2h6 0-0 12 Id1 2xc413 2xc4 2b6 (Black should counterattack with 13...2xh6 14 Uxc4 Ub6) 14 2a2! Ud6 15 h4 and White launched an offensive (Gavrikov-Gulko, 49th USSR Ch., Frunze 1981).

12.4 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3)

3 ... **\$g4** Before White has played e2-e3 or e2-e4, this is considered premature.

4	De5	Lh5
5	Dc3	



5 g4 leads to interesting complications:

(a) 5...&g6 6 h4 (after 6 \bigtriangleup c3 \boxdot d7 7 \boxdot xc4 c6 Black's position is satisfactory) 6...&xb1 7 \blacksquare xb1 Шd5 8 \blacksquare h2! f6 9 Шa4+ b5 10 &g2 with advantage to White (analysis);

(b) 5...f6 is a sharp reply: 6 gxh5 fxe5 7 &g2 (if 7 dxe5 &xd1+ 8 &xd1 there can follow 8...Cc6 9 f4 0-0-0+ 10 Cd2 g5) 7...c6 8 d5 (if 8 dxe5 &a5+) 8...Cf6 9 e4 e6 10 0-0 (10 Cc3 &b4) 10...exd5 11 exd5 cxd5 12 &g5 (after 12 Cc3 the exchange sacrifice 12...d4 13 &xb7 Cbd7! is promising) 12...Cc6 13 &xf6 &xf6 14 &xd5 \blacksquare d8 15 &xc4 \blacksquare d4 16 \bigotimes b3 \blacksquare b4 17 \bigotimes h3 with a double-edged position, in which Black has to reckon with his kingside being undeveloped (Malich-Kavalek, Halle 1963).

f6

Obvious moves are unsatisfactory:

5

5...e6? 6 g4 \pounds g6 7 h4 f6 8 a4+ c6 9 xg6 hxg6 10 \oiint xc4, and the old game Alekhine-Grünfeld (Semmering 1926) continued 10...f7 (10...e7 11 e4 d7 12 \pounds e3 0-0-0 13 d5! also favours White) 11 e4 d7 12 \pounds e3 a5 13 a3 (directed against 13...b6 14 b3 \oiint b4; the queen must be kept on the a2-g8 diagonal) 13...e8 14 f4 e7 15 0-0-0 \oiint c8 16 f5! \oiint d6 17 \oiint a2! g5 18 h5 b5 19 e5 with a decisive advantage for White.

After 5... 신d7 Black has a difficult (a) 6 신xc4 신gf6, and now:

(a1) 7 ₩b3 2b6 8 e4 ₩xd4 (after 8...e6 9 2c3 White has a positional advantage without any material loss) 9 2c3 ₩d8 (the queen has to return, since 9...₩d7? is refuted by 10 2xb6! axb6 11 2xb6 and 12 2b5, Bogoljubow-Grekov, Kiev 1914) 10 f3 e6 11 2b5 (first 11 Id1 ₩c8 and now 12 2b5 2xc4 13 ₩xc4 is also favourable)

11... 0xc4 12 \vec xc4, and White has a clear advantage (Bogoljubow);

(a2) 7 f3 2b6 8 2a5 Ib8 9 e4 e6 10 a3 2fd7 11 2e3 2d6 12 Wd2 c6 13 b4 0-0 14 \$e2 with excellent game (Andersson-Kavalek, Bugojno 1982);

(b) 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a4 c6 (6... $\frac{1}{2}$ gf 7 e4) 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ xc4 (perhaps even stronger than 7 2xd7 ₩xd7 8 ₩xc4, then e2-e4 and \$e3 with a good position for White -Alekhine) 7... 2xe5 8 dxe5 e6 9 g4 2g6 10 \$2 \$\$c7 11 f4, and if 11...h5 12 h3 hxg4 13 hxg4 \armaxh1+ 14 \overlinexh1 0-0-0 15 Wa4!

6 Dxc4 e6 ₩b3 7 Ø)c6 If 7... 響xd4 8 包b5. 8 e3

The white pieces are actively placed, but, in Tartakower's opinion, after 8... **Zb8** Black can defend successfully.

12.5 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3)

. . .

3

b5

Until recently this move was unconditionally accompanied by a question mark. The attempt to keep the pawn is, of course, faulty. But, in allowing the opponent superiority in the centre, Black can hope to use his passed pawns on the queenside to create counterplay.

4 24

If 4 e3 2d7 (4... 2f6 leads to the variation 3 2f3 2f6 4 e3 b5) 5 a4 c6 6 De5! (not 6 axb5 cxb5 7 De5 Dc6, and if 8 ②xd7 響xd7 9 b3 e5, when all the play lies ahead). But now 7 axb5 cxb5 8 $rac{W}{13}$ is threatened – White stands better.

Here it should be mentioned that Black can avoid these not very favourable variations by not hurrying with 3...b5, but instead playing 3...c6, and only if 4 e3 b5, when after 5 a4 e6 a positional analysed below is reached.

c6 . . . 5 e3

4

5 axb5 cxb5 6 b3 is less clear in view of 5...e5.

5 e4 is possible, when 5...e6 6 b3 leads to a position from the Slav Defence (1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 2 f3 dxc4 4 e4 b5 followed by 5...e6 or 5... (2) f6).

> 5 еб. . . .

Or 5....\begin{bmatrix} b6 6 axb5 cxb5 and now:

(a) 7 0e5 e6 (but not 7... 0b7, when the usual 8 b3 cxb3 9 Wxb3 enables White advantageously to restore material equality) 8 b3 (or 8 #f3 #b7; the 10 劉xa8 ②c6 loses material) 8... 皇b4+:

(b) 7 b3! cxb3 8 Wxb3 and White regains the pawn with the better position: Black cannot reply 8...b4 in view of 9 ₩d5 皇b7 10 皇b5+ 皇c6 11 纪e5 ₩xb5 12 ₩xf7+, winning, while 8... 2d7 is met by 9 包e5.



This position also arises in the Slav Defence after 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 2f3 dxc4 4 e3 b5 5 a4 e6.

6 axb5

If 6 b3 Black has:

e5?! (if 8...a5 9 bxc4 b4 Osnos indicates 10 c5, after which the white knight may reach d6; 8...cxb3 9 axb5 b2 10 互a2 requires testing) 9 axb5 exd4 10 公xc4 金e6 11 徵xd4 徵xd4 12 exd4 and White gained a great advantage (Osnos-Vorotnikov, USSR 1985);

(b) 6...b4 is an improvement: 7 (sc4(if 7 bxc4 c5!) 7...(cf 6 8 0 - 0 (bd 7 9 (bd 2 0 - 0 11 (bd 2 0 -

6 ... cxb5 7 b3 ≙b4+

In Kramnik-Hübner (Biel 1993) Black preferred 7...公f6, but after 8 bxc4 bxc4 9 오xc4 오e7 10 ②e5! 0-0 11 對行 ②d5 12 ②c3 오b4 13 오d2 오b7 14 ②xd5 오xd2+ 15 空xd2 오xd5 16 오xd5 exd5 17 耳hb1 White gained an undisputed positional advantage.

8 2d2 2xd2+ 9 2bxd2 a5

It is on this move, setting up two passed pawns, that the modern interpretation of the variation is based.

10 bxc4 b4



11 **L**d3

The alternative plan is 11 c5 with the possible transfer of the knight to d6:

(a) 11... 20e7 12 \$b5+ \$d7 13 ₩a4 (after 13 \$xd7+ 2xd7 14 0-0 0-0 15 2c4 2d5 Black has counterplay with ...2c3; if 15 e4 he replies 15...2b8, intending ...2bc6) 13...0-0 14 2e5 2xb5(14...2d5 15 2xd7 2c3 16 2xf8!2xa4 17 2xe6 fxe6 18 $\Xi xa4$ favours White) 15 $\Xi xb5$ C7 16 2dc4 2bc6(Neverov-Gurgenidze, USSR 1985) 17 2xc6 2xc6 18 0-0, planning 2b6, $\Xi fd1$ and e3-e4. White's superiority in the centre and control over important squares on the queenside give him the advantage (Neverov);

(b) 11... 公f6 12 金b5+ (12 公c4) 12... 全d7 13 徵a4 0-0 (Baburin-Ruban, USSR 1986) 14 ②e5! with the better chances for White.

. 幻f6

12 g4!?

11

12

White uses his central advantage to prepare a kingside attack. If, as in the previous variation, he continues 12 0–0 0–0 13 c5 (not 13 e4 e5!) (Ruban-Vorotnikov, USSR 1985), then 13... a6 (or 13...c6 14 c4 c4 c45 15 c2h6 16 c46 c33 14 c424 c45 15 c2h6 16 c46 c33 14 c24 c424 15 cxc4 c244 16 c33 17 c3d2, and White exchanges the knight at c3 by c3b1, with a complicated battle and chances for both sides.

If 12... 2xg4 13 Ig1, picking up the g7 pawn and intending c4-c5 and 2c4.

13	g5	⊂ Øfd7
14	De4	

14 h4 螢c7 15 c5 h6 16 公c4 hxg5 17 公d6+ 空e7 18 單g1 leads to a sharp, unclear position (Lputian-Gurgenidze, 52nd USSR Ch., Riga 1985).

Naumkin-Ruban (Moscow 1991) now continued 14... \Im c7 15 c5 0–0 16 \Im g1 g6, when Ruban evaluates this position as roughly equal. After 17 2d6 \pounds c6 18 h4 a4 19 h5 b3 Black does have counterplay, but White's pieces are very active, and his chances seem better. 13

Mannheim Variation 3 勾f3 勾f6 4 營a4+

1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 公f3 公f6 4 幽a4+

The variation in which White regains the pawn at c4 by the queen manoeuvre @a4+ and @xc4 occurred in one of the games from the Bogoljubow-Alekhine match (1934) played in Mannheim, and became known as the Mannheim Variation. The resulting set-ups are close to the Catalan Opening, or, more precisely, to the variation 1 d4 @16 2 c4 e6 3 g3 d5 4 @g2 dxc4 5 @a4+.



Black's main replies are: 4....€ (13.1) 4....€ c6 (13.2) – p.203 4...€ bd7 (13.3) – p.207 4....€ d7 (13.4) – p.212 4....€ d7 (13.5) – p.213

After 4... 2 fd7 5 e4 e6 6 \$\overline{xc4 c5 7} d5 exd5 8 \$\overline{xd5}\$ White stands better (Pachman-Janetschek (Barcelona 1975). 13.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ᡚf3 ᡚf6 4 ₩a4+)

> ... c6 ₩xc4

The main continuations are:

5... £f5 (13.11)

5.... g4 (13.12) - p.201

5...g6 (13.13) - p.202

If Black is agreeable to a slightly inferior ending, he can offer the exchange of queens by 5... Ud5.

For 5....e6 cf. p.192.

13.11 (1 d4	d5 2 c4 dxc4	3 Df3	②f6
4 ₩a4+ c6	5 ₩xc4)		

5 ... \$£f5 This move, currently considered very sound, was employed in game 23 of the Bogoljubow-Alekhine match. By taking control of e4, Black intends to prevent White from strengthening his centre.

White has two plans:

6 De3 (13.111)

6

6 g3 (13.112) - p.200

In Andersson-Garcia Palermo (Mar del Plata 1982) the modest 6 e3 was successfully employed: after 6...e6 7 호d3 호xd3 8 螢xd3 公bd7 9 0-0 호e7 (9...c5!?) 10 公c3 0-0 11 e4 螢c7 12 호g5 White had the initiative.

6 **g**5 De4 is satisfactory for Black.

13.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 句f 句f6 4 豐a4+ c6 5 豐xc4 皇f5)	3

තිc3 නිbd7

6...e6 is also played:

(a) 7 g3 ②e4 (beginning a battle for the e4 square) 8 호g2 ②xc3 9 bxc3 호e4 10 0-0 호e7 11 ②d2 호xg2 12 李xg2 習d5+ 13 e4 豐xc4 14 ②xc4. White's position is preferable (Trifunovic-Radulescu, Budapest 1948);

(b) 7 對b3 對b6! 8 對xb6 axb6 9 ②h4 b5 10 ②xf5 exf5 11 e3 ④bd7 12 氢d3 g6, and Black's position is even slightly preferable (Smyslov-Hübner, match, Velden 1983).

7 g3

Skembris-Lirindzakis (Ano Liosia 1993/4) went 7 e3 e6 8 \triangle h4 &g4 (8... \triangle b6 9 Wb3) 9 h3 &h5 10 g4 \triangle d5 11 \triangle f5 (or 11 \triangle g2 &g6 12 \triangle f4) 11...&g6 12 \triangle g3 with chances for both sides.

e6

Or 7... ②e4 8 兔g2, when 8... ②xc3 9 bxc3 ②b6 10 斷b3 兔e4 is probably best, although after 11 ②e5 兔d5 12 兔xd5 酇xd5 13 f3 e6 14 e4 酇xb3 15 axb3 the ending is more pleasant for White.

8 ģg2 ģe7

In the Bogoljubow-Alekhine game the World Champion unexpectedly played 8...&c2?! The white queen is surrounded, and Black threatens to win it by 9...&b6. But after the 'forced' 9 e3 White occupied the centre and gained the advantage: 9...&c7 10 0–0 0–0 11 a3 a5 12 @c2 &c6 13 e4 @b6 14 h3 @a6 15 @c2.

Alekhine played ... 2c2 too early. Perhaps he should have waited, to see if the opponent would play his rook to d1 - 8... 2c7 9 0-0 0-0 10 Id1? (preparing 2h4 and e2-e4), and then win the exchange by 10... 2c2!, since after 11 Id2? 2b6 White loses his queen.

In Dlugy-Williams (New York 1983) White fell into this trap after 8...h6 9 0-0 全e7 10 罝d1? 全c2! Correct (as in the Bogoljubow-Alekhine game) is 10 e3 (or 10 a4) 10...0-0 11 徵e2 ④e4 12 ②d2 ②xd2 13 兔xd2 ②f6 14 e4 兔g6 15 兔e3 螢a5 16 a3, when White's position is preferable (Fedorowicz-Williams, New York 1982/3).

In Portisch-Spassky (Amsterdam 1964) Black chose 8....全d6. This move too cannot be considered good, since White obtains a strong centre: 9 0-0 0-0 10 公h4! 堂g4 11 h3 堂h5 12 e4 纪e8 13 堂e3 堂e7 14 纪f3 公d6 15 戰b3 with the better position.

After 8.... 2 e4 9 0−0 2 b6 10 ₩b3 \$e7 strong is 11 a4!

9 0--0 0--0



10 e3

The modern continuation.

As already mentioned, 10 **Id1**? loses the exchange (10...**2**c2!), while 10 **2**h4? loses the d4 pawn after 10...**2**b6.

Other continuations:

10 **\$**g5:

(a) 10...h6 11 \$xf6 \$xf6, and now:

(a1) 12 e4, when Black put pressure on the central pawn by 12.... 全g4 13 耳fd1 ②b6 14 斷d3 斷d7 15 e5 全e7 16 ②e4 耳fd8 and gained a good position (Taimanov-Platonov, Moscow 1964);

(a2) the restrained 12 單fd1 a5 13 e3 a4 14 豐e2 豐a5 15 纪d2 纪b6 led to an equal game (Seirawan-Portisch, Tilburg 1983);

10 a3 a5 11 全存 包b6 12 署a2 包fd5 13 罩ac1 (Hort-Wiemer, West Germany 1983/4) 13...包xf4 14 gxf4 包d5 with equal chances.

10 單e1 包e4 11 智b3 智b6 12 智xb6 axb6 with an equal position (Portisch-Unzicker, Santa Monica 1966).

10 单 f4, and now:



(b) 10... 包b6 is also satisfactory: 11 對3 包fd5 12 单d2 包xc3 13 单xc3 单e4 14 单b4 单xb4 15 獸xb4 a5 16 獸c3 獸d5 with an equal game (Filip-Tringov, Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964);

(c) 10...2e4 11 a4 a5 12 **E**fd1 **W**b6 13 2h4!, and in Miles-Hübner (Wijk aan Zee 1984) White seized the initiative: 13...2xh4 (if 13...2xc3 14 2xf5, or 13...2d6 14 2xd6 2xd6 15 2xf5exf5 16 2h3! with advantage to White - Miles) 14 2xe4 2xe4 15 2xe4 2e716 2f3 2f6 17 e4. The strong centre and two bishops give him the advantage. 10 ... De4

Lechtynsky-Kir.Georgiev (Stara Zagora 1990) went 10...a5 11 費e2 包e4 12 公d2 公xd2 13 皇xd2 a4 14 e4 皇g6 15 a3 公f6 16 皇e3 饗a5 17 置fd1 置fd8 18 罩ac1. White's position is slightly the more active.

White also gained the better chances in Lputian-Smyslov (Rostov-on-Don 1993) after 10...h6 11 We2 De4 12 Dd2 Dxd2 13 2xd2 e5 14 d5 Db6 15 e4 2d7 16 Ifd1 2c5 17 dxc6 bxc6 18 2e3.

11 🖉 e2



11 Od2 is the alternative:

(a) 11...2xd2 12 \$\overline{x}d2 e5 13 e4, and now:

(a1) 13... 2b6 14 對b3 (Andersson-Hübner, Wijk aan Zee 1984). White's position looks promising, but Black was able to defend: 14...exd4 15 exf5 dxc3 16 全xc3 對d3 17 單fe1 單fe8 18 單e4 (18 全e4 獸c4) 18...對d7 19 罩g4 全f8;

(a2) 13...exd4 is sounder: 14 exf5 dxc3 15 \$\Delta xc3 \$\Delta f6\$ with equality (Keitlinghaus-J.Janovsky, Dortmund 1991);

(b) 11.... 2d6 12 響e2 c5 13 d5 exd5 14 2xd5 2f6 15 e4 2xd5 16 exf5 2b4 with chances for both sides (Crouch-Boudre, Cappelle la Grande 1991);

11 ... axc3

11.... b6 12 2d2 2d6 13 b3 (13 e4 \$\overline{2}g6 14 2b3 a5 with good counterplay, Vaganian-Shirov, Manila Olympiad 1992) 13...a5 14 2a3 and Iac1 with the better chances for White (Shirov).

11.... 響a5 12 皇d2 響b6 13 包e5!, and:

(a) 13....(2)xc3 14 bxc3 (2)xe5 15 dxe5, then e3-e4, Seh1 and f2-f4 favours White;

(b) 13...②xd2 14 ②xd7! 變d8 15 資xd2 資xd7 16 e4 with the better chances for White;

(c) 13...2xe5 14 2xe4 2d7 15 2c3 (15 2c3 and e3-e4 can also be considered) 15...2b4 16 2d2, and with e3-e4 to follow, White stands better (Cvetkovic-Blagojevic, Skopje 1991).

11... 2 b4 12 2 d2 (2)xd2 13 (2)xd2 e5 14 a3! with the more promising position for White (Salov-Brenninkmeijer, Wijk aan Zee 1992).

12 bxc3 单e4

13 c4, and now:

(a) 13...c5 14 單d1 豐c7 15 皇b2 ④b6 16 單ac1 皇f6 with equal chances (Akopian-Shirov, Wijk aan Zee 1993);

(b) 13... **W**a5 14 a4 **W**a6! 15 a5 c5 with an equal game (Shirov).

13.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 €)f3 €)f6 4 ₩a4+ c6 5 ₩xc4 £f5) White fianchettos his bishop, hurrying to complete his kingside development.

> 6 ... ∲2bd7 7 \$£g2 e6 8 0-0

The development of the knight at c3 – now or on the next move – leads to positions from variation 13.111.

H.Gretarsson-Spangenberg (Matinhos 1994) went 8 ₩b3 ₩b6 9 0-0 ₩xb3 10 axb3 &c2 (10...c5 11 2bd2; the simplest is 10...&d6 11 2bd2 0-0 12 2bc4 &c7 with equality) 11 2bfd2 &b4 12 2ba3 &g6 13 2bdc4 &c7. After 14 &d2 the chances are equal.

... 🛓e7

8.... 2b6 9 ₩b3 ₩d5 comes into consideration:

(a) 10 2bd2, and now:

8

(a1) 10... Wxb3 11 2xb3 a5 12 2d2 2c4 with equal chances (Gheorghiu-O.Rodriguez, New York 1988);

(a2) 10... & e7 11 10... 0 12 2b3(12 e3 is possible, and if 12... 12 & b3(2e5 followed by b2-b3, b2 and 12, Kurajica-Giorgadze, El Vendrell 1996) 12... ae4 when Black easily solved his opening problems (Goldin-Akopian, St Petersburg 1994);

9 ②bd2

9 **₩b3** is also playable: 9... 2b6 (9... ₩b6 10 2bd2 transposes into the main line) 10 a4 a5 11 2c3 0-0 12 2bh4 \$\overline\$g4 13 e4.

If 9 & g5 0-0 10 @ bd2 a5 11 & xf6 @ xf6 12 @ e5 @ b6 13 e4 & g6 14 @ xg6 hxg6 with equal chances (Kurajica-Seirawan, Indonesia 1983).

9 ... 0-0 Or 9...Øe4:

(a) 10 2xe4 2xe4 11 2e3 0-0 12 Ifd1 2b6 13 Wc1 Wd5 14 2e1 2xg2 15 2xg2 with an equal position (Gheorghiu-Suetin, Novi Sad 1982);

(b) 10 對b3 對b6 (Clarke-Alexander, Hastings 1962/3) was thought to ensure Black equal chances, but the idea of 11 公c4 對xb3 (11...對a6 12 全f4) 12 axb3, as in Agdestein-L.Hansen given below is worth testing.

10 ₩b3 ₩b6



11 Hel

11 ...

12 🖤a4

After 12 e4 Black, before withdrawing his bishop, exchanges queens – 12... $\forall xb3$ 13 axb3 &g6, and meets 14 h4 with 14...e5!

12 ... a5

This position was reached in Taimanov-Geller (31st USSR Ch., Leningrad 1963), which continued 13 e4 (White should have exchanged the bishop with 13 2h4) 13...\$g6 14 a3 (here too 14 2h4 came into consideration) 14...\$a7, and by threatening ...b7-b5 or ...c6-c5 Black took the initiative: 15 e5 (now 15 2h4 is met by 15...b5! 16 \$c2 \$xd4, and if 17 2xg6 hxg6 18 \$xc6 2g4 19 \$c2 2de5 with a strong attack) 15... 2d5 16 2e4 c5. After the opening of the position Black's lead in development manifests itself.

13.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6
4 ₩a4+ c6 5 ₩xc4)

5 ... \$\Delta g4 A move frequently employed by Smyslov. Black will fianchetto his king's bishop, with play similar to the Grunfeld Defence.

5....2e6 is less sound. After 6 \(\Vec{W}c2\) g6 7 e4 \(\Lef{2}g4 8 \(\Lef{2}e3 \(\Lef{2}xf3 9 gxf3 \(\Lef{2}g7 10 \(\Lef{2}c3 0-0 11 \(\Lef{2}e2 \(\Lef{2}bd7 12 0-0-0 b5 13 \(\Lef{2}bb 1 4 f4 White's position is the more promising (Golz-Zinn, East Germany 1963).

White still intends to fianchetto his bishop. The immediate 6 g3 is unfavourable in view of $6... \pounds xf3$ 7 exf3 e6 (or 7...g6) with pressure on the isolated d-pawn.

6 2€5 looks promising, but Pytlakowski-Smyslov (Helsinki Olympiad 1952) showed that Black can successfully solve his opening problems: 6... **\hat{\underline{a}}**e6 7 **\underline{\underline{b}}**d3 $\underline{\bigcirc}$ bd7 8 $\underline{\bigcirc}$ xd7 $\underline{\widehat{a}}$ xd7 9 $\underline{\bigcirc}$ c3 (if 9 e4 e5 10 dxe5 **\underline{\underline{b}}**a5+ 11 $\underline{\bigcirc}$ c3 **\underline{\underline{b}}**xe5; the ...e7-e5 counter is the leitmotif of the variation) 9...**\underline{\underline{b}}b6** (Black's plans include castling queenside) 10 **\underline{\underline{c}}d2** (preparing $\underline{\bigcirc}$ a4, since it is dangerous to take the b2 pawn in view of 11 **\underline{\underline{b}}b1**; if 10 e4 Black again replies 10...e5!, e.g. 11 dxe5 $\underline{\bigcirc}$ g4 12 **\underline{\underline{b}}g3 \underline{\underline{c}}c5** with a dangerous initiative; 10 e3 is a possibility, with the idea of completing his kingside development as quickly as possible) 10...e5 11 dxe5 $\underline{\bigcirc}$ g4.



12 岁g3? (holding on to the pawn; 12 e3 公xe5 13 登c2 was comparatively best, when Black's position is merely somewhat more active) 12...0-0-0 13 h3? (another plausible move) 13...全e6! 14 眞d1 (if 14 hxg4 眞xd2! 15 全xd2 徵xb2+) 14...徵xb2! 15 hxg4 金b4 and Black obtained a very strong attack.

After 6 2c3 2bd7 (6...2xf3 7 gxf3 g6!? 8 e4 2g7, Krasenkov-Garcia Palermo, Andorra 1991) 7 e4 2xf3 8 gxf3 e5 9 2e3 exd4 (better 9... 2d6) 10 2xd4 2d6 11 0-0-0! 27 12 2h3 b5 13 22 0-0 14 2b1 2f4 15 2c2 2ad816 2xd7! 2xd7 17 2h3 15 2c2 2ad816 2xd7! 2xd7 17 2h3 19 1 g6 18 h4 White gained a promising position in Andersson-Christiansen (London 1982). Having the two bishops, the opening of the centre is to his advantage. 6 ... 2bd7 After 6...g6 7 g3 2g7 8 2g2 0-0 9 0-0 2a6 10 2e5 (10 b3?! c5 gave Black an excellent position in Benko-Olafsson, Yugoslav Candidates 1959) 10...2e6 11 ₩a4 White stands better.

We should also mention that Black can offer to exchange queens -6... $\forall d5$ (if 7 $\forall c2 \ (c2)$

After 7....₩a5 8 \$g2 e5 9 0-0 Black has:

(a) 9... \pounds d6 10 \forall b3! (with the threats of 11 \forall xb7 and 11 \triangle c4) 10...e4 11 \forall xb7 0–0 12 \forall xc6 \pounds b4 13 \triangle e5! with advantage to White (Taimanov-Novopashin, 30th USSR Ch., Yerevan 1962);

(b) 9...e4! (recommended by Boleslavsky and Suetin) 10 ②e5 (10 ②b3 對b4) 10...全e6 11 對c2 ②xe5 12 dxe5 獸xe5 13 ③xe4 ③xe4 14 盒xe4 獸c5!, when the bishop sacrifice 15 盒xh7 g6 16 盒xg6 is problematic, and after other moves Black has an equal position.

8 \$g2 \$d6

8... $\underline{\bullet}$ e7 9 0–0 0–0 10 e4 allows White to gain an advantage in the centre, whereas now Black is ready to meet d2-d4 with ... e7-e5.

9 0-0 0-0 10 對C2 호c7 11 b3 e5 12 愈b2 星e8 with a satisfactory position for Black (Portisch-Polugayevsky, Budapest 1963).

9 ¥b3 公b6 10 0-0 0-0 11 公c4 公xc4 12 ¥xc4 ¥a5 13 全d2 ¥h5 with equal chances (Andrianov-Kharitonov, Jurmala 1983).

13.13 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ②f3 ⊙f6 4 ∰a4+ c6 5 ₩xc4)

5 ... g6

Another set-up with the development of the bishop at g7, which also resembles the Grünfeld Defence.



6 2003

In Flohr-Stoltz (Warsaw Olympiad 1935) White fianchettoed his bishop without first determining the position of his queen's knight: 6 g3 \$g7 7 \$g2 \$e6 8 ₩c2 \$f5 9 ₩a4 (if 9 ₩b3 ₩b6, and it is unfavourable for White to exchange queens, opening the a-file for the opponent) 9... 2bd7 10 Dc3 De4?! (better 10...0-0 and if 11 0-0 c5, or 11 Dh4 \$e6 followed by ...Db6 and **I**dl with the better prospects for White.

In Gheorghiu-Bastian (Baden-Baden 1981) 6 2 bd2 Wd5 7 e3 2g7 8 b3 0-0 9 2b2 2f5 10 Ic1 2bd7 11 Wb4! (now Black is forced to sacrifice a pawn) 11...b5 12 Wxe7 Ifc8 (threatening 13... 皇f8) 13 營b4 (13 營a3 a5) 13... a5 14 Wc3 De4 15 Dxe4 2xe4 16 2e2 ≜f8 17 ₩d2 a4 18 \$d1 c5 19 0-0 axb3 20 axb3 Ia2 21 Del c4 22 f3 aa3 led to a sharp, still unclear position. ≗g7

6 . . .

6....b5 needs testing.

7 e4 leads to the Boleslavsky Variation of the Grünfeld Defence (1 d4 2 f6 2 c4 g6 3 2 c3 d5 4 2 f3 2 g7 5 ₩b3 dxc4 6 ₩xc4 0-0 7 e4 c6).

7		£ e6
8	₩d3	Da6
9	⊈g2	≗ f5
10	₩d1	

winning a pawn.

10 De4 . . . 10.... 10 b4 is partied by 11 0-0, when after 11... Dc2?! 12 e4! White gains two minor pieces for a rook and two pawns: 12... Dxe4 13 Wxc2 Dxg3 14 Wb3 ⊙xf1 15 ₩xb7, with advantage.

11	00	00
12	∲ f 4	Exc3

12....c5 also comes into consideration.

13 hxc3 2 e4

₩d2 14

In Pachman-Szabo (Varna Olympiad 1962) after 14...c5 White exchanged the 'Indian' bishop: 15 \$h6 cxd4 16 \$xg7 \$xg7 17 cxd4 \$\$d5 18 \$\$fd1 \$\$fd8 19 Dh4 \$xg2 20 Dxg2, with the better position

14... Ie8 is quite good, preserving the g7 bishop and planning 15... xf3 followed bye7-e5 with exchanges.

13.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 ₩a4+)

White prepares to occupy the centre.

If 5 Wxc4 we can recommend 5... \$e6, e.g. 6 ₩a4 \$d5 7 e3 e6 8 Dc3 ♠b4 with satisfactory piece play for Black.

Other possibilities for White:

5 e3. and now:

(a) 5...皇d7 6 皇xc4, when 6... 包e5? fails to 7 Dxe5, since the queen cannot be taken on account of mate;

(b) 5...9d7 = 6 Wxc4 = 5! 7 dxe5 (7)d5? 2b6) 7... 2dxe5 8 2xe5 2xe5 9 對b5+ 例d7 10 单e2 c6 11 對c4 单d6 12 對e4+ 兔e7 13 0-0 ②f6 14 對c2 0-0 with an equal game (Andersson-Timman, Tilburg 1982);

(c) 5....e6, when the seemingly active 6 265 does not promise anything after 6....2d7 7 2xd7 2xd7!:

(c1) 8 豐xc4 e5 9 dxe5 (9 d5 公b6) 9...①dxe5 10 豐e4 (if 10 豐c2 公b4) 10...豐d7! 11 兔b5 兔b4+ 12 公c3 f5 13 豐c2 豐d5! 14 兔xc6+ 豐xc6 with the better position for Black (Kotov-Flohr, 19th USSR Ch., Moscow 1951);

(c2) 8 ≜xc4 ②b6 9 ₩c2 ②xc4 10 ₩xc4 is the lesser evil for White;

(d) 5... ①d5 6 鄧xc4 ②b6 7 鄧c2 g6 8 호b5 호d7 9 호d2 호g7 10 ②a3 0-0 with an equal position (Radojevic-Kupreichik, Sombor 1970).

5 g3, and now:



(a) 5... 2d5 6 對xc4 g6 7 e4?! (7 2c3 is correct) 7... 2b6 8 對d3 皇g4 9 2bd2 皇g7 10 d5 2b8 11 h3 全c8 12 纪c4 0-0 13 纪xb6 axb6 14 皇g2 e6 15 0-0 exd5 16 exd5 皇f5 17 獸c4 獸d7 (the black bishops are very strong) 18 g4 單a4! with a clear advantage (Seoev-Kalashian, Moscow 1963);

(b) 5... 兔e6, when after 6 兔g2 營d7 7 ②c3 (Tukmakov-Kozlov, USSR 1984) 7... ②d5 is strong;

(c) 5... 2 d7 6 響xc4 2 b6 7 響d3 e5! 8 皇g5 f6 9 皇e3 2 b4 10 營d1?! (White should have played 10 $\forall b3$) 10...exd4 11 $\triangle xd4$ c5 and Black obtained an excellent game (Verduga-Yakovich, Bayamo 1990);

(d) 5...g6 6 & g2 Od7 is also worth considering.

②d5

Petrosian's manoeuvre, which, as we have seen, is also employed after 5 e3 or 5 g3.

To prevent e2-e4, Black can play 5...\$g4:



(a) 6 ②e5 \$d7 7 ₩xc4, and now:

(a1) 7... $\pounds e6 8$ Wb5 a6! 9 $\oint xc6$ axb5 10 $\oint xd8$ $\oint xd8$ 11 $\oint xb5$ $\exists xa2$ 12 $\exists xa2$ $\pounds xa2$ (Alekhine-Böök, Warsaw Olympiad 1935), and White's attempt to switch his king's rook to the queenside did not achieve anything: 13 $\oint c3$ $\pounds c4$ 14 e4 $\pounds xf1$ 15 $\exists xf1 e6$ 16 $\pounds g5$ $\pounds e7$ 17 $\oint e2$ $\oint d7$ 18 $\exists a1$ $\oint b6$ 19 $\oint xe7 +$ $\oint xe7$ 20 $\exists a7$ $\exists b8$ 21 $\oint d3$ $\oint d8$, then 22... $\oint c8$ and ... $\exists a8$;

(a2) 7...e6 8 兔g5 兔e7 9 兔xf6 (9 Id1!? - Taimanov) 9....兔xf6 10 ②xd7 II e3 兔e7 12 a3 0-0 13 兔e2 ②a5 14 劉a2 c5 15 dxc5 獸c6 16 0-0 獸xc5, and White did not achieve anything from the opening (Petrosian-Korchnoi, Curacao Candidates 1962);

(b) 6 e3 \$\overline\$xf3 7 gxf3 \$\overline\$d7 8 ₩xc4 \$\overline\$b6 9 ₩e2 ₩d7 10 f4 e6 11 \$\overline\$g2 f5 12 ▲d2 ▲e7 with a complicated battle and equal chances (Petrosian-Golz, Copenhagen 1960).

In recent years the modest **5...e6** has drawn attention:

(a) 6 ₩xc4 (6 e4 \$b4) 6... 2b4 7 ₩b3 c5, and now:



(a1) 8 e3 cxd4 9 exd4 鱼e7 10 鱼g5 ②c6 11 單d1 0-0 12 鱼d3 b6 13 a3 鱼b7 14 螢c2 g6. In this typical isolated dpawn position Black has harmoniously deployed his forces: chances are equal (Illescas Cordoba-Wolff, Biel 1993);

(a2) 8 dxc5 皇xc5 9 a3 乞c6 (not 會g3 ④h5+ 12 當h3 e5+ 13 g4) 10 g3 Da5 11 ₩c2 (avoiding a little trap: 11 對b5+? 皇d7 12 對xc5 ④b3 13 對c4 \$e7 (another trap: Black loses after 12...9b3? 13 \$b5+ or 12...\$b3? 13 $\forall e2$ with the threat of $\bigcirc d2$ and b2-b4) 13 b4 ②c6 14 ②a4 營d8 15 盒g2 盒d7 16 0-0 (if 16 Dc5 Black gains counter-18 2b2 (Stohl-Meister, Slovensko 1994), and now 18...b5 19 2c5 (or 19 ②c3 賞b6) 19... \$xc5 20 bxc5 ⊙a5 21 ₩b4 2c4 would have given roughly equal chances (Stohl);

(b) 6 a3 is a good reply: 6...a6 7 ₩xc4 \$\overline\$d6 8 \$\overline\$g5 h6 9 \$\overline\$h4 (or 9 \$\overline\$xf6 對xf6 10 g3) 9....0-0 10 星d1. White's position is preferable (Sosonko-Piket, Holland 1995).

6 e4

Klaman-Taimanov (Leningrad 1963) went 6 &g5 &xc3 7 bxc3 \blacksquare d5! (threatening 8...b5). White sacrificed a pawn - 8 e4 \blacksquare xe4+ 9 &e3, but after 9...&d7 10 \blacksquare xc4 e6 11 &e2 &d6 12 a4 0-0 13 0-0 e5 14 \blacksquare fd1 exd4 15 cxd4 &b4 16 &e5 &e6 Black retained a material advantage.

Interesting complications can arise after 6 **\forall xc4**:



(a) 6... 2 e6 7 e4, and now:

(a1) 7...2db4?! 8 d5 $2c^2+9$ d12xa1 10 2d2 with an extremely sharp position, but probably favourable for White: the knight at a1 will fall, and he can count on gaining two minor pieces for a rook (Hort-Rivas, Montilla 1978);

(a2) 7... 20b6 8 豐c5 호d7 9 d5 e6 10 豐e3 20b4 11 호d3 20xd3+ (or 11... 20c4 12 豐e2) 12 豐xd3 호e7 with chances for both sides;

(b) 6... db4 7 Wb3, when:

(b2) 7...e5 is a good reply:

(b21) 8 a3? 皇e6 9 營d1 exd4 10 2b5 a6 11 2bxd4 2xd4 12 2xd4 Wxd4 with a material advantage for Black (Botterill-Miles, England 1979);

(b22) 8 dxe5 (if 8 d5 2)d4) 8... e6 (or 8... 皇g4) 9 響a4 皇d7 10 響d1 皇f5 11 e4 wxd1 + 12 wxd1 0 - 0 - 0 + with the initiative for the pawn (Lilley-Sadler, Crewe 1992);

(c) 6... Db6 7 ₩d3 e5!? 8 Dxe5 (8 dxe5 皇g4) 8... 2b4 9 對b1 對xd4 10 Ø13 ₩d6 with equal chances (Conquest-Dlugy, New York 1984).

6		②b6
7	Wat	◎ a4
8	d5	- g-

If 8 **a**e3 Black achieves an excellent game by 8... \$xf3 9 gxf3 e6 10 \$e2 Wh4! 11 0-0 0-0-0! (Cruz-Sanguinetti, Buenos Aires 1963).

De5 8 9 _⊈f4



Skembris-Vlahos (Athens 1984) went 9 2e2 2xf3 10 gxf3 e6! (10...c6 11 f4 2g6 12 f5 De5 13 \$f4 favours White) 11 f4 2g6 (11... 2d3+ 12 2xd3 cxd3 13 dxe6) 12 dxe6 fxe6 (if 12... Wxd1+ 13 2xd1 fxe6 White gains the better chances by 14 \$\overline{15}\$ 13 \$\overline{263}\$ Wh4 14 2h5! 2b4 with a complicated,

double-edged position.

9 ₩d4 ᡚxf3+10 gxf3 \$xf3 11 ¤g1 (Rajkovic) is an interesting sacrifice:

(a) 11...e6?! 12 We3! \$h5 13 Wh3 g6 14 dxe6 fxe6 15 \vert xe6+ \overline e7? (if 15... We7 16 exc4 with a favourable position for White) 16 We5 Ef8 17 2h6 If7 18 Wh8+ and Black came under a very strong attack (Crouch-Sadler. Hastings 1992);

(b) 11... \d6!? 12 e5 \d7, or 12 \l2g3 e5 and ... Ah5.

> 9 <u>න</u>6 10 **≜g3**

Threatening 11 2b5. After 10 2e3 e6 Black has a good position (Petrosian-Botvinnik, match, Moscow 1963).

> 10 . . . e5 11

dxe6

It is unfavourable for White to regain the pawn by 11 2xc4 2xc4 12 Wa4+ ₩d7 13 ₩xc4 in view of 13... xf3 14 gxf3 h5!

1		âxe6
12	₩xd8+	Xxd8
13	≜xc7	



Id4?! (better 15...De5, although even then after 16 f4 White's position is preferable) 16 Idl Ixd1+ 17 2xd1 and

Black experienced certain difficulties due to the weakness of his queenside pawns (Rajkovic-Barle, Yugoslavia 1983).

13... Ξ c8 14 \pounds g3 a6 (14... \pounds c5!? – Alburt) 15 Od4 \pounds c5 16 0–0–0 0–0 17 \pounds c2 \pounds d7 18 Of5! and White gained the advantage (Alburt-Dlugy, USA 1974).

13.3 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 包f3 包f6 4 習a4+)

4

... ∛∆bd7

This natural move was for a long time considered perfectly satisfactory, but after an analysis by the Hungarian master Negyessy in the late 1950s and the game Taimanov-Polugayevsky (27th USSR Ch.) it was pronounced unsatisfactory. However, as the reader will see, such an evaluation is too severe.



5 Dc3

White intends to occupy the centre. The c4 pawn will not 'run away', and the queen, as soon becomes clear, is needed at a4.

If 5 Wxc4:

(a) 5...e6 6 g3 (after 6 ₩c2 c5 7 e3 \$e7 8 2C3 0-0 the game is equal), and also in other branches when White fianchettos his bishop, play usually transposes into variations of the Catalan Opening;

(b) 5... 2b6 6 堂 c2 堂 g4 7 纪 c3 c6 8 e4 堂 xf3 9 gxf3 螢 xd4 10 堂 e3 螢 d7 11 a4 e5 12 a5 and for the sacrificed pawn White gained a significant lead in development (Chistyakov-Kogan, Moscow 1959).

After 5 e3 e6 6 \pounds xc4 \pounds d6 7 0–0 0–0 followed by ...e6-e5 chances are equal.

A way for Black to avoid the unpleasant main line is 5...c6 6 #xc420b6 7 #d3 g6 8 e4 &g7, as in a variation of the Grünfeld Defence.

After 5....a6 6 e4:

(a) it used to be though that Black could not play 6...b5 on account of 7 2xb5 2xe4 (7...2b6? 8 2d6 mate) 8 2xc4, but in Arkell-Speelman (Dublin 1993) Black replied 7...2b7. After 8 2xc3 2xe4 9 2xc4 e6 10 2e5 2d6 11 2xe4 2xe4 12 0-0 c6 13 Ie1 (if 13 2xc6? 2b6) 13...2b6 14 Wa5 2xc4 15 Wxd8+ Ixd8 the game ended in a draw, although White could have tried for more with 16 2xc4 2d5 17 2xd6+ Ixd6 18 2d2!, despite the oppositecolour bishops (Flear);

(b) the position after 6...e6 7 & xc4 is considered in the main line on p.211.

5 e4

Or $6 \pounds g5$ h6 7 \pounds h4 (White can also exchange 7 $\pounds x$ f6 imes xf6 imes xf6 and then play 8 e4) 7... \pounds e7 8 imes xc4 (preparing e2-e4; the immediate 8 e4 does not work on account of 8... \pounds xe4 while 8 e3 0-0 9 $\pounds x$ c4 c5 followed by ... \pounds b6 leads to a roughly equal position) 8...0-0 9 \blacksquare d1 a6, and now:

(a) 10 a4 b5 11 axb5 axb5 with strong counterplay for Black (both 12 響xb5 單b8 and 12 ②xb5 鱼a6 13 e3 c6 14 \vec va5+ are unfavourable for White):

(b) 10 e3 b5 11 Wb3 \$b7 12 \$e2 c5 13 dxc5 wc8 14 0-0 Ω xc5 15 wc2 (Rozenfeld-Kholmov, USSR 1961) 15... ₩c6 with a good position for Black;

(c) 10 e4, with somewhat the better prospects for White.

Now Black can reply:

6...c5 (13.31)

6... \$e7 (13.32) - p.211

The cautious 6...c6 concedes White the centre and the freer game after 7 ₩xc4.

13.31 (1	d4 d5 2 c4	dxc4 3 ②	f3 Øf6
4 ₩a4+4	<u>ඩbd7 5 වි</u> ර	c3 e6 6 e4)	1

Or 7 \$\overline{xc4} (7 \$\overline{sf4}\$ a6!) 7...cxd4 8 ②xd4 (8 e5!? - Taimanov) 8... 全c5 9 ²∕₂b3 (after 9 *2*e3 0−0 Black's position is quite satisfactory, Levenfish-Suetin, Minsk 1953) 9... 2d6 10 2e2 0-0 11 \$e3 ₩e7 12 0-0 De5 13 h3 \$d7 14 對d4 ②c6 15 對d1 單fd8 16 f4 e5 17 f5 2d4! and things turned out well for Black (Eslon-Tal, Seville 1992).





After 8 exd5, compared with the variation 3 2f3 c5 4 d5 2f6 5 2c3 e6 6 e4 exd5 7 exd5, the position of the queen at a4 causes White some problems in view ofa7-a6, ... 0-0 andb7-b5.

Now 8.... ②g4 9 ②xd5 gives White a clear advantage. We consider:

8...b5 (13.311)

8...d4 (13.312) - p.209

13.311 (1	d4 d5 2	c4 dxc4	3 Øf3
②f6 4 🝟	a4+ ②bd7	5 Dc3 e	66 e4
c5 7 d5 ex	(d5 8 e5)		

8 b5

A counter-sacrifice with the aim of driving the queen from its active position and bringing the rook into play.

9 Wxb5

Not 9 2xb5? De4 10 \$f4 \$e7, and if 11 e6 0-0! 12 exd7 **≜**xd7 13 ₩a6 皇f6 14 萬b1 g5! 15 ②c7 gxf4 16 ②xa8 Wxa8 with advantage to Black (Raud-P.Schmidt, corr. 1936/7).

9		⊒ b8
10	Wa4	d4
11	exf6	dxc3
12	≜xc4	∐ b4

We must first demonstrate that 12...cxb2 13 xf7+ xf7 loses:



(a) 14 @c4+ &e8 15 f7+ &c7 16 &xb2 (16 0-0 is worth trying) 16... @a5+! (as shown by Meyer, 16...@xb217 0-0-0! favours White) 17 &c3 @a6and Black parries the threats;

(b) $14 \bigcirc g5+$ (suggested by the Dutch player de Haas), when a dismal fate awaits the black king, wherever it moves: 14... e e8 (Black also loses after $14... \between xf6$ 15 $\textcircled{e} c6+ \between c5$ 16 $\oiint e6+ \between d4$ 17 $\oiint e4+$, or $14... \between g6$ 15 $\oiint e4+$ with inevitable mate) 15 f7+ \between c7 16 $\oiint e4+$ $\oiint c5$ (16... \between d6 17 $\pounds f4+$) 17 $\oiint xe5+$ $\between d7$ 18 $\between xb2$ with the threat of 19 $\blacksquare d1+$ or 19 0-0-0+ and a winning attack.

13 ₩d1!

Despite the favourable evaluation of this move, in Miles-Karpov (Biel 1990) White preferred the old continuation 13 $extbf{Wc2}$. After 13...2xf6 14 b3 $\pounds e6$ 15 0-0 $\pounds xc4$ 16 bxc4 $\pounds e7$ 17 2e5(Ftacnik considers that 17 $extbf{Wxc3}$ gives White slightly the better chances) 17... 0-0! 18 $extbf{Wxc3}$ (winning the exchange by 18 $2c6 extbf{Wc7}$ 19 2xb4 cxb4 is unclear - Black also picks up the c4 pawn) 18... $\pounds d6$ 19 2d3 (19 $2c6 extbf{We8}$!) 19... $extbf{Eb}$ 20 $extbf{Ee1}$ the players agreed a draw.

13 ... gxf6

In S.Marshall-Schardtner (corr. 1958), which as far as we know is where 12 \forall d1 first occurred, Black took the pawn with the queen, but the game did not last long: 13... \forall xf6 14 &g5 \forall d6 15 \forall e2+ &e7 16 \blacksquare d1 cxb2 17 0-0 b1 \forall 18 \blacksquare xd6 f6 19 \blacksquare xb1 \blacksquare xb1+ 20 \bigcirc e1 \bigcirc e5 (if 20...fxg5 21 \blacksquare e6) 21 &b5+ \Leftrightarrow f8 22 \blacksquare d1 \blacksquare xd1 23 \blacksquare xd1 fxg5 24 \bigcirc f3 Black resigns.

Other possibilities:

After 13...gxf6 it appears that Black has nothing to fear...



He threatens 14... $\Xi xc4$ (15 $\Psi e2+$ $\Psi e7$), and the energetic 140-0 does not work in view of 14...cxb2 15 $\pounds xb2$ $\Xi xb2$, and if 16 $\Psi d5 \triangle e5!$

14 b3!

Negyessy's move. White defends his bishop, shuts the rook out of the game, and 'surrounds' the c3 pawn.

After 14...豐e7+ 15 全e3 包e5 16 包xe5 fxe5 17 營d3 the position of Black's king gives cause for alarm.

Therefore he should think about exchanging queens -14...2e5, but 15 $\forall xd8 + & xd8 16 & xe5 fxe5 17 & g5 +$ (17 &xf7 can also be considered) 17... &e7 18 0-0-0+ & e8 (18...&d7 19)&h6!) 19 &xe7 & xe7 leads to an en $ding, in which after 20 <math>\blacksquare$ he1 or 20 \blacksquare d5 White has the advantage (Negyessy).

13.312 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2)f3 2)f6 4 ₩a4+ 2)bd7 5 2)c3 e6 6 e4 c5 7 d5 exd5 8 e5) This move allows White to begin a very strong attack.

9 exf6 dxc3 10 ≜xc4



... ₩xf6

10

The same position can be reached via the move order 9 $\pounds xc4 dxc3$ 10 exf6 #xf6. If instead 10 $\triangle g5$, then:

(b) 10.... (b) g4, and White still has to justify his piece sacrifice. Therefore 9 exf6 is sounder and better.

In the diagram position Black can prevent 25 by 10...h6, but then, using the tempo granted, White attacks with 11 0-0 256 12 261+ (Butnoris-Giorgadze, Volgograd 1963).

Things are also difficult for Black after 10...gxf6 11 0-0:

(a) 11... 全g7 (if 11... 全e7 very strong is 12 全h6) 12 星e1+ 会f8 13 全f4! 经e5 14 公xe5 fxe5 15 全xe5 全xe5 16 星xe5 cxb2 17 星ae1 (Pachman-Kuijpers, Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964), and White gained an overwhelming advantage;

(b) 11...cxb2 12 象xb2 象e7 13 国ad1! 0-0 14 象b5! 對b6 15 象xd7 對xb2 16 象xc8 国axc8 17 国b1 對c3 18 国fe1 (Knezevic-Messing, Yugoslavia 1976), and Black noticed to his horror that White was threatening not only 19 Ixe7, but also 19 Ie3, trapping the queen.

11 **£g5! ₩c6**

After 11...raklefter field for the field



12 0-0-0!

Black was caught in this clearly unfavourable variation in Taimanov-Polugayevsky (27th USSR Ch., Leningrad 1960): **12...cxb2+** 13 xxb2 (13 xb1) We4+ 14 \oiint{x} xb2 is also good) 13...ee7 (Black held out only slightly longer after 13...f6 in Krasenkov-A.Mikhalchishin, Tallinn 1988) 14 \blacksquare hel f6 15 kb5 Wb6 16 ccl! fxg5 17 \oiint{x} d7+ \oiint{e} f8 18 \blacksquare xe7! \oiint{x} xc7 19 We4+ \oiint{c} d8 20 \oiint{c} f5+ cc7 21 We5+ cc6 22 \blacksquare d6+ \oiint{c} 5 23 Wb2+ Black resigns. It can be added that 12...2e7 would not have saved Black in view of 13 $\forallxc6!$ bxc6 14 2xe7 cxb2+ (or 14... 2xe7 15 Ξ hel+ 2d8 16 2e5 2e7 17 2xf7 Ξ f8 18 $\Xi e7$, winning material) 15 2xb2 2exe7 16 Ξ hel+ 2ef8 (or 16... 2d8 17 2g5) 17 2e5! etc.

13.32 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 ᡚf3 ᡚf6 4 ₩a4+ ᡚbd7 5 ᡚc3 e6 6 e4)

The point of this move is to playc7-c5 after castling and thereby avoid the problems of the previous variation. If now 7 d5 exd5 8 e5, then 8....2e4 9 2xd5 2ec5 10 2xd4 2b6 11 2xb6 axb6, when Sajtar-R.Byrne (Helsinki Olympiad 1952) continued 12 2c2 g6 13 2c4 2f5 14 2c3 2d3+ 15 2c2 2c1+ 16 2axc1 0-0 17 2d3+ 15 2c2 with a satisfactory position for Black.

However, $6... \pounds e^7$ is a passive move that allows White to consolidate his advantage in the centre.



7 皇xc4 0-0 8 徵c2 c5 9 e5 (or 9 dxc5 2xc5 10 0-0 a6 11 e5) 9... ②d5 (if 9... ④e8 White gains an advantage by 10 dxc5, e.g. 10... 徵c7 11 皇f4 2xc5 12 0-0, Taimanov-Westerinen, Havana

1967) 10 \$\overline\$ xd5 exd5 11 \$\overline\$ xd5 cxd4 12 \$\overline\$ e4! (after this Black has difficulties over the defence of his d4 pawn) 12...\$\overline\$ 813 0-0, and now:

(a) 13... 호c5 14 b4 单b6 15 ②g5! f5 16 斷h4 h6 17 ②f6+ with a decisive attack (Taimanov-Volovich, Yalta 1962);

(b) 13...2d6 when the the e5 pawn appears to be in danger, but in Bagirov-Amirkhanov (Baku 1963) after 14 265268 White built up an irresistible attack with the tactical blow 15 $2xf7! \pm xf7$ 16 $267! \pm 288$ 17 exd6 26618 ± 614 $266 19 \pm 621 \pm 624 = 20 \pm 621 \pm 621$ $2661! \pm 22 \pm 627 + \pm 68 = 23 \pm 688$ mate.

13.33 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2	f6
4 ₩a4+	

6 ... a6

This move also leads to an advantage for White, with his strong centre.

7 \$14 is also good, and if 7... 2b8 8 \$xc4.



7...c5 (7...b5? 8 包xb5 包b6? 9 包xc7+) 8 dxc5 皇xc5 9 e5 包g4 10 包e4 豐c7 11 皇e2 包gxe5 12 包xe5 豐xe5 13 包xc5 豐xc5 14 皇e3. For the pawn

White has a lead in development, and after 14... 窗口 15 0-0 0-0 16 国口 Black has difficulty in unravelling his queenside (Taimanov-Kots, 30th USSR Ch., Yerevan 1962).

7...**Ⅱb8** 8 ∰c2 b5, and now:

(a) 9 \$\dots d3 \$\dots b7 (9...c5 10 \$\dots f4 \$\dots b6) 10 0-0 c5 11 d5 c4 (after 11...e5 12 a4 b4 13 \$\dots d1 White has the advantage) 12 \$\dots e2 exd5 (here too 12...e5 is strongly met by 13 a4) 13 exd5, when:

(a1) it is dangerous to accept the pawn sacrifice: 13...2xd5 14 2xd52xd5 15 $\Xi d1$ 2f6 (15...2b6 16 a4! or 15...2e6 16 2g5) 16 2g5 2e7 17 2f5!;

(a2) 13...\$d6 (13...\$b4 requires testing) 14 a4! 0-0 (14...b4 is strongly met by 15 20e4, so Black prefers to part with his b-pawn) 15 axb5 axb5 16 20xb5 with advantage to White (Lutikov-Gurgenidze, Moscow 1963);

(b) 9 &b3 c5 10 &f4 c4 11 &xc4 bxc4 12 &xb8 \bigotimes xb8 13 d5 \bigotimes bd7! (not 13...exd5? 14 0–0–0) with approximate material equality and chances for both sides;

(c) 9 @e2 @b7, when:

(c1) 10 e5 公d5 11 0-0 c5 with an equal game;

(c2) 10 0–0 b4 11 e5 bxc3 12 exf6 cxb2 13 fxg7 (13 \pounds xb2 gxf6! – White's compensation for the pawn is insufficient) 13...bxa1=2! 14 gxh8=W (or 14 gxf8=W+ \blacksquare xf8 15 Wc3 \blacksquare g8 16 Wxa1 Wf6) 14...2xc2 and the complications favour Black: 15 \pounds g5 f6! 16 Wxh7 fxg5 17 Wg6+ \pounds e7, and if 18 2xg5 2xd4! (analysis by Ivanchuk).

(c) 7...c6 8 $rac{4}{2}$ (as in the previous variation, 8 $ac{1}{2}$ d3 can be considered) 8...c5 9 dxc5 $ac{1}{2}$ xc5 10 0–0 $ac{1}{2}$ c7 11 $ac{1}{2}$ 2 g4 12 $ac{1}{2}$ b3 with the the better chances for White (Knezevic-Romanishin, Kiev 1978). 13.4 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 包f3 包f6 4 營a4+)

4 ... ₩d7

The exchange of queens simplifies the position, but leaves White with a slight positional advantage.

₩xc4 ₩c6

6 Da3

5

6 Dbd2 2e6 (6... Wxc4 7 Dxc4 leads to the main line) is also played, inviting the opponent to exchange queens:

(a) 7 Wd3 2a6 (7...2d5 8 2e5) 8 a30-0-0 9 b4 Wa4 10 2b2 g6 11 g3 c612 2g2 2g7 13 0-0 2c7 14 Ifc1 (142g5??) 14...Wb5 (the queen is out ofplay, and Black aims to ease his defenceby exchanging it) 15 Wxb5 2xb5 16 a42c7 17 2g5 2b8 18 2xe6 2xe6 19 e32c7 20 2c4 2fd5 21 2a3. White hastwo bishops and an active position(Smyslov-Alexander, Hastings 1962/3);

(b) 7 $\forall xc6+ 2xc6 \ 8 \ a3 \ 0-0-0 \ 9 \ e3$ d5 with an equal position (Fedorowicz-Shirazi, USA 1984).

Other continuations:

6

6 ②e5 ¥xc4 7 ②xc4 ②c6 8 e3 ②b4 9 ②ba3 鱼f5 10 f3 鱼d3 maintaining equality (Krasnov-Gaspariants, Moscow 1961).

6 e3 $\forall xc4$ 7 & xc4 e6 8 $\triangle c3$ a6 and then ...c7-c5 with an equal game.

.... ₩xc4

But now if 6... **≜e6** 7 ₩d3 ᡚa6 White can reply 8 **≜**d2!

7 ②xc4 e6

7...b6 or 7...g6 can also be tried.

8 a3

White prevents further simplification (after 8...2b4+), and threatens to cramp the opponent by b2-b4.

8 g3 leads to a position from the Catalan Opening.

The position after 8 a3 was reached in Alekhine-Fine (Kemeri 1937).



With the poor move 8...c5 Black weakened the d6 square and allowed his opponent to obtain an excellent position: $9 \pounds f4 \textcircled{2}c6$ (in Alekhine's opinion, 9...2bd7 10 $\textcircled{2}d6+ \pounds xd6$ 11 $\pounds xd6 \textcircled{2}e4$ 12 $\pounds c7$ b6 and ... $\pounds b7$ was slightly better, although even then the advantage remains with White) 10 dxc5 $\pounds xc5$ 11 b4 $\pounds e7$ 12 b5! 2b8 13 2d6+ $\pounds xd6$ 14 $\pounds xd6 \textcircled{2}e4$ 15 $\pounds c7!$ 2d7 16 2d4.

In his comments to the game Alekhine recommended 8...a5, preventing b2-b4. If 9 &f4 b5 and then ...&d6. Even so, the weakening of Black's queenside leaves White with the better chances.

13.5 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 包f3 包f6 4 鬯a4+)

4 ... **Ad7** This move is better than its reputation.

5 🖞xc4 e6

If Black proceeds as in the Catalan

Opening with 5... 全c6 6 ②c3 ②bd7, then 7 全g5 e6 (McCambridge-Tarjan, San Jose 1983) 8 e4! 全e7 9 全d3 with the better position for White.

් ෙ නිය	
6 g3 leads to the	Catalan Opening.
6	Da6
7 e4	c5

8	≗e2	cxd4
9	②xd4	 ≣c8
10	₩d3	

Image: Second secon

Tartakower-Böök (Kemeri 1937) continued 10... ②b4 11 對b1 e5 12 ②f3 全c5 13 0-0 ②c6 14 全g5 and White gained the advantage.

Nowadays $4... \pounds d7$ is hardly ever played. The fault for this may lie with the evaluation of the Tartakower-Böök game. In fact, things are by no means so bad for Black. $10... \pounds b4$, as played by Böök, is correct, but $11... \pounds 5$ cannot be recommended. $11... \pounds c6$ or $11... \pounds e7$ should be played, after which White can hardly count on an advantage.

10...2c5 also comes into consideration, and if 11 $\frac{1}{2}e3 2a4$ (12 e5 2xc3).

3 තිf3 තිf6 4 තිc3

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	ହ୍ୟା	۵f6
4	Dc3	



A popular variation. White does not waste time on e2-e3, but intends immediately to advance his pawn to e4. However, the position of the knight at c3 hinders the regaining of the gambit pawn, although experience shows that White gains an appreciable advantage in the centre along the lines of the Tolush-Geller Gambit in the Slav Defence (1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 包f3 包f6 4 Oc3 dxc4 5 e4). Note that, if he wishes, Black can immediately transpose into the Slav by 4...c6 (the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 2f3 2f6 4 2c3 dxc4), while 4... Dc6 leads to positions from the Chigorin Defence (1 d4 d5 2 c4 包c6 3 Dc3 dxc4 4 Df3 Df6, or 3 Df3 Df6 4 包c3 dxc4).

Black's main alternatives are: **4...e6 (14.1)** – p.215 **4...a6 (14.2)** – p.217 Other continuations: 4...c5 5 e4 (5 d5 e6 6 e4 exd5 7 e5 leads to the variation on p.187) 5...cxd4 6 $\forall xd4 \forall xd4 7 & xd4$. This simplifying continuation occurs in a number of branches. Here Black's e-pawn is on its initial square, and there can follow 7...e5 8 2 db5 & d8 (8... & a6 9 & xc4) 9& e3 & e6, when he gives up the a7 pawn but keeps the one at c4:



(a) 10 \$\overline\$xa7 \$\overline\$bd7 11 \$\overline\$c3 \$\overline\$bd4! 12 f3 \$\overline\$a5 13 0-0-0 \$\overline\$c7 with chances for both sides (Pein-Zs.Polgar, New York 1986);

(b) 10 \triangle xa7 \triangle bd7 11 f3 $\hat{2}$ bd 12 \triangle ab5 \exists a5 13 \Leftrightarrow f2 \Leftrightarrow e7 14 $\hat{2}$ e2 \exists c8 with roughly equal chances (Winants-Karolyi, Brussels 1986);

(c) 10 0–0–0+ 2bd7 11 2xa7, when if 11...xa7 12 2xa7 2g4 13 2d5!2xd5 (or 13...2xf2 14 2xc4 with the better chances) 14 xd5 2c5 15 2b52xf2 16 2e2 2xh1 17 2g4 2f2 18 xd7+ 2c8 (O.Garcia-Valdes, Cuba 1990) 19 xf7+ 2xg4 20 xc7+ 2b821 xc5 2xh2 22 xe5 with a favourable ending for White;

(d) 10 f4 (White does not regain the pawn, but aims for rapid development)

10...exf4 11 \$\overline{2}xf4 \$\overline{2}bd7\$ 12 \$\overline{2}e2\$ \$\overline{2}c5\$ 13 0-0-0 with good compensation (Levitina-Zs.Polgar, Shanghai 1992.

(a) 6 = 5 = 5 = 66; 7 = 2xc6 = 8 = 2g6 9 0-0 $\pm g7$ 10 $\pm e3$ 0-0 11 f4 f5 12 e5 $\pm e6$ 13 $= 2a4 \pm d5$ (Lalic-Djuric, Yugoslavia 1988) 14 $\equiv c2$ followed by = 2xb6 and $\pm xc4$ with an equal position: White restores material equality, but repairs the black pawns;

(b) $6 \triangle xc4 \oslash xc4 7 a 4+ \boxdot c6$ (after 7...c6 8 a spatial advantage) 8 a xc4 white's has a spatial advantage and mobile centre.

White's game is preferable after 4....g6 5 e4 \$\overline{9}\$ d6 \$\overline{9}\$ e3 \$\overline{9}\$ c6 7 \$\overline{9}\$ xc4 \$\overline{3}\$ xf3 \$\overline{9}\$ g7 9 e5 (Peev-Barreras, Plovdiv 1976).

White also has the better chances after 4...2bd7 5 e4 2b6:

(b) 6 2 = 5 g6 7 2 xc4 2 g7 (7...2 xc4 8 2 xc4 2 g7 9 e5) 8 2 e5 0 - 0 9 2 e2 c610 0 - 0 2 fd7 11 2 f3 e5 12 2 g5 2 f6(12...) e8 13 d5!; 12...f6 13 2 e3) 132 xf6 <math>@ xf6 14 2 xe5 2 xe5 15 dxe5 @ xe5 16 f4 with the better position for White (Farago-Donchev, Prague 1985);

(c) 6 \$\overline\$g5 c6 7 \$\overline\$c2 g6 8 a4 a5 9 \$\overline\$\overline\$c6 10 0-0 \$\overline\$g7 11 \$\overline\$d2 0-0 12 \$\overline\$ad1 again with the better chances (Knaak-Szilagyi, Balasiha 1977).

If 4.... £15 White can play:

(a) 5 ②e5! (as in the Slav Defence) 5...e6 (5...c5 is strongly met by 6 e4! ②xe4 7 對f3 ②d6 8 dxc5, or 6... 愈xe4 7 **Q**xc4 e6 8 **₩**a4+) 6 f3 2 fd7 (6... 2 bd7? 7 e4) 7 2 xc4 2 c6 8 e4 2 g6 9 2 f4 f6 10 2 e3 with the better position (Sosonko-Hort, Hamburg 1980);

(b) 5 e3 e6 6 \$xc4, and now:

(b1) 6...c6 7 0-0 2bd7 8 ₩e2 2b6 (8...\$e7 9 e4) 9 \$b3 2b4 10 2d2 2xd2 11 \$xd2 \$g6 12 f4 \$e7 13 e4! ₩d7 14 d5 with advantage to White (Simic-Skembris, Vrnjacka Banja 1982);

(b2) 6...a6 7 \triangle e5 \triangle bd7 (if 7... \triangle e7? 8 #f3! threatening 9 \triangle xf7) 8 \triangle xd7 #xd7 9 f3 b5 10 \triangle b3 c5 11 e4 \triangle g6 (or 11...cxd4 12 exf5 dxc3 13 fxe6 #xd1+ 14 \bigstar xd1 0-0-0+ 15 \bigstar c2 cxb2 16 \triangle xb2) 12 \triangle e3 and White stands better (Kapetanovic-Drasko, Yugoslavia 1991).

14.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 句f3 句f6 4 친c3)

4 ... e6



5 e4

Other continuations:

5 Wa4+ c6 6 Wxc4 (note that this position can also arise in the Semi-Slav Defence after 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 2f3 2f6 4 2c3 e6 5 Wb3 dxc4 6 Wxc4) 6...b5 7 Wd3 (after 7 Wb3 2bd7 8 2g5 Black can take advantage of the queen's
position with 8...c5, since if 9 dxc5 \triangle xc5 10 \bigotimes xb5+ \triangle d7 he has a great lead in development), and now:

(a) 7...2bd7 8 a3 b4 9 axb4 2xb4 10 e4 a5 11 e5 2d5 12 2d2 2a6 13 We4 2xf1 14 2xf1 2e7! (to defend the kingside) and in Karpov-Lautier (Tilburg 1996) 15 Zd1 would have restricted Black's counterplay (Karpov);

(b) 7... 2b7, when:

(b1) 8 a3 a6 9 e3 c5 10 dxc5 \pm xc5 11 $\forall xd8+ \pm xd8$, and already Black stood slightly better in the endgame (Karpov-Kasparov, Las Palmas 1996);

(b2) 8 g3 a6 9 \pounds g2 c5 10 0–0 $\overleftarrow{2}$ c6 (10... $\overleftarrow{2}$)bd7!? – Seirawan) 11 \blacksquare d1 Wb6 12 \pounds e3 \blacksquare d8 13 dxc5 \pounds xc5 14 \pounds xc5 Wxc5 15 $\overleftarrow{2}$ e4! with the better chances for White (Seirawan-Hübner, Skelleftea 1989);

(b3) 8 e4 b4 9 包a4 包bd7 10 皇g5 響a5 11 b3 c5 12 盒xf6 gxf6 13 盒e2 0-0-0 14 0-0 會b8 15 d5!, and White stands better in this sharp position (Karpov-Gelfand, Linares 1993);

5 &g5 a6 6 a4 (6 e3 b5 7 a4 c6 8 axb5 cxb5 9 &)xb5 axb5 10 \blacksquare xa8 &b4+ is an interesting exchange sacrifice), and now:

(a) $6... \ge c6$ 7 e3 (2)a5 8 (2)e5 c5 9 (2)ac4 (2)e7 10 0-0 (10 (2)ad3!?) 10... cxd4 11 exd4 with somewhat the better prospects for White (Eingorn-Gelfand, Tallinn 1989);

(b) 6... 2b4 7 e3 c5 8 2xc4 cxd4 9 exd4 2c6 10 0–0 0–0 11 2c1 2e7 12 2c1 reaching a position from the Classical Variation with an extra move (2c1) for White (Kasparov-Nogueiras, Belfort 1988).

... ≜b4

Or 5...c5 6 \$xc4 (for 6 d5 cf. p.186) 6...cxd4, and now:

(a) 7 ₩xd4 ₩xd4 8 2xd4 a6 9 e5 2fd7 10 f4 \$\overline\$c5 (if 10... b5 Black has to reckon with the sacrifice 11 金xe6!? fxe6 12 公xe6, Rogers-Kallai, Kraljevo 1984) 11 公b3 with the better position for White;

(b) 7 2xd4, when:



(b1) 7... 皇e7 is unfavourable in view of 8 e5 公d5 9 豐g4;

(b2) the old game Capablanca-Bogoljubow (where this position was reached by a slightly different move order) continued 7... $\&c5 \ \&c3 \ \&bd7$, and White sacrificed his bishop to launch an offensive: 9 &xe6!? fxe6 10 $\&xe6 \ \&a5$?! (Black could have defended with 10... $\&b6 \ 11 \ \&xc5 \ \&xc5 \ 12$ 0-0 &c6 - Bogoljubow) 11 0-0! &xe312 fxe3 $\&f7 \ 13 \ \&b3 \ \&g6 \ 14 \ \Xif5$!;

(b3) 7... ①bd7, when White has a pleasant choice: 8 0-0 (8 ②db5 is also good) 8... 金c5 9 ②b3 金e7 10 變e2, and if 10...e5?! 11 金e3 and 單fd1 (Hübner-Radulov, Leningrad 1973);

(b4) 7...a6 8 e5 2 fd7 9 4 f4 2 b6 10 4 b3 again with advantage to White (Flohr-Najdorf, Margate 1937).

6 e5

6 &g5 leads to the Vienna Variation of the Queen's Gambit Declined (1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 2f3 2f6 4 2g5 2b4+ 5 2c3 dxc4 6 e4).

6 **Axc4**? is an interesting pawn sacrifice:



6...Oxe4 7 0–0 Oxc3 (it is extremely dangerous to accept the second pawn by 7... \pounds xc3 8 bxc3 Oxc3 in view of 9 Wd3 Od5 10 \pounds a3) 8 bxc3, and now:

(a) 8... \$\overline\$ xc3 is strongly met by 9 ■b1 c5 (if 9...0-0?! 10 ■b3 \$\overline\$ a5 11 \$\overline\$ 2g5 with an attack} 10 \$\overline\$ g5 f6 11 \$\overline\$ b3;

(b) 8...2e7! 9 2e5 0=0 10 22 2d711 2d1 followed by 2d3 with compensation for the pawn (Arbakov-Kishnev, Moscow 1989).

Pr.Nikolic-Hübner (Skelleftea 1989) went 6 徵c2 c5 7 dxc5 徵a5 8 ②d2 徵xc5 9 ②xc4 0-0 10 요e3 徵c7 11 요e2 요xc3+ 12 bxc3 e5 13 요g5 요e6 14 요xf6 요xc4 15 요xe5 徵xe5 16 요xc4 ②d7 with equal chances.



6 ... 2d5

6... De4 is less favourable: 7 ₩c2 ₩d5 8 \$\overline\$e2 (or 8 \$\overline\$d2 \$\overline\$xc3 9 bxc3 b5 10 a4 c6 11 \$\overline\$c1!, switching the bishop to the a3-f8 diagonal) 8...b5 9 0-0 \$\overline\$xc3 10 bxc3 \$\overline\$b7 11 a4 a6 (Kharitonov-Chekhov, Irkutsk 1983) 12 axb5 axb5 13 \$\overline\$xa8 \$\overline\$xa8 14 \$\overline\$bel1! and f2-f3, driving the knight from e4, with a complicated game, perhaps more promising for White.

\$d2 ②b6!

If 7... 2xc3 8 bxc3 b5 9 2g5 White has a serious initiative for the pawn.

7

8

After 7...②xc3 8 bxc3 兔e7 9 兔xc4 c5 10 0-0 0-0 11 ₩e2 ②d7 12 Ifd1 cxd4 13 cxd4 ②b6 14 兔a5 White stands better (Pr.Nikolic-Panchenko, Sochi 1982).

a3 单e7

14.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 신f3 신f6 4 신c3)

4 ... a6 White's main continuations are:

5 e4 (14.21) - p.218

5 a4 (14.22) - p.231

5 e3 b5 6 a4 b4 does not promise him any advantage:

(a) 7 ②a2 e6 8 오xc4 鱼e7 9 0-0 0-0 10 豐e2 鱼b7 11 單d1 a5 12 鱼d2 ②bd7 13 ②c1 c5 14 ②b3 豐b6 with an excellent game for Black (Reshevsky-Smyslov, USA v. USSR 1945);

(b) 7 2b1 e6 8 \$xc4 \$b7 9 0-0 2bd7 10 2bd2 c5 with an equal position (Kuzmin-Miles, Reykjavik 1978). 14.21 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 විf3 විf6 4 විc3 a6)

5 e4



This move was made by Bogoljubow in his match with Alekhine (Germany 1934), who made the following comment: 'But this is merely an adventure, which could be selected only by a player who had already but little to lose.'

Modern players, of course, do not agree with such a categorical opinion.

After sacrificing a pawn, White has good chances of exploiting his spatial advantage in the centre and on the kingside.

.. b5

5... ≙g4 6 **≙**xc4 e6 7 **≜**e3 **€**)c6 8 0–0 favours White (Veresov-Lutikov, Moscow 1960).

5...c5 can be met by either 6 \pounds xc4 cxd4 (6...b5 7 \pounds d3 cxd4 8 \bigstar xd4) 7 Wxd4 Wxd4 8 \bigstar xd4, or 6 d5 e6 7 a4!, and if 7...exd5 8 e5, reaching a favourable position for White (cf. p.232).

6 e5 7 a4

Compare this position with that arising in the gambit variation of the Slav

例d5

Defence: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 263 26642c3 dxc4 5 e4 b5 6 e5 265 7 a4. Instead of ...c7-c6 Black has played ...a7-a6. The main difference is that White is threatening to regain his pawn immediately, which denies Black the move ...e7-e6 and forces him to exchange on c3.

 $7 \, \odot g5$ is the main alternative:



(a) 7...e6, and now:

(a1) 8 ₩f3 was played by Bogoljubow in the afore-mentioned game, which continued 8...₩d7 9 2xd5 exd5 10 a3 (10...2b4+ was threatened) 10... 2c6 11 2e3 2d8 12 2e2 ₩f5! 13 ₩g3 (after 13 ₩xd5? 2b7 White loses his queen) 13...h6 14 2h3 (if 14 2f3 ₩g4) 14...c6 15 f4 ₩c2! 16 ₩f2 2xa3!, and Black gained a great material advantage, since the bishop cannot be taken: 17 Ixa3 ₩xb2 18 Ia5 ₩b4+ 19 2d2 c3;

(a2) 8 Wh5 was later found to be more accurate:

(a21) 8..., we7 (here Alekhine cut short his commentary, regarding Black's position as safe) 9 2 e2, and Black still has much work to do in order to avoid the dangers awaiting him in this seemingly quiet position. The e5 pawn, cramping Black, the e4 square for the knight, the weak dark squares – these are White's trumps as he prepares his offensive.



Korelov-Gufeld (USSR Ch. $\frac{1}{2}$ -Final 1963) continued 9... $\frac{1}{2}$ C6 (if 9... $\frac{6}{2}$ b7 10 0-0 $\frac{1}{2}$ d7 11 a4!) 10 $\frac{6}{2}$ e3 $\frac{1}{2}$ cb4 11 0-0 $\frac{1}{2}$ xc3 12 bxc3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d5 13 $\frac{6}{2}$ d2 $\frac{6}{2}$ b7 14 a4 c6 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ fb1 g6 16 $\frac{6}{2}$ h3, with sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn;

(a22) 8...g6 9 $rac{1}{2}$ f5 (or 9... $rac{1}{2}$ d7, B.Vladimirov-Korolev, Leningrad 1963, when 10 2 ge4! is strong) 10 exf6 $rac{1}{2}$ f6 11 2 xd5 $rac{1}{2}$ 2xc7+ $rac{1}{2}$ d7 13 gxf3 2 b4+ 14 $rac{1}{2}$ 2xc7 15 2 f4+ $rac{1}{2}$ b6 16 2 h3 with advantage to White (Petursson-Sigurjonsson, Reykjavik 1982);

(a23) 8... 省d7 (as in the Bogoljubow-Alekhine game):



9 & e2 (with the queen at h5, 9 \bigtriangleup xd5 exd5 10 e6 may seem to work, but the

cool 10.... erries all the threats) 9... 207 10 263 g6 11 264 b4 12 20ce4 20c6 13 20 a6 14 20h3 0-0-0 15 0-0 with a complicated, double-edged position (Petursson-Zaltsman, Reykjavik 1984). Black is still a pawn up, but White's spatial advantage in the centre, strong knight at e4, and advanced enemy pawns equalise the chances;

(b) 7...2f5 led to a rapid defeat in Höttes-Bialas (Bad Pyrmont 1961): 8 2xf7! 2xf7 9 2f3 e6 10 g4 2b4 11 gxf5 18 12 12 g1 exf5 13 2b+5 2g8 14 2b+6 17 15 e6 1e7 16 2xg7! 1xe6+ (16...1xg7 17 2f7+) 17 2e5+ 2f8 18 2xh7, and White won;

(c) 7...f6 leads to interesting complications:



8 ②xd5 ₩xd5 9 오e2 c6 10 오f3 ₩d8, and now:

(c1) 11 De4 fxe5 12 0-0 Wxd4? (better 12...exd4) 13 2e3! Wxd1 14 Ifxd1 (despite the exchange of queens and his extra pawns, Black's position is difficult) 14...2e6 15 a4 (15 Dg5! is even stronger) 15...2d5 16 axb5 e6 (B.Vladimirov-Zakharov, USSR Ch. ½-Final 1963), and now 17 b6 would have confirmed White's advantage;

(c2) 11 exf6 exf6 12 豐e2+ 兔e7 13 ②e6 兔xe6 14 豐xe6 豐d7 15 豐e2 0-0?! (Black should have played 15... Wxd4, gaining e5 for his queen – Rogers) 16 0–0 Za7 17 a4 with an excellent position for the pawn (Rogers-Garcia Palermo, Dortmund 1985);

(d) 7... Dxc3 used to be considered the main reply to Bogoljubow's move:

(d1) 8 bxc3 f6 9 對f3 (this move, made in Münder-Kühler, Menden 1974, is an improvement on 9 ②e4 對d5!, Buslaev-Gurgenidze, Georgian Ch. 1964) 9...里a7 10 ②h3, retaining the initiative in view of the threat of ②f4 (if 10...金b7 11 獸g3 and 兔e2).

(d2) 8 對行! This interposition, suggested by Rogers, is perhaps the strongest move.



If 8... at the follows 9 wxc3, with the idea of exploiting the position of the black queen at d5 and bringing the king's bishop into play with gain of tempo.

Âfter 7 a4 Black has several replies: 7...∲xc3 (14.211) 7...∲b7 (14.212) – p.226 7...∲b4 (14.213) – p.227

7...c6 (14.214) - p.229

7...e6 (14.215) - p.230

After 7....b4 8 2e4 White regains the pawn with the better position: 8....c3 (or 8....2f5 9 2g3 2g4 10 2xc4 e6 11 h3) 9 bxc3 bxc3 10 2a3 2f5 11 2g3 2g412 2c4 e6 13 2xf8 2xf8 14 h3 2xf3 15 獣xf3 ②c6 16 ②e2 ②cb4 17 皇xd5 ②xd5 18 ②xc3 ②xc3 19 獣xc3 g6 20 0-0 堂g7 21 罩ac1 (Shamkovich-Kapetanovic, New York 1987).

7...\$15 fails to 8 2h4!, when after 8...2xc3 9 bxc3 24 10 e6! 35 (10... fxe6 11 35 fails to 8 26 11 exf7+ 2612 22 Black's position is unsatisfactory (Miles-Heinbuch, Ostende 1985).

... ∅xc3 bxc3 ₩d5



If 8.... b7, then:

7

8

(a) 9 ②g5 e6 (9...h6 10 對h5 g6 is also possible) 10 對h5 g6 11 對g4 鱼e7 12 鱼e2 ②d7 13 h4 h5 14 對g3 ②b6 15 0-0 ②d5 with a favourable position for Black (Johansson-Ardiansyah, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984);

(b) 9 e6! (a blockading sacrifice) 9... f6 (9...fxe6 transposes into variation 14.212), when the e6 pawn, cut off from base, is picked up by Black, but his backward development and, more important, difficulty in manoeuvring, allow White various active possibilities:

(b1) 10 \$e2, and now:



(b11) 10... ₩d5 11 0-0 ₩xe6 12 **Z**e1, when:

(b111) 12... $\forall d7$ 13 $\triangle h4$ (13 $\triangle d2!?$ – Belyavsky) 13...g6 14 $\triangle g4$ f5 15 $\triangle f3$ $\triangle c6$ 16 $\triangle g5$ h6 (even the more tenacious 16... $\diamond f7$ would not have helped: 17 d5 $\triangle d8$ 18 $\blacksquare a2$ h6 19 $\triangle f4$ $\triangle g7$ 20 $\triangle h5$ gxh5 21 $\forall xh5+ \diamond g8$ 22 $\triangle xf5$ $\equiv h7$ 23 $\blacksquare xe7 \; \forall xd5$ 24 $\blacksquare e8+$, Belyavsky) 17 d5 $\triangle e5$ 18 $\blacksquare xe5$ hxg5 19 $\triangle xg6$ (Belyavsky-Dlugy, Tunis 1985), with a difficult position for Black;

(b112) 12...@b6 is an improvement: 13 @h4 @d7 14 @g4 @d5 15 axb5 (15 @f5 e6 16 axb5 0-0-0 17 @e3 is unclear) 15...axb5 16 \blacksquare xa8+ @xa8 (W.Schmidt-Schulz, Prague 1987), when Konikowski gives the interesting variation 17 @f5 g6 18 @xe7 @xe7 19 @a3 @e5 20 dxe5 f5 21 @xf5 @xa3 (or 21...gxf5 22 e6 @c6 23 @h5+ @d8 24 @xe7+ @xe7 25 @g5+ with perpetual check) 22 @d7+ @f8 23 @e4 @xe4 24 \blacksquare xe4 g5 25 \blacksquare e3 @g6 26 \blacksquare f3+ @g8 27 @d8+ @g7 28 @xc7+ with a draw;

(b12) 10...&d5 11 0-0 c6 12 2h4 &xe6 13 axb5 cxb5 14 &f3 &d5 15 2f5 g6 16 2e3 &xf3 17 3xf3 $\blacksquarea7$ 18 $\blacksquare e1 \&g7$ 19 2d5 0-0 20 &a3 with compensation for the pawn (Piket-Schlosser, Munich 1989); (b13) 10...g6, a comparatively new continuation, to which White can reply:

(b131) 11 0–0 &g7 12 \bigtriangleup h4 &d5 13 &f3 c6 14 &a3 0–0 15 &c5 f5 (Lobron-Raetsky, Cap d'Agde 1994) 16 g3! &f6 17 \circlearrowright g2 with a complicated game where White would seem to have sufficient compensation for the pawn;

(b132) 11 &f4 (11 h4 and h4-h5 is also interesting – Dreev) 11...&g7 12 h4 0–0 (or 12...@d5 13 h5 @xe6 14 h6 &f8 15 @b1 with definite compensation for the pawns) 13 h5 g5 14 h6 &h8 15 @b1!? @d5 (15...gxf4? 16 @f5 and \blacksquare h4, winning) 16 \blacksquare h5 @xe6 17 <Dxg5 fxg5 18 \blacksquare xg5+ <math>@f7 19 &e5 @e8 (Raetsky) – the resulting complicated positions require further analysis;

(b2) 10 2e3, and now:



(b21) 10... ₩d6 11 2 ₩xe6 12 ₩b1 with a favourable position for White in view of the threats to capture on b5 and c4 (Sosonko-Pachman, Geneva 1977);

(b22) 10... 全d5 11 ④h4 g6 12 對b1 對d6 13 axb5 對xe6 14 单e2 ④d7 15 0-0 with a sharp game and chances for both sides (Sosonko-Dlugy, New York 1984);

(b23) 10.... 11 201 206 12 axb5 (12 鱼e2 20a5 13 20h4 堂e4 14 堂b4 20b3 15 鱼f3 堂xe6 16 鱼xb7 20xa1 17 0-0 2c2 18 4c5 needs testing) 12... axb5 13 4c8 2xa8 14 2c2 4d8 15 2g5 fxg5 (15...4c8xg2 16 2c8 4c8 17 2c86 4c8 4c8

(b3) 10 g3:



10...@d5 11 &g2 @xe6+ 12 &e3 @c8 (after 12...c6 13 0-0 @c8 14 \blacksquare e1 White has compensation for the sacrificed material) 13 0-0 e6 14 @h4 &xg2 15 @xg2 &d6 16 @h5+ (or 16 axb5 @d7) 16...g6 17 @f3 @d7 18 axb5 @f7 19 @c6 @b6 20 &f4 @d7 and by giving back the gambit pawns Black equalised (Vaiser-Korsunsky, USSR 1978).

9 g3

9 2e2 is also possible.

9... ≜b7

Other continuations:

9... 2e6 10 2g2, and now:

(a) 10...Wb7 (an idea of Simagin) 11 0-0 (or 11 Ah4, with the idea after 11... Ad5 12 Axd5 Wxd5 13 0-0 e6 of playing 14 Ag2, intending Af4 and d4-d5; after 14...Wb7 15 d5! Wxd5 16 Wxd5exd5 17 axb5 Ad7 18 Ae3 White has the advantage, Chekhova-Mulenko, Sochi 1981) 11...Ad5, when: (a1) 12 2a3 2d7 (or 12...e6 13 2xf8 2xf8 42h4 2xg2 15 2xg22d7 16 f4 g6 17 f5, Varszindi-Navarovszky, Hungary 1982) 13 2e2 e6 14 2xf8 2xf8 (Vakhidov-Vaiser, USSR 1984) 15 2fb1! with the idea of 16 axb5 axb5 17 2xa8+2xa8 18 2b2(Vaiser);



(a21) 13 ②g5 皇d5 14 皇xd5 螢xd5 15 axb5, when there can follow:

(a211) 15...axb5 16 罩xa8 徵xa8 17 螢g4! 公c6 (if 17...e6 18 公xe6 fxe6 19 螢xe6+ 金e7 20 金g5, or 17..., 一致b7 18 螢f5) 18 螢f3 f6 19 公e6 螢b7 20 螢d5 and Black is in trouble (Balashov-Miles, Bugojno 1978);

(a212) 15...h6 16 公h3 (the quiet 16 對行! can also be considered) 16...e6 17 公f4, when after 17...豐xb5 White has positional compensation for the sacrificed pawns, while if 17...豐d7 he continues the offensive with 18 對行 (Matanovic);

(a213) 15...e6 16 \blacksquare e1 \boxdot d7? (16... ad6 was essential) 17 bh5 g6 18 axe6!! Black resigns (Bareev-Yakovich, Tallinn 1986) – either capture of the queen is answered by 19 ag7+ and 20 He8 mate, while after 18...fxe6 he loses his queen;

(a22) 13 axb5, and now:

(a222) 13...2d5 14 bxa6 Ξ xa6 (not 14... Δ xa6? 15 $\forall a4+ c6$ 16 $\Delta e5$) 15 Ξ xa6 $\forall xa6$ 16 $\Delta e5$ 2xg2 17 $\Rightarrow xg2$ $\Delta c6!$ (neither 17...e6 18 $\forall f3$, nor 17... $\forall b7+ 18 \Rightarrow g1 e6$ is good in view of 19 $\forall h5! g6$ 20 $\Delta xg6 fxg6$ 21 $\forall e5 -$ Vaganian) 18 $\Delta xc6 \forall xc6+ 19 d5 \forall b5$ 20 $\forall d4 c6 21 dxc6 \forall xc6+ 22 \Rightarrow g1 f6$ and for the pawn White retains a lead in development, although the position remains unclear;

(b) 10...豐e4+ (an unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the defence by blocking the e-file) 11 皇e3 對b7 12 0-0 皇d5 13 e6 fxe6 (13...皇xe6 is no better) 14 ④h4 g6 15 釁g4 ⑤c6 16 置fe1! with advantage to White (Lalev-Yakovich, Sofia 1988).

If 9... \$ f5 10 \$ g2, then:

(a) 10... 2e4? 11 0-0, and if 11...e6 12 **E**e1! with the threat of 13 **E**xe4, against which Black has no satisfactory defence;

(b) 10...e6 11 0-0 對b7 12 ②h4 鱼e4 13 鱼xe4 (or 13 對g4, Langeweg-Miles, Amsterdam 1978) 13...對xe4 14 單e1 對b7 (14...對d5 15 ②g2 and ②f4, or 14...對c6? 15 axb5 axb5 16 d5!) 15 d5! 對xd5 (15...exd5 16 e6) 16 對xd5 exd5 17 axb5 ②d7 (17...c6 18 b6) 18 bxa6 鱼c5 19 鱼e3 鱼xe3 20 其xe3 0-0 21 Щa5 with advantage to White (Gligoric-Buljovcic, Novi Sad 1979).

10 **£g2**

₩d7



11 🔔 a3

11 2h4 comes into consideration:

(a) $11... \pounds xg2$ 12 2xg2 Wd5 (or 12...e6?! 13 Wf3 $\blacksquare a7$ 14 axb5 Wxb5 15 Df4, and with the eventual threat of d4-d5 White has a strong position) 13 0–0, with the same plan of Df4 and d4-d5, again with the better position;

(b) 11...c6 12 f4 e6 13 f5! exf5 14 0-0 g6 15 &g5 and White gained an attacking position (Kavalek-Miles, Wijk aan Zee 1978);

(c) 11... 2c6 12 f4 e6 13 0-0, transposing into the variation 11 0-0 e6 12 2h4 2c6 - see below.

11 0-0 e6 12 2h4, when Black has:

(a) 12... xg2 (12...c6 13 f4!) 13 Dxg2 b4 14 Df4 (14 ₩e2 bxc3 15 ₩xc4 2c6 could also be tried) 14...2c6 15 We2 bxc3 16 d5 exd5 17 e6 fxe6 18 Dxe6 \$f7! 19 Le1 \$g8 20 \$f4 (20 ②xc7 IC8 favours Black) 20... Ie8 21 Dxf8 Hxf8 22 📕 adl 🖓 f7 (not Iee7) 23 響f3 ④b4 24 響xc3 (Nemeth-Hort, Lugano 1983), and instead of 24... 2d3 25 Ixd3 cxd3 26 Wxd3, when White gained compensation for his material deficit (strong bishop, rook at h8 shut in), correct was 24...a5!, supporting the knight and gaining chances of realising the extra pawns (Hort);

(b) 12... Dc6 should also be mentioned: 13 f4 g6 14 f5! gxf5 15 \$g5 ²e7 (Morgulev-Shumilin, USSR 1991), but not 15... \$ g7 16 留h5 h6 17 ①xf5! exf5 18 e6! (Shumilin).

The most recent idea is the original 11 e6 響xe6+ 12 皇e3 響c8 13 d5 (also 13 窗b1!?) 13... 纪d7 14 0-0 纪f6 (the amusing variation 14...g6 15 2d4 Ig8 16 ②g5 h6 17 ②h7!?, suggested by Ivanchuk, requires testing) 15 De5 e6! 16 dxe6 fxe6 17 \$25, and now:

(a) 17... 2d6? 18 2xf6 0-0 19 2xg7 \$\$xg7 20 ₩g4+ \$\$h8 21 \$\$xb7 ₩xb7 22 Wxe6 and White gained the better chances (Belyavsky-Illescas Cordoba, Linares 1995);

(b) 17...\$xg2! 18 \$xf6 (18 \$xg2 ₩b7+ favours Black) 18...h5!, with advantage to Black: 19 Wc2 (or 19 Sxg2) gxf6 20 2g6 Ih6 21 2xf8 \$xf8) 19...gxf6 (19... Th6 is also good) 20 ₩g6+ \$e7 21 ₩f7+ \$d6 (Illescas Cordoba).

e6

11



This was played in the source game Bronstein-Korchnoi (Moscow 1964). Other moves were later tried:

11... 2d5 12 0-0 2c6 13 Hel, and now:



(a) 13...g6 (Olafsson suggests 13...h6 with the idea of ...g7-g5 and ... g7) 14 **≜**c5, when:

(a1) 14...**2**b8 15 axb5 axb5 16 ∅g5 𝔅xg2 (if 16...e6 White attacks with 17 \$xd5 ₩xd5 18 De4 - Ehlvest) 17 \$\$xg2 \$\$h6 18 e6 \$\$\$d5+! 19 \$\$f3 \$\$\$xf3+ 20 2xf3 f6 21 d5 and White gained a clear advantage (Ehlvest-Chekhov, 52nd USSR Ch., 1985);

(a2) 14...Id8 15 axb5 axb5 16 2g5 ≜xg2 17 e6 (17 \$xg2 \$h6!) 17...fxe6

(b) 13...道b8 14 e6 (or 14 axb5 axb5 15 e6 fxe6 16 變e2, and if 16...h5 17 点h3 置h6 18 ②g5) 14...fxe6 (14... 点xe6? 15 互xe6! fxe6 16 ②g5 g6 17 点h3 ②d8 18 變e2 盒g7 19 ③xe6 ④xe6 20 点xe6 徵d8 21 徵f3 and wins, Ivkov-Donchev, Sofia 1984) 15 ②g5 盒xg2 16 每xg2 徵d5+ 17 徵f3 with advantage to White (Veingold-Karpeshov, USSR 1984);

(c) if 13...b4 (with the intention of answering 14 cxb4 with 14...e6), White himself plays 14 e6!

11....g6 has been played several times by Ibragimov:



(a) 12 h4 🚖 g7 13 h5 0–0, and now:

(a1) 14 hxg6 fxg6 15 置xh7?! is clever but in the end unfavourable: 15....
兔xf3 16 兔xf3 螢f5! 17 罝xg7+ ��xg7 18 兔xe7 螢xf3 19 兔xf8+ 螢xf8 20 axb5 a5, and White's compensation for the piece is insufficient (Sakaev);

(a2) 14 堂f1!? (to free the knight) 14...免d5 15 hxg6 fxg6 16 包g5 免xg2+ (16...h6 17 包e4!) 17 空xg2 單d5+ (17...h6 18 \bigcirc e4 Wd5 19 Wg4 favours White) 18 Gg1! h6 19 \bigcirc h3 \bigcirc c6 20 \bigcirc f4 \blacksquare xf4 (if 20... \oiint f7 21 Wc2 g5 22 \bigcirc g6 \blacksquare fd8 23 We4), and although the exchange sacrifice was Black's best chance, it did not change the situation: 21 gxf4 \blacksquare f8 22 \blacksquare h4 h5 23 $\textcircled{W}b1 \sqsupseteq$ f5 24 axb5 axb5 25 \pounds c5 \oiint h7 26 $\Huge{W}f1!$ with advantage to White (Sakaev-Ibragimov, Kherson 1991);

(b) 12 0-0 &g7 13 \blacksquare e1 0-0 14 e6 fxe6 15 De5 Wc8 16 &h3 (also after 16 &xb7 Wxb7 17 \oiint g4 Wd5 18 &xe7 \blacksquare e8 19 &c5 White has an active position for the pawn, but the move played is more energetic) 16...&d5, and now White should consider 17 Wd2 (17 &xe7 17... \blacksquare e8 18 &g5 c5 gave Black counterplay in Shneider-Ibragimov, USSR 1991) 17... \oiint e8 (if 17...Dd7? 18 &xe6+! &xe6 19 Dc6) 18 Dg4 and De3 (Ibragimov).



For the sacrificed pawn White exerts pressure on the opponent's position.

13...g6, and now:

(a) 14 2h4 14...c6 15 f4 ₩e7 16 ₩d2 \$\Dots g7, and in the afore-mentioned Bronstein-Korchnoi game White began an offensive: 17 f5! exf5 18 \(\mathbf{Z}xf5 \) \(\hat{L}c8\) 19 里f6 里a7 20 里af1 皇e6 21 響g5!;

(b) 14 ②g5 皇xg2 15 會xg2 豐d5+ 16 資子 資本13 + 17 会本13 b4 18 cxb4 ②c6 19 Hacl ②xb4 (not 19... ②xd4+? 20 \$g2 20b3 21 Ixc4 20d2 in view of 22 Ixc7 ᡚxf1 23 ᡚxf7! Ig8 24 ᡚg5 ᡚd2 25 2xh7+ \$e8 26 2f6+ \$f8 27 2xg8 \$xg8 28 He7 - for the knight White has too many pawns) 20 Ixc4 2d5 21 耳fc1 耳a7 22 凸h3 (22 耳b1!?) 22... 空g7 23 21f4 2xf4 24 \$xf4 \$\Box b8 25 \$e3 ℤb3+ and the ending should be drawn (Kapetanovic-Grottke, corr. 1985/8).

13...\$d5 14 2h4 c6 (securely defending d5; after 14... xg2 15 Dxg2 g6 16 De3 White has an active position for the sacrificed pawn) 15 Wh5 h6 16 \$xd5 cxd5 (if 16...₩xd5 Inkiov suggests 17 f4 g6 18 2xg6+! fxg6 19 ₩xg6 Ia7 20 f5, winning) 17 axb5 g6 (after 17 ... Wxb5 18 f4 g6 the knight sacrifice is not now so clear: 19 2xg6+ fxg6 20 \vert xg6 \vert e8 21 \vert f6+ \vert g8 22 f5 2d7) 18 對f3 \$g7 19 對f6+ \$h7 20 f4 with a promising position for White (Inkiov-Bellon, Rome 1985).

14.212 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 2c3 a6 5 e4 b5 6 e5 2d5 7 a4)



As already mentioned, the point of such sacrifices is to hinder the normal development of Black's kingside.

fxe6 8 . . . If 8... f6 White plays 9 De4, when:

(a) 9.... De3? 10 axe3 axe4 is unfavourable on account of 11 Od2 ad5 12axb5 axb5 13 Xxa8 2xa8 14 Wh5+ g6 15 \vert xb5+, when White wins a pawn with a completely won position (Vaiser-Romanishin, USSR 1973);

(b) 9... 2b4 10 2c5 \$xf3 11 gxf3 ②8c6 12 皇e3 ②xd4 13 皇xd4 劉xd4 14 響xd4 句c2+ 15 當d2 句xd4 16 當c3 **Zd8** again with a difficult position for Black (Chiburdanidze-Sturua, Odessa 1982). White should have played 17 \mathfrak{D} xa6! \mathfrak{D} xe6 18 axb5 and \mathfrak{L} xc4.



9 ≜e2

With this move order (when Black does not exchange first on c3) White has the strong move 9 De4 Db4 10 Dc5 (things are no better for Black after 10 ②eg5 d7 11 皇d2 ④8c6 12 axb5 axb5 13 🖾 xa8+ 🗟 xa8 14 b3 9)d3+ 15 \$xd3 cxd3 16 0-0, Cooper-Findlay, England 1978) 10... 2xf3 11 gxf3 28c6 (or 11...,) xd4 12) xd4 ②c2+ 13 含d1 three extra pawns, White has the advantage) 12 2xe6 Wd6 13 d5 We5+ (13...①xd5? 14 螢xd5) 14 皇e3 ②d8 15 axb5 ②xe6 16 dxe6 罩d8 17 ¥a4 ¥xb2 18 bxa6+ c6 19 Ic1 g6 20 exc4, and Black resigned without managing to develop his kingside (Gufeld-B.Kogan, Ukrainian Ch. 1964).

> 9 Dxc3 . . . 10 bxc3

₩d5

After the 31st USSR Ch. (Leningrad 1963) this position was considered

satisfactory for Black. The game Taimanov-Novopashin went 11 &f4, which allowed Black to return the sacrificed pawns and complete his development: 11...2)d7 12 &xc7 g6 13 0–0 &g7 14 Ξ e1 e5! 15 &xc5 $<math>\bigcirc$ xe5 16 dxe5 0–0 17 Wxd5+ &xd5 18 \bigcirc d4 Ξ f4 19 axb5 axb5 20 \boxplus xa8+ &xa8 21 &f1 &d5 22 \bigcirc xb5 \exists f5 23 \blacksquare d1 e6 24 \bigcirc d6 \blacksquare xe5 25 \bigcirc xc4 &xc4 26 &xc4 \blacksquare e4.

But a year had not passed when the evaluation of the variation changed. In Borisenko-Stein (USSR Team Ch., Moscow 1964) White employed a very promising plan.

11 Dg5!

The move order in this game was more accurate: $7...2xc3 \ 8bc3 \ 2b7 \ 9$ e6 fxe6 10 $\ 2g5 \ d5 \ 11 \ 2e2$. In this way Black avoided the unfavourable variation given in the note to White's 9th move.

> 11 ... ₩xg2 12 Ifi \$d5

If 12... \vee xh2 there follows 13 \vee xe6 \vee dots 14 d5! with a very strong attack.



13 \$f4, and now:

(a) in the afore-mentioned game Stein gave up his queen for rook and knight: 13...g6 14 \$\Delta g4\$ h6 15 \$\Delta h3\$ (the queen is trapped; despite the fact that Black gains sufficient material compensation for it, his position is cheerless due to his poor development and pawn weaknesses) 15... $\Re xf1+ 16 \ \& xf1 \ hxg5$, and White could have gained a great advantage by $17 \ \& e5$, e.g. 17... $\blacksquare h4 \ 18$ axb5 axb5 $19 \ \& xa8 \ \& xa8 \ 20 \ \& b1$ with two threats $-21 \ \& xg6+$ and $21 \ \& xb5+$;

(b) 13...b4 14 \$\overline{2}g4\$ (if 14 cxb4 Black continues 14...\$\overline{2}c6 15 \$\overline{E}b1 e5! 16 dxe5 e6) 14...h6 15 \$\overline{2}h3 \$\overline{2}xg5\$, and by sacrificing his queen for two minor pieces, Black gains counterplay: 16 \$\overline{2}xg5\$ hxg5 17 \$\overline{2}g4\$ (Polugayevsky-Szabo, Budapest 1965), and now instead of 17...\$\overline{2}c6 the immediate 17...e5 came into consideration.

Therefore it is more accurate to continue the attack with 13 axb5 axb5 (13...豐xh2 14 皇g4!) 14 邕xa8 皇xa8, and now:

(a) 15 &f4 g6 16 \textcircleda xe6 \textcircleda 6 17 $\verb"#a1$ &b7 18 $\verb"#a5" \verb"#c6 19$ d5 $\verb"#d7 20 \&$ e5 $\verb"#g8 21$ f4 with a powerful position for White (Bronstein-Lyavdansky, 32nd USSR Ch., Kiev 1964/5);

(b) 15 皇g4 is perhaps even more convincing: 15...e5 (no better is 15... 對xh2 16 兔xe6 兔g2 17 獸g4 兔xf1 18 兔f7+ �d8 19 ④e6+ �c8 20 ④c5+, or 15...b4 16 cxb4 ④c6 17 兔f3 獸xh2 18 獸a4!) 16 兔e6! 兔d5 17 兔h3 獸xh2 18 獸h5+ �d8 19 獸g4 e6 20 ④f7+ and White won (Knaak-Bönsch, Dresden 1970).

14.213 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2f6 4 2c3 a6 5 e4 b5 6 e5 2d5 7 a4)

7 ... ⊘b4 A comparatively new continuation, leading to extremely complicated positions. 8... ≙f5 is threatened. 8 d5

Other possibilities:

8 axb5 호f5 9 호xc4 친c2+ 10 슣f1 친xa1 11 g4!, and now:

(a) 11... \$ g6? 12 e6! fxe6 13 De5;

(b) 11...2e6? 12 2xe6 fxe6 13 14 14 13 c 15 17 24 8 16 2xe6+2xe8 17 2xf8 12xe7 18 18 2xe6+2xe8 17 2xf8 12xe7 18 18 12xe7 19 12xe7 20 2e6+2xe812xe6 and White wins;

(c) 11...axb5 leads to quite fantastic complications: 12 $\pounds xf7+ \pounds xf7$ 13 $\oiint g5+ \pounds g8$ 14 gxf5 $\oiint c6$ 15 $\oiint c6$ $\blacksquare d7$ 16 $\pounds h6$ $\oiint xe5$ 17 $\blacksquare g1$ $\oiint g6$ 18 d5 (Padevsky) or 18 $\blacksquare f3$ (Schwarz);

(d1) 14... $\underline{\Psi}$ xd4 15 $\underline{\Phi}$ g2! (Black was reckoning on 15 $\underline{\Psi}$ xa8 \underline{A} d3+ 16 $\underline{\Phi}$ e1 $\underline{\Box}$ c2+ 17 $\underline{\Phi}$ d2 $\underline{\bullet}$ e4+, winning; also in his favour is 15 $\underline{\Psi}$ f7+ $\underline{\Phi}$ d7 16 $\underline{\Psi}$ e6+ $\underline{\Phi}$ d8 17 $\underline{\Box}$ f7+ $\underline{\Phi}$ e8 18 $\underline{\Box}$ xh8 $\underline{\Box}$ d7) 15...axb5 16 $\underline{\bullet}$ e3 $\underline{\Psi}$ c4 17 $\underline{\Psi}$ xa8 $\underline{\Psi}$ c6+ 18 $\underline{\Psi}$ xc6+ $\underline{\Box}$ xc6 (Kouatly-Radulov, France v. Bulgaria 1984), and White could have gained a decisive advantage by 19 $\underline{\Box}$ xa1 $\underline{\Box}$ xe5 20 $\underline{\Box}$ xb5 $\underline{\Box}$ xg4 21 $\underline{\Box}$ xc7+ $\underline{\Phi}$ d7 22 $\underline{\Box}$ ce6 (Kouatly);

(d2) 14... \blacksquare a7! (Padevsky), after which White has nothing more than perpetual check at f7 and e6 (if 15 e6 \triangle g6 16 \triangle f7 \blacksquare c8 17 \triangle xh8 \blacksquare xe6).

8 & e2 &f5 9 0–0 &c2 10 \blacksquare a2 (10 \blacksquare b1 also comes into consideration, e.g. 10...e6 11 axb5 axb5 12 &xb5 &b4 13 &g5 \blacksquare d7 14 &xc4 &xb1 15 \blacksquare xb1, Knaak-Donchev, Bratislava 1983, or 10...&b4 11 &g5 &xb1 12 \blacksquare xb1, in both cases with a lead in development for the sacrificed exchange) 10...&b4 (not 10...b4 in view of 11 &xc4 bxc3 12 bxc3 and &b3) 11 \blacksquare a3, and now:

(a) 11... 2c2 is not altogether clear after 12 ₩d2 e6 13 axb5 2d3 14 2xd3 cxd3 15 ②e4, and now not 15...增d5?! 16 斷f4 斷xb5 17 ②eg5 斷d7 18 ②xh7 (Grøun-Hegeler, Gausdal 1991), which would appear to favour White, but 15...全e7;

(b) 11...e6 12 axb5 \$\overline{c2} 13 \$\overline{d2}\$ d3, when:

(b1) 14 b3 $\pounds xe2$ 15 $\boxdot xe2$ $\boxdot d5$ 16 a1 cxb3 17 $\forall d3$ c6 18 bxa6 $\exists xa6$ 19 $\exists xa6$ $\boxdot b4$ 20 $\forall xb3$ $\boxdot 8xa6$ (20... $\boxdot 4xa6$ is preferable) 21 $\boxdot f4$ $\pounds e7$ 22 $\pounds d2$ 0-0 23 $\forall c4$ with the better chances for White (Yusupov-Adamski, Sofia 1984);

(b2) 14 2xd3 cxd3 15 2d 2d5 16 2xd5 2xa3 17 2g5 and for the sacrificed exchange White has a promising position (Sideif-Zade-Lerner, USSR 1983);

(c) 11... Dc2, when:

(c1) 12 axb5 2xa3 13 bxa3 axb5 (13...e6 comes into consideration, preventing White's next move) 14 d5 e6 15 2d4 2c5 16 2xf5 exf5 17 2xb5 0-0 18 d6 cxd6 19 exd6 2d7 20 2xc4 2e5 21 2e2 and White has sufficient compensation for the exchange;

(c2) 12 ②h4!? 皇d3 (12...④xa3? 13) Dxf5, or 12...Dxd4 13 Dxf5 Dxf5 14 axb5) 13 2xd3 cxd3 14 e6 fxe6 (14...①xa3 15 響f3 fxe6 16 響xa8 ②c4 17 axb5 axb5 18 2f3! favours White -Pr.Nikolic) 15 Wh5+ g6 (15...\$d7 is strongly met by 16 De4! Dxa3 17 ②c5+ ��c8 18 bxa3 ②c6 19 ②xe6. Krasenkov-Yanovsky, USSR 1985) 16 Ôxg6 hxg6 17 ₩xh8 b4 (17...Ôxa3 18 bxa3) 18 \gg8! (stronger than 18 \overline h6 \$d7! – unclear, Sosonko-Pr.Nikolic, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984) 18...bxa3 19 豐xg6+ 会d7 20 豐xd3 纪b4 21 豐e4 a2 22 Dxa2 Dd5 (22...Dxa2 23 Wxa8 ⑦c6 24 響xa6) 23 罩e1 c6 24 響xe6+ c_{25} c_{25} cof the wild complications White gained the advantage (Zlochevsky-Baryshev, USSR 1986) – analysis by Glek and Zlochevsky.

.. ŝf5

Not 8... 全b7 in view of 9 e6! fxe6 10 dxe6 螢xd1+ 11 \$\vert\$xd1 c6 12 \$\vert\$f4.

9...&g6 is weak in view of 10 axb5 \bigotimes xd5 11 &xc4.

10	e6!	₩d6
11	exf7+	∲xf7

Titorenko-Putyatina (USSR 1984) continued 12 全e2?, when Black should have played 12...e5! 13 dxe6+ 空e8, and if 14 0-0, then boldly 14...豐xd4 15 全h5+ 会d8 16 全g5+ 全e7 17 全xe7+ 会xe7 18 戰行3 星f8 19 獸xa8 全xf1 20 星xf1 全8c6 21 獸b7 獸a7!, parrying all the threats.

14.214 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 신3 신6 4 신c3 a6 5 e4 b5 6 e5 신d5 7 a4)

7 ... c6



bxc3 cxb5

10 ②g5!?

9

The methodical preparation of the offensive -10 g3 e6 11 g2 b7 12 0-0 e7 13 c1 g2 2 b7 12 0-0 b6 13 c1 g2 2 b7 15 f4 cb6 16 f5 also gives White definite compensation for the pawn (Damjanovic-Rivas Pastor, Groningen 1980).

10 ... f6

10....e6? loses to 11 🖄 xf7.

10...全b7 11 e6, which used to be considered unfavourable for Black, is not altogether clear. S.Ivanov-Tyrtania (Berlin 1992) continued 11...f6 12 ②f7 (if 12 ②xh7 單d5!, but not 12...單xh7 13 獸c2!) 12...豐c8 (or 12...豐d5) 13 ③xh8 獸xe6+. The knight at h8 is doomed, and in the coming complicated battle both sides have chances.

11 🖞 🕄

The gambit 11 e6 徵d5 12 皇e2 fxg5 13 皇h5+ 當d8 14 0-0 徵xe6 15 簋e1 徵f6 16 d5 is unclear (Paehtz-Bernard, Rostock 1984).

11		⊒ a7
12	e6	₩b6

Or 12... 2b7, and now:

(a) 13 d5 $extbf{W}xd5$ (after 13... $extbf{L}xd5$ 14 $extbf{W}e3$ $extbf{C}c6$ 15 $extbf{L}f7$ $extbf{W}c8$ 16 $extbf{L}xh8$ $extbf{W}xe6$ 17 $extbf{W}xe6$ $extbf{L}xe6$ 18 $extbf{L}e3$ $extbf{L}a8$ 19 h4! White should be able to realise his material advantage) 14 $extbf{W}xd5$ $extbf{L}xd5$ 15 $extbf{L}e3$ fxg5 (after 15... $extbf{L}b7$? 16 0-0-0! Black lost quickly in Vaiser-Vera, Berlin 1982) 16 $extbf{L}xa7$ $extbf{L}c6$ 17 $extbf{L}xa6$ $extbf{L}xa7$ 18 $extbf{L}xa7$. Material compensation for the exchange is sufficient, but the chances are with White (Vaiser);

(b) 13 \frac{1}{9}f4, when:

(b1) 13... 堂c8 14 d5! 오xd5 15 오e3 (the complications after 15 徵d4 fxg5 16 徵xa7?! g6! 17 오xg5 螢xe6+ 18 오e3 ②c6 19 螢xa6 오g7 20 邕c1 0-0 21 螢xb5 ②e5! favour Black, Kir. Georgiev-Murshed, Novi Sad Olympiad 1990) 15... 互b7 16 響f5 響c6 17 0-0-0 with advantage to White (Timoshchenko-Kharitonov, USSR 1983);

(b2) 13...豐d6 14 ②f7 豐xe6+ 15 호e3 \$\phixf7 16 豐xb8 豐b6 17 d5 置a8 (A.Kuzmin-K.Grigorian, USSR 1965) 18 豐xf8+ 置hxf8 19 \$\phixb6 \$\pmixd5, and Black has three pawns for the piece.

The attack 14 @f7+ cd8 15 cxg5(threatening 16 d6 or 16 ce2) is brilliantly parried by the rook sacrifice 15... @d7! 16 exd7 cdxd7 17 ce2 h6 18 ce3@f6! (Sosonko-Rivas, Amsterdam 1979).

The consequences of 14 &xg5 are unclear. After 14...&xe6 15 &e3 Шb7 16 &xa7 &xd5 17 Шe3 (if 17 Шh5+ &f7 18 Шh3 &d7 and then ...e6-e5) 17...e6 (17...&xg2 18 &xg2 Шxg2 19 0-0-0 favours White) 18 &xb8 Шxb8 19 \blacksquare xa6 b4 Black has a strong passed pawn for the exchange (Miles).

₩c7

14 ... 15 ⊈e2



The bishop at e3 is worth more than the rook. In Langeweg-Witt (Holland 1982) after 15...**Lb**7 16 g3 **Lb**6 (16... d7 17 0-0 d8 18 exd7 **W**xd7 19 dxg5 also favours White) 17 h4! g4 18 f7+ cds 19 h5 h6 20 0-0 cb7 White took the exchange 21 cbxb6 at the most appropriate moment – the black pieces are paralysed.

In Knaak-Thorman (East Germany 1980) Black preferred to return the piece by 15... \bigcirc d7 16 Wf7+ \oiint d8 17 exd7 xxd7 18 0-0! (here too the bishop is more important than the rook, although White also has the advantage after 18 xxa7 Wxa7 19 0-0, Rein-Richter, corr. 1984) 18... \blacksquare a8 19 xf3 Wd6 20 xxg5. White intends to switch his bishop to d4; for the pawn he has a very strong position.

14.215 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 신f3 신f6 4 신c3 a6 5 e4 b5 6 e5 신d5 7 a4)





A comparatively new idea. By sacrificing the b5 pawn, Black gains time.

8 axb5 🔔b4

Miles's idea of 8... (2)b6 also comes into consideration:

(a) 9 ②g5 h6 10 ₩h5? g6 favours Black;

(b) 9 \$g5 (9 \$e3 \$b7) 9...\$e7 10 \$xe7 ₩xe7 11 bxa6 \$\overline{4}xa6 12 \$\overline{4}xa6

\$xa6 13 \$e2 0−0 14 0−0 £c6 15 ¥b1 Id8 16 Id1 2b7 17 De4 h6 Black cannot hold the c4 pawn, and the chances are equal (Tukmakov-Miles, Biel 1995):

(c) 9 2e2 2b7 10 bxa6 IIxa6 11 Ixa6 ②xa6 12 0-0 皇e7 13 ②a4 (White could have considered 13 2xc4 Dxc4 14 幽a4+, Miles) 13...劉d5 14 ②e1 his isolated pawns. Black has solved his opening problems (Van Wely-Miles, Matanzas 1995).

₩c2

9. 2d2 (3)b6 is the alternative:

(a) 10 De4, and now:

9

(a1) $10... \pounds xd2 + 11 \pounds exd2 axb5 12$ Exa8 ②xa8 13 2xc4 bxc4 14 ₩a4+ 盒d7 15 響xa8 0-0 16 0-0 盒c6 17 響a3 2d5, with a position where the weak c4 and d4 pawns balance each other (Lautier-Andersson, Cannes 1989):

(a2) 10... 省d5! 11 包g3 盒xd2+ 12 ₩xd2 axb5 13 ¤xa8 ₩xa8 14 @e2 Dc6 15 0-0 h6 16 Dh5 Ig8 17 b3 ₩a5 18 窗c2 b3 19 皇d3 包d5, and White's kingside activity was countered by Black's successful counterplay on the queenside (Lukacs-Fominykh, Budapest 1990):

(b) 10 bxa6 is another possibility: 10... Ixa6 11 Ixa6 @xa6 12 @e2 2c6 13 皇g5 鬯d7 14 0--0 (V.Shcherbakov-Fominykh, USSR 1988).

②b6 9 ₩e4 10

White can also consider 10 bxa6 ¤xa6 11 ¤xa6 \$xa6 12 \$e2, or 10 **2e2 2b7** (after 10...**2**xc3+ 11 bxc3 axb5 12 Ixa8 2xa8 13 Wb1 he has a strong position - his dark-square bishop has no opponent) 11 bxa6 **E**xa6 12 Xa6 and 0-0.

10 ₩d5 11 ₩g4 axb5

11....g6 is dangerous. After 12 2d2 ≜xc3 13 bxc3 axb5 14 ॾxa8 ₩xa8 15 Le2 Black's weakened kingside comes under attack.

IIxa8 12 ₩xa8 13 ≜e2

After 13 \vert xg7 Black has:

can hope to create counterplay;

(b) 13... Wall? (a paradoxical idea that needs further testing) 14 Wxh8+ 會d7 15 會d1 皇xc3 16 bxc3 幻d5 17 豐xh7 ᡚxc3+ 18 當d2 ᡚc6 19 豐c2 のa4 (Semenov-Fominvkh. USSR 1988), and now 20 \$xc4 (... \$b4 was threatened) 20...bxc4 21 Wxc4 2b6 22 Despite White's considerable material advantage, the position remains unclear.

13 . . . 0-0 14

0__0

We have been following I.Khenkin-G.Gurevich (Israel 1994). To defend against \$h6, Black played 14 ... \$h8?, which allowed White to gain an important tempo for the attack: 15 2g5 h6 16 對h5 當g8 17 ②ge4, and after 17... 盒xc3 to decide the game with 18 ②f6+! gxf6 19 \$13! \$a4 (19...\$b7 20 exf6 or 19... 创d5 20 皇xh6, in both cases with irresistible threats) 20 2e4 2b7 21 exf6.

Black should have played 14... $\pounds xc3$ 15 \$h6 g6 16 bxc3 (if 16 \$xf8 \$xb2 17 皇h6 ②8d7 18 衢h4 皇b7 19 ②g5 We8) 16... Ze8, regardless of the weakening of the dark squares, e.g. 17 Wh4 包8d7 18 包g5 f6.

This entire sharp and little-explored variation requires further testing in practice.

14.22 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 2f3 2)	f6
4 Dc3 a6)	



5 ... 公c6 Or 5...c5 6 d5, and now:

(a) 6...e6 (this move leads to an unfavourable position for Black from the 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 273 c5 variation with the inclusion of a2-a4 and ...a7-a6) 7 e4 exd5 8 e5, when:



(a2) 8... 2g8 9 螢xd5 公c6 10 호xc4 호e6 11 螢e4 again favours White (B.Vladimirov-Khodos, USSR 1958); (a3) 8... ②e4 9 ②xd5 ②c6 (if 9... 響a5+ 10 愈d2 ③xd2 11 響xd2 響xd2+ 12 零xd2, or 9... 愈e6 10 愈xc4 響a5+ 11 愈d2 ②xd2 12 響xd2 響xd2+ 13 零xd2 愈xd5 14 愈xd5, in both cases with advantage to White) 10 愈xc4 愈e6 11 0-0 ②b4 12 ②e3 鬱xd1 13 萬xd1 愈e7 14 愈d2 and White stands better (Sämisch-Bogoljubow, Berlin 1937);

(b) 6...\$f5 7 2g5 h6 8 e4, with interesting complications:



(b1) 8...\$g6 9 2f3 (after 9 e5 hxg5 10 exf6 exf6 11 \$xc4 \$\$d6 Black's position is preferable) 9...2xe4 10 2xe4 \$\$xe4 11 \$\$xc4, and Black faces difficulties;

(b2) 8...hxg5 (this involves a pawn sacrifice) 9 exf5 ₩d6 10 \$\overline\$xg5 ₩e5+ 11 \$\overline\$e2 \$\overline\$bd7 12 \$\verline\$c2 (the f5 pawn is more important than the one at d5; now after 12...\$\overline\$xd5 13 \$\overline\$xd5 \$\verline\$xd5 14 \$\overline\$f3 \$\verline\$e5+ 15 \$\overline\$e3 the white bishops become very active) 12...\$\verline\$xh2 13 0-0-0 \$\verline\$xg2 14 \$\overline\$h4 g6 15 fxg6 \$\verline\$xg6 16 \$\overline\$b1 0-0-0 17 \$\overline\$xc4. For the sacrificed pawn White has two strong bishops, and the pawn at d5 cramps Black (Spassky-Smyslov, Moscow v. Leningrad 1960).

6 e4

If 6 d5 Black's knight occupies a strong post at b4, which ensures him

counterplay: 6...2b4 7 e4 e6 8 2xc4exd5 9 exd5 2c7 10 0-0 0-0 11 h3 2f5 12 2f4 2c8! 13 2d4 2g6 14 Wd2 2d6 15 2c2 2f6 16 $\Xi ac1$ $\Xi e8$ with a good position (if 17 $\Xi fe1$ very strong is 17... $\Xi xe2!$).

After 6 堂g5 h6! 7 堂xf6 (if 7 堂h4 g5 8 堂g3 g4 9 空e5 豐xd4 10 空xc6 豐xd1+ 11 罩xd1 bxc6 12 堂xc7 堂e6, holding the pawn) 7...exf6 8 e3 空a5 9 堂e2 堂e7 10 0-0 0-0 11 豐c2 Black stands better (I.Sokolov-Kramnik, Chalkidiki 1992).

6 ... ≜g4 7 ≜e3



7 全xc4 全xf3 (after 7...e6 8 全e3 全b4 9 徵d3! 0-0 10 公d2 White, with his strong centre, stands better) 8 gxf3 is an interesting pawn sacrifice that occurred in several games played in various USSR events in 1963:

(a) 8...螢xd4 9 螢b3 0-0-0 10 오xf7, and now:

Klaman) 14 f4! 徵xd1+ 15 貫xd1 公d3+ 16 當e2 萬xe6 17 萬xd3 萬d6 18 萬hd1 with advantage to White (B.Vladimirov-Lyavdansky);

(a2) 10...e5 11 0-0 Wb4 12 f4 Wxb3 13 2xb3 2d6 (supporting the e5 pawn; after 13....2)d4?! 14 2d1 exf4 15 2xf4 **এe**7 16 \$h1 2e6 17 **\$**g3 h5 18 e5 2d7 19 h3 g5 20 2d5 2c5 21 f4 gxf4 22 Dxf4 White had the advantage in Lyavdansky-Kvyatkovsky) 14 fxe5 £xe5 15 f3, when Black has a choice between 15... The8, with a sound, roughly equal position, and the sharper 15... $\pounds xc3$ 16 bxc3 $\blacksquare d3$, allowing the opponent the two bishops but hoping to exploit his pawn weaknesses (Geller-Gurgenidze);

(a3) 10... ②e5 11 0-0! (or 11 堂e6+ \$\$\phib 12 \overline{a}e3 \Overline{A}xf3+ 13 \overline{a}e2 \Overline{A}2 14 \overline{A}xd4 \Overline{A}xb3 15 \overline{A}xf6 \Overline{A}xa1 16 \overline{a}e5 \Overline{A}c2 17 \Overline{A}d5 \overline{A}d6, Marovic-Golz, Zinnowitz 1966) 11... \Overline{A}xf7 (not 11... \Overline{A}xf3+ 12 \overline{B}g2 \overline{A}d3 in view of 13 \overline{A}e3) 12 \overline{A}xf7 e5 13 \overline{A}d1 \overline{A}d6 (Lutikov-Ivkov, Sukhumi 1966) 15 \overline{B}xe5 with advantage to White;

(b) 8... 2xd4 is also possible:

but after 9 e5 2h5 White gains the advantage: 10 2e3 2c6 11 e6, or 10...c5 11 2d5! (Suetin).

Other moves for White:

7 d5 2e5 (7...2a5 8 e5 2d7 is worth testing, when White still has to regain the c4 pawn) 8 2e2 (also 8 2f4!?) 8...2xf3 9 gxf3, and now:

(a) 9...e6 10 f4 (after 10 \forall d4 \bigcirc fd7 11 \triangle e3 \triangle c5 12 \forall d2 exd5, Ho-Adianto, Manila Olympiad 1992, or 10... \bigcirc c6 11 \forall xc4 exd5 12 \bigcirc xd5 \bigcirc xd5 13 exd5 \bigcirc b4 Black has the better chances), when:

(a1) 10... 2g6 11 \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 12 2xd5 2xd5 13 \$\overline{xc4}\$ (or 13 \$\overline{xc4}\$ c6 14 \$\overline{xb3}\$ \$\overline{xb4}\$+ 15 \$\overline{xc4}\$ ezd \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 c6 14 \$\overline{xb3}\$ \$\overline{xb4}\$+ 15 \$\overline{xc4}\$ everline{xc4}\$ exd5 no \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 no \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 c6 14 \$\overline{xb3}\$ \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 no \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 no \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 c6 \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd5 no \$\overline{ attack) 13... 全b4+ 14 空2 堂e7 15 資xb7 0-0. White's king is stuck in the centre, and for the sacrificed pawn Black has attacking chances;

(b) 9...2d3+ 10 2xd3 cxd3 11 3b3 (if 11 3xd3 c6 or 11...e6) 11...3c8 12 2g5 2d7 13 0-0-0 c5! 14 dxc6 (otherwise 15...c4) 14...3xc6. For the moment the d3 pawn is immune, and Black has a comfortable game (Kuzmin-Shutrov, USSR Team Ch. 1964).

If 7 e5?! Black replies $7... \pounds xf3$ (7... 2d7 can be met by 8 e6!? fxe6 9 $\pounds xc4$ g6 10 $\pounds e2$, with fair compensation for the pawn) 8 gxf3 2d5 9 $\pounds xc4$ 2b6with advantage (Ardiansyah-Hort, Surakarta-Denpasar 1982).

... e5

7

 equality, and after 19... $265 20 \pm 64 g6$ the game was equal (Aloni-Van den Berg, Tel Aviv 1958);

(b) 8 變C2 皇xf3 9 gxf3 e6 10 單g1 with a complicated game (Livshitz-Neishtadt, Leningrad 1964).

Q

?. ②d7 ≜xc4 ②dx





Black has a good position (Euwe). After 10 &e2 &xf3 (10...&e6 is also good) 11 gxf3 &b4 12 0–0 Wh4 13 f4 \blacksquare d8 he seizes the initiative (Neikirch, Tsvetkov).

It should be mentioned that White can also play 10 2xe5 2xe5 (10... 2xd1 loses to 11 2xf7+2e7 12 2g5+2ed6 13 2xd1+2exe5, when the knight cannot be taken on account of 14 f4 mate) 11 2e2 2ed xd1+ (or 11...2e6) 12 2xd1 2e6 with roughly equal chances.

15

Central Variation 3 e4

1	d4	d5
2	c4	dxc4
3	e4	



For a long time it was thought that the immediate occupation of the centre did not create any problems for Black, and that he could easily equalise by 3...e5 or 3...c5. Nowadays 3 e4 is played frequently and with success, and it comprises one of the main branches of the Queen's Gambit Accepted.

Black's main replies are:

3...e5 (15.1) 3...c5 (15.2) - p.246 3...\(\2)c6 (15.3) - p.254 3...\(\2)f6 (15.4) - p.262

How White should play after 3...b5? was explained to their readers by the authors of the first treatises on reformed chess. However, the variation 4 a4 c6 5 axb5 cxb5 6 b3 cxb3 7 2xb5+2d7 82xb5 + 2d7 82xb5 + 2d7 82xb5 + 2d7 102xd7+, in which White has the advantage, is not altogether accurate: instead of 6... cxb3 Black can play 6...金b7, 6...a5 7 bxc4 b4, or, more important, 6...e5! 7 dxe5 金b4+ 8 金e2 螢xd1+ 9 金xd1 金b7 10 bxc4 bxc4 11 金xc4 金xe4 12 f3 金c6, equalising. These last two variations are given in Bilguer's *Handbuch*.

This means, firstly, that White should transpose moves -5 b3, and only after 5...cxb3 play 6 axb5. And secondly, Black in turn can improve with 4...D, when after 5 axb5 D xe4 6 Dc3 D7 7 Df3 e6 8 Dxc4 White stands better, but this is the maximum that Black can achieve in this rejected variation.

3...e6 4 \$\overline\$ xc4 \$\overline\$ f6 5 \$\overline\$ cc3 c5 6 d5 is considered under a different move order in the 3...c5 variation (p.250).

15.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4)		
3 4 2	e5	

4 dxe5 $\forall xd1+5 \Rightarrow xd1$ does not promise White anything: 5...2c666f4(6 $\pm xc4 \Rightarrow xe57 \pm e2$ is absolutely harmless for Black; after 7... $\pm c58 \pm f4$ f6 9 $\pm g3 \pm e610 \Rightarrow f30-0-0+$ it is White who has to try and equalise, Shevelev-Rublevsky, Paris 1993) 6... $\pm g4+$ (or 6...f6) 7 $\Rightarrow f30-0-0+8$ $\pm c2 \Rightarrow b4+9 \Rightarrow c3 \pm d110 \pm e3 \Rightarrow e7!$ with an excellent game for Black (Polovodin-Ionov, St Petersburg 1992).

After 4 d5 in the old game La Bourdonnais-McDonnell (match, London 1834) there followed 4...f5 (4...2)f6 5 2c3 \$c5\$ is also good enough to equalise) 5 ②c3 ②f6 6 ≜xc4 ≜c5 7 ②f3 豐e7 with chances for both sides.

The wild gambit 4 \pounds xc4 is unjustified. After 4... $\textcircledargle xd4 5$ $\textcircledargle b3$ $\textcircledargle xd4 + 6$ \pounds e3 $\textcircledargle g6 7$ $\textcircledargle f3$ $\textcircledargle d7 8$ $\textcircledargle c3 c6 9 0-0$ (9 0-0-0!?) 9... \pounds e7 10 \blacksquare ad1 Kuzminykh-Somov (Leningrad 1946) a mistake by Black 10...e4? led to a crushing defeat: 11 $\textcircledargle xe4$ $\textcircledargle xe4$ 12 $\textcircledargle g5$. Correct was 10... $\textcircledargle g6$, when White is ahead in development, but Black is two pawns up.

Now Black has:

4...exd4 (15.11) 4...≙b4+ (15.12) – p.244

15.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 分f3)

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4 ... exd4
5 ≌xc4
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After 5 circleft xd4 circleft xd4 the game is simplified, and Black maintains the balance:

(a) 6...호c5 7 2b5 2a6 8 单f4 单e6! 9 2xc7+ 2xc7 10 호xc7 2f6 11 2c3 0-0 12 호e2 호d4 13 호f3 罩ac8 with a sound position (Nilsson-Ekström, Stockholm 1949);

(b) 6... 2 f6 7 2 c3 (or 7 f3, as played in similar positions) 7... 2c5 8 2e3 (if 8 ②db5 ②a6 9 皇f4, then, as in the Nilsson-Ekström game, 9... e6! 10 \$xc7 0-0 11 \$d6 \$fd8 12 \$xc5 \$\car{2}xc5 13 ②c7 里ac8 14 ②xe6 ④xe6 15 f3 2d4 16 0-0-0 b5 17 De2 Dc6, and thanks to his queenside pawn majority, Black's chances are even slightly preferable, Zilberman-Bagirov, USSR 1985) 8... 2g4 9 2d5 2xe3 10 fxe3 2a6 11 2xc4 c6 12 2xa6 cxd5 13 2b5+2c714 exd5 \hat{a} xd4 15 exd4. White's extra doubled pawn is of no significance, and in Mikhalchishin-Gulko (52nd USSR Ch., Riga 1985) a draw was agreed.

After 5 2xd4 2c5 6 2e3 2f6 7 ₩a4+ (7 f3 2c6) 7...2bd7 8 2c3 0-0 9 ₩xc4 2g4 10 ₩e2 2xe3 11 ₩xe3 2f6 12 Id1 2g4 Black stands better (Yukhtman-Bagirov, Dnepropetrovsk 1970).

We now consider:

5...\$b4+ (15.111)

5....2 c6 (15.112) - p.243

After 5...c5? 6 ②e5! 皇e6 7 皇xe6 fxe6 8 斷h5+ g6 9 ②xg6 ②f6 10 斷h3 異g8 11 獸xe6+ White wins a pawn.

15.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 ②f3 exd4 5 오xc4)

15.1111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 公f3 exd4 5 \$xc4 \$b4+)

6	⊈d2	≜xd2+
7	②bxd2	



7 ... ②c6 7...c5 leads to a sharp situation, but apparently favourable to White: 8 ②e5 ②h6 9 斷h5 0-0 10 h3 斷e7 11 g4 ②d7 12 ⁽¹⁾d3 with a powerful position (Forintos-Radulov, Oberwart 1981.

If 7...2h6 there can follow 8 e5 2g4 (8...2d5 is weak in view of 9 12 0-0 2c6 13 2xc6! bxc6 14 12cd 0-0 12 0-0 2c6 13 2xc6! bxc6 14 12cd 7 15 2c3, when White establishes control over c5 and d4, Bagirov-Radulov, Vrnjacka Banja 1974) 9 h3 2h6 10 0-0 0-0 (or 10...2f5 11 2b3 0-0 12 2bxd4 2xd4 13 2xd4, Silakov-Toprover, USSR 1972) 11 2b3 2c6 12 2bxd4 2xd4, transposing into the main line.

If 7.... 2 h6 8 0-0, then:

(a) 8...c5 9 \triangle b3 \forall e7 10 \equiv c1 with pressure on c5; after 10...b6 White gains an advantage by force: 11 \triangle d5 \triangle b7 12 \triangle xc5 bxc5 13 \forall a4+ \triangle f8 14 \equiv xc5! \triangle a6 15 \equiv a5 \triangle c5 16 \equiv xc5 \forall xc5 17 \triangle xb7 \equiv d8 18 \triangle d5 \triangle f5 19 \triangle e5! (Partosch-Miles, Biel 1977);

For 7... \forall f6 8 0–0 \triangle c6, cf. the notes to Black's 8th move.

8 0-0

Other continuations:

8 1 當fe 1 0-0 2 全ge 7 10 e5 13 當fe 1 0-0 12 全d3 對h5 13 當ac1 (Azmaiparashvili-Kaidanov, Vilnius 1984) 13...公g6 with chances for both sides.

8 2b3 d3 9 0-0 公ge7 10 徵xd3 徵xd3 11 호xd3 호g4 12 호e2 0-0-0 with equal chances (Szabo-Matulovic, Vrsac 1979).

8 ... 公f6 Other possibilities: 8.... 對f6, and now: with (b) 9 e5 $\forall g6$ 10 & b5 (10 $\forall b3 \ 2 ge7$ White 11 $\blacksquare fe1$ 0-0 leads to a position from Azmaiparashvili-Kaidanov - cf. the note to White's 8th move; Hort's idea of 10 $\blacksquare e1 \ 2 ge7$ 11 $\blacksquare e4!$? is worth

studying) 10...Qge7 11 2x44 0-0 (Miles-Dlugy, Tunis 1985), when instead of 12 2xc6 2xc6, which led to a roughly equal position, Miles recommended 12 22f3 2xd4 13 Wxd4 with some pressure, but 12...2h3!? (R.Schwarz) needs testing;

(c) 9 Ξ el 2ge7 10 b4 a6 (10...2xb411 e5 \Im g6 12 2xd4 0-0 13 e6 favours White - I.Sokolov) 11 e5 \Im g6 12 \Im b3 2e6 13 2e4 (best) 13...0-0 14 2c52xc4 15 \Im xc4 b5 16 \Im b3 Ξ ad8 17 e6 Ξ d6 18 exf7+ \Im h8 (if 18... \Im xf7 19 2e6, or 18... Ξ xf7 19 2d3! with the threat of 2e5) (Lalic-Howell, Isle of Man 1994), when 19 Ξ ad1 (weaker is 19 2xa6 2d5!) would have given White an excellent position;

(d) 9 b4, when:

(d1) 9...②xb4 again does not work in view of 10 e5 ₩g6 11 ₩a4+ ᡚc6 12 ᡚxd4 এd7 13 e6 fxe6 14 এxe6;

(d2) 9... ②ge7 10 b5 ②a5 11 豐a4 ②xc4 12 豐xc4 c6 13 ③xd4 gives White somewhat the better chances;



(a) 9 2b3 ≗g4 10 2bxd4 0-0-0!

(but not 10...**⊑**d8 11 e5! ②xe5? 12 **₩**e1);

(d3) 9...a6 10 \blacksquare e1 (also possible is 10 e5 Wg6 11 Ob3 Ag4 12 Ad3, Shirov-Zs.Polgar, Brno 1991, or 10 a4 Oge7 11 b5) 10...Oge7 leads to a position from the previous variation;

(d4) 9... \mathfrak{Q}_{g4} 10 \mathfrak{W}_{a4} \mathfrak{Q}_{xf3} 11 \mathfrak{Q}_{xf3} \mathfrak{Q}_{ge7} 12 e5 \mathfrak{W}_{f4} 13 e6! f6 (Browne-Espinosa, Linares 1993), when instead of 14 b5 White should have played 14 \mathfrak{Z}_{ad1} 0-0 15 b5 \mathfrak{Q}_{e5} 16 \mathfrak{Q}_{xd4} with positional pressure (Browne).

8.... 2 ge7?!, and now:

(a) 9 ②b3 0-0 10 ②fxd4 ②xd4 11 對xd4 對xd4 12 ②xd4 with an ending that looks promising for White, but 12...單d8 13 單fd1 毫d7 14 f3 \$f8 15 \$f2 ②g6 16 罩ac1 \$f2 f2 @g6 16 罩ack to equalise (Taimanov-Polugayevsky, 31st USSR Ch., Leningrad 1963);

(b) $9 \oplus g5 \oplus e5 (9...0-0? 10)$ 10 $\oplus b3 \oplus g4$ (relatively best; if 10...h6? 11 f4!) 11 $\oplus xf7 + \oplus xf7$ 12 $\oplus xg4 \oplus xg5$ 13 $\oplus xg5$ with the better position for White (Brameyer-Frank, East Germany 1965);

8...We7 9 Qb5 Qd7 10 Qxc6 Qxc611 Qxd4 Qd7 12 Wc2 c6 (Mititelu-Fuster, Siegen Olympiad 1970) 13 \blacksquare fe1 with the better chances for White, e.g. 13...Qh6 14 Q2b3 0–0 15 Wc5.

8...②h6 9 ②b3 (the simple 9 h3!? is also possible) 9...0-0 (9... \$\overline{9} 4 10 \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} 5) 10 ③fxd4 ④xd4 11 ¥xd4 ¥xd4 12 ④xd4 \overline{\$\overline{9}\$} 13 \overline{\$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} 13 \overline{\$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} 14 \overline{\$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} bdd \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{\$\overline{9}\$} add \$\overline{9}\$} add \$\over

9 e5 ②g4 After 9...⊙d5:

(a) 10 Wb3 is promising:

(a2) 10... 包a5, when in Karpov-Hübner (Germany 1994) White demonstrated a clear plan for gaining an advantage: 11 빨b5+! c6 12 빨c5 b6 (or 12.... 빨b6 13 빨xb6 公xb6 14 오d3 c5 15 틸fc1 公d7 16 b4! with an enduring initiative) 13 빨xd4 公xc4 14 빨xc4 오d7 15 오d4 틸c8 16 오e4;

(a3) 10... 全e6 11 劉xb7 ②de7 is weak in view of 12 오xe6 fxe6 13 劉b3 劉d7 14 ②g5 (Radashkovich-Klovans, USSR 1969);

(b) 10 2b3 is less good: 10...0-0 (if 10...2b6 11 2b5 2d7 12 2c5 with advantage – Anand) 11 2bxd4 2xd4 12 螢xd4 (12 2xd4 2f4) 12...2b6 13 2b3 2c6 14 螢c5 單c8 15 單ad1 (or 15 2xc6 fxc6) 15...螢c7 16 螢c3 2xb3 17 螢xb3 單ad8 White has no advantage (Karpov-Anand, Linares 1992).



11.... 15 and now:

(a) 12 ₩d3 12...0-0 13 Ife1, when:

(a1) 13...₩e7 14 ⊒ac1 **2**e6 (or 14... ⊒d8 15 e6!, D.Gurevich-Dlugy, Estes Park 1984) 15 20c5 (Dalko-Bayer, corr. 1968) leads to an advantage for White;

(a2) 13... ②h4! enables Black to equalise: 14 單ad1 单f5 15 豐e2 ②xf3+ 16 豐xf3 单c2 17 單d2 单xb3 18 豐xb3 豐g5 19 單de2 ④a5 20 豐c2 ④xc4 21 豐xc4 單fd8 22 單d1 豐f4 23 豐xc7 d3, and a draw was agreed (G.Flear-Slipak, Mallorca 1991);

(b) 12 兔b5 (Taimanov) 12..., 變d5 13 ②bxd4 (if 13 兔xc6+ 變xc6 14 萬c1 數b6 15 ②bxd4 0-0 16 ②xf5 兔xf5 17 數d4, C.Flear-Slipak, Mallorca 1991, 17...c6 with an equal position) 13... ②fxd4 14 ③xd4 요d7! 15 兔xc6 (15 ③xc6 變xb5) 15....兔xc6 16 ③xc6 變xc6 with equality.

11...0-0 12 ②bxd4 (12 罩c1!? - Gipslis) 12...②xd4:



(b) 13 ②xd4 ②f5 (13...) 對h4 14 萬c1 gives White the better chances) 14 ③xf5 호xf5 15 對f3 對g5 16 對xb7, when after 16.... 萬ab8 (Black should play 16... 호xh3 - Flear) 17 f4! 對h4 18 對xa7 萬b6 19 호d5 萬g6 20 對e3 호xh3 21 f5 萬g5 22 e6 fxe6 23 萬f4 White parried the attack and gained a winning position (S.Ivanov-Rublevsky, Chelyabinsk 1991).

15.1112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 分f3 exd4 5 兔xc4 兔b4+)

6 Dbd2

White avoids the exchange of the dark-square bishops.

6... ∑c6 70—0

If 7 a3 White has to reckon with the opponent holding the pawn: 7... 2xd2+ 8 ₩xd2 (8 2xd2 2f6 9 0-0 2g4) 8... 2g4.

7 ... Dife Other continuations:

7... 单 e6 8 单 xe6 fxe6:



(a) 9 2b3, and now:

(a1) 9...e5? is weak in view of 10 ②xe5 ②xe5 11 對h5+ ②g6 12 對b5+ and 13 對xb4, when Black also loses the d4 pawn;

(a2) 9...d3 10 2e3 2f6 11 2bd4 2xd4 12 2xd4 clearly favours White (Renet-Schulz, Altensteig 1988);

(a3) 9...♥d7 10 ②bxd4 ②xd4 11 ♥xd4 ♥xd4 12 ③xd4 ♥f7 13 ③f3. White has restored material equality and obtained a favourable endgame (Taimanov-Peterson, Kiev 1964);

(a4) 9...2)f6 10 2)fxd4 2)xd4 (not 10...2)xe4 in view of 11 \\$\\$h5+ g6 12 \\$\\$g4, Miles-Rivas, Montilla 1978) 11 2)xd4 \\$\\$d7 12 2)xe6! \\$\\$xe6 13 \\$\\$a4+ \\$f7 14 \\$\\$xb4 \\$\\$xe4 15 \\$\\$b3+ \\$d5 16 \\$C2 (M.Gurevich-Gurgenidze, Sverdlovsk 1984), and now 16...c6 17 \\$\\$d1 \\$he8 18 h3 (or 18 b4 \\$\\$e6 19 \\$b2 當g8) 18...增e6 would have enabled Black to maintain the balance;

(b) 9 2c4 2f6 10 a3 2c7 11 b4 2xe4 12 b5 3d5! 13 bxc6 3xc4 14 2e5 3d5 15 cxb7 2b8 16 3a4+c6 17 2xc6 2xb7 with a double-edged position and chances for both sides (Zak-Grechkin, Leningrad 1947);



(a) 8 e5 ₩g6, when:

(a1) 9 2h4 10 2df3 2e6 11 h3 (11 2xe6 fxe6 12 10 2df3 2ge7 13 h3 11 2xe6 fxe6 12 12 2df3 2ge7 13 h3 12 2d3 13 2g5 2e7 (declining the gift; after 13...2xe5 14 2e4 or 13... 12 2xe5 14 2hf3 15 2e4 147 16 2xc6 2xc6 17 2xe6 fxe6 18 2xd4, Bönsch-Chekhov, Halle 1987, White gains definite compensation) and in a double-edged struggle White managed to create strong threats: 14 2e4 17 15 2xe6 18xe6 16 2xc6+ 2xc6 17 18xd4148 18 184 2c5 19 162 (19 2f5!?) 19...12d5 20 2b4 2d4 21 2f5 2xe5 22 121 (Timman-Tal, Montpellier 1987);

(a2) 9 a3 \$e7 10 \$e1 \$e6, when:

(a21) 11 b4 a6 12 ₩e2 Dh6 13 2d3 2f5 14 De4 Dg4, and thanks to the tactical possibility of …⊘e3 (after 15 2£4 or 15 2b2) Black neutralised the opponent's threats (Karpov-Timman, Amsterdam 1988);

(a22) 11 \pounds xe6 \oiint xe6 12 \pounds b3 was recommended by Karpov and Zaitsev, but in Flear's opinion Black has the sound reply 12...0-0-0 13 \pounds bxd4 \pounds xd4 14 \pounds xd4 \oiint d7 15 \pounds e3 \pounds c5, and if 16 \oiint c2 \pounds xd4 17 \blacksquare ed1 \oiint e6 18 \blacksquare xd4 \blacksquare xd4 19 \pounds xd4 \pounds e7.

(b) 8 ②b3 皇g4 9 ②bxd4 ②xd4 10 響xd4 皇xf3 11 響xf6 ②xf6 12 gxf3 ②d7 13 單d1 and, thanks to his two bishops, White's chances are somewhat preferable (Belyavsky-Chekhov, 52nd USSR Ch., 1984);

7... 호xd2 8 호xd2 (or 8 敏xd2 愈e6 9 愈b5 愈d7 10 b3!) 8... 愈e6 9 愈xe6 fxe6 10 敏b3 幽d7 11 邕ac1 with good compensation for the pawn (Miles-Ullrich, West Germany 1983/4).

7.... we7, and now:



(b) 8 2b3 2g4 9 2bxd4, when:

(b1) 9... 包e5? 10 包xe5! 鱼xd1 11 鱼xf7+ 雪f8 12 包e6+ 斷xe6 13 鱼xe6 鱼e2 14 包f7 鱼xf1 15 雪xf1 雪e7 16 **2**b3 ②f6 17 ③xh8 **I**xh8 18 f3 (Tukmakov-Avner, Örebro 1966), with a decisive advantage to White;

(b2) 9... 2 xd4 10 ₩xd4 with somewhat the better prospects for White;

(c) \$ & d5 & d7 9 @ c4 @ f6 10 & g5h6 11 &h4 g5 12 &g3 @ xe4 13 a3 @ xg3 14 hxg3 &c5 15 b4 &b6 16 \blacksquare e1 &e6 17 &xe6 fxe6 18 b5! with strong pressure on d4 and e6 (Ftacnik-Speelman, Moscow 1985).

7... ④h6? 8 ④b3 兔g4 9 单d5 with advantage to White (Korchnoi-Mestrovic, Sarajevo 1968).



8....²)g4 can be met by 9 h3 ²∩h6 10 g4!?

9 ②b3

9

9 a3 comes into consideration 9... &e7 (or 9...&xd2 10 &xd2 0–0 11 &g5&de7 12 b4 with advantage to White, Arensibia-Barua, Calcutta 1988) 10 @b3 &a5 11 @a4+ &c6 12 &xd4 &b613 &xc6 &xa4 14 &xd8 &xd8 15 &e4with the more active position for White (Murshed-Prasad, Calcutta 1988).

... ②b6

Or 9...0-0 10 Dxd4 with some initiative for White (Dorfman-Barua, Delhi 1982).

10 **L**b5

10 \$g5 \$e7 11 \$xe7 is the alternative:

(a1) 12... 255 13 2∫fxd4 2xd3 14 ₩xd3 0-0 15 II adl ₩d5 16 ₩e2, when:



(a12) 16...**三**ad8 17 ②f5! 獸e6 18 ②bd4 \\ 🖞 d7 19 e6 \\ 獸e8 20 \\ 獸g4 with a winning position (Flear);

(a13) 16... ②c6 17 ②xc6 ¥xc6 18 ②a5 ¥a4 19 ③xb7 ¥xa2 (Pr.Nikolic-Hübner, Barcelona 1989), and 20 国d4 国fe8 21 国c1 国ac8 22 f4 would have retained White's initiative;

(a2) 12... 堂 g4 13 ②bxd4 ②ed5! (13... ②g6 14 h3 堂 xf3 15 ②xf3 0-0) 14 h3 堂 h5 15 豐b3 0-0;

(a3) 12... ②g6 13 ②fxd4 ②f4 (not 13... ②xe5? 14 邕e1 斷f6 15 斷e2 ②bd7 16 ②f3; after 13... 0-0 White gains the better chances by 14 f4 ②d5 15 斷d2) 14 兔b5+ c6 15 斷f3! (15 ②xc6 bxc6 16 兔xc6+ 兔d7 17 兔xa8 獸xa8 18 f3 0-0 is unclear), when White's position looks the more promising (Ftacnik-Cu.Hansen (Yerevan Olympiad 1996);

(b) 11...₩xe7:



12 皇b5 皇d7 13 皇xc6 皇xc6 14 ②fxd4 皇d5 (if 14...皇d7 15 邕c1 c6 16 ②c5 with advantage to White) 15 饗g4, and now:

(b1) 15...g6?! 16 \blacksquare fe1 0-0 (if 16... 2e6 White has the promising 17 \triangle xe6 fxe6 18 \blacksquare ac1 \triangle d5 19 \triangle c5 \Leftrightarrow f7 20 \triangle xb7 \blacksquare ab8 21 \triangle c5 \blacksquare xb2 22 \blacksquare a4) 17 \triangle f5 with advantage to White (Kasparov-Hübner, Skelleftea 1989);

(b2) 15...0-0 (not fearing 16 \vert xg7+ \$xg7 17 \$15+ \$\$h8 18 \$\Delta xe7, since 18... axb3 19 axb3 Ife8 leads to an equal position) 16 f4 (16 Ife1 can be met by 16... 2e6 17 2xe6 fxe6 18 Iac1 2d5 19 2c5 Ife8 20 2xb7 Iab8 and ... Ixb2 with a double-edged position; Kasparov-Hübner compared with Black's king and king's rook are much better placed) 16...g6 17 2f5 Wd7 18 ②h6+ 會g7 19 買g5 皇xb3 20 axb3 買d8 21 到f5+ \$h8 22 De7 到d5 23 到xd5 Wxd5 (I.Sokolov-Hübner, Haifa 1989). Black was able to parry the threats to his king (the advance of the h-pawn or the switching of a rook) and the game ended in a draw.

Other continuations:

10... 2d7 11 2bxd4 2xd4 12 2xd4, and in view of the threat of e5-e6 Black is in some difficulties:



10...0-0 11 오xc6 bxc6 12 ②bxd4 響d5 13 ℃2 c5 14 ②b5 變c6 15 a3 變xb5 16 axb4 cxb4 17 ②g5 g6 18 變xc7 ②d5 19 變a5 變xa5 20 異xa5 오e6 led to an equal position in Speelman-Hübner (Munich 1992).

Other continuations:

11 ②fxd4 0-0 12 ②xc6 響xb5 13 ③xb4 響xb4 with an equal game (Portisch-Hübner, Tilburg 1988).

10 ...

(Matulovic recommends 14...d3 15 2)e1 2)d5 16 II cd 2 f5 17 II dd II d8 with a double-edged position) 15 II cd d3 16 II dd, and now instead of 16... 2 e6? (the bishop was needed to defend the d3 pawn) 17 2)e1 0-0 18 2)xd3 when White gained a material advantage (Dokhoian-Kristensen, Copenhagen 1991) Black should have considered 16... 2)b6.



11.... 全d7 12 ②xc6 對xb5 13 ②fd4 對c5 14 ③xb4 對xb4 with an equal game (Pr.Nikolic-Matulovic, Yugoslavia 1984).

After 11...0-0 12 ②xc6 (12 호xc6 bxc6 13 窗c2 c5 transposes into a position from Speelman-Hübner, p.242) 12...窗xb5 13 ③xb4 窗xb4 14 窗c2 窗c4 Black has no problems (Solozhenkin-Rublevsky, Paris 1993).

15.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 ②f3 exd4 5 ≗xc4)

> 5 ... Dc6 6 0-0 \$e6

After 6...&c5 (Stein-Kvyatkovsky, Ukrainian Ch. 1959) White conducted the offensive in the spirit of an open gambit: 7 &c5 &ch6 8 &cxf7 &cxf7 9 &cxf7+ &cxf7 10 @h5+ g6 11 @cc5 **W**e7 12 **W**c2 \pounds e6 13 f4 with good attacking chances.

6... ①h6 was played in Shamkovich-Alatortsev (Leningrad 1951), which continued 7 单d5 單f6 8 e5 單g6 9 ②xd4 ②xd4 10 獸xd4 c6 11 ②c3! 单e7 (after 11...cxd5 12 ③xd5 White develops a strong attack) 12 单e4 ②f5 13 獸a4. White stands better.

6....全g4 (Pytel-Castro, Dortmund 1977) is not good: after 7 對b3 對d7 8 全xf7+! 對xf7 9 對xb7 單c8 10 對xc6+ 全d7 11 對a6 White won a pawn.

6...g6 was refuted in Lehmann-Bellon (Malaga 1970): 7 e5! 皇g7 8 對b3 對d7 (8...豐e7 9 皇g5) 9 包g5 包d8 10 包xf7 包xf7 11 e6.

From modern games we should mention Notkin-Nenashev (Cappelle la Grande 1995), in which Black tried to hold the d4 pawn by 6...2667 e52e48 $\Xi e12c59 \pm g5 Ud7 10 b4 (10 \pm b52e6) 10...2e6 (10...2xb4 fails to 11$ e6! fxe6 12 De5, or 11... Dxe6 12 De5 $Ud6 13 Uf3 f6 14 <math>\pm xf6!$ gxf6 15 Uf5+) 11 b5 (or 11 a3!?) 11... Dcd8 12 Dbd2 and White has the initiative for the sacrificed pawn (Notkin).

7	≜xe6	fxe6
8	₩b3	₩d7



This variation occurred in three games from the Romania-Georgia match (Bucharest 1961):

9 Wxb7 Ib8 10 Wa6, and now:

(a) 10...2)f6 11 2)bd2 \$\$e7 12 a3 0-0 (Mititelu-Giorgadze), when with 13 b4! followed by \$\$b2 and \$\$ac1 White could have counted on an advantage;

(b) 10...2d6 11 a3 266 12 $\Xi e1 e5$ (Ghitescu-Buslaev), when White should have played 13 b4, e.g. 13...0-0 14 $2g5 \Xi b6$ 15 $\Im c4+ 268$ 16 2bd2 with advantage.

In Gheorghiu-Djindjihashvili White picked up a different pawn - 9 ②g5 0-0-0 10 ②xe6, but 10...置e8 11 ②xf8 置xf8 12 ②d2 g5 gave Black equal chances.

15.12 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 公f3)

... ⊈b4+

This can transpose into variations considered earlier. Here we will examine other alternatives.

5 Dc3

4



5 ②bd2 invites 5...c3, when after 6 bxc3 ≙xc3 7 ≌b1 Black plays 7...②e7! 8 ≙c4 0-0 9 0-0? (an incorrect piece

sacrifice; 9 dxe5 was essential) 9...exd4 10 ②g5 h6 11 斷h5 hxg5 12 ②f3 斷d6 and White's attack came to a halt (Westerinen-Fahnenschmidt, Bad Mondorf 1972).

After 5 ≜d2 ≜xd2+ 6 ∰xd2 (6 Dbxd2 exd4 leads to variation 15.11) 6...exd4 White has:

(a) 7 \forall xd4, and now:

(a1) 7... 螢xd4 8 ②xd4 单d7 9 单xc4 ②c6 10 ③xc6 单xc6 11 ②c3 置d8 12 會e2 ②f6 13 f3 with slightly the better chances (Karpov-Seirawan, Skelleftea 1989);

(a2) 7...2f6 (Black invites the opponent himself to exchange queens) 8 2xd8+2xd8 9 2c3 2c6 10 2d4 (10)2c5 is soundly met by 10...2c6 11 2xc6+2xc6, as was confirmed by Timman-Salov, Sanghi Nagar 1994, or 11 2xc4 2c7) 10...2db47 (or 10...2c711 2xc6 fxe6 12 2xc4 2d8 13 f3 2c614 2d1 2xd1+15 2xd1 2d8+16 2c1g5, Karpov-Ivanchuk, Roquerbrune 1992) 11 2xc6+2c7 (Miles-Rachels, USA 1989), in each case with an equal position;

(b) 7 2xd4 2f6 8 2c3 We7 9 f3 0-0 (or 9... 2e6 10 2xe6 Wxe6 11 Wd4 2c6 12 Wxc4) 10 2xc4 c5 11 2de2 Id8 12 We3 and White's position is preferable (Andersson-Seirawan, Tilburg 1990).

... exd4

5...2hf6 leads to a complicated game: 6 2hxe5 (the tactical justification of Black's move is that after 6 2h4+ 2h6 7 d5 he has the strong reply 7...2hxe4! 8 dxc6 2hxc3! 9 bxc3 2hxc3+ 10 2hd2 b5 11 2hd1 2hxa1 12 2hxa1 0-0 with an obvious advantage - Bareev) 6...b5 7 2he2 2h7 8 0-0 c6 (8...2hxc3 9 bxc3 2hxe4 10 2hf3 0-0 needs testing) 9 2hg5. For the pawn White has a very active position (Bareev-Ivanchuk, Linares 1992).

- 6 ₩xd4 Or 6 ᡚxd4, and now:
- (a) 6...₩e7 7 \$xc4!, when:



(a1) 7... Wxe4+ is extremely dangerous:

(a11) 8 $rac{1}{2}$ cxc3 (8... $ac{w}{g4}$ needs testing) 9 bxc3 $rac{2}$ e6 (if 9... $ac{2}$ e7 10 $ac{w}{a4+}$ $rac{2}$ d7 11 $ac{w}{b3}$ 0-0 12 $rac{2}$ a3 and $ac{m}{a1}$ e1 with strong threats) 10 $ac{w}{b3}$ (or 10 $ac{w}{a4+}$ $ac{2}$ c6 11 $ac{d}{g5}$ $ac{d}{cxc4+}$ 12 $ac{w}{cc4}$ $ac{2}$ ce7 13 $ac{m}{a1}$ $ac{w}{g6}$ 14 h4 $ac{d}{s15}$ $ac{w}{cxc7}$ f6 16 $ac{m}{a1}$ and wins, Shirov-Hübner, Dortmund 1992) 10... $ac{d}{cxc4+}$ 11 $ac{w}{cc4}$ $ac{2}$ c6 12 $ac{d}{g5}$ $ac{w}{g6}$ 13 $ac{m}{a1}$ + with a powerful attack (Alburt-Romanishin, Kiev 1978);

(a12) 8 全e3 全xc3+9 bxc3 全e7?! (if 9...螢xg2? 10 智h5!, 9...全e6 10 智a4+, or 9...公f6 10 智a4+) 10 0-0 0-0 11 邕e1 公g6 (11...習g4 is more tenacious) 12 全c1! 智g4 13 全a3. Black is seriously behind in development (Dreev-R.Scherbakov, Borzhomi 1988);

(a2) 7...公f6 (it is more sensible to decline the pawn sacrifice) 8 0-0 0-0 9 全g5 全xc3 10 全xf6 (the piece sacrifice 10 bxc3 避c5 11 全xf6 豐xc4 12 斷h5 gxf6 13 斷h6 公c6 14 里ae1 公xd4 15 cxd4 and 里e3 also needs testing, Hertneck-Westerinen, Manila Olympiad 1992) 10...豐xf6 11 bxc3 ②c6 12 ③xc6 豐xc6 with an equal position (Alburt-Zaltsman, New York 1983);

(b) 6... ②e7 (more restrained) 7 호xc4 (Epishin-Godena, Reggio Emilia 1995/6 saw the interesting positional pawn sacrifice 7 호f4 ②g6 8 호g3 豐e7 9 호xc4 豐xe4+ 10 當f1 호xc3 11 bxc3 0-0 12 豐e1! 豐xe1+ 13 簋xe1 with the idea of h2-h4) 7... ②bc6, when:



(b1) 8 公db5 螢xd1+ 9 李xd1 皇g4+ 10 f3 (or 10 李c2 皇a5) 10...0-0-0+ 11 李c2 皇c6 12 皇xe6+ fxe6 13 皇c3 a6 does not promise White any advantage (Alburt-Rachels, USA 1989);

(b2) 8 \$e3 0-0 9 Ddb5!?, when Black has:

(b21) 9... 2d7 (9... 2a5 is also possible) 10 a3 2a5 11 b4 2b6 12 2xb6 axb6 13 f4 2a7 (otherwise he has to reckon with White's pressure on c7) 14 2xa7 2xa7 2xa7 150-0 2b8 16 2b3. White stands better (Vyzhmanavin-Bagirov, Podolsk 1992);

(b22) 9... 堂e6 10 堂xe6 fxe6 11 螢xd8 (11 0-0 a6) 11... 国axd8 12 ②xc7 常行 13 ②7b5 (forced, since if 15 a3 堂xc3+ 16 bxc3 a6, cutting off the knight's retreat) 13...a6 14 ②a3 b5 15 ②c2 堂xc3+ 16 bxc3 Rd3 17 堂d2 置fd8 18 0-0-0 置c8 19 置he1 (19 堂e1!? -Nogueiras) 19... ②e5 20 置e3 ②7g6, and White has compensation for the pawn (Azmaiparashvili-Nogueiras, Yerevan Olympiad 1996).

6 ... ₩xd4 7 ᡚxd4

Now after 7...公f6 8 f3 there can follow:

(a) 8... 2d7 9 2xc4 2c6 10 2xc6 2xc6 11 2f4 2d7 (or 11...0-0 12 0-0-0, Keres-Khalibeili, Moscow 1960) 12 Ec1 (after 12 0-0-0 2xc3 13 bxc3 0-0-0 14 2g3 Hhf8 15 e5 Ede8 16 Ehe1 White's chances, despite his two bishops, are minimal, Karpov-Radulov, Leningrad 1977) 12...f6 13 a3 <math>2xc3+14 Exc3 2bc5 15 2c2 0-0-0 16 b4 2a4 17 2f2 Ehe8 18 Ehc1 Ee7 19 h4 with the more promising position for White (Bagirov-Barua, Frunze 1984);

(b) 8...a6 9 \$xc4 b5 10 \$e2 c5, when:

(b1) 11 Dc2 2a5:



(b11) 12 \$\overline\$ 2 \$\overline\$ 6 13 e5 \$\overline\$ 14 f4 \$\overline\$ 6 15 \$\overline\$ 13 \$\overline\$ 16 \$\overline\$ e4 \$\overline\$ xd2+ (16...\$\overline\$ c7 \$17 \$\overline\$ g5!) \$17 \$\overline\$ xd2 \$\overline\$ 0-0 (Rashkovsky-Lerner, Lvov \$1981) \$18 \$\overline\$ hd1! with the initiative for White;

(b12) 12 $rac{12}{2}$ 2 e6 13 2 e3 $rac{14}{2}$ 14 Ind1 0-0 15 g4 Ifd8 16 g5 $rac{16}{2}$ e8 17 Od5 with the more active position for White (Azmaiparashvili-Lerner, USSR 1981); (b2) from recent games we should mention the plan of pressure on c5, employed in Karpov-Zs.Polgar (Roquebrune 1993): 11 ②b3 兔e6 12 兔e3 ②bd7 13 會f2 單c8 14 單hd1 ③b6 15 單ac1 當e7 16 g4 h6 17 h4 ④c4 18 兔xc4 兔xc4 19 e5 ④d7 20 ④d5+ 兔xd5 21 罩xd5 c4 22 ¹ ④d4 g6 23 a3 兔a5 24 罩d1. White has the initiative.

15.13 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 ②f3)

The alternative is 5 2xe5, as played in Portisch-Pr.Nikolic (Amsterdam 1984). After 5...2xe4 6 2xc4 2b4+72c3! 0–0 (if 7...2xc3? 8 2xf7+2f8 9 bxc3 2xc3+10 2f1 with the threat of 2a3+) 8 0–0 2d6 (not 8...2xc3 9 bxc3 2xc3? in view of 10 2xf7 2xf7 11 2f3 2xa1 12 2xf7+2f8 13 2g5 and wins; after the comparatively best 9...2d6 White stands better – Portisch) 9 2b3 2c6 10 2d5! 2a5 11 2f5!White gained the advantage.

5 ...

6 0-0 6 公c3 公d6 7 dxe5 also comes into consideration.

例xe4

6 ... ≜e7

After 6... ②d6 7 호b3 e4 8 ②e5 호e7 9 ②c3 White has the advantage: 9... ②d7 10 ③xe4! ③xe5 11 dxe5 ③xe4 12 ¥f3 호e6 13 ¥xe4 호xb3 14 axb3 c6 15 호e3 ¥d5 16 ¥xd5 cxd5 17 罩fd1 (Gutman-J.Adamski, Giessen 1992).

Now after 7 2xe5 2d6 8 2b3 White has the initiative (Bagirov-Mukhin, USSR 1975).

15.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4) 3 ... c5 White has: 4 ⁽²⁾f3 (15.21) 4 d5 (15.22) - p.249

15.21 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5)

4 ②f3 cxd4

4...e6 5 $\triangle xc4$ cxd4 6 $\triangle xd4$ or 6 $\nexists xd4$ is considered under other variations.

₩xd4

5

5 2xd4 is weak in view of 5...e5.

The gambit idea 5 &xc4 @c6 6 0-0 is worth considering:



(b) 6...g6 7 e5 \$\overline{g}7 8 \$\verline{H}e1 e6 9 \$\overline{s}f4\$ \$\overline{g}e7 10 \$\overline{b}d2 0-0 11 \$\overline{c}e4\$ with good compensation for the pawn (Haik-Radulov, Smederevska Palanka 1982);

(c) 6...e6, when:

(c1) 7 e5 \triangle ge7 8 \triangle bd2 \triangle g6 9 \blacksquare e1 \$\overline{2}e7 10 a3 0-0 11 b4 b6 (Black does better to play 11...f6, e.g. 12 exf6 \triangle xf6 13 \triangle e4 \triangle ce5! 14 \triangle xe5 \triangle xe5 15 \triangle b3 \$\overline{2}h8 16 \triangle f4 \triangle c6 17 \triangle d6 \triangle e7 18 \triangle g3 \$\overline{2}h4, Shneider-Kaidanov, USSR 1987) 12 \blacksquare e4 \triangle b7 13 \triangle b2 \blacksquare c8 14 \blacksquare e2 with compensation for the pawn (Dokhoian-Yakovich, USSR 1986);

(c2) 7 a3, when 7...2d6 is a sound reply: 8 b4 266 9 b5 (Shirov-Kramnik, Oakham 1992) 9...265 10 2xe5 2xe511 f4 2c7 12 e5 2d5 with a comfortable game for Black.

5 ... ₩xd4 If Black avoids the exchange of queens - 5...\$d7 6 2c3 e6, White gains the freer game by 7 2c5! 2f6 8 2xc4 (Miles-Korchnoi, Tilburg 1985).

6 **Dxd4**

Despite the early exchange of queens and the symmetrical pawns, White's lead in development and centralised pieces give him the better chances. Black still has work to do in order to equalise.

6 ... \$\\$d7 Or 6...a6 7 \$\\$xc4 e6 8 \$\\$e3, and now:

(a) 8.... (a) f6 9 f3, when:



(a1) Taimanov-Nei (Moscow 1964) showed that Black's position is not without its dangers: 9...b6 10 ②d2 鱼b7 11 堂行 ②bd7 12 鱼e2 鱼c5 13 a3 e5? (even without this poor move Black would have faced a difficult defence) 14 ②f5 g6 15 鱼xc5 gxf5 16 鱼d6 fxe4 17 單ac1 單g8 18 ②c4 單g6 19 單hd1 exf3 20 gxf3 ②d5 (otherwise 21 鱼b4) 21 鱼d3 單h6 22 鱼e4 單c8 (after 22... $\mathbb{I}xh2+ 23 \ \mathfrak{D}g3 \ two \ black \ pieces$ are attacked) 23 $\mathfrak{D}b4 \ \mathfrak{D}xb4 \ 24 \ \mathfrak{D}xb7$ $\mathbb{I}c7 \ 25 \ axb4 \ b5 \ 26 \ \mathfrak{D}c3 \ \mathbb{I}xh2+ 27 \ \mathfrak{D}g3$ $\mathbb{I}xc1 \ 28 \ \mathbb{I}xc1 \ and \ White \ won;$

(a2) 9... 金b4+ 10 公d2 公bd7 would seem to be relatively best: 11 a3 单d6 12 互c1 ②e5 13 单e2 单d7 14 ②4b3 0-0 15 单d4 耳fc8 (Mascarinas-Murshed, Cebu 1992);

(b) 8...2c5 9 2d2 2c6, when the tactical operation 10 2xe6! 2xe3 11 2c7+ 2d8 12 2xa8 brought White a material advantage, since he was able to free his knight: 12...2a7 13 2d5 2ge7 14 2xc6 bxc6 15 2c4 2e6 16 b3 2xc4 17 bxc4 2c8 18 2b1 (Ornstein-Radulov, Pamporovo 1981).

After 6...②f6 the sharp continuation 7 e5 ②fd7 8 e6!? is interesting. In Speelman-Seirawan (Roquebrune 1992) after some interesting tactics - 8...②e5 9 ②a3 ②d3+ 10 堂e2 金xe6 11 ③xe6 ③xc1+ 12 基xc1 fxe6 13 ③b5! White achieved an excellent position.

7 ≜xc4 Dc6 8 Dxc6

The alternative is to maintain the tension by 8 & e3 & f6 9 f3 e6 10 & b3:

(a) 10...2b4 11 2a3 2e7 12 2f2 0-0 13 2c5 Ifc8! (M.Gurevich-Yakovich, 53rd USSR Ch. 1986, went 13...2c6 14 2d3 Ifd8 15 2xb4 2xb4 16 Ihd1 with some initiative for White) 14 2xd7 (not 14 2xb7? Iab8 15 2a5 2d3+ 16 2xd3 Ixb2+ 17 2c2 2b5!) 14...2xd7 15 Ihd1 2b6 16 2b3 2c5 with an equal game (M.Gurevich);

(b) $10...\Xi c^8$ 11 $2c^2 \Delta b4$ 12 Δa^3 a6 13 $2c^2 b^5$ 14 $\Xi hd1 2c^7$ 15 g4 c5 with an equal position (Chernin-Seirawan, Wijk aan Zee 1991).

8 ... ⊈xc6 9 f3

White delays the development of his knight, in order after \$e3\$ to develop it

at d2, and by 2c4 or 2b3-c5(a5) to put pressure on the opponent's queenside.

He can also play 9 2c3 e6 (as already mentioned, in such positions 9... e5 is normally unfavourable for Black: 10 0-0 c5 11 2b5 cxb5 12 cxb5+ c7 13 c5+ c16 14 c4 and then c45 with advantage to White, Szabo-Rukavina, Sochi 1973), and now:

(a) 10 2b5 2b4+ 11 2d2 2xd2+ 12 2xd2 2c7 13 2c3 2f6 14 f3 Inc8 with an equal ending (Spasov-Osnos, Plovdiv 1982);

(b) 10 \$\overline{2}\$ \$\overline{2}\$ b4 11 f3 \$\overline{2}\$ f6 12 \$\overline{2}\$ e2 (Tisdall-Shvidler, Haifa 1989) and instead of exchanging on c3 Black should play 12...\$\overline{2}\$ e7 followed by ...\$\overline{2}\$ d7 and ...\$\overline{2}\$ hc8, equalising (Shvidler);

(c) 10 堂b5 單c8 11 堂xc6+ 單xc6 12 堂e3 a6 13 a3 ②f6 14 堂e2 堂d6 15 f4 e5 16 f5 ②g4 17 堂d2 堂c5 18 h3 ②f6 19 g4 堂d4 followed by ... ②d7-c5 with equal chances (Nalbandian-Lputian, Protvino 1993).



9 ... e6 10 \$\overline{ve3}\$ \$\overline{\Delta f6}\$ 11 \$\overline{vd2}\$! \$\overline{vd7}\$ The set \$\overline{vd7}\$ or \$11...\$\overline{vd6}\$ 12 \$\overline{ve7}\$ er \$2\$ \$\overline{ve7}\$ 13 \$\overline{vf2}\$ \$\overline{ve7}\$ red \$\overline{ve7}\$ 16 \$\overline{ve7}\$ er \$16\$ \$\overline{ve7}\$ er \$16

White (Portisch-Seirawan, Reykjavik 1991).

15.22 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5)

4 d5

We consider: 4...e6 (15.221)

4...②f6 5 ②c3 b5!? (15.222) – p.251

15.221 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5 4 d5)

... еб

4...b5 5 a4 包f6 6 包d2 (or 6 暫c2 包a6!, and if 7 axb5 包b4 8 暫xc4 e6!) 6...b4 7 盒xc4 g6, and now:

(a) an extremely sharp situation arises after 8 e5 ②fd7 (8...②xd5 9 ②e4!) 9 e6 fxe6 10 dxe6 ②e5 11 ②b5+ ③bc6 12 ¥e2 ②g7 (Yashvili-Efimov, USSR 1989). If White wins a piece by 13 ③xc6+ ②xc6 14 ¥f3 ¥d6 15 ¥f7+ ③d8 16 ¥xg7, then after 16...¥xe6+ 17 登d1 篇g8 18 ¥h6 ③a6 19 ¥e3 ¥d5 followed by ...⑤c7 and ...篇ad8 he comes under a strong attack;

(b) it is therefore better to prepare the advance of the central pawn, e.g. by 8 b 3 2g7 9 a5 0-0 10 e5 2fd7 11 f4, when the play is in his favour (Plaskett-Ray, London 1990).

5 \$xc4

Or 5 2c3 exd5, when:

(a) 6 exd5 6...⊙f6 7 \$xc4 a6, and now:

(a1) 8 a4 \$\overline\$ d6 (8...\"C7 followed by ...\$e7 needs testing) 9 \"e2+, when:

(a11) on the basis of Kuuskmaa-Schrancz (corr. 1981) the variation used to be evaluated in favour of White: after 9...豐e7 10 豐xe7+ 拿xe7 (10.... 全xe7 11 全f4!) 11 全g5 全f5 12 ②ge2 followed by ②g3-e4 he achieved an excellent position;

(a2) 8 \$£4, allowing ...b7-b5, is interesting:



(a22) Black should not be in a hurry to play ... b7-b5: 8... 2d6 9 We2+ 2f8leads to a complicated game with chances for both sides;

(b) 6 2xd5 2c6 (6...2e7 7 2xc42xd5 8 2xd5 transposes into a position considered later) 7 2xc4 2d6 8 2f32ge7 9 2g5 h6 10 2h4 2fa5 + 11 b4! 2xb4 12 2f6+! gxf6 13 2xd6, and

White, disregarding the double check, gained a very strong attack (Dautov-Donchenko, USSR Team Ch., Podolsky 1990).

Df6

Here the seemingly natural exchange 5...exd5 can have unfortunate consequences after 6 \$xd5! (threatening 7 Âxf7+):

5

(a) 6...\$d6 is met by 7 e5! \$xe5 8 皇xf7+ 當e7 9 句f3 (Veresov-Neishtadt, Moscow 1965):

(b) 6... Wc7 avoids the immediate danger, but the advantage remains with White, e.g. 7 2c3 2f6 8 2ge2 2d6?! (8... @ e7) 9 @ c4 a6 10 f4 b5 11 e5! bxc4 12 exf6 \$b7 13 fxg7 \$\$g8 14 2d5 ₩d8 15 2g3 Ixg7 16 0-0 (Rashkovsky-A.Petrosian, USSR 1971).

> 6 Dc3

Nothing is promised by 6 dxe6 ₩xd1+7 \$xd1 \$xe6 8 \$xe6 fxe6.

6 營a4+ 盒d7 7 營b3 looks tempting, but then 7...exd5, and:

(a) 8 \vec{w}xb7? dxc4! (but not 8...\\\\\\\\\colored{c6}? 9 2b5!) 9 "xa8 "c7, and the white queen may regret its bold raid (10 De2 \$c6 11 \$f4 ₩a5+ 12 \$d2 ₩b6);

(b) 8 exd5, but now too Black can disregard the b7 pawn and continue 8... \$\overline\$\ove "b6), when he threatens 10.... 2 g4 and has excellent development for the sacrificed pawn (analysis).

6 exd5 ... 7 Dxd5

7 exd5 a6 8 a4 (or 8 ≗f4) leads to a position examined in the notes to White's 5th move.

> **Dxd5** . . .

If 7... **2e6** (7... 2xe4? 8 **W**e2), then 8 省b3 is good (Petrosian).

_⊈xd5 **≗e**7 8

After 8... 2d6 9 Wh5 g6 (9... Wf6 10 √
f3
<sup>
</sup>
<sup>
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<sup>
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<sup>
</sup>
g6 comes into consideration, although the chances remain with White) 10 Wh6 \$18 11 We3 2d7 12 ₩b3 ₩e7 13 ②f3 h6 14 皇f4 White gained the advantage in Petrosian-Radulov (Plovdiv 1983).

9 DB

Also possible is 9 2e2 0-0 10 0-0 2d7 11 2c3 2b6 12 单f4 单f6 13 e5 (after 13 皇d6 ②xd5 14 響xd5 皇e6 15) ₩xc5 \$xc3 16 bxc3 b6 White is a pawn up with opposite-colour bishops), and now:

(a) 13... 2xd5 14 2xd5 \$e7 (or 14... \$g5 15 \$xg5 ₩xg5 16 f4) 15 e6! with advantage to White (Khalifman);

(b) 13... 2e7 14 2e4 Wxd1 15 Ifxd1 and White stands better (Khalifman-Vulfson, St Petersburg 1995).

White gains no advantage by 9 Wh5 0-0 10 Df3 Dd7 11 Dg5 \$xg5 12 \$xg5 ②f6 13 盒xf6 螢xf6 14 0--0 邕b8! (14... ₩xb2 is dangerous in view of 15 **Zab1** 17 皇xb7 皇xa2 18 里b5 里ab8 19 響xc5. Gleizerov) 15 Zad1 b6 (after 15... Wxb2 16 盒xf7+ 罩xf7 17 罩d8+ 罩f8 18 鑽d5+ **≜**e6 19 ₩xe6+ \$h8 20 \$\overline\$xb8 \$\overline\$xb8 21 Id1 White has the more active position) 16 f4 2e6 17 e5 Wf5 (Timman-Salov, match, Sanghi Nagar 1994).

The double attack 9 Wb3 is not dangerous: 9...0-0! 10 皇xb7? (10 幻f3 is correct) 10...c4! 11 Wb5 a6 12 Wd5 ≌b4+.

> 0-0 . . . ₩b6 10 0-0

9

Or 10.... 2a6 (10... 2d7 and ... 2f6 is also possible, with the same idea of exchanging the bishop at d5) 11 2f4 (11 We2 comes into consideration, and if 11... Dc7 12 2c4 2e6 13 2e3 Wc8 14 Iac1 - Vyzhmanavin) 11... ④c7 12 Ie1 (again White can avoid the exchange by 12 2c4 2e6 13 2e2, retaining some initiative, Varga-Afek, Budapest 1991) 12... 公xd5 13 exd5 单d6 14 单xd6 對xd6 15 ④e5 b5 (15... b6 is probably simpler, Milov-Afek, Tel Aviv 1993) 16 a4 单b7 17 axb5 對xd5 (17... 单xd5? 18 ④c6!) 18 對xd5 单xd5 19 ④d7 (Belyavsky-Ehlvest, Reykjavik 1988), and here Black could have equalised by 19... 單fd8 20 ④xc5 单c4.

11 单e3

We should also mention 11 ②e5 鱼e6 12 鱼f4 單d8 13 響f3 ②d7 14 ②c4 響a6 15 單fe1 鱼f6 with chances for both sides (Goldin-Kallai, France 1993).

11 ... Dc6

11...響xb2 is unfavourable: 12 單b1 響a3 13 鱼xb7 鱼xb7 14 罩xb7.

11... £e6 is strongly met by 12 b4!:

(a) 12... 全xd5 13 對xd5 對xb4 14 国ab1 對a4 15 国xb7 公c6 16 公e5 公xe5 17 国xe7 with advantage to White;

(b) 12.... 且d8 (Yusupov-Ehlvest, Belfort 1988) when White could have gained a won position by giving up his queen for two rooks: 13 bxc5! 요xc5 14 요xc5 對xc5 15 요xb7 萬xd1 16 貫fxd1 公d7 17 兔xa8 (Yusupov).

11...2a6 is a possible improvement: 12 2e5 2c7 (the b-pawn cannot be taken in view of 13 2xf7+ 14 ab3 b3 b4! (13...2e6 14 2d7!) 14 ac2 2e6 15 2c4 b5 (the queen is in danger; after 15...2xc4 16 2xc4 b5 17 2e2 2e6 18 a3 aa5 19 a4! White has the advantage) 16 f4 (Milov-Afek, Budapest 1993) 16...ac6(relatively best) 17 2e5 when White still has a slight initiative (Milov).

12 Ic1

If now 12... 2g4 White drives back the bishop by 13 h3, forcing it to go to e6, since if 13... 2h5 there can follow 14 g4 2g6 15 2d2!, while if 13... 2xf314 2d4 15 2d4 15 2d4 cxd4 16 e5, and in this situation the opposite-colour bishops favour White (Flear).



Therefore Black can choose between 12... $\pounds e6$ 13 $\pounds xe6$ fxe6 14 $extsf{wc2}$ (14 $extsf{we2}$ $extsf{wb4}$ 15 $extsf{wc2}$ $extsf{wc3}$ 14... $extsf{ac8}$, and 12... $extsf{ac8}$, 14 $extsf{wc3}$ $extsf{ac8}$, and 13. $extsf{ac8}$, 14 $extsf{wc3}$ $extsf{ac8}$, and 14... $extsf{ac8}$, and 12... $extsf{ac9}$, 13 $extsf{wc3}$ $extsf{ac8}$, 14 $extsf{wc3}$ $extsf{ac8}$, and 13. $extsf{ac9}$, 13 $extsf{wc3}$, 14 $extsf{ac8}$, 19 $extsf{ac8}$, 19 $extsf{ac8}$, 19 $extsf{ac8}$, 19 $extsf{ac8}$, 12 $extsf{ac8}$

15.222 (1 d4 d5)	d5 2	c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5	4
4		幻f6	

5 公c3 If 5 ¥a4+ 鱼d7 6 ¥xc4 e6 7 公c3 exd5 8 exd5 鱼d6 with complicated play. 5 ... b5!?


5....e6 is considered in section 12.112.

The source game of this currently fashionable variation was Furman-Birkan (Kiev 1967), in which after 6 2xb5 \$\$\$ a5+7 2c3 2xe4 8 \$\$ f3 2d6 92f4 2d7 10 0-0-0 \$\$\$ b8 11 2xd6 exd6 12 2xc4 2e7 13 \$\$\$ 2 2d8 14 2f32f6 15 \$\$\$ c2 2b6 16 2d2 Black should have played 16...g6 with chances for both sides.

White's main continuations are: 6 e5 (15.2221) 6 免f4 (15.2222)

15.2221 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5 4 d5 ②f6 5 ②c3 b5!?)

6	e5	b4
7	exf6	bxc3
8	bxc3	②d7

After 8...exf6 (or 8...gxf6 9 \$\overline{2}xc4) 9 \$\overline{2}xc4 \$\overline{2}d6 10 \$\overline{2}e2+\$\overline{2}e7 11 \$\overline{2}xe7+\$ \$\overline{2}xe7 12 \$\overline{2}bf3\$ White has the superior pawn formation (M.Gurevich-E.Vladimirov, Moscow 1992).

Gerard-Peric (Parthenay 1993) went 8... Wa5 9 Qd2 gxf6 10 Qxc4 Qd7 11 Qf3 Qb6 12 Qe2 c4 13 Qd4 Qb7 14 0-0. Black won the d-pawn but after Qf3 and Ie1 White had a serious initiative.

9 🖤a4

9 fxe7 \$\overline{2}\$xe7 10 \$\overline{2}\$xc4 \$\overline{2}\$b6 11 \$\overline{2}\$b5+ (Shirov-Oll, Tilburg 1992) 11...\$\overline{2}\$d7 does not promise White any advantage - Black restores material equality.

Complicated play results from 9 2xc4 2b6 10 2c2 (or 10 2f3 gxf6 11 0-0 2xc4 12 2a4+2d7 13 2xc4 2b7 14 2d1 2g8 15 2f4 2d8 16 2xc5 e5 17 2a6 2c7 18 2g3 2a4 19 2b6 2xd5 20 2xh7 2g4 - Black has compensation for the pawn, Frias-Ehlvest, Saint John 1988) 10...exf6 11 0-0 2d6 12 2d3 2c7 13 2g3 c4 14 2a1+2f8 15 &c2 h5 16 a4 with chances for both sides (Lautier-Ehlvest, Terrassa 1991).

9 ... exf6 After 9...gxf6 10 单f4 ¥b6 11 单xc4 单g7 12 单b5! White stands better V.Zilberstein-Anikaev (Kislovodsk 1972). 10 单f4 ¥b6

11 🔍 xc4



11...2d6 (accepting the pawn sacrifice by 11...2d6 (accepting the pawn sacrifice by 11...2d1 2d1 2

(a) 13...\De5?! 14 \(De2xe5\) \(De2xe5\) 15 Tabl \(Wc7\) 16 f4 \(De2xe5\) d6 17 \(Wc6\) with the better prospects for White, Granda Zuniga-E.Vladimirov, Tilburg 1992);

(b) 13...金xf4 14 ②xf4 單d6 and ... ②b6 is preferable, as in the earlier game Rashkovsky-K.Grigorian (41st USSR Ch., Moscow 1973).

15.2222 (1	d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4	3 e4	c5
4 d5 幻f6 5	包c3 b5!?)		

6 单f4

A fashionable and even sharper continuation, many variations of which are difficult to evaluate.

6 ... ₩a5 6...a6 7 e5 b4 8 exf6 bxc3 9 bxc3 leads to a favourable version for White of variation 15.221.

7 单d2

Other continuations:

7 e5 20e4 8 20ge2 20a6! 9 f3, when play can develop as follows:

(a) 9... $\Delta xc3$ 10 $\Delta xc3$ &f5 11 g4 &g6 12 a4 $\Delta b4$ 13 &f2 &d3 14 axb5 Wb6 15 &e3 g6 (Belyavsky-Anand, Linares 1993), and now 16 Wa4 with the threat of Wxb4 would have given White the advantage (Belyavsky);

7 at 2xe4 (an essential reply; bad is 7...b4? 8 2b5 2a6 9 2xc4, when the e4 pawn cannot be taken in view of 10 We2) 8 2ge2 (as shown by Kamsky, 8 axb5 2xc3 9 2xa5 2xd1 10 2xd12d7 11 2xc4 2b6 12 b3 2b7 and ...2xd5 is unfavourable for White) 8...2d6 9 axb5 2b6, and now:

(a) 10 \$\Delta xd6 exd6 (10...\\$\xd6 11 \$\Delta g3 followed by \$\Delta xc4 and \$\Delta ge4 is good for White) 11 \$\Delta g3 \$\Delta e7 12 \$\Delta xc4 0-0 13 0-0 \$\Delta f6 14 \$\Vec{14}\$ c2. White's position is preferable (Belyavsky-Kamsky, Linares 1993);

(b) 10 2g3 2d7 11 2xd6 Wxd6 12 2ge4 We5 13 2e2 g6 14 0-0 2g7 15 d6 (Azmaiparashvili-Granda Zuniga, Groningen 1993) 15...0-0 16 2f3 2b7 17 2f6+ 2xf6 18 2xb7 Zad8 19 dxe7 對xe7^{*}20 對f3 亘d7 21 亘fe1 對d8 22 요c6 亘c7 23 亘ad1 with fair compensation for the pawn (Azmaiparashvili).

7 f3. This simple move was played in Vyzhmanavin-Azmaiparashvili (Burgas 1994). After 7...2h5 (7...b4 8 #a4+ is good for White) 8 d2 (8 a3 2d7) 8...2d7 9 f4 g6 10 a2 (Vyzhmanavin recommends 10 e5 ah6 11 2g2 with the threat of g2-g4) 10...ag7 11 e5 b4 12 #a4 #xa4 13 2xa4 aa6 14 g4 the enforced sacrifice of a piece for three pawns - 14...2xf4 15 axf4 ab5 16 b3 led to a sharp situation with the chances on White's side.



7...b4 8 e5 bxc3 (if 8...2fd7 9 e6!) 9 2xc3 a 6 (9...c 7 10 exf6 exf6 11 2xc4 2d6 12 e 2+) 10 exf6 exf6 11 b3 2e7 12 2xc4 e 4d6 13 2e2 0-0 140-0 f5 15 a e1! with an excellent position for White (Shirov-Kramnik, Linares 1993).

7...e5, and now:

(a) 8 f4 2bd7 9 2f3 2d6, when Black maintains his position in the centre: 10 a4 b4 11 2b5 2b8 12 2xc4 a6 is in his favour;

(b) 8 dxe6 fxe6 (but not 8... 오xe6 9 e5 ②fd7 10 習f3) 9 e5 ②fd7 10 ②f3 (10 ②d5 營d8 11 ②f4 should also be noted). Shirov thinks that White has compensation for the pawn, but Gelfand considers Black's position to be sound: 10...2b7 and if 11225 Wb6.

7... \forall d8. An amusing retreat. The difference compared with the position after Black's 6th move is that White's queen's bishop is not at c1, but d2. But this means that he does not have 8 e5, since the d5 pawn is undefended. And after 8 \triangle f4 he can invite his opponent to repeat moves with 8... \forall a5 and share the point...

Black does not directly attack the centre, but puts pressure on it, provoking the advance of the d-pawn.

White can continue:

4 d5 (15.31)

3

- 4 e3 (15.32) p.255
- 4 213 (15.33) p.259

15.31 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 2c6)

4 d5

White aims to exploit his spatial advantage.

4 ... ⊘e5 5 ≗f4

If 5 f4 Black replies 5... 0d3+, and after 6 0xd3 cxd3 he attacks the d5 pawn by ...e7-e6 and ... \textcircled{0}f6.

But after 5 #d4 it is better to retreat the knight to g6:

(a) 5....2d3+ 6 \$\overline\$ xd3 cxd3 7 \$\overline\$ cc3 c6 8 \$\overline\$ f3 \$\overline\$ f6 9 0-0 and White has a spatial advantage (Baburin-Ibragimov, USSR 1988);

(b) 5... 2g6 6 2f3 e5! 7 對xc4 (not 7 2xe5 2b4+ 8 2d2 c5, and if 9 2xf7 cxd4 10 2xd8 c3! winning material) 7... 2f6 8 2c3 a6 with equal chances.

6 **£g**3

5

6

Or 6 **요e3** ⁽ 전)f⁶ (6...h5 7 h4 can also be included) 7 ⁽ 건c3, and now:

(a) 7...e5 (Tomson-Platonov, Riga 1964), reaching a position from variation 15.32 where White has lost a tempo (\pounds f4 and \pounds e3);

6...h5 7 h4 can be included. 7 夕c3 e6

7...e5 comes into consideration.

8 £xc4 exd5 9 exd5



9.... **2**d6, and now:

(a) 10 &b5+ &f8 (after 10...&d7 11 &xd6 cxd6 12 &e2+ &e7 13 0-0-0 White's position is preferable) 11 &f3a6 12 &e2 b5 (this weakens the c6 square; 12...h5 came into consideration) 13 &d4 (this leads to complications, since White sacrifices his central pawn; 13 0-0 is sound) 13...b4 14 &dc6 &d715 &d4 (Tukmakov-Kupreichik, Kislovodsk 1982), when Black should have played 15...&dxd5, and if 16 &f3 (16 響xd5 兔xg3) 16...響xc6 17 兔xd5 響e8+ 18 當f1 單b8 with a complicated, unclear position (Tukmakov)

(b) 10 @e2+ &f8 11 @d2 a6 12 @ge2 h5 13 h4 b5 14 &b3 b4, again with chances for both sides (Barlov-Marjanovic, Bor 1985).

9...a6 10 \bigcirc f3 \bigcirc d6 11 We2+ \bigcirc e7? (11... \bigcirc f8 would have transposed into the previous variation) 12 \bigcirc h4! 0-0 13 \bigcirc xf6 gxf6 14 0-0 f5 15 Wd2 \bigcirc g6 16 Wd4 \bigcirc e7 17 \bigcirc e2 \bigcirc f6 18 Wd2 \bigcirc h8 19 \blacksquare ac1 with advantage to White (R.Scherbakov-Sulava, St Martin 1992).

15.32 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 2)c6)

4 **L**e3

Not hurrying to cross the demarcation line, White reinforces his centre.

4 ... 266The line where Black delays the development of his king's knight by 4...e5 5 d5 2ce7 6 2xc4 2g6 is of great interest:



(a) White can count on some advantage by delaying the opponent's queenside development with 7 對b3, when 7...公f6 fails to 8 d6!, while if 7... 总d6 8 总b5+ 會f8 9 色e2 and 10 色bc3);

(b) 7 皇b5+ 皇d7 8 斷b3 (with his last two moves White has created direct threats on the queenside) 8... 266 (the defence of the pawn by 8... 266 9 2xd7+2xd7 10 2e2 and 11 2bc3 would have weakened the light squares) 9 2xd7+2xd7 10 2xb7 2b8 11 2c6 2h4!(11... 2xb2 12 2f3 2b4+ 13 2bd2favours White) 12 2f1 2c5 13 2xc52g5 14 2d2 2xd2, when Black launched a clever, but ultimately unsuccessful counterattack (Shirov-Murshed, Brno 1991).

5 f3 e5 6 d5 is also played:

(a) 6... De7 7 2xc4 Dg6 (the position after 7... a6 is considered later under a slightly different move order) 8 2b5+ (as in the Shirov-Murshed game):



Lalic-Miles (Hastings 1995/6) continued 8... \bigcirc d7 9 \bigcirc e2 a6 10 \bigcirc d3 \bigcirc d6 11 Wd2 Wg4+ 12 g3 We7 (invading with 12...Wh3 13 \bigcirc bc3 Wg2 is fatal: 14 \blacksquare f1 Wxh2 15 0-0-0) 13 \bigcirc bc3 \bigcirc f6 14 h4! h6 15 0-0-0 \bigcirc d7 16 Cb1 \bigcirc c5, and now instead of the exchange on c5, 17 \blacksquare c1! \diamondsuit xe3 18 Wxe3 would have given White good chances with his spatial advantage (Lalic);

(b) 6... 公d4 7 호xd4 exd4 8 ₩xd4 c6 9 公c3 (after 9 호xc4 호b4+ 10 公c3 0-0 11 公ge2 ₩a5 Black has definite compensation for the pawn) 9... 호b4 (if 9... cxd5 10 e5!?; 9...b5 fails to 10 0-0-0

\$b7 11 d6!) 10 ₩e5+, when Karpov-Piket (Groningen 1995) continued 10... ₩e7 11 ₩xe7+ \$xe7 12 dxc6 bxc6 (12...b5 13 a4 2a6 14 2ge2 is unfavourable; after 12... e6 13 cxb7 Iab8 14 Dge2, as in the game, White has the superior pawn formation) 13 2xc4 2d7 14 0-0-0 De5 15 2e2 g5 16 h4 gxh4 17 Ixh4 2e6 (or 17...h5 18 g4 包g6 19 里xh5 里xh5 20 gxh5 包f4 21 \$c4 ②xh5 22 ②ge2) 18 Ih5!, and White gained the advantage (Karpov). 5

e5

Or 5... ②g4 6 皇xc4, and now:

(a) 6... ②xe3 7 fxe3 e5 (7...e6 8 包f3 2e7 is passive; by continuing 9 0–0 and e4-e5 White takes the initiative. Bagirov-Dobrovolsky, Stary Smokovec 1981) 8 對h5 g6 9 對f3 f6 (D.Gurevich-Kovacevic, Hastings 1982/3), when instead of 10 2ge2 White could have considered:

(a1) 10 2d5 (more energetic), then 0-0-0 and h2-h4 with a sharp, not unfavourable position;

(a2) 10 0-0-0, and if 10...exd4 11 exd4 2xd4 12 Wf1!, when his initiative more than compensates for the sacrificed pawn;

(b) 6...e5, when Black does not hurry to exchange on e3:



(b1) 7 Wb3 Wd7 8 0-0-0! exd4 9

②f3 皇c5 (or 9... ②a5 10 劉b5 ②xe3 11 fxe3 Wxb5 12 2xb5; 10...2xc4 11 ₩xc4 c5 12 h3) 10 ₩b5, when:

(b11) 10... \$66 11 h3 (or 11 2xd4) ②xd4 12 এxd4 c6 13 營a4! এxd4 14 Zxd4 ₩e7 15 2d5 ₩e5, after which the splendid move 16 Wa3!! confirmed White's advantage, Milov-Degerman, Budapest 1993) 11... 2xe3 12 fxe3 and then 13 exd4:

(b12) 10...\$d6 11 \$xd4 0-0 (11... ②xd4 12 罩xd4 豐xb5 13 盒xb5+ 会e7 14 e5 皇c5 15 邕c4 皇xf2 16 邕xc7+ or 12.... xf2 13 \$xf7+ \$f8 14 \$\vert xd7 **≜**xd7 15 **∐**f1 **\$**xf7 16 e5 favours White - Vyzhmanavin) 12 h3 2xd4 13 豐xd7 皇xd7 14 里xd4 ④xf2 15 里f1 \$e6 16 \$xe6 fxe6 17 \$xf2 \$c5 18 Ifd2 皇xd4 19 ②xd4 (Vyzhmanavin-Baburin, Gorky 1989). The ending favours White, who has two knights for a rook and pawn;

(b2) 7 d5 2xe3 8 fxe3 2b8 9 響f3 ₩h4+ 10 g3 ₩g4 11 ₩f2 2d6 12 2f3 a6 13 0-0-0 Wh5 14 h3 f6 15 g4 Wf7 16 Zhf1. White stands better (Bönsch-K.Müller, Germany 1991).

⁄⊡e7

6 d5

If 6.... @d4, then:

(a) 7 ≜xd4 exd4 8 ₩xd4, and White, compared with the 5 f3 e5 6 d5 2 d4 variation, is more favourably placed: instead of f2-f3 he has made the active move Oc3. If 8...c6, apart from 9 $\pounds xc4$, 9 0–0–0 cxd5 10 e5 is possible;

(b) 7 皇xc4 c5 8 dxc6 bxc6 9 创f3 ②xf3+ (9...皇g4? 10 皇xf7+) 10 豐xf3 \$b4 11 0−0 0−0 12 h3 (Dautov-Chekhov, Dresden 1989), and White gained the better prospects, since the c6 pawn is weak, and the exchange on c3 concedes the advantage of the two bishops.

Now let us analyse the bold move 6....@a5:



(a) 7 ₩a4+ c6, when:

(a1) the direct 8 b4? is met by 8...cxb3 9 axb3 b5 10 彎a2 (10 燮xa5? 彎xa5 11 簋xa5 逸b4) 10...金b4 11 堂d2 0-0 with advantage to Black;

(a2) 8 dxc6 \triangle xc6 9 &xc4 &b4 10 \triangle f3 0-0 11 0-0 &xc3 12 bxc3 \triangle xe4 13 &xf7+ Ξ xf7 14 \blacksquare xe4 &f5 led to a roughly equal game in Vyzhmanavin-Sadler (Paris 1994);

(b) 7 创f3, and now:

(b1) 7... 2d6, when:

(b11) 8 Wa4+, and:

(b111) 8...\$d7 9 ¥xa5 was played in the amusing miniature Illescas-Cordoba-Sadler (Linares 1995): 9...a6 (threatening to win the queen by 10... b6) 10 Db1?? (vacating d2 for the queen; White had a choice of two good moves: 10 Da4! and 10 b4) 10 ... Dxe4 11 \$\phid1 (vacating el) 11...c3! (interference - after either capture of the pawn the queen is lost), and in his confusion the Spanish grandmaster resigned, not wishing to check the variation 12 b4 b6 13 Wa3 a5 14 Wc1 axb4 15 \$d3, since Black already has three pawns for the piece, White's queenside is in a dismal state, and his king is unable to castle;

(b112) thus the knight sacrifice is incorrect and 8...c6 must be played, when after 9 dxc6 2xc6 both sides have chances, e.g. 10 Id 0-0 11 2c5 2d4;

(b12) 8 2d2, when after 8...0-0 (8...2g4 9 ¥a4+ c6 10 dxc6 2xc6 is also possible) 9 2xc4 2xc4 10 2xc4 2g4 11 ¥d2 2xe3 12 ¥xe3 a6 13 0-0 2d7 Black achieved a good game (Candela-Baltar, Madrid 1995);

(b2) 7... 2g4 8 2g5 f6, and now:



(b21) 9 2h4?! 2d7! 10 2d2 b5 11 a4 a6 12 axb5 axb5 13 2e2 2b4 14 h3 2h6 15 2h5+ 2f7 16 2g4 2e7 17 2xb5 2xg4 18 hxg4 0–0 19 2c3 2b3(Belyavsky-Miles, Groningen 1994), and here a draw was agreed, although after 20 2xa8 2xa8 21 0–0 2xd2 22 2d2 2c5 Black's position is preferable: the bishop at h4 is out of play, and the b2 pawn is weak;

(b22) 9 \pounds d2 is stronger, and if 9... \pounds c5 10 \forall a4+ c6 11 \bigtriangleup d1 with advantage (Ftacnik);

(b3) 7...a6 8 ∆xe5 (in contrast to the Illescas Cordoba-Sadler game, here 8 ₩a4+ does not work, since after 8...\$d7 9 ₩xa5? b6 the queen has no retreat) 8...b5 (White has won the epawn, in return Black has solidly defended his c4 pawn) 9 \$e2 \$b4 10 ₩d4 0-0 11 0-0 (the sharper 11 0-0-0 is also possible) 11...\$b7 12 \$d\$g4 (if 12 \$g5 Black replies 12...₩d6, intending ...\$c5) 12...2xg4 13 \$xg4 \$\$e7 14 Iad1 Iad8 15 \$f4 (Kamsky-Salov, Sanghi Nagar 1995) and now Black should play 15...2c6! 16 \$\$e3 (the unusual variation 16 dxc6 Ixd4 17 cxb7 Ixd1 18 Ixd1 \$\$xc3 19 \$c8 \$\$xb2! is unfavourable for White) 16...2e5 17 \$\$e2 \$\$26 18 \$\$g3 Ife8 with chances for both sides (Matanovic).

≜xc4 Øg6

7

Giorgadze-Skomorokhin (St Petersburg 1996) went 7...a6 8 &c5!? 2g6 9 &xf8 2xf8 10 Wa4+ &d7 11 Wb4 b5 12 &d3 2g6 13 2f3 (with the idea of playing the knight to b3) 13...&g4 (or 13...We7 14 a3, and if 14...a5 15 Wxe7+ Exe7 16 2xb5 &xb5 17 &xb5 2xe4 18 \blacksquare c1 and 0–0 with the better chances for White) 14 2d2 2f4 15 2f1 We7 16 a3 h5 17 h4 2d7 18 2b3. White's position is the more promising.



A problematic position. The general impression is that White's chances are better, but let us turn to some practical examples.

8 f3 a6 9 2 ge2 2 d6 10 ₩d2 2 d7, and now:

chances for both sides (Ivanchuk-Wolff, Biel 1993);

(b) 11 23 h5 (here too 11...0-0 12 h4 is good for White) 12 0-0-0! h4 13 25 xf5 14 exf5 2e7 15 g4 hxg3 16 hxg3 xh1 17 xh1 2xf5 18 g5 d719 f1 with excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn (Belyavsky-Lautier, Linares 1994).

8 **2**b5+, when:

(a) 8...2d7 9 Wb3 b6 weakens Black's queenside, and after 10 f3 2d6 11 Dge2 0–0 12 0–0 a6 13 2xd7 Wxd714 Dg3 De7 (Shirov-Pr.Nikolic, Groningen 1993) White gains the better chances by 15 \blacksquare ac1 and \blacksquare fd1;

(b) 8...2d7 9 2ge2 (another plan aimed at restricting the knight at g6 – 9 g3 2d6 10 h4 is demonstrated by Petursson-Sadler, Andorra 1991: 10...h6 11 2f3 a6 12 2e2 2f6 13 2d2 0–0 14 a3 2e8 15 2c1 2d7 16 2c4) 9...2d6 10 2d2 a6 11 2d3 2e7 12 f3, and now:

(a) 12...2166 13 h4 (the quiet 13 0–0 comes into consideration) 13...2h5 (13...h5?! 14 g3) 14 0–0–0 (or 14 g3 2d7 with a double-edged position) 14...2d7 15 \$\$b1 (if 15 g4 2hf4 16 h5 2h4! - Lautier) 15...b5 16 g4?! (the restrained 16 2c2 would have given White good prospects - Flear) 16...2hf4 17 h5 2h4! with fair counterplay for Black (Timman-Lautier, match, Wijk aan Zee 1994);

(b) 12...b5 was played in another game from the same match, (where there was a slightly different move order (9 ₩d2 a6 10 \$\overline{d}d3 \$\overline{d}d6 11 \$\overline{d}ge2\$ ₩e7 12 f3), and Timman preferred the plan with kingside castling: 13 0-0 0-0 14 \$\overline{d}ac1 \$\overline{d}c5 15 \$\overline{d}c2 \$\overline{d}d7 16 \$\overline{d}g3\$ \$\overline{d}fc8 (16...b4 17 \$\overline{d}cc2) 17 \$\overline{d}f5 \$\overline{f}f8 18\$ \$\overline{d}xd6 cxd6 19 b4. White has the initiative. 8 h4 2d6 9 g3 2d4 10 2d5+2f811 2g5 f6 12 2d2 2c5 13 2h3 h5 with a complicated game and chances for both sides (Wilder-Ye Rongguang, Belgrade 1988).

8 213, and now:



(a) 8...a6 9 호c2 호d6 10 0-0 0-0 11 国C1 호d7 12 ②e1 變e7 13 容h1 h6 14 g3 c6 15 dxc6 호xc6 16 호f3 国fd8 17 變e2 b5 and ...變b7, with a good game for Black (A.Greenfeld-Ye Rongguang, Novi Sad 1990);

15.33 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 2 c6)

4 ⊘f3 ≜g4

4... \bigcirc f6 5 d5 used to be considered totally unacceptable for Black (after 5... \bigcirc a5 6 Wa4+ c6 White plays 7 Ad2!), but after 5... \bigcirc xe4!? interesting complications arise: (a) 6 dxc6 螢xd1+ 7 容xd1 ②xf2+ 8 會e1 ②xh1 is not fully clear: the knight is lost, but Black will have a rook and a couple of pawns for two knights;

(b) 6 \pounds xc4 \pounds b8 7 0-0 g6 8 \pounds c3 \pounds f6 (8... \pounds xc3 9 \clubsuit d4) 9 \blacksquare e1 \pounds g7 10 \clubsuit e2 \pounds bd7 11 d6! (a tactical solution to the problem; the simple 11 \pounds f4 is also possible, with excellent development) 11...cxd6 12 \pounds xf7+ \pounds f8 (the bishop cannot be taken because of 13 \pounds g5+ \pounds e8 14 \pounds e6) 13 \pounds g5 \pounds c5 14 \pounds c4 d5, and here, instead of 15 \pounds xd5 \pounds xd5 16 \pounds xd5 \clubsuit xd5 17 \clubsuit xe7+ \pounds g8 18 \pounds f4 \pounds f8 19 \clubsuit c7 \clubsuit d7, when Black managed to parry the attack and save the game (Herndl-Varga, Werfen 1991), 15 \pounds e3! followed by \blacksquare f1 came seriously into consideration (Flear).



Now White has: 5 **&e3** (15.331) 5 **&xc4** (15.332) – p.260 5 d5 (15.333) – p.261

15.331	(1	d4	d5	2	c4	dxc4	3	e4	Det	5
4 Df3 .	<u>é g</u>	(4)								

5 **2**e3 e6 5...2)f6 6 2C3 leads to a position from the Chigorin Defence (1 d4 d5 2

c4 친c6 3 진c3 dxc4 4 친f3 친f6 5 e4 호g4 6 호e3).

5...&xf3 6 gxf3 e5 7 d5 \bigtriangleup ce7 8 ad+(8 &xc4 a6 9 f4 deserves testing)8...c6 (after 8...ad7 9 ad7+ad7 10 ada+and @c3 White stands better) 9 @c3 b5 10 ad6 ad6 ad7+, ada+ad712 dxc6 (after 12 d6 d6-d7+, ada+ad1 adxc8 Black will have two pawns for the exchange) 12...adxc6 13 adxb5 adb+14 de2 @ge7 15 ada3. White has the advantage (D.Gurevich-Djindjihashvili, USA 1989).

Defending the pawn by 5...b5?! is rather risky. After 6 a4 a6 7 axb5 axb5 8 $\exists xa8 \forall xa8 9 \bigcirc c3 \forall a5 10 \bigcirc e2$ White has a strong centre and the better development.

6	≜xc4	≜xf3
7	gxf3	₩f6
8	ي د لغ	

To 8 $2c_3$ Black replies 8...0-0-0, and if 9 d5 $2b_4$. 8 e5 is possible, and if 8...Wh4 9 f4 (Sosonko).

8 ... 2 ge7 Black should consider 8... 2 b4+, inviting the knight to occupy a less favourable position at c3 (cf. the note to the next move), and only then 9... 2 ge7.

9 🖾d2!

An idea of Taimanov – White supports his d4 pawn. In Gutman-Kupreichik (Hastings 1984/5) 9 公c3 0-0-0 10 變a4 變xf3 11 罩gl g6! led to an advantage for Black.

Now after 9...0-0-0 10 4 b3 White stands better.

15.332 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 오c6 4 인f3 오g4)

5 全xc4 e6 5...全xf3 6 螢xf3 e6 7 d5 全e5 (7...exd5 8 全xd5 螢d7 9 0-0 or 8...全e5 9 螢g3 favours White), and now:



(a) 8 $\underline{W}e2 - 2xc4 9 \underline{W}xc4 exd5 10$ $\underline{W}b5+$ (the simple 10 exd5 should also be considered) 10...c6 11 $\underline{W}xb7 \underline{W}c8 12$ $\underline{W}xc8+ \underline{Z}xc8 13 exd5 \underline{a}b4+ 14 \underline{a}d2$ $\underline{a}xd2+ 15 - 2xd2 cxd5$ with an equal game (Inkiov-Kupreichik, Minsk 1982);

(b) 8 金b5+! c6 9 螢c3 cxb5 (after 9...金d6 10 dxc6 bxc6 11 金xc6+ ②xc6 12 螢xc6+ 会f8 13 ②c3 Black does not have compensation for the pawn) 9... cxb5 10 螢xe5 with the better chances for White.

5... \bigcirc f6? is bad in view of 6 b3, and if 6...e6 7 \oiint xb7 \oslash as 8 \bigcirc b5+, when White is close to a win.



6 d5 exd5 7 单xd5 ②f6 (defending c6 by 7...单b4+ 8 ②c3 ②ge7 fails to 9

 $\pounds xf7+$, while 8... $\forall d7 9 \forall b3$ is strong for White) 8 0–0 $\pounds e7 9 \pounds xc6+ bxc6 10 \forall c2$ and Black is in difficulties (Speelman-Sadler, Hastings 1992/3).

6 **2b5**, and now:

(a) $6... \pounds b4+ 7 \triangle c_3 \triangle ge7 8 \pounds g5 f6$ 9 $\pounds e_3 0-0$ (Petran-Baburin, Hungary 1991) 10 $\forall b_3$ with the better chances for White (Flear);

(b) 6... 堂xf3 7 堂xc6+ bxc6 8 gxf3 置b8 9 公c3 堂b4 10 堂e3 公e7 11 賀c2 0-0 12 0-0-0 公g6 13 公e2 賀d6 14 置d3 f5 with chances for both sides (Mozetic-Drasko, Jagodina 1994);

(c) 6...2ge7 7 2bd2 a6 (7...4d6 8 a3 0-0-0 9 2c4! 4xd4 10 2xd4 2xd1 11 2xc6 2xc6 12 2g5 f6 13 2xc6 bxc6 14 2xf6! gxf6 15 4xd1 gave White a favourable ending in Salov-Magem Badals, Madrid 1992) 8 2e2 2g6 9 h3 2xf3 10 2xf3 2b4+ 11 2d2 2xd2+ 12 4xd2 with the better position (Begovac-Ibragimov, Bern 1992).

6 &e3 &xf3 7 gxf3 extsfwf6 8 &b5 &b4+9 \bigtriangleup c3 $\Huge{\textcircled{a}}$ e7 10 a3? (a poor move, allowing Black to intensify the pressure on d4; Lautier suggests 10 h4) 10...&a5 11 f4 0-0-0 12 e5 extsfwf4 13 extsfwf4 (13 extsfwf4 22. &b6) 13...a6 14 &xc6 $\Huge{\textcircled{a}}$ xc6 15 0-0-0 &xc3 16 bxc3 g5! 17 fxg5 $\Huge{\textcircled{a}}$ xe5 with advantage to Black (Inkiov-Lautier, France 1996).

> 5 d5 ②e5 6 營d4

This leads to great complications. Other continuations:

6 \$14 2g6, and now:

(a) 7 호g3 e5 8 호xc4 호d6 9 호b5+ (after 9 暫b3 亞f6 10 호b5+ 會f8 11 亞fd2 亞h5 12 亞c3 亞hf4 both sides have chances, Mikhalchishin-Vorotni(b) 7 **e**.e3, when:

(b1) 7...e5 8 2xc4 2d6 9 h3 2d7 10 h4 h6 11 h5 2f8 12 2h4 2e7 13 g4 b5 14 2b3 with advantage to White (Smyslov-Semkov, Rome 1990);

(b2) 7...216 8 2c3 e6 9 4a4+ 4d7 (9...2d7!? 10 2d4 exd5 11 h3 c5 12 2db5 d4 with a very complicated game) 10 4xd7+ 2xd7 (10...2xd7!?, and if 11 2d4 exd5 12 h3 c5 13 2db5 d4 14 hxg4 0-0-0) 11 2xc4 exd5 12 exd5 2xf3 13 gxf3 a6 14 2e4 4 exd5 12 exd5 2xf3 13 gxf3 a6 14 2e4 4 exd5 17 2d3 2e5 18 2e2 favours White) 15 2xf6+ gxf6 16 0-0-0 2d6 17 h4 and White, with the two bishops, has the better chances (M.Gurevich-Ivanchuk, Reggio Emilia 1991) – analysis by Gurevich.

6 2 c3 was played by Kasparov against the computer 'Deep Thought' (New York 1989). After 6...c6 (6...a6! was best) 7 \$£14 2 g6 8 \$£e3 cxd5 9 exd5 Black was cramped.



8 单 xc4

8

The tactical justification of the sacrifice is 8...2xh1? 9 2b5+ c6 10 dxc6, and White wins. However, according to the latest analysis, Black has excellent chances for counterplay.

... e5

8..., f5!? also comes into consideration (threatening to take the rook), and if 9 $\exists g1 \& xe4 10 \exists xg7 \textcircled{2}f6$ (Nunn).

8...a6 9 Ξ g1 e5 (Black offers to return the pawn in order to exchange queens after 10 \Im xe5+ \Im e7) 10 \Im d3 \pounds h5 11 Ξ g5 \pounds b4+ 12 \bigtriangleup c3 \pounds g6 13 Ξ xe5+. White has regained the pawn while retaining the queens, but after 13... \boxdot e7 14 Ξ g5 h6 15 Ξ g3 c6 16 \pounds d2 Ξ c8! (Manninen-Ye Rongguang, Manila 1992) his position in the centre proves insecure (17 a3 cxd5!).

9 **Qb5**+

After 9 燮xe5+ 燮e7 10 요b5+ Ġd8! 11 燮xe7+ 요xe7 12 互g1 요xe4 the play favours Black.

If 9 世c3 Black retains his extra pawn by 9.... 世f6 10 互g1 (10 全b5+? c6 11 dxc6 0-0-0!) 10... 全xe4 (Rajkovic-Djuric, Cetinje 1993)

9		c6
10	₩xe5+	



The evaluation of this position is based on analysis by Flear:

10...2e7 1 2d2 f6 (11...2xh1? 12 dxc6) 12 we6 wa5 13 dxc6 wxb5 14 2xf3 wxc6 or 14 wd7+ 2f7 15 2xf3wxc6 with equal chances.

10... $\pounds e7$ 11 $\blacksquare g1$ (if 11 2d2 $\pounds xh1$ 12 dxc6 bxc6 13 $\pounds xc6+ \pounds f8$ 14 $\pounds xa8$ Wxa8 15 f3 Qf6 16 $\pounds f2$ h5 17 $\pounds g1$ $\pounds xf3$ 18 Qxf3 Qxe4 and Black is a pawn up) 11... Wa5+! 12 Qd2 (if 12 Qc3 cxb5 13 d6 $\blacksquare d8$ or 13 $\oiint xg7$ $\pounds f6$) 12... cxb5 13 d6 (the exchange of the queen for two rooks by 13 $\oiint xg7$ $\pounds f6$ 14 $\oiint xh8$ $\pounds xh8$ 15 $\blacksquare xg8+ \pounds d7$ 16 $\blacksquare xa8$ is unclear) 13... f6 14 $\oiint e6$ g6 15 dxe7 Qxe7 with approximate equality.

The given variations have shaken the reputation of the aggressive 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$

15.4 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4)

3 ... ⊉f6 As in variation 15.3, Black invites the opponent to advance one of his central pawns with gain of tempo.

4 e5

If $4 \bigcirc c3$ the simplest is 4...e5, when 5 $\bigcirc f3 = c3d 4 6 @xd4$ leads to a position from the variation 3 e4 e5 4 $\bigcirc f3 = c3d 4$ (p.236), if 5 d5 b5, while White does not achieve anything by 5 dxe5 @xd1+6 $\textcircled{cxd1} \oslash g4$.

4 ... ⊘d5 5 \$xc4 Now we consider:

5....2c6 (15.41) - p.263

5...2b6 (15.42) - p.264

After 5....e6 6 ⊙f3 c5 (or 6... 2e7 7 0-0 0-0 8 ⊙bd2 b6 9 ₩e2 2b7 10 2 e4 2 d7 11 2 d3, Gheorghiu-Pfleger, Vmjacka Banja 1961, or 8 2 c3 b6 9 ₩e2 2 xc3 10 bxc3 2 b7 11 **E**d1, Kiercz-Keene, Dortmund 1978) 7 0–0 2 c6 8 2 g5 2 e7 9 2 xe7 4 xe7 10 2 c3 White stands better (Gipslis-Schulte, USSR 1971).

15.41 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 신f6 4 e5 신d5 5 호xc4)

6 De2 or 6 Df3 usually transposes after 6...Db6 into variation 15.42.

6

In Yusupov-Chandler (Leningrad 1987) Black answered 6 2hf3 with 6...2g4, and defended the e5 square: 7 2c3 e6 8 0-0 2b4. After 9 2xd5 exd510 2b5 0-0 11 2xc6 bxc6 12 Wd3White stood better.

皇d7

7 单b5 8 幻ß

Groszpeter-Horvath (Hungary 1992) went 8 &e3 e6 9 a3 \bigcirc e7 10 &d3 &c6 11 \bigcirc f3 \bigcirc f5 12 0–0 \bigcirc d5 13 Be2 &e7 14 \blacksquare ac1 Bd7 15 \bigcirc e4 0–0 with chances for both sides. The arrangement of the black pieces, controlling the light squares, is typical of the modern handling of this variation.

... e6

If 8...a6 9 \$\overline{d}3 \$\overline{g}4\$ 10 \$\overline{d}e4\$ e6, then:

(a) 11 h3 兔h5 12 兔e3 燮d7 13 d5!? 兔xf3 14 燮xf3 公xd5 15 公xd5 exd5 16 兔xd5 兔b4+ 17 安f1 公xe5 18 燮e4 땧b5+ 19 安g1 0-0-0! 20 兔xb7+ 燮xb7 21 Wxe5 Wd5 with chances for both sides (Kir.Georgiev-Drasko, Sarajevo 1985);

(b) 11 0-0 &e7 12 &e3 &h5, when 13 d5! gains in strength: 13...@xe5(13...exd5 14 @xd5 @xe5 15 @xb6@xf3+ 16 gxf3 @xd1 17 @fxd1 cxb6 18 &xb6 is clearly to White's advantage) 14 dxe6 @xd1 15 @fxd1@xf3+ 16 gxf3 fxe6 17 &xb7 @b8 18 &c6+ @f7 19 b3. White's pieces are more actively placed (Glek-Kozlov, Frunze 1988).

9 0-0

The alternative is 9 @e2 2b4 10 a3 2xb5 11 @xb5+ 2c6 12 2e3 @d7 13 0-0 2e7 14 Iac1 a6 15 @e2 2ed5 16 2e4 @b5 17 @c2 h6 18 2d2 2e7 19 2c5! White has the initiative (Seirawan-Barlov, Zagreb 1987).9 ... 2b4

9 ... 2b4The most accurate. The other route with the same aim begins 9...2e7:



(a) 10 单d3 单c6, and White, exploiting the delay in Black's kingside development, begins an attack: 11 空g5 h6 (11...豐xd4? 12 ②xf7 含xf7 13 单g6+) 12 劉h5, and now:

(a1) 12...g6 13 ②ge4! 皇g7 (13... gxh5? 14 ②f6 mate; 13...豐xd4 is more than dangerous in view of 14 ②f6+, then 豐e2 and 트d1) 14 豐g4 ②f5 15 全e3 ②d5 (of course, Black cannot take twice on d4 on account of the loss of his queen) 16 ②xd5 螢xd5 17 ②c3 螢d7 18 當fd1 當d8 19 當ac1 (Belyavsky-Portisch, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984), and now Black should have defended with 19...螢e7, intending ...單d7 and ...螢d8 with chances for both sides;

(a2) 12...hxg5!? (an attempt to seize the initiative by an exchange sacrifice) 13 豐xh8 豐xd4, intending 14 單d1 豐g4! 15 豐h3 豐xh3 16 gxh3 f6! and ...當f7, or if 14 豐h7 0-0-0 (Portisch), although after 15 全e4 (Belyavsky) the situation is far from clear;

10 **Le2**

With the knight at b4 (rather than e7) the light-square bishop has to retire to a less active position.

Petursson-Anand (Wijk aan Zee 1990) continued **10...2c6** 11 a3 24d5 12 2d3 2d7 13 2e4 0-0-0:



Now 14 &g5 &e7 15 Oc5 We8 16 &xe7 Oxe7 17 Ie1 Oa4 led to a roughly equal position.

15.42 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 2)f6 4 e5 2)d5 5 \$xc4)

5 ... 2b6 The bishop has two possible retreats: 6 2d3 (15.421) 6 2b3 (15.422) - p.268

15.421 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 신f6 4 e5 신d5 5 오xc4 신b6)

6 \$d3 නිc6



The d4 pawn can be defended by: 7 **▲e3** (15.4211) 7 **△e2** (15.4212) – p.266

15.4211 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 වැ6 4 e5 වැd5 5 හැද4 වැb6 6 හැය3 වැc6)

≜e3 ∅b4

The Grünfeld set-up 7...g6 8 2c3

(a) 9...0-0, and now:

7

(a1) 10 h4 2b4 11 2e4 c5 (11... 24d5 is strongly met by 12 h5! 2e6 13 3c1 2xe3 14 3c2 with good attacking chances, Portisch-Spraggett, Wijk aan Zee 1985) 12 dxc5 (if 12 d5 Black replies 12...2f5 13 2xf5 gxf5 14 2xc5 26xd5 with equal chances) 12... 2c413 2b3 2xe3 14 2xb4 as 15 2a42g4 16 2xb7 2xb7 17 2bxg4 2xe5and in this sharp position Black has compensation for the sacrificed pawn;

(a2) if 10 a3 (preventing ... 2)b4), then 10....f6 promises Black counterplay, e.g. 11 對b3+ 當h8 12 e6 賢d6 13 d5 ②e5;

(b) 9...2b4 10 2e4, and 10...c5 fails to 11 dxc5 \vert xd1+ 12 \Dxd1! (Ftacnik).

7... **2e6** has been seen in recent years:



(a) 8 2c3, when:

(a1) 8... ②c4 is frankly weak in view of 9 金e4, and if 9... 金c8 10 e6! (B.Furman-Noskov, Moscow 1991);

(a2) White has good prospects after 8...2d5 9 2f3 e6 10 0-0 2c4? (or 10...2e7 11 2xd5 2xd5 12 a3) 11 2xc4 2xc4 12 33 (the pawn sacrifice 12 d5!? is also good) 12...26a5 13 32c2(Salov-Hübner, Haifa 1989);

(a3) 8... 2b4 9 ≜e4 204d5 10 2bf3 11 2bg5 is worth studying:

(a31) 11...g6 12 \triangle xe6 Wxe6 13 0–0 f5, although after 14 \pounds f3 \triangle xe3 15 fxe3 \pounds h6 16 We2 c6 17 b3 Wd7 18 \triangle a4 White has the more promising position (M.Gurevich-Hübner, Munich 1993);

(a32) 11...全f5 12 ②xd5 ③xd5 13 對b3 盒xe4 14 ②xe4 (but not 14 對xb7? $2 \times e^3$ 15 $2 \times e^4$ (14...0-0-0) 15 0-0 with the better chances for White (Gurevich);

(a4) 8...@d7 9 2f3 0-0-0 10 0-0 (or 10 h3 2b4 11 2c2 f5 12 0-0 h6 13 a3 2d45 14 2e1 2xc3 15 bxc3 2c4 16 2d3 e6 17 a4 g5 18 @c2 @c6 with chances for both sides, Karpov-Ivanchuk, Reggio Emilia 1991/2) 10...2b4 (10...2g4 11 a3) 11 2c2 f5 12 a3 2d45 13 a4! 2xc3 (if 13...2xe3 14 fxe3 2d5 strong is 15 e4 2c3 16 @c12xf1 17 d5 with an attack, or 15... 2xc3 16 bxc3 fxe4 17 2g5 with advantage – Gurevich) 14 bxc3 h6 15 a5 2c4 16 2c1 a6 17 @c2 intending 2e1-d3. White stands better (M.Gurevich-A.Greenfeld, Burgas 1994);

(b) $8 2 2 2 b 4 9 2 4 2 5 10 2 b c 3 2 x e 4 11 2 x e 4 e 6 12 0 0 2 d 7 13 2 2 c 3 2 4 d 5 14 2 e 2 followed by <math>\exists a c 1$, a 2 - a 3 and b 2 - b 4 with somewhat the better prospects for White (Georgadze-Lputian, Simferopol 1988).



8 单 e4 f5

An original idea of Short, before which 8...c6 was played:

(a) 9 2 c3 2 e6 10 2 ge2 2 4d5 11 0-0 ₩d7 12 2 g3 (12 ₩d3 should be considered, or 12 2 c1, and if 12...f5 13 exf6 exf6 14 \bigtriangleup d3 0-0-0 15 We2 -Belyavsky, Mikhalchishin) 12...f5 13 exf6 exf6 14 \blacksquare e1 0-0-0 (Belyavsky-Yakovich, Sochi 1986), when 15 Wc2would have given some initiative;

(b) 9 2 d2 2 e6 10 a3 2 d45 11 2 gf3 費d7 12 2 b3 2 xe3 13 fxe3 2 xb3 14 費xb3 e6 15 0-0 2 e7 16 国ad1 2 d5 17 2 b1, and White's position is somewhat more active (Dydyshko-V.Zhuravlev, St Petersburg 1992).

9 exf6

9 & f3 does not promise anything in view of 9...f4 10 &xf4 $extsf{W}$ xd4 11 $extsf{W}$ xd4 &c2+ and ...&xd4.

exf6

9 ... 10 ②c3

10 a3 is interesting, and if 10...f5 the pawn sacrifice 11 axb4 \pounds xb4+ 12 \pounds c3 (after 12 \pounds d2 \pounds xd2+ 13 \pounds xd2 Ψ e7! both sides have chances) 12...fxe4 13 Ψ h5+ \pounds f8 14 \pounds ge2, and now:

(a) 14... 公d5 15 0-0 公f6 16 衢h4 全g4?! (16... 全f5 17 公g3 全g6 is more tenacious - Tregubov) 17 公g3 全e7 18 公gxe4 with a strong attack (Tregubov-Zvyagintsev, Russian Ch. 1992);

(b) 14...@e8 15 @h4 \$@g8 (15...@f516 0-0 @xc3 17 @xc3 @c4 is weaker; after 18 @f4 @d6 19 @a5 @f7 20 f3 @g6 21 @h4 White has a very strong attack, Tregubov-Stajcic, Harkany 1992) 16 0-0 @f5 17 @g3 @g6 18 @gxe4 h6 19 @c5 @f7! 20 @xb7 @h7 21 @c5?!(Adams considers 21 @a5 preferable, with the idea of playing the knight to c6, and if 21...@d7 22 d5) 21...@he8. White has not only regained the pawn, but even acquired another one, but Black has good compensation (A.Greenfeld-Adams, Moscow Olympiad 1994).

10 ...

11 单13

Timman-Salov (match, Sanghi Nagar 1994) went 11 2b1 2dd5 12 2f3 2d6

f5

(if 12...2xe3 13 fxe3 \pounds d6 14 0-0 0-0 15 \clubsuit b3+ \pounds h8 16 e4 fxe4 17 2xe4 with attacking chances) 13 \pounds g5 \checkmark d7 14 \checkmark e2+ \checkmark e6 15 2e5 0-0 16 0-0 2xc317 bxc3 \pounds xe5 18 dxe5 \checkmark c6 19 \pounds d3 \pounds e6. White's position is more promising.

12 ②ge2 ②xe3 13 fxe3 单d6 leads to a roughly equal game.



After 15 Iel Ig8 16 25 Ie8 17 27f4 2xf4 18 2xf4 g5 19 2c5 2g7 Black had a satisfactory position.

In Short's opinion, 15 a4 was more promising for White.

7 De2

Compared with variation 15.4211, the queen's bishop can occupy a more active post than e3.

7 ... <u>\$g4</u> The old (for this variation) game Korchnoi-Suetin (Budva 1967) went 7... $2e6 \ 8 \ 2bc3 \ Wd7 \ (8...g6 is strongly met by 9 \ 2e4!, Lautier-Adianto, Novi Sad Olympiad 1990) 9 \ 2e4 \ 2b4 \ 10 \ 2b1 \ 2c4 \ 11 \ 2c5 \ Wg4 \ 12 \ h3 \ Wxe2+13 \ Wxe2 \ 2xe2 \ 14 \ 2xe2 \ 0-0-0 \ 15 \ e6! \ 2c6 \ (15... \ xd4 \ 16 \ exf7) \ 16 \ 2e3 \ f6 \ 17 \ 2e4 \ with advantage to White.$

In the modern game A.Greenfeld-Shvidler (Israel 1992) Black acted as in variation 15.4211 - 7...2b4 8 2e4 f5. After 9 exf6 exf6 10 2f4! $rac{10}{2}$ f4! $rac{10}{2}$ f4! $rac{10}{2}$ f4! $rac{10}{2}$ white had an undisputed advantage.

8 f3

Or 8 &e3 &xe2 9 &xe2 @d7 10 Oc3 (after the passive defence of d4 by 10 Oa3 and Oc2 Black's position is slightly the more active) 10...0-0-0 11 a4 a6 (if 11...Oxd4 12 a5!) 12 a5 Od5, and now:

(a) 13 \$f3?! \$\Ddb4 (Black attacks the d4 pawn; 13...e6? fails to 14 2xd5 exd5 15 \$g4, but 13... Dcb4 is possible) 14 e6 (forced combinational play, since after 14 0–0 2xd4 15 2xd4We7 White does not have sufficient compensation for the pawn) 14... #xe6 15 d5, and now instead of 15... We5 16 0-0 = 6 = 17 dxc6 = xd1 = 18 cxb7 + cb8 = 19Ifxd1 (Karpov-Timman, Brussels 1988), which however also favours White after 19.... 全d6 20 g3 增f6, the other queen move 15...₩f6 16 0-0 2e5 17 \$e4 e6 18 對b3 exd5 19 2xd5 2xd5 20 皇xd5 c6 21 Zac1 2d6 22 f4 2c7! would have enabled Black comfortably to maintain his extra pawn (Timman);

(b) 13 0-0 e6 (now if 13... 公db4 White can reply 14 對b3 and then 單fd1) 14 全f3 会b8 15 對b3. White's position is preferable (I.Sokolov-Seirawan, Belgrade 1991).

8 ... 单e6 8...单h5 is strongly met by 9 e6! 9 分bc3 9...2b4 10 2b1 c6 11 a3 24d5 12 De4 Wc8 13 0-0 f5 14 Dg5 h6 15 Dxe6 Wxe6 16 g4 g6 17 Dg3 Ig8 18 Sh1 f4 19 De4. White's position is the more active (Shabalov-A.Greenfeld, Pula 1989).

9...₩d7 10 De4 2d5 11 Dc5 ₩c8, and now:

(a) 12 a3 e6 13 $rac{1}{2}$ (if 13 b4 a5, and White cannot play 14 b5? $rac{1}{2}$ xe5, while after 14 $rac{1}{2}$ b1 axb4 15 axb4 $rac{1}{2}$ e7 Black has a solid position, Miles-Seirawan, Niksic 1983) 13... $rac{1}{2}$ xc5 14 $rac{1}{2}$ (d7 15 0-0 a6 (in Bukic-Petrosian, Banja Luka 1979, Black equalised after 15... $rac{1}{2}$ e7 16 $rac{1}{2}$ (d7 17 $rac{1}{2}$ d2 $rac{1}{2}$ e7 18 $rac{1}{2}$ c6 19 $rac{1}{2}$ $rac{1}{2}$

(b) the plan of developing the queenside should be considered -12 \pounds e3 e6 13 Ξ c1!? Ob4 (13... \pounds xa2 is dangerous in view of 14 b3 a5 15 \pounds b5) 14 a3 Oxd3+ 15 Wxd3 Od7 16 Oe4. White has the better position (Meulders-Van der Sterren, Lyon 1990).



9...\$d5 10 0-0 e6 11 a3 \$e7 (if 11...\$d7 12 \$\arrow\$e4!?) 12 \$\arrow\$e3 \$\arrow\$d7 13 \$\arrow\$c2 \$\arrow\$c4 14 \$\arrow\$e4 f5 15 exf6 \$\arrow\$xf6 16 \$\arrow\$fd1 (16 \$\arrow\$xh7 0-0-0!?) 16...\$\arrow\$d5 17 \$\arrow\$xd5 exd5 18 \$\arrow\$d3 \$\arrow\$xd3 19 \$\arrow\$xd3 0-0. Black stands better (Ruzell-Mikhalchishin, Manila Olympiad 1992).

9....**£c4** and:

(a) 10 单e4 變d7 11 b3 호xe2 (if 11...호a6 12 a3 0-0-0 13 单e3 and b2b4) 12 ②xe2 0-0-0 13 호xc6 變xc6 with chances for both sides;

(b) 10 \pm xc4 \pm xc4 11 \pm b3 \pm b6 12 e6 (a blockading pawn sacrifice; the quiet 12 \pm e3 e6 leads to a roughly equal game) 12...fxe6 13 \pm e3 \pm d7 14 \pm f4 \pm d5 15 \pm cxd5 (complications favourable to Black arise after 15 \pm xe6 \pm xe3 16 \pm b5 \pm c2+ or 16... \pm xg2+, Van der Wiel) 15...exd5 16 \pm xb7 (if 16 \pm xd5 \pm xd5 17 \pm xd5 0–0–0 with advantage to Black) 16... \pm b8 17 \pm a6 \pm xb2 18 0–0 e6 19 \pm ae1 (19 \pm ab1 \pm b6!) 19... \pm b6 20 \pm a4 \pm b4. Black has parried the threats and retained his extra pawn (Van der Wiel-Van Wely, Brussels 1993).

15.422 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 乞f6 4 e5 신d5 5 호xc4 신b6)

Other replies:

6...c5, as played by Short in his match with Karpov (Linares 1992):

(a) 7 dxc5 $\forall xd1+ 8 \Rightarrow xd1$ (8 $\Rightarrow xd1!?$) 8...2 dd7 9 e6 fxe6 10 $\Rightarrow xe6$ 2 a6, and here instead of returning the pawn - 11 c6 bxc6 12 $\Rightarrow e3$ (or 12 2 df32 ac5) 12...2 c7 13 $\Rightarrow b3$ $\Rightarrow dd5$ 14 $\Rightarrow df3$ $\Rightarrow xe3+ 15$ fxe3 g6, which led to a comfortable position for Short, preferable was 11 $\Rightarrow e3$ $\Rightarrow dxc5$ 12 $\Rightarrow xc8$ = xc8 13 $\Rightarrow c3$ when the e-pawn is isolated and White has the better chances; (b) later the sharp 7 d5 was tried: 7...c4 8 2a4+2d7 9 2c2 (after 9 2xd7+2b8xd7 White has to reckon with ...2c5-d3) 9...e6 10 d6 2c6, and:

(b1) 11 2 f3 28d7 12 2 bd2 g6 with a complicated game and chances for both sides (Notkin-Suetin, Russia 1994);

6... \$ f5 and now:

(a) 7 2C3 e6 8 2ge2 2e7 (8...2c6 leads to the main line) 9 0–0 0–0 10 2e3. Black has delayed developing his queen's knight so as now to play 10...2a6. Notkin-Kharlov (Russian Ch. 1994) continued 11 2g3 2g6 12 2ce4 2b4 (12...2d7, with the idea of ...c7c5, is well met by 13 2c4! – Kharlov) 13 a3 24d5 14 2c1 (14 2d2 2d7) 14...2xe3 15 fxe3 2d7 16 2a4 c6 17 2e2 and by continuing 17...a5, with the idea of ...b7-b5, ...2b6 and ...c6-c5, Black would have retained roughly equal chances;

Now White's main choices are:

7 De2 (15.4221) - p.269

7 2f3 (15.4222) - p.271

7 **2e3 2**f5 is the other alternative:

(a) 8 222 e6 9 0–0 (compared with the main line, White delays playing 233 9...235 (the other plan is 9...2b4, with control over d5) 10 244+ (or 10 22 266 11 2bc3 2e7 12 2f4 2ac4

13 皇e4 0-0 14 響e2 c5 15 昌ad1 with somewhat the more active position for White, Adianto-Anand, Kuala Lumpur 1989) 10...c6 (or 10... 🖸 xa4 11 🖉 xa4+, 11... 句c6 12 句bc3 a6 13 句g3 单d3 14 Ifel White has a slight advantage) 11 14 \$xg6 hxg6 (14...fxg6 15 b3 \$\varDel{x}e3 16 fxe3 favours White) 15 De4. Now Black's slight activity - 15 ... Ih4 (after 15... 2 xe3 16 fxe3 0-0 17 If3 or 15... 0-0 16 &g5 White stands better) 16 ⑦2g3 習d5 17 習c2 0-0-0 18 皇g5 ≜xg5 19 ⊙xg5 ⊑d7?! (not 19...Ξxd4 20 2xf7 and Wxg6, but 19... Idh8 20 幻f3 異xd4 21 幻xd4 買xd4 was possible - the e5 pawn is attacked, and both sides have chances) 20 2f3 If4 (20 ... In the would have been met by 21 b3 and De4) 21 Zad1 g5 22 ₩c1! concluded with the practically forced 22... \$\$\mathbb{Z}\$ xf3 23 gxf3 Wxf3 (Karpov-Speelman). After 24 Ife1 Black has no compensation for the exchange (Karpov, 1.Zaitsev);

(b) 8 e6 must also be mentioned:

(b1) 8...&xe6 9 &xe6 fxe6 10 2c3g6 (or 10...Wd7 11 2f3 0-0-0 12 0-0, Bronstein-Lukin, USSR 1982, one of the first games with this variation) 11 2f3 &g7 12 0-0 Wd7 13 Wb3 0-0-0 14 2g5 $\fbox{Z}de8$ 15 a4 2d5 16 $\fbox{Z}fd1$ (here Black would have answered 16 2xe6Wxe6 17 2xd5 with 17...2b4!) 16...2b8 17 2ce4 2a5 18 Wd3 (Karsa-Schrancz, Hungary 1985), and in both cases the pawn sacrifice justified itself;

(b2) according to analysis by Kuzminykh, with 8...fxe6 Black obtains a satisfactory position: 9 2f3 (9 2c3 2d5 10 2f3 2xc3 11 bxc3 2a5 12 2c2 3d5, or 12 2h4 2xb3 13 3xb3 2e4) 9...e5! 10 2g5 (10 2h4 3d7 11 d5 2a5, or 10 d5 2a5 11 2c3 e6) 10...e6 11 g4 h6 12 2xe6 2xd4. 15.4221 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 신f6 4 e5 신d5 5 호xc4 신b6 6 호b3 신c6)



9 a3

This move can also be made later, with the same position often being reached. Transpositions in the preceding moves are also possible.

Other continuations:

9 0-0 2b4 (with the intention of invading at d3; 9... 2e7 10 0-0 would transpose into the next variation) 10 f4 c5 11 a3 2d3 12 g4! 2xc1 13 gxf5 2xb3 14 2xb3 exf5 15 d5 with advantage to White (Brilla-Banfalvi-Smith, corr. 1985).

9 **2e3**, and now:

(a) 9... 2 e7 10 0-0, when:

(a1) 10...0-0 11 2g3 2g6 12 f4 2a5 (12...2b4 13 d5!) 13 d5 2xb3, when White can choose:

(a11) 14 axb3 &b4 15 &xb6 axb6 16 $\blacksquare xa8 \blacksquare xa8$ 17 $\blacksquare g4 \blacksquare c8$ (Shirov-Yakovich, Tyumen 1987). Both sides have chances: 18 f5 &c5+ 19 ch1 exf5 20 $\textcircled{c}xf5 \pounds xf5$ 21 $\blacksquare xf5$ g6 22 $\blacksquare f4$ $\blacksquare xg4$ 23 $\blacksquare xg4 \blacksquare a8$; (a12) 14 豐xb3 호d3 15 d6 (15 dxe6 호c4!) 15...cxd6 16 單fd1 dxe5 17 ②ce4 exf4 18 單xd3 戰b8 19 호xb6 axb6 (preferable to 19...fxg3 20 호e3 gxh2+ 21 容h1 b6 22 單d7 戰e5 23 ②d2 호c5 24 호xc5 獸xc5 25 獸d3, when the knight proved stronger than the pawns, Sergienko-Kharlov, Podolsk 1992) 20 ②f1 單d8, and again Black has three pawns for the knight, but the position remains unclear (Sergienko, Raetsky);

(a2) 10...費d7 (Black is not in a hurry to castle):

(a21) 11 全c2 公b4 12 全xf5 exf5 13 對b3 對e6 14 對xe6 fxe6 and Black's position is preferable (Polovodin-Yakovich, St Petersburg 1993);

(a22) 11 \bigcirc g3 &g6 12 f4 \bigcirc a5 13 d5 \bigcirc xb3 14 axb3 (compared with Shirov-Yakovich and Sergienko-Kharlov examined earlier, Black's queen is at d7, and if 14 \textcircled xb3 &d3 15 \blacksquare fd1 &c4 16 dxe6 he plays 16... \oiint xe6) 14... \bigcirc -0 15 dxe6 \oiint xd1 16 exf7+ &xf7 17 \blacksquare axd1 &xb3 18 \blacksquare de1 \bigcirc d5 19 \bigcirc xd5 &xd5 20 f5 &b4 21 \blacksquare d1 c6. Black's two bishops and queenside majority, with the possibility of ...a5-a4, give him a good game;

(b) 9... 對d7 10 0-0 直d8 (Black gives priority to the development of his queenside):



11 2g3 \$g6 (11... 2xd4 12 \$xd4 Wxd4 is unfavourable in view of 13 14 \vert xb7) 12 h4! \(\Delta xd4 13 \) \(\Delta xd4 (13) h5 @d3!) 13... Wxd4 14 Wf3 Wxh4 15 ₩xb7 Qc5 16 ₩c6+ 2d7 17 Iad1 ♠b6 (the forcing variation 17...,₩xg3 18 Ixd7! @xf2+ 19 Ixf2 Ixd7 20 @a4 0-0 21 \#xd7 \#xe5 22 \#d2, in which Black has three pawns for a piece, favours White) 18 Exd7 Exd7 19 Edi 0-0 20 Ixd7 Wxg3 21 Wxb6 Wxc3 22 bxc3 cxb6 23 Ixa7 Ic8, and in Shirov-Anand (Dortmund 1992) the adventures concluded in an equal ending: 24 c4 h5 25 邕d7 邕c5 26 f4 b5 (Shirov).

... È 🔍 e 7

9...,對d7 10 0-0 0-0 -0 11 免e3 免e7 (or 11..., 会b8 12 兔a2 兔e7 13 b4 h5 14 區c1 h4 15 兔b3 f6 with chances for both sides, Petursson-Speelman, London 1994; 12 區c1 and 包a4 comes into consideration – Petursson) 12 區c1, and:

9

(a) 12...2a5 13 d5 exd5 14 $\pounds xb6$ axb6 15 $\pounds xd5$ (if 15 $\pounds xd5$ Black defends by 15...2c6 16 $\pounds c3$ $\pounds c6$) $15... \pounds c6$ 16 $\bigstar c2$ $\pounds b8!$ (if 16...c6 White gains the advantage by 17 $\pounds a4$ $\pounds c7$ 18 $\pounds xe6$ $\oiint xe6$ 19 b4) 17 $\blacksquare cd1$ c6 18 $\pounds a2$ $\oiint c8$ 19 $\pounds d4$ $\pounds xa2$ 20 $\pounds xa2$ b5 21 $\oiint c3$ $\oiint c7$ with chances for both sides (Epishin-Magem Badals, Manresa 1995) – analysis by Magem Badals;

(b) 12...f6 13 exf6 gxf6 14 2a4 2d516 2c4 2a5 16 2a2 2g4 17 2ac3Ing8 18 2d2 2b6 19 2d4 2c6 20 f3 2h5 21 2c5 2xc5 22 2xc5 2f7 23 If c1 e5 with roughly equal chances (Epishin-Salov, Madrid 1995).

The new continuation 9...f6 is worth testing, e.g. 10 \pounds f4 (after 10 exf6 $\$ xf6 11 \pounds e3 0-0-0 the black pieces are active) 10...fxe5 (risky is 10...g5?! 11 \pounds e3 fxe5 12 0-0 \pounds e7 13 d5 \pounds a5 14 \pounds xb6 axb6 15 \pounds a2 exd5 16 \pounds xd5 \pounds c6 17 對b3! 置f8 18 置ad1 堂d6 19 對e3 – White has a strong position for the pawn, Epishin-Kharlov, Russian Ch. 1995) 11 堂xe5 堂d6.

10 0-0 燮d7 Or 10...0-0 11 金e3 包a5 12 堂c2 堂xc2 13 燮xc2 包ac4:



(a) 14 \equiv adl \bigtriangleup xe3 15 fxe3 c6 (after 15... \boxdot d5 16 \boxdot xd5 exd5 17 \textcircled b3, intending \boxdot f4, White stands slightly better) 16 \equiv f3 \boxdot d5 17 \boxdot e4 \pounds g5 (or 17...f6 18 exf6 \pounds xf6 19 \equiv h3 with slightly the better chances for White) 18 \textcircled d3 \textcircled e7 19 \boxdot f4 \pounds xf4 (after 19... \blacksquare ad8 20 \boxdot h5 White has the advantage) 20 exf4 g6 21 \oiint e2 \blacksquare ae8 22 \blacksquare e1 \oiint d8 23 \oiint f2 (Karpov-Short, match, Linares 1992). White's position is the more promising (Karpov);

(b) 14 @f4 @d5 15 @xd5 @xd5(15...exd5 16 a4 a5 17 b3 @b6 18 @g3f5 19 @f4 or 18...f6 19 e6, and in both cases White's position is preferable – Nikolic) 16 @ac1 b5 17 @fd1 @d7 18 @fd3. White stands better (Pr.Nikolic-Van Wely, Groningen 1993).

11 单 a2 0--0

In Kamsky-Magem Badals (Madrid 1994) Black (in analogy with previous variations; cf. the note to 9... \pounds e7) chose 11...0-0-0, and after 12 \pounds e3 f6 13 exf6 \pounds xf6 14 $\forall e1$ \bigcirc xd4 15 \bigcirc xd4 \pounds xd4 16 호xd4 螢xd4 17 호xe6+ 호xe6 18 螢xe6+ 螢d7 19 螢b3 a6 20 트ac1 트he8 21 螢c2 螢d3 White took play into a favourable ending: 22 ᡚd5 螢xc2 23 ᡚxb6+ cxb6 24 트xc2+ 容b8 25 f4.

12 2e3 Ifd8

13 h3

Threatening to advance the g- and fpawns.

13 ... h6

Van Wely-Adianto (Amsterdam 1996) went 13...\$26 14 Wel (intending Idl, f2-f4 and g2-g4; the set-up 14 Wcl and Idl is also quite possible – Van Wely) 14...a5 (with the idea of ...\$b4!?) 15 \$b3 a4 16 \$a2 \$a5 17 \$af4, and here Black could have considered 17...\$c2 18 Icl \$b3 19 \$b1 \$c4, planning ...\$b3 and ...\$d5 with counterplay.

14 ₩c1

14

. . .

White does not hurry, but prepares the above-mentioned plan. The immediate 14 g4 &h7 15 f4 is also possible:

(b) 15...2a5 16 b3!, and if 16...2xa3 17 2b1 2b4 18 f5 I ac8 19 W c1 with good attacking chances.

£18

Instead of 15 Id1 (Epishin-Kharlov, Moscow 1992), which allowed Black to prepare for defence with 15...2e7 (followed by ...c7-c6, ...2h7 and ...2bd5), 15 g4 2h7 16 f4 was good, and if 16...2a5 17 f5! (here 17 b3 can be met by 17...Ier7) 17...exf5 18 2g3! with the better position for White (Epishin).



7 ... &g4The alternative is 7... $\&f5 \ \&c3 \ e6 \ 9$ a3 $@d7 \ 10 \ h3 \ \&d8 \ 11 \ \&e3 \ \&e7 \ 12 \ 0-0$ c6 13 $\&g5 \ h6 \ 14 \ \&ge4 \ \&ed5 \ 15 \ @f3$ with somewhat the better chances for White (Maksimovic-Nutiu, Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984). In pinning the knight, Black provokes a typical sacrifice.

8 £xf7+

 $8 \bigtriangleup g5 \pounds xd1 9 \pounds xf7+ \pounds d7 10 \pounds e6+$ leads to a draw (Yusupov-Belyavsky, Tunis 1985).

11 ... ¥xe5

12 **£e**3

Does White's initiative compensate for the sacrificed pawn?

12		②d5
13	ହ୍ୟା	₩f5
14	00	e6
15	Dc3	

In Azmaiparashvili-Balashov (53rd USSR Ch., Kiev 1986) White played 15

2d4, and after 15...2xd4 16 2xd4 2d6 17 2c3 2f7 (probably simpler is 17...2f4 18 2f6+2e7 19 2fd1 2xh2+20 2f1 2fh1+21 2e2 2fh5+and 22...2f7) 18 2e4 2fhe8 19 f4 2f8Black castled artificially and retained the pawn.

... Id8

15

15.... 全d6 is weaker. After 16 ②xd5 豐xd5 17 單fd1 豐f5 18 ②d4 ②xd4 19 全xd4 White has the initiative

(M.Gurevich-Drasko, Vrsac 1985). 16 Ife1

16 **Eac1** needs testing, e.g. 16... 2xc3 17 **Exc3** 2d6 18 **Eb3** – here White has compensation for the pawn.

16 ... Âe7

17 单d2

Stronger than 17 2b5 2xe3 18 fxe3 (Yusupov-Portisch, Tunis 1985) 18... 2d6!, when the chances are with Black.



Alburt-Gulko (Somerset 1986) continued 17...Qxc3 18 \$\overline{2}xc3 (18 bxc3 \$\overline{2}d6! 19 \$\overline{2}ab1 b6 20 \$\overline{2}b3 proved good enough only to restore material equality: 20...\$\overline{3}d3! 21 \$\overline{3}xd3 \$\overline{2}xc3 \$\overline{2}ab1 b6 20 \$\overline{2}b3! \$\overline{3}xc3 \$\overline{2}xc3 \$\overline{3}xc3 \$\overlin{3}xc3 \$\overline{3}xc3 \$\overline{3}xc3 \$\ov 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4

In this chapter we will consider:

3 e3 (16.1)

3 ∕⊡c3 (16.2) – p.280

3 44 usually transposes into other variations, e.g. 3...c6 4 8xc4 266, or 3...2c6 4 263 266. The following lines are of independent significance:

(a) 3... 2c6 4 2f3 a6 5 ac6 4 2c3 a6 5 ac6 4 2c3 a6 5 ac6 4 2c3 a 2c4 a

(b) 3... 创有 4 e4 gives White an advantage in the centre;

(c) 3... \forall d7 4 \forall xc4 \forall c6. Automatic play for simplification is not the best way to equalise, as demonstrated by Reshevsky-Dake (New York 1936): 5 e3 e6 6 \triangle c3 \forall xc4 7 \triangle xc4 \triangle f6 (7...a6 is better) 8 \triangle b5 \triangle a6 9 a3 b6 10 \triangle e2 \triangle b7 11 f3 \triangle e7 12 e4 c6 13 \triangle bc3 with advantage to White.

16.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4)

3 e3

Until quite recently White's last move was thought to be inaccurate, allowing Black to equalise without difficulty by 3...e5. Now the evaluation of the variation has changed: after 3...e5 Black also faces a battle for equality, and one that is no less difficult than in the approved variations.

3 ... e5

Naturally, with 3...266 Black can invite his opponent to transpose into other variations. After $4 \pm xc4$ e6 the

play can take an original direction if White develops his king's knight at e2:

(a) 5 De2 a6 6 a4 c5 7 Dbc3 Dc6 8 0-0 cxd4 9 exd4 \$e7. This typical isolated d-pawn position with the knight at e2 does not give White any advantage (Anderson-Pr.Nikolic, Brussels 1988);

(b) 5 2c3 a6, and now:

(b1) 6 2ge2 c5 7 0–0 b5 8 2d3 (8 2b3 needs to be tested in practice) 8...2bd7 9 2g3 2b7 10 2ce4 cxd4 11 exd4 2e7, and Black has no difficulties (Sveshnikov-Petrosian, USSR 1982);

(b2) 6 1f3 is an interesting move: 6...0c6 7 a3 (7 0ge2 saves a tempo) 7...0d6 8 0ge2 0-0 (the immediate 8... e5 is also possible, and if 9 0d5 0xd5 10 0xd5 0-0, sacrificing a pawn for the initiative after 11 0xc6 bxc6 12 0xc6 \blacksquare b8) 9 h3 e5 10 d5 e4! 11 0xe4 0e5 12 0xf6+ 0h8 13 0e4 0xf6, and now:

(b21) 14 螢c2? 螢g6! 15 螢xg6 fxg6, and Black has the advantage in view of the threat of a check at d3 after the bishop moves, while if 16 b3 b5 (Andruet-Semkov, Sofia 1990);

(b22) 14 f4 2xc4 15 ¥xc4 ¥g6 16 \$\phi2 \equiv 68 17 2xc3 f5 18 \overline d2 \overline d7 19 \equiv het c6, and Black would appear to have sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn (Semkov).

After 3...c5 4 \pounds xc4 cxd4 5 exd4 the unusual 5... \textcircled c7 was played in two games from Horgen (1994): 6 \pounds b3 \pounds g4 7 f3 \pounds d7 8 \pounds c2 (or 8 \pounds c3 e6 9 \pounds ge2 \pounds d6 10 \pounds e4 with the better chances for White, Gelfand-Leko) 8... \pounds f6 9 \pounds bc3 g6 10 \pounds g5 \pounds g7 11 \blacksquare c1 \textcircled d8 (Yusupov-Miles), and now 12 d5 (not allowing the knight to go to c6) would have given White a good game. A trap for beginners goes 3...b5? 4 a4, and if 4...c65 axb5 cxb5 6 3 f3, winning material.



4 \$xc4

4

If he captures on e5, White can no longer regain the c4 pawn: 4 dxe5 營xd1+ 5 含xd1 金e6 or 5...公c6 6 公f3 (6 f4 f6!) 6...金e6 7 ②bd2 0-0-0. Black has a good position.

If 4 d5 0 f6 5 0 xc4 c6 with a perfectly satisfactory position for Black.

4 ②c3 exd4 5 exd4 ②f6 6 ≗xc4 transposes into the main line.

... exd4

After 4... 2h6 5 2c3 2d6 6 dxe5 2xe5 7 Wxd8+ 2xd8 8 2f3 2xc3+ 9 bxc3 2e6 10 2xe6 fxe6 11 c4 2f7 12 2a3 White has some initiative in this simplified position (M.Gurevich-Gurgenidze (52nd USSR Ch., Lvov 1985). 4....皇b4+ 5 ②c3 exd4 6 exd4 ②f6 is analysed in the main line.

5 exd4

Or 5 \b3 \e7, when:

(a) 6 a3 包d7 7 包f3 包b6 8 包xd4 包xc4 9 螢xc4 螢c5 10 包d2 螢xc4 11 包xc4 包f6 (Billinger-E.Grünfeld, Austria 1941) with an equal game;

(b) 6 ⊘d2 is interesting, offering a pawn to gain time for development (Novikov-Lobanov (Moscow 1985).

5 \bigtriangleup 13 is not dangerous for Black: 5... ab4+ (not 5...dxe3? 6 \oiint xf7+; after 5... ad6 6 bb3 ah6 7 exd4 be7+ 8 ae3 ag4 9 0-0 axe3, Sokolsky-Mikenas, USSR 1950, 10 \fbox{e}1 White stands better) 6 \oiint d2 (if 6 \oiint f1 \oiint e7 defending against \oiint xf7+) 6... \Uparrow xd2+ 7 \oiint xd2 \oiint f6 8 exd4 0-0 9 0-0 \clubsuit f5 10 \oiint c3 \oiint bd7. The chances are roughly equal.

Now Black's main continuations are: 5...2b4+ (16.11)

5....2f6 (16.12) - p.277

5....â.d6 (16.13) - p.280

If 5... 2c6 6 2f3, then:

(a) 6... 全g4 7 0-0, when the pseudoactive 7... 對f6 (Ahues-Holzhausen, Berlin 1926) failed to 8 全g5! 對g6 (8... 對xg5? 9 全xf7+, or 8... 全xf3? 9 ₩e1+) 9 d5 全xf3 10 ₩xf3 公ce7 11 d6!;

(b) $6...\pounds b4+ 7$ $2 c_3$ $2 f_6$ 8 d5!? $\forall c_7+9$ $\pounds c_3$ $2 a_5$ 10 $\pounds c_2$, when the knight at a5 looks to be in danger, but in V.Ivanov-Bebchuk (Leningrad 1991) White was unable to exploit this: 10... 0-0 11 0-0 $\blacksquare d8$ 12 $\pounds g_5$ $\pounds xc_3$ 13 bxc3 c6 14 $\forall a4$ $\blacksquare xd5$ 15 c4 $\blacksquare c_5$ 16 $\pounds c_3$ $\blacksquare f_5$ 17 $\pounds d3$ $\blacksquare h5$ 18 c5. Here a draw was agreed. After 18... $\forall d8$ 19 $\blacksquare fd1$ $\blacksquare d5$ the position remains unclear.

16.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4 **a**xc4 exd4 5 exd4)

De3 576 6

White gains a slight advantage after 6... 響e7+7 2ge2 2f6 8 0-0 0-09 皇g5 c6 10 Wd3 h6 11 2h4 2e6 12 2g3 \$xc3 (12...g5? is refuted by 13 €f5! 2xf5 14 Wxf5 gxh4 15 Zae1 Wd6 16 Ee4! with a decisive attack) 13 bxc3 \$xc4 14 ₩xc4 (Johannessen-Jauregui, Moscow Olympiad 1956).

9B

7

7 Wb3 should be considered:

(a) 7... 響e7+ 8 ②ge2 0-0 9 皇g5! Dc6 10 0-0 \$xc3 (10...Da5 is bad in view of 11 \$xf6 gxf6 12 \$c2 \$\Dxc4 13 Ød5) 11 ₩xc3, and now:

(a1) 11...h6 12 Ah4 when White stands better:



(a11) 12...g5 13 皇g3 ②e4 14 豐e3 Dxg3 15 Dxg3 (Plachetka-Matulovic, Vrnjacka Banja 1985);

(a12) 12... 2g4 13 f3 2e6 (13... 2h5? 14 2f4; 13... £f5 14 Efe1) 14 d5! 2xd5 (giving up the exchange in another way offers a tougher resistance: 14... 2xd5 15 \$xe7 2xc3 16 \$xf8 \$xc4 17 bxc3 \$xf8 18 \$fe1 \$\mathbf{B}_{d8} = Pekarek) 15 \$xd5 (Black was counting on 15 \$xf6 \$c5+) 15 ... 2xd5 16 \$xe7 Dxc3 17 2xf8 Dxe2+ 18 2f2 Df4 19 **Q**a3 **∐**e8 20 **G**g1! and White won the exchange for a pawn (Plachetka-Pekarek, Czechoslovakia 1986);

(a2) 11... e6. Now in Pekarek's variation the white pawn is not at f3 but f2, which favours Black, but White is not bound to play 12 d5. Instead 12 Lael! maintains the tension in a favourable situation (Christiansen);

(b) 7... Dc6!? is more promising:

(b1) 8 \$xf7+ \$f8 9 \$c4 (the point is that 9 Dge2? is refuted by 9... #e7 10 \$c4 Da5) 9...₩e7+ 10 \$e2 Dxd4 11 ₩d1 2xe2 and Black's position is even slightly more pleasant;

(b2) 8 2 ge2 0-0 9 0-0 2e7 10 Id1 with a roughly equal game (Paunovic-Karolyi, Kecskemet 1986).

0-0 7 . . . After 7.... #e7+ 8 De5 0-0 9 0-0 2bd7 (Haag-Lutikov, Hamburg 1965) 10 Le1! White stands better.

8 0-0 <u>\$94</u> White's main continuations are:

9 a3 (16.111)

9 2g5 (16.112) - p.276

After 9 Wb3 2xf3 10 Wxb4 2c6! 11 Wa4 2d5 12 Id1 Wd6 the game is egual (W.Schmidt-Matanovic, Nis 1984).

Malanyuk-Pekarek (Tbilisi 1986) went 9 h3 2h5?! (Black should have played 9...皇xf3 10 豐xf3 ②c6) 10 g4 皇g6 11 包e5 包fd7 12 f4 對h4 13 雲h2 Dxe5 14 dxe5 Dc6 15 \$e3 Had8 16 ₩e2 20d4 17 ₩g2 with advantage to White.

The old move 9 de3 20c6 10 de2 Dd5 does not promise White any advantage (Burn-Duras, Karlsbad 1911).

16.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4 £xc4 exd4 5 exd4 £b4+ 6 ⊙c3 ②f6 7 ②f3 0-0 8 0-0 皇g4)

9 a3 ≜xc3 If 9... 2d6 10 h3 2h5 11 g4 2g6 12 De5, when the attempt to attack the

pawn – 12...c5?! is strongly met by 13 신b5 신c6 14 오f4

9...&e7 was recommended in his time by Taimanov. The development of the bishop on this square (without first checking on b4) is currently topical – cf. variation 16.121 (p.277).

10 bxc3 c5 11 h3



11.... h5 and now:

(a) 12 g4 皇g6 13 ②e5 cxd4 14 cxd4 ②c6 15 ③xg6 hxg6 16 d5 ②e5 17 皇b3 耳c8 with an equal game;

(b) 12 &gS @bd7 13 g4 &g6 14 @eS @aS (after 14...@b6 15 &a2 cxd4 16 cxd4 White has the advantage, Eingorn-Lukin, Kiev 1984) 15 @xd7 @xd7 16 &e7 @fc8 17 &dS with the initiative for White (Eingorn).

11... xf3 12 \xf3, when:

(a) 12...cxd4 13 螢xb7 公bd7 14 cxd4 ②b6 15 盒a2! 螢xd4 16 盒e3 螢e4 (16...螢a4 17 盒c5 星ab8 is preferable – Maric) 17 螢xe4 ②xe4 18 單fc1 異ac8 19 盒b3! the chances are with White, who has the two bishops (Korchnoi-Matulovic, Belgrade 1984);

(b) 12...2c6 13 Idl (a simple move, maintaining the tension and retaining the initiative; after 13 dxc5 De5 14 響e2 公xc4 15 響xc4 IIC8 Black has counterplay for the pawn) 13...cxd4 14 cxd4 IIC8 15 全e3 空e7 16 IIC1 空ed5 17 全g5 營d7 18 IIC1, and White's two active bishops give him the advantage (Lukacs-Kriszany, Kecskemet 1991).

16.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5	4
≜xc4 exd4 5 exd4 ≜b4+ 6 Dc	3
තf6 7 තf3 00 8 00 දු g4)	

9... &e7 is possible, preventing Od5, but after 10 h3 &xf3 (10... &h5 is strongly met by 11 g4 &g6 12 Oe5, and if 12... Oc6 13 f4) 11 Wxf3 Oc6 12 $\blacksquaread1$ White has the more active position.

After 9... \$xc3 10 bxc3 \$\$\vec{W}d6 11 \$\$\vec{W}d3\$ White's position is preferable.

10	∕ ∆d5	≜ e7
11	②xe7+	₩xe7



12 \(_dds\) (12 \(_e1\) \(_dds\)) and now:

(a) 12.... 直fd8 13 里e1 單d6 14 호xc6 (Marshall-Janowski, New York 1924) 14... 豐xc6! 15 ②e5 單d5! 16 ②xg4 豐xg5 17 ②xf6+ 豐xf6 with equal chances (Alekhine);

(b) 12...h6 13 急h4 剿d6 14 急xc6 剿xc6 15 ②e5 盒xd1 (if 15...剿e6 16 f3 12 h3 &xf3 (after 12...&h5 13 d5 &be5 14 &e2 &xf3 15 &xf3 h6 16 &xf6 &xf5 17 &e4 c6 18 &b3 cxd5 19 &xd5 &ab8 20 &ac1 in this simplified position White has a great positional advantage) 13 &xf3, and now:

(a) 13... ②xd4 14 螢xb7 置fb8?! (even after the recommended 14... 螢c5 15 愈xf6 螢xc4 White gains an advantage in the ending by 16 b3! 螢b5 17 螢xb5 ②xb5 18 愈b2 - Simagin) 15 愈xf6 螢xf6 16 螢xc7 罩xb2 17 罩ad1 and White gained a clear advantage (Stahlberg-Gligoric, Belgrade 1949);

16.12	(1	d4	d5	2	c4	dxc4	3	e3	e5	4
.⊈.xc4	ex	d4 :	5 e>	٢đ	4)					

5 ... 🖾 f6



Now White has: 6 ②f3 (16.121) 6 ₩b3 (16.122) – p.279 16.121 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4 \$xc4 exd4 5 exd4 2)f6)

6 ᡚ**13 ≜**e7

6... \$b4+ leads to variation 16.11.

7 Dc3 0-0

Only not D d7, which loses at ter 8 $\Delta x f7+ \Phi x f7$ 9 $\Delta g5+ \Phi g6$ 10 $\Psi d3+ \Phi h5$ 11 h3 Black resigns (Shmatkov-Edlin, Moscow 1968).

8 0-0

By 8 h3 White can prevent the pin on his knight:

(a) amusingly, 8...2c6 now leads to a position from... the Petroff Defence! (1 e4 e5 2 263 2163 2xe5 d6 4 2f32xe4 5 d4 d5 6 2d3 2e7 7 0-0 2c6 8 c4 2f6 9 2c3 0-0 10 h3 dxc4 11 2xc4). Vaiser-Zs.Polgar (Oviedo Rapid 1993) continued 9 0-0 2f5 (dubious is 9...2a5?!, after which 10 2d3 2e6 11 E1 2c6 12 a3 2d6 13 2e3 2d5 14 2c2 gave White an excellent position, Gelfand-Adams, Wijk aan Zee 1994) 10 E1 a6 11 a3 b5 12 2b3 b4 13 axb4 2xb4 14 2e5 c5 15 d5 2d6 16 2c62xc4 14 2e5 c5 15 d5 2d6 19 E2with the better position for White;

(b) 8...2bd7 9 0-0 2b6 10 2b3 is more usual:



(b1) 10...c6, when: (b11) 11 De5 Dfd5 12 De4 2e6 13

a3 $rac{14}{2}$ a a b c 7 14 $rac{14}{2}$ a l a d 8 15 $rac{15}{2}$ a b c 8 16 $ac{1}{2}$ c 2 with a promising position for White: if 16...f6 17 $ac{15}{2}$ h5! (the simple 17 $ac{17}{2}$ d 3 is also good) 17...fxe5 18 $ac{16}{2}$ d 6 $ac{16}{2}$ f6 19 $ac{1}{2}$ xc8 $ac{1}{2}$ xh5 20 $ac{1}{2}$ xe7+ $ac{16}{2}$ f7 21 $ac{1}{2}$ xe5 g6 22 $ac{1}{2}$ g5 (I.Sokolov-Piket, Corfu 1991);

(b2) 10... ②bd5 11 里e1 金e6 12 ②g5 ②xc3 13 bxc3 金xb3 14 豐xb3 and White stands better (Vaganian-Tal, Moscow 1982).

... ≗g4

8

Or 8... ④bd7 9 里e1 ④b6 10 单b3 c6 (we have already met this set-up after 8 h3 – thus here White has an extra tempo; 10... g4 is well met by 11 h3 ≜xf3 12 ₩xf3) 11 ≜g5 ≜f5 (or 11... 2bd5 12 2xd5 cxd5 13 包e5 单e6 14 2d3 with positional pressure, Browne-Petrosian, Las Palmas 1982) 12 Dh4 \$94? (12...\$96 was better) 13 \$xf6 \$xf6 (13...\$xd1 14 \$xe7 and Zaxdl favours White - he has three pieces for the queen with excellent development) 14 Wxg4 2xh4 15 Zad1 \$f6 16 De4! \$e7 17 Dc5. White has a clear positional advantage (Nikoloff-Hebert, Toronto 1990).

9 h3 🔍 🗐 🕯 🕯 🎗 🕯

9...\$h5 10 g4 \$\overline{9}6 11 \$\verline{2}e5 c5 (11...c6 is strongly met by 12 f4, and if 12...b5 13 \$\overline{2}b3 b4 14 f5! bxc3 15 fxg6 hxg6 16 bxc3 \$\verline{2}d5 17 \$\verline{7}f3 \$\overline{6}f6 18 \$\overline{2}a3\$ \$\verline{2}e8 19 \$\verline{1}ae1\$ with a clear plus, Henley-Dlugy, New York 1983) 12 d5 (12 dxc5 contains an interesting trap: 12...\$\overline{2}xc5 13 \$\verline{2}xg6\$ and if 13...hxg6? 14 \$\overline{2}xf7+! ✿xf7 15 ₩b3+; cf. also Ulybin-Erikalov (p.280) where the same position is reached) 12... \$\Delta de 13 f4 a6 14 a4 and in this sharp position White has the better chances (Christiansen-Grupe, USA 1983).

10 Wxf3 2c6

11 Le3 🖄 xd4

After the slow 11...a6 White has the interesting plan of advancing his g- and f-pawns, e.g. 12 Ξ ad1 h6 13 \Leftrightarrow h1 \Im d7 14 g4 \checkmark h7 15 \Im g2 Ξ ad8 16 f4 b5 17 \pounds d5 \checkmark b4 18 \pounds f3 with the better chances.

12 Wxb7



White has the better position:

12....c5 13 오xd4 cxd4 14 里ad1 里c8 15 免b3 里c7 16 對f3 里d7 17 之e2 免b4 18 里d3 對b6 19 單fd1 單fd8 20 g4! h6 21 h4 with advantage (Zaichik-Karpeshov, Volgodonsk 1983).

12...215 13 Ifd1 Wb8 14 Wxb8 Iaxb8 15 \$xa7 (Arencibia-Espinosa, Gali 1990). Instead of 15...Ib7?, which after 16 \$\Delta d3! led to a clear advantage for White, correct was 15...Ixb2, although even in this case he has the better chances. 6 ₩b3 ₩e7+



7 De2

Vaganian-Klovans (36th USSR Ch., Alma Ata 1968/9) went 7 堂们 g6 8 ②c3 鱼g7 9 鱼g5 0-0 10 ②d5 變d8, and now the routine move 11 互e1 (after 11 酇f3 ③bd7 and 12..c6 White does not achieve anything) 11...鱼e6! led to an advantage for Black.

7 全e3 is possible, and if 7...g6 (Black prefers not to exchange queens and continues developing; if 7...)對4+8 公C3 鄧xb3 9 全xb3 - Plaskett) 8 公f3 全g7 9 0-0 0-0 10 萬e1 公C6 11 全d2! 劉d8 12 d5 with an excellent game for White (Plaskett-Lukin, Plovdiv 1984).

Plaskett's paradoxical suggestion of 7 \oplus dl can be met by 7... \oplus e4, and if 8 \oplus e3 \oplus d6.

₩b4+

Compared with Vaganian-Klovans (cf. the note to White's 7th move) here 7...g6 favours White. His king has not lost the right to castle, and he has a marked lead in development: 8 (Dbc3) $\text{$\underline{\diamond}g79 \text{ }\underline{\diamond}g50-0 10 0-0 \text{ }\underline{\diamond}bd7 11 \text{ }\underline{\diamond}d5$ $\text{$\underline{\$}d8 12 \text{ }\underline{\blacksquare}ad1 \text{ }\underline{\diamond}b6 13 \text{ }\underline{\diamond}xb6 axb6 14$ ②c3 皇f5 15 d5 (Polovodin-Vorotnikov, Moscow 1983).

7....\Dbd7 was played in Granda Zuniga-Pr.Nikolic (Zagreb 1987). After 8 0-0 \Db6 White tried to exploit his lead in development by 9 \Df4 \Dxc4 10 \Vxc4 \Vd7 11 \Dc3 \Dxe7 12 \Dcd5, but 12...\Dxd5 13 \Dxd5 c6 14 \Dxe7 \Vxe7 15 d5 0-0! (15...cxd5 16 \Vb5+ \Vd7 17 \Vec1el+) 16 dxc6 \Dxe6 17 \Vec4 bxc6 18 \Vxc6 \Vec4 allowed Black to gain an active position for the sacrificed pawn.

8 ⊘bc3 ₩xb3 9 \$xb3

9 axb3 is also good, e.g. 9...c6 10 0-0 &b4 11 &g5 (11 &f4 0-0, and if 12 &xb8 \blacksquare xb8 13 \blacksquare xa7 b5 with counterplay – Pekarek) 11...Obd7 12 d5 cxd5 13 Oxd5 Oxd5 14 &xd5 with some initiative for White (Arkhipov-Pekarek, Czechoslovakia 1985).

... \$d6

White gains the better chances after 9... \$\Delta e6 10 d5 \$\Delta d7 11 \$\Delta g5 \$\Delta e7 12 0-0-0 \$\Delta a6 13 \$\Delta he1 0-0-0 14 \$\Delta g3 \$\Delta he8 15 \$\Delta h5! (Gorelov-Lukin, Telavi 1982).



10 ②b5, and now:

(a) 10...\$b4+ 11 \$d2 \$xd2+ 12

\$xd2 Da6, and with accurate play Black can equalise:

(a1) 13 \exists ac1 \Leftrightarrow d8!, and if 14 \pounds xf7 \exists f8 and then 15...Oe4+, picking up the f2 pawn;

(a2) 13 f3 皇d7 14 ②ec3 0-0 15 国本目 單fd8 16 當e3 皇太b5 17 ②太b5 c6 18 ②c3 ②b4 (Stoltz-O'Kelly, Beverwijk 1946);

(b) 10...\$e6 11 \$f4 \$xf4 12 \$xe6, when the original move 12...a6! (three minor pieces are en prise) secures Black equal chances (Janosevic-Matulovic, Birmingham 1975).

White's other two moves look more natural:

10 \$\overline\$ g5 \$\overline\$ bd7 11 0-0 0-0 12 \$\verline\$ ac1 a6 13 \$\verline\$ fe1 and Black is in difficulties (Hamovic-Poppel, Austria 1951).

10 0–0 a6 11 $2g_3$ $2c_6$ (11...0–0 12 g_5) 12 E_{1+} g_7 13 $2g_{e4}$ 2xe4 14 2xe4 2b4 (14...2xd4 15 2xd6 cxd6 16 $2f_4$ is unfavourable for Black) 15 Ed1. White's position is more promising (Wirthensohn-Miles, Biel 1977).

16.13 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4 \$\overline{xc4}\$ exd4 5 exd4)

6...2e7? would be a blunder in view of 7 2g5 0-0 8 Wh5.

7 0-0 0-0 8 වැය

8 h3 is worth considering, e.g. 8...c6 9 $2c_3 \pm f_5 = 10 2h4 \pm g_6 = 11 \pm g_5 2bd7$ 12 f4! b5 (Horvath-Lengyel, Budapest 1993). After 13 $\pm b_3 = b_4 = 14 2be_2 \pm e_4$ 15 $2b_3 = 16 2b_3 = 16 2b_3 = 16 2b_3$

8 & g5 O c6 9 O c3 & g4 10 O d5 & e7 leads to a position from variation 16.112 (p.276), where the bishop has retreated to e7 not from b4, but from d6.

Qg4

8 ...

9 \$\overline\$25 \$\overline\$2bd7 10 h3 \$\overline\$h5 11 \$\overline\$2e4
12 \$\overline\$2g3 \$\overline\$26 13 \$\overline\$26 (Goglidze-Kmoch, Tbilisi 1934). The white pieces have taken up active positions, but by 13...\$\overline\$2 xe5 14 dxe5 \$\overline\$2e4 it would seem that Black could have equalised: 15
6 \$\overline\$xd8 \$\overline\$xd8 16 \$\overline\$2xe4 \$\overline\$xe4 17 \$\overline\$28
5 \$\overline\$xd8 \$\overline\$xd8 \$\overline\$xd8 \$\overline\$xe4 \$\overline\$xe4 17 \$\overline\$28
5 \$\overline\$xd8 \$\overline\$xd8 \$\overline\$xd8 \$\overline\$xe4 \$\ove

After this plausible move White launched an offensive with the vigorous 12 2xg6 hxg6 13 dxc5 2xc5 14 2xf7+! (Ulybin-Erikalov, USSR 1986).

9 里e1 ②bd7 10 兔g5 c6 11 ②e4 兔e7 12 ②g3 ②b6 13 兔b3 ②bd5 14 h3 兔e6 15 ②e5 里e8 16 翬f3 and the chances are with White (Sjödell-Ernst, Gausdal 1991).

16.2 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4)

3 Dc3

This move, like 3 e4 and 3 e3, allows the counter 3...e5. There are also several transpositional possibilities.

We consider:

- 3...e5 (16.21)
- 3...a6 (16.22) p.281

3...c6 leads to a variation of the Slav Defence (1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 Cc3 dxc4).



3...e6 4 e4 c5 5 d5 or **3...c5** 4 d5 e6 5 e4 is examined in the line 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5 4 d5 e6 5 2c3 (p.249).

3....c5 can also lead to positions from the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 263c5 4 d5, examined on p.184. Here we will mention only Whitehead-Zs..Polgar (San Francisco 1986), in which White did not play 263: 3...c5 4 d5 e6 5 e4 267 6 251? h6 7 2h4 exd5 8 exd5 g5 9 2g3 2g7 10 2xc4 265 11 262+2678 (11...267 12 2xc7+ 2xc7 13 d6+) 12 0-0-0 2d4. Here, instead of 13 2657, which gave the advantage to Black, correct was 13 2d2 2f5 with chances for both sides (Polgar).

For 3... 2d7 4 2f3 2b6, cf. p.193.

3... O**c6** leads to a variation of the Chigorin Defence (1 d4 d5 2 c4 Oc6 3 Oc3 dxc4).

3 e5	16.21 (l d4	d5 2 c	4 dxc4	3 Dc3)
		3	•••	e5	
	I	ð .	<u>e</u>	<u>Ý</u>	4 I
			≜ (2) 7\		
	Å	Ĕ.		ÅÅ	

4 d5

If 4 dxe5 Wxd1+ 5 Oxd1 (or 5 Oxd1 Qe6 6 f4 f6! 7 Of3 Oc6 and Black stands better, Gurgenidze-Suetin, USSR 1960) 5...Oc6 e4 Oxe5 7 Qf4 Qd6 8 Qxe5 Qxe5 9 Qxc4 Oe7. The ending is slightly more pleasant for Black.

4 e3 exd4 5 exd4 2 f6 leads to positions from the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 (p.274).

White gains no advantage by 4 2f3 exd4 5 Wxd4 (after 5 2xd4 c5 6 2db5 a6 7 Wxd8+ \$xd8 8 2a3 b5 9 2c2 2b7 Black holds on to the pawn, Orel-Fochtler, Eger 1992; 5...a6 comes into consideration) 5...Wxd4 6 2xd4 a6.

4 ... c6

Golombek-Alekhine (Margate 1935) went 4...a6 5 e4 b5 6 a4 b4 7 2a2 f5 8 exf5 2xf5 9 2xc4 2f6 10 2e2 with chances for both sides. In Taimanov's opinion, 10 2g5 promises White slightly better prospects.

Or 6 오xc4 오b4 7 對b3 變e7 8 오g5 오xc3+ 9 bxc3 (Terterian-Savon, Podolsk 1991) 9...0-0 with roughly equal chances.

6

≜b4

Benitez-Szilagyi (Moscow Olympiad 1956) continued 7 &xf6 &xf6 &xc40–0 9 Oge2 Od7 10 0–0 Ob6 11 &b3 &d7 with roughly equal chances.

3		a6
4	e4	

4 e3 \triangle f6 (after 4...b5 5 a4 b4 6 \triangle a2 White's position is preferable) 5 \triangle xc4 b5 (Black can transpose into the Classical Variation by 5...e6) 6 \triangle d3 \triangle b7 7 \triangle f3 (after 7 f3 e6 8 \triangle ge2 c5 Black has a comfortable game) 7...e6 8 $\textcircled{C}2 \ \triangle$ bd7 9 a4 b4 10 \triangle e4 c5 11 \triangle xf6+ (if 11 \triangle xc5 \triangle xc5 12 dxc5 \blacksquare c8 with a promising position for Black) 11... \triangle xf6 12 b3 (Timman-Pr.Nikolic, Wijk aan Zee 1982, went 12 dxc5 C713 e4 \triangle xc5 14 0-0 \triangle d7 15 b3 0-0 16 <u>\$b2 \$d6</u> with equal chances) 12...cxd4 (if 12...\$xf3 13 gxf3 cxd4 14 \$b2! with an excellent game – Nikolic) 13 2xd4 \$xg2 14 Eg1 \$b7 (14...\$d5? 15 \$xa6) 15 \$b2. White's initiative compensates for the sacrificed pawn.

If 4 a4 e5, when after 5 dxe5?! (5 d5 ②f6 gives equal chances) 5...豐xd1+ 6 會xd1 金e6 Black's position is slightly preferable (Capablanca-I.Rabinovich, Moscow 1935).

> 4 ... b5 5 a4 b4

After 5... 2b7 6 axb5 axb5 7 IIxa8 2xa8 8 2xb5 2xe4 White has:

(a) 9 2c3 or 9 2f4 (9...e5 10 2c52b4+11 2c3) with the better position.

6 **නි**a2

If $6 \bigtriangleup b1 \pounds b7 7 f3 e5 8 d5 c6!$ with slightly the better prospects for Black (Korchnoi-Hübner, TV game 1984).



6...e6 7 \$\overline\$c4 \$\overline\$b7 (or 7...\$\overline\$f8 f3 c5 9 \$\overline\$e2 \$\overline\$c6 10 \$\overline\$e3 cxd4 11 \$\overline\$xd4 \$\overline\$a5 12 \$\overline\$e2 \$\overline\$e7 13 \$\overline\$c1 0-0 14 \$\overline\$cb3 \$\overline\$b7 15 0-0 with the more promising position, I.Sokolov-Sadler, Oviedo

1992) 8 f3 c5 9 ②e2 cxd4 10 ③xd4 豐c7 11 豐e2 호d6 12 호e3! ④e7 (12... 호xh2 13 茑c1 호g3+ 14 容f1 豐e7 15 f4 g5 is unclear) 13 茑c1 ②bc6, and Black maintains the balance (Marjanovic).

6...e5 7 \pounds xc4 exd4 (7... \forall xd4 8 \forall b3) 8 \forall b3 (or 8 \bigcirc f3 c5 and if 9 \bigcirc g5 \blacksquare a7) 8... \forall e7 9 \bigcirc f3 c5 (9... \forall xe4+? 10 \textcircled d1 is more than dangerous for Black) 10 \pounds g5 \bigcirc f6! 11 0–0 (11 e5 h6 12 \pounds xf6 gxf6 13 0–0 is unfavourable for White in view of 13... \bigcirc d7! 14 exf6 \forall xf6 15 \blacksquare ae1+ \pounds e7 – Kharlov) 11...h6 12 \pounds d5, and now:

(a) in Eingorn-Kharlov (USSR Ch. 1991) Black sacrificed the exchange – 12...hxg5!? 13 2xa8 g4 14 2d2 (14 2g5 is strongly met by 14...2h5 15 f4 gxf3 16 2xf3 2e6 17 Wd1 Wa7) 14...2e6 15 Wg3 Wd8 16 e5 2h5 17 Wd3 Wh4 with a dangerous attack;

(b) 12...\$e6, when Alterman-Raetsky (Rostov 1993), which reached this position by a quieter move order (10 0–0 \$e6 11 \$\overline{d}d5 \$\overline{d}fof 12 \$\overline{g}5 h6\$), continued 13 \$\overline{d}h4 \$\overline{g}5 14 \$\overline{d}g3 \$\overline{g}7 15\$ \$\overline{d}c 2 0-0 (if 15...\$\overline{d}xd5 16 \$\overline{d}xd5 0-0 17\$ If fe1 \$\overline{d}a7 18 \$\overline{d}6 \$\overline{d}c 8 19 \$\overline{d}xd4 \$\overline{d}xd5\$ 20 \$\overline{d}f5\$) 16 \$\overline{d}xb4 \$(16 \$\overline{d}xa8 \$\overline{d}s1)\$ 16...\$\overline{d}xd5 (16...\$\overline{d}xd5 \$\overline{d}d7\$ with chances for both sides.

6... b7 7 f3 c6! (a new and interesting idea) 8 d5 (if 8 c3 e5) 8...c3a59 d2 (9 c3xb4 e6 favours Black) 9... e6! (winning the exchange by 9...b310 cxc4 c3xa1 11 c3xb4 gives White compensation – Alterman) 10 dxe6 fxe6 11 cxb4 c3xb4+12 c3xb4 wh4+13 g3 c7. Black's position is preferable (Alterman-Av.Bykhovsky, Israel 1994).

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        16.21 3...e5 281
        16.22 3...a6 281
```